



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>





600084671W







## **GREEK SYNTAX.**

LONDON  
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.  
NEW-STREET SQUARE

A BRIEF  
GREEK SYNTAX  
AND  
HINTS ON GREEK ACCIDENCE:

WITH SOME REFERENCE TO  
COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY, AND WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM  
VARIOUS MODERN LANGUAGES.

BY THE  
REV. FREDERIC W. FARRAR, M.A., F.R.S.

LATE FELLOW OF TRIN. COLL. CAMBRIDGE; HON. FELLOW OF KING'S  
COLL. LONDON; ONE OF THE MASTERS AT HARROW SCHOOL;  
AUTHOR OF 'THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE,' 'CHAPTERS  
ON LANGUAGE,' ETC.



LONDON:  
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.  
1867.

304. g 4



TO THE

REV. H. MONTAGU BUTLER, D.D.

AND TO MY FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES

THE ASSISTANT MASTERS OF HARROW SCHOOL

I Dedicate

WITH FEELINGS OF CORDIAL ESTEEM

WHATEVER MAY BE FOUND WORTHY OF APPROBATION

IN THIS ATTEMPT TO RENDER THE STUDY OF GREEK GRAMMAR

BROADER, MORE INTERESTING, AND MORE FRUITFUL.



## PREFACE.

---

THE PUBLICATION of a new Greek Grammar when there are already so many in existence, is an act which requires justification ; and as it is also an act of some temerity, I will briefly state the causes that induced me to undertake the task.

I observed from the comparison of a large number of 'Grammar and Scholarship papers' that the same questions,— or questions involving the same points of scholarship,— recurred with a remarkable frequency. As there is a Grammar Examination every year at Harrow, I wished to draw up for my own pupils a manual which should, in as clear a manner as possible, give them some insight into these special points. With the encouragement, and by the wish, of some competent judges among the Harrow masters, I published in a small compass my card of 'Greek Grammar Rules,' in which I had attempted to fulfil this object; and in drawing up these rules it appeared to me that many most valuable points relating to them and to the general structure of the Greek Language, had not hitherto found their way into any ordinary schoolbook. I therefore thought that I could render a service to the cause of Classical Philology, by amplifying my 'Greek Grammar Rules' into a larger and fuller Syntax ; and the great favour with which the 'Rules' were received, the number of Schools that adopted them, and the many eminent scholars and teachers who wrote to me to express their approbation of them, confirmed me in this belief.

I aimed above all things at making every point *intelligible* by furnishing for every usage (as far as was possible) a satisfactory reason ; and by thus trying to eliminate all mere

grammatical mysticism, I hoped that I should also render grammar *interesting* to every boy who has any aptitude for such studies, and is sufficiently advanced to understand them. On the latter point I venture to lay some stress. I have published elsewhere my reasons for believing that we commence too soon the study of formal grammar, and that this study, which is in itself a valuable and noble one, should be reserved to a later age and for more matured capacities than is at present thought necessary. I should never think of putting this Grammar into the hands of boys who have no aptitude for linguistic studies, or of any boys below the fifth or sixth forms of our Public Schools; and I have purposely avoided stating rules or reasons under a form in which they could be learned by rote. Taught in a parrot-like manner to crude minds, I believe that grammar becomes bewildering and pernicious; taught at a later age and in a more rational method, I believe that it will be found to furnish a most valuable insight into the logical and metaphysical laws which regulate the expression of human thought, and that it will always maintain its ground as an important branch of knowledge, and a valuable means of intellectual training.

All grammars must necessarily traverse a good deal of common ground, but the careful perusal of a very few of the following pages will prove, I trust, that this Syntax differs in its *method* from all, or nearly all, that have preceded it; partly in the more free and informal manner of treatment, partly in its perpetual reference to the general principles of Comparative Philology, and partly in its constant endeavour to leave no single idiom of Greek unillustrated by the similar idioms or peculiarities of other ancient languages, of modern languages, and of English. A good illustration often throws over an idiom a flood of light unattainable by the most lengthy explanation; and I feel great hopes that a student who has gone carefully through the following pages, will, —in addition to what he will have learnt about ancient Greek,—have acquired some insight into the principles of his own, and of other languages. Further than this, I shall have failed in my endeavour if he do not also gain some

interest in observing the laws and great cyclical tendencies of Language in general. The historical development of one language bears a close analogy to the historical development of a large majority of the rest; and this is the reason why I have called such repeated attention to *Modern Greek*, and to the traces in Hellenistic Greek of those tendencies which in Modern Greek are still further developed, and carried to their legitimate result.

I am not so sanguine as to hope that I have escaped errors. He would be a bold man, who, even after years of study, should suppose that he had eliminated all the chances of error in treating of a language which is so delicate, so exquisite, and so perfect a medium for the expression of thought, as the Greek language is felt to be by all who have studied it. For myself, I may candidly confess that I have entered on the task with the utmost diffidence. Some critics may doubtless regard as erroneous, views which I may have deliberately adopted, and which I believe that I could adequately defend; but independently of these I may doubtless have fallen into positive mistakes,

‘quas aut incuria fudit,  
Aut humana parum cavit natura.’

For the correction of any such errors I shall be grateful, and I trust that they will neither be sufficiently numerous nor sufficiently important to outweigh some other advantages. My plan is necessarily, to a certain degree, tentative: if it meet with any favour, the knowledge and the experience of others may enable me in the future to introduce, from time to time, considerable further improvements. I have given to it the best thought and care at my command. With more leisure I could doubtless have rendered it far more perfect; but I hoped that the result might still be found commendable, however much I may have fallen short of even my own standard of ideal perfection. The inability to reach the excellence which would have been attainable under more favourable circumstances is no excuse for declining to attempt anything at all.

It is unnecessary to give a list of the large number of

grammatical mysticism, I hoped that I should also render grammar *interesting* to every boy who has any aptitude for such studies, and is sufficiently advanced to understand them. On the latter point I venture to lay some stress. I have published elsewhere my reasons for believing that we commence too soon the study of formal grammar, and that this study, which is in itself a valuable and noble one, should be reserved to a later age and for more matured capacities than is at present thought necessary. I should never think of putting this Grammar into the hands of boys who have no aptitude for linguistic studies, or of any boys below the fifth or sixth forms of our Public Schools; and I have purposely avoided stating rules or reasons under a form in which they could be learned by rote. Taught in a parrot-like manner to crude minds, I believe that grammar becomes bewildering and pernicious; taught at a later age and in a more rational method, I believe that it will be found to furnish a most valuable insight into the logical and metaphysical laws which regulate the expression of human thought, and that it will always maintain its ground as an important branch of knowledge, and a valuable means of intellectual training.

All grammars must necessarily traverse a good deal of common ground, but the careful perusal of a very few of the following pages will prove, I trust, that this Syntax differs in its *method* from all, or nearly all, that have preceded it; partly in the more free and informal manner of treatment, partly in its perpetual reference to the general principles of Comparative Philology, and partly in its constant endeavour to leave no single idiom of Greek unillustrated by the similar idioms or peculiarities of other ancient languages, of modern languages, and of English. A good illustration often throws over an idiom a flood of light unattainable by the most lengthy explanation; and I feel great hopes that a student who has gone carefully through the following pages, will,—in addition to what he will have learnt about ancient Greek,—have acquired some insight into the principles of his own, and of other languages. Further than this, I shall have failed in my endeavour if he do not also gain some

interest in observing the laws and great cyclical tendencies of Language in general. The historical development of one language bears a close analogy to the historical development of a large majority of the rest; and this is the reason why I have called such repeated attention to *Modern Greek*, and to the traces in Hellenistic Greek of those tendencies which in Modern Greek are still further developed, and carried to their legitimate result.

I am not so sanguine as to hope that I have escaped errors. He would be a bold man, who, even after years of study, should suppose that he had eliminated all the chances of error in treating of a language which is so delicate, so exquisite, and so perfect a medium for the expression of thought, as the Greek language is felt to be by all who have studied it. For myself, I may candidly confess that I have entered on the task with the utmost diffidence. Some critics may doubtless regard as erroneous, views which I may have deliberately adopted, and which I believe that I could adequately defend; but independently of these I may doubtless have fallen into positive mistakes,

‘quas aut incuria fudit,  
Aut humana parum cavit natura.’

For the correction of any such errors I shall be grateful, and I trust that they will neither be sufficiently numerous nor sufficiently important to outweigh some other advantages. My plan is necessarily, to a certain degree, tentative: if it meet with any favour, the knowledge and the experience of others may enable me in the future to introduce, from time to time, considerable further improvements. I have given to it the best thought and care at my command. With more leisure I could doubtless have rendered it far more perfect; but I hoped that the result might still be found commendable, however much I may have fallen short of even my own standard of ideal perfection. The inability to reach the excellence which would have been attainable under more favourable circumstances is no excuse for declining to attempt anything at all.

It is unnecessary to give a list of the large number of

grammars, monographs, and works of scholarship which I have felt it a duty to consult in the composition of these pages. I believe that I have not neglected any Greek grammar of great importance; and special obligations will be found acknowledged in their proper place. I have of course constantly referred to the chief works on Comparative Grammar both English and German, and to that immense repertory of Greek scholarship, the Greek Grammar of Mr. Jelf. I have found much that was most useful in Bernhardy, in Burnouf, in Winer, in Madvig, in the Student's Greek Grammar of Dr. Curtius edited by Dr. Smith, in Mr. Miller's Greek Syntax, and in '*Die wichtigsten Regeln der Griechischen Syntax*' by Dr. Klein. There are however three authors to whom I am under more peculiar and extensive obligations, viz., Mr. F. Whalley Harper, Dr. Clyde, and Dr. Donaldson. Mr. Harper's book on 'The Power of the Greek Tenses' has rendered me most material assistance in treating that part of the subject. The well-known works of Dr. Donaldson have been constantly in my hands, even when I venture to dissent from the conclusions of that admirable scholar. The Greek Syntax of Dr. Clyde, which is much less known in England than it ought to be, is a most suggestive and valuable book, to which I have been under *constant* obligations. I have often been surprised by finding that it was unknown to English teachers to whom I have mentioned it. If its arrangement had been a little more convenient, and if it had seemed to me well-adapted for school usage in our higher forms, I should not have undertaken my present task. I am indebted to Dr. Clyde's work for many hints and many illustrations, all or most of which I believe that I have acknowledged in their proper places. If in any instance (and especially in the treatment of the Moods) I should have omitted to do so, I must content myself now with this more general reference to his Syntax, and to the other admirable books which I have just mentioned. I have gained more *suggestions* from the study of them than it was always possible specifically to acknowledge.\*

\* I may observe that the same fact or rule is in some instances intentionally repeated.

One pleasant task remains. I have to offer my warmest thanks to the Rev. Dr. Collis, the distinguished Head Master of Bromsgrove School, and to my friend and colleague E. M. Young, Esq., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for their kindness in helping me to get through the task of correcting the proof sheets. Mr. Young was good enough to correct for me the sheets of the earlier part of the book; Dr. Collis, though I am personally unknown to him, yet with a kindness for which I hardly know how to express sufficient gratitude, not only helped me to revise and correct the proofs of the entire book, but constantly enriched them with many acute and interesting suggestions, the result of his own ripe learning and judgment. Should this Syntax succeed in rendering the study of Greek Grammar more fruitful and more interesting, some of its success will be due to the kind offices of that well-known scholar.

F. W. FARRAR.

HARROW:

*March, 1867*

grammars, monographs, and works of scholarship which I have felt it a duty to consult in the composition of these pages. I believe that I have not neglected any Greek grammar of great importance; and special obligations will be found acknowledged in their proper place. I have of course constantly referred to the chief works on Comparative Grammar both English and German, and to that immense repertory of Greek scholarship, the Greek Grammar of Mr. Jelf. I have found much that was most useful in Bernhardy, in Burnouf, in Winer, in Madvig, in the Student's Greek Grammar of Dr. Curtius edited by Dr. Smith, in Mr. Miller's Greek Syntax, and in '*Die wichtigsten Regeln der Griechischen Syntax*' by Dr. Klein. There are however three authors to whom I am under more peculiar and extensive obligations, viz., Mr. F. Whalley Harper, Dr. Clyde, and Dr. Donaldson. Mr. Harper's book on 'The Power of the Greek Tenses' has rendered me most material assistance in treating that part of the subject. The well-known works of Dr. Donaldson have been constantly in my hands, even when I venture to dissent from the conclusions of that admirable scholar. The Greek Syntax of Dr. Clyde, which is much less known in England than it ought to be, is a most suggestive and valuable book, to which I have been under *constant* obligations. I have often been surprised by finding that it was unknown to English teachers to whom I have mentioned it. If its arrangement had been a little more convenient, and if it had seemed to me well-adapted for school usage in our higher forms, I should not have undertaken my present task. I am indebted to Dr. Clyde's work for many hints and many illustrations, all or most of which I believe that I have acknowledged in their proper places. If in any instance (and especially in the treatment of the Moods) I should have omitted to do so, I must content myself now with this more general reference to his Syntax, and to the other admirable books which I have just mentioned. I have gained more *suggestions* from the study of them than it was always possible specifically to acknowledge.\*

\* I may observe that the same fact or rule is in some instances intentionally repeated.

One pleasant task remains. I have to offer my warmest thanks to the Rev. Dr. Collis, the distinguished Head Master of Bromsgrove School, and to my friend and colleague E. M. Young, Esq., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, for their kindness in helping me to get through the task of correcting the proof sheets. Mr. Young was good enough to correct for me the sheets of the earlier part of the book; Dr. Collis, though I am personally unknown to him, yet with a kindness for which I hardly know how to express sufficient gratitude, not only helped me to revise and correct the proofs of the entire book, but constantly enriched them with many acute and interesting suggestions, the result of his own ripe learning and judgment. Should this Syntax succeed in rendering the study of Greek Grammar more fruitful and more interesting, some of its success will be due to the kind offices of that well-known scholar.

F. W. FARRAR.

HARROW:

*March, 1867*



# CONTENTS.

---

## INTRODUCTORY.

	PAGE
THE GREEK LANGUAGE . . . . .	1
1, 2. The families of languages. 3. The Semitic family. 4, 5. The Aryan family. 6. The classes of languages. 7-9. Synthetic and analytic languages. 10, 11. The progress of language from synthesis to analysis. 12. Respective advan- tages of synthesis and analysis. 13-15. Inflections not arbitrary. 16. Reasons for the study of Greek . . . . .	1-6

## HINTS ON THE ACCIDENCE.

THE ALPHABET . . . . .	7
1. The Greek alphabet borrowed from Phenicia. 2. The original sixteen letters. 3. The digamma, &c. The Ionian letters. 4. Archonship of Euclides. 5. <i>San</i> and <i>Koppa</i> . 6. Origin of the alphabet.	
LETTERS AS NUMERALS . . . . .	9
7. Numerical value of letters. 8. <i>στοιχεῖα</i> , <i>γράμματα</i> . 9. Earliest Greek writing.	
PRONUNCIATION . . . . .	10
11, 12. Sound of vowels. Itacists and Etists.	
CLASSIFICATION OF LETTERS . . . . .	11
13. Importance of the subject. 14. Labials, gutturals, dentals. 15. Laws of euphony.	
VOWELS . . . . .	13
16-19. Ecthlipsis, synæresis, crasis, &c.	
DIALECTS . . . . .	15
20. The chief dialects: i. Ionic and Attic. ii. Æolic. iii. Doric. iv. Hellenistic.	

	PAGE
<b>PARTS OF SPEECH . . . . .</b>	<b>17</b>
21. All roots nominal or pronominal. 22. The eight parts of speech.	
<b>NOUNS . . . . .</b>	<b>17</b>
23. The declensions.	
<b>CASES . . . . .</b>	<b>18</b>
24. 'Casus.' 25. The five cases. 26. The nominative and vocative. 27. The locative. 28. Origin of case-endings. 29. Evanescence of case-distinctions.	
<b>NUMBERS . . . . .</b>	<b>20</b>
31. The dual number.	
<b>GENDERS . . . . .</b>	<b>21</b>
32, 33. Origin and history of genders. 34. General rules of gender.	
<b>DECLENSIONS . . . . .</b>	<b>24</b>
35. A declension formed by suffixes.	
<b>ADJECTIVES . . . . .</b>	<b>25</b>
38. Adjectives not indispensable. 39. Their gender. 40. Adjectival terminations. 41-43. Degrees of comparison. 44. Intensive prefixes. 45. <i>'Ayaθbs</i> and <i>kakōs</i> .	
<b>PRONOUNS . . . . .</b>	<b>27</b>
46, 47. Nature of the pronouns. 48-50. The third personal pronoun. 51. Peculiarities of <i>ob</i> . 52-56. Reflexive and demonstrative pronouns. 57, 58. Possessive pronouns. 59. <i>Aύτēs</i> . 60, 61. " <i>Orris</i> , <i>ßs</i> .	
<b>NUMERALS . . . . .</b>	<b>31</b>
62. Cardinals. 63. Ordinals. 64. Other numerals.	
<b>ADVERBS . . . . .</b>	<b>32</b>
65-68. Nature and classes of adverbs.	
<b>VERBS . . . . .</b>	<b>33</b>
69-71. Nature and definition of the verb. 72, 73. Person-endings. 74, 75. Duals. 76. Voices. 77. Nature of the middle. 78. Deponent verbs. 79. Reduplication. 80. Chief rules of reduplication. 81. Augment. 82, 83. Chief kinds of augment. 84, 85. Verbs in <i>o</i> . 86-94. Irregularities of verbs. 95-100. Classes of verbs: inceptives, desideratives, frequentatives, &c.	
<b>COMPOUND WORDS . . . . .</b>	<b>46</b>
101, 102. Parathetic compounds. 103-105. Synthetic compounds. 106. Inferior power of composition in Latin. 107-109. Laws and irregularities of composition. 110. The word 'telegram.'	

## SYNTAX.

	PAGE
1-3. Sentences and clauses . . . . .	50
<b>THE ARTICLE . . . . .</b>	<b>51</b>
4. Originally a demonstrative pronoun. 5, 6. Subsequent traces of this. 7. It also served as a relative. 8. Its original form. 9. Development of the article in other languages. 10, 11. It both specifies and generalises. 12. Its use with proper names. 13. Distinguishes the subject from the predicate. 15. Used instead of the possessive. 16-19. Its position. 20. The tertiary predicate. 21. Apparent violations of the law. 22. Main usages of the article. 23. With the infinitive. 24. Various phrases.	
<b>CONCORD . . . . .</b>	<b>59</b>
25-27. Apparent violations of the concords. 28. Duals agreeing with plurals. 29. The <i>Schema Pindaricum</i> . 30. Whole and part figure. 31, 32. Plural of excellence. 33. Use of <i>τύε</i> , &c.	
<b>CASES . . . . .</b>	<b>61</b>
34. The case-endings were once separate words. 35. Varying points of view from which the relations of objects may be observed. 36. Gradual evanescence of case-meanings. 37. Comparison of cases in Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit.	
<b>THE NOMINATIVE . . . . .</b>	<b>63</b>
38. The 'nominative absolute.' 39. Copulative verbs are followed by a nominative.	
<b>THE VOCATIVE . . . . .</b>	<b>64</b>
40. The slightest of all the cases. 41. The nominative often substituted for it. 42. Its origin.	
<b>THE GENITIVE . . . . .</b>	<b>64</b>
43. The name due to a mistake. 44. Its three main uses. 45. Genitives of ablation (causal, material, &c.). 46. Genitives of partition. 47. Genitives of relation. 48. Genitives of the subject and of the object. 49. Double genitive. 50. Genitive absolute. 51. Compared with the ablative absolute. 52. Absolute cases in other languages.	
<b>THE DATIVE . . . . .</b>	<b>71</b>
53. The dative expresses juxtaposition. 54. Hence it is used to express accidents, instruments, &c. Datives of place, time, manner, general reference, &c. 55. The ethic dative in Greek and various other languages.	

	PAGE
<b>THE ACCUSATIVE . . . . .</b>	74
56. The accusative implies <i>motion towards</i> and <i>extension over</i> . 57. Accusatives of space, time, the cognate notion, &c. 58. Double accusative. 59. Whole and part figure. 60. Accusative after passive verbs. 61. Accusative in apposition to the sentence. 62. Omission of the governing verb. 63. Antiposis. 64. ' <i>Accusativus de quo.</i> ' 64. The accusative used absolutely.	
<b>CONTRASTED MEANINGS OF THE CASES . . . . .</b>	79
66. Fundamental conceptions of the cases. 67. Their absolute use. 68. Contrasted instances.	
<b>ADJECTIVES . . . . .</b>	80
69. Illustrations of the chief idioms in the use of adjectives.	
<b>COMPARATIVES . . . . .</b>	83
70. Illustrations of the chief idioms in the use of comparatives.	
<b>SUPERLATIVES . . . . .</b>	85
71. Qualitative superlative. 72. Inclusive use of superlatives. 73. Phrases used to strengthen superlatives.	
<b>PREPOSITIONS . . . . .</b>	86
74. The prepositions were originally local adverbs. 75. Their meanings are modified by the <i>cases</i> with which they are used. 76. Due to the analysing tendency of language. 77. Spurious prepositions. 78. The name 'preposition.' 79. The eighteen prepositions. 80. Variation in the use of prepositions. 81. Manner in which they alter the meanings of verbs.	
<b>PREPOSITIONS WHICH GOVERN THE GENITIVE . . . . .</b>	89
82. i. <i>Αὐτή</i> . ii. <i>πρό</i> . iii. <i>δικ.</i> , <i>διξ.</i> iv. <i>διώ</i> , <i>εὖθε</i> , <i>μεταξύ</i> , &c.	
<b>PREPOSITIONS WITH THE DATIVE . . . . .</b>	90
83. i. <i>Ἐν</i> . ii. <i>σύν</i> .	
<b>PREPOSITIONS WITH THE ACCUSATIVE . . . . .</b>	91
84. i. <i>Εἰς</i> . ii. <i>ὡς</i> .	
<b>PREPOSITIONS WITH THE GENITIVE AND ACCUSATIVE . . . . .</b>	91
85. i. <i>Διδ.</i> ii. <i>κατά</i> . iii. <i>διέρ.</i>	
<b>PREPOSITIONS WITH THE DATIVE AND ACCUSATIVE . . . . .</b>	93
i. <i>Ἀντ.</i> Contrast of <i>ἀντά</i> and <i>κατά</i> .	
<b>PREPOSITIONS WHICH GOVERN THREE CASES . . . . .</b>	94
86. i. <i>Αμφί</i> . ii. <i>περί</i> . iii. <i>ἐπί</i> . iv. <i>μετά</i> . v. <i>παρά</i> . vi. <i>πρός</i> . vii. <i>διά</i> . 87. Passage of Philo-Judeus.	
<b>PREPOSITIONS IN COMPOSITION . . . . .</b>	97
88. Prepositions in composition.	

## CONTENTS.

xvii

	PAGE
<b>IDIOMS CONNECTED WITH PREPOSITIONS . . . . .</b>	<b>98</b>
89. <i>Constructio prægnans</i> . 90–92. Other idioms. 93. Variation of prepositions in the same clause. 95. Various phrases.	
<b>PRONOUNS . . . . .</b>	<b>100</b>
96. Personal pronouns used for emphasis. 97. Meanings of <i>αὐτός</i> . 98. Possessive pronouns. 99. Use of reflexive pronouns. 100. Interchange of reflexive and reciprocal pronouns. 101. Chief uses of demonstrative pronouns. 102. Chief uses of relative pronouns. 103. Chief uses of indefinite pronouns. 104. Chief uses of distributive pronouns.	
<b>THE VERB . . . . .</b>	<b>107</b>
105. The kinds of verbs. 106–110. The voices. 111. Four chief uses of the middle voice. 112. Contrasted meanings of the active and middle. 113. Special uses of the middle. 114. The middle voice in other languages.	
<b>TENSES . . . . .</b>	<b>110</b>
115–117. General remarks on the tenses. 118. Nine <i>possible</i> tenses of the indicative. 119, 120. Tabulation of the tenses. 121. Important inferences from this scheme of the tenses. 122–128. Full explanation of the nature and importance of the aorist. 129–131. Perpetual contrast of the aorist and imperfect tenses. 132. The past-aorist sometimes used for the (wanting) present-aorist. 133. Tabulation of the tenses of the passive.	
<b>CHIEF IDIOMATIC USES OF THE TENSES . . . . .</b>	<b>121</b>
134. 'Idioms.' 135. Dramatic use of the present and imperfect. 136. Used to express an <i>attempt</i> . 137. Potential use of the imperfect without <i>δύναται</i> . 138. Use of the present with <i>πάλαι</i> ; illustrated from other languages. 139. Use of <i>κλέψει</i> , &c. 140–143. Idiomatic uses of the imperfect.	
<b>THE FUTURE . . . . .</b>	<b>124</b>
144. Imperative use of the future. 145. The periphrastic future. 146. Four passive and middle forms. 147, 148. The future perfect.	
<b>THE PAST-TENSE . . . . .</b>	<b>125</b>
149, 150. Its use to express abiding results.	
<b>THE AORIST . . . . .</b>	<b>126</b>
151. The aorist as an historical tense. 152, 153. Its connection in form and meaning with the future. 154. The gnomic aorist.	

	PAGE
<b>THE PLUPERFECT . . . . .</b>	127
155. Comparative neglect of the tense in Greek. Its use to imply rapidity.	
<b>MODS . . . . .</b>	128
156. Difficulty and importance of the subject. 157, 158. The moods properly three in number. 159. Unsatisfactory nomenclature of the moods.	
<b>THE INDICATIVE . . . . .</b>	129
160. Already treated of under 'The Tenses.'	
<b>THE IMPERATIVE . . . . .</b>	129
161-163. Slightness of tense-distinctions in the imperative.	
164. Other modes of expressing command.	
<b>THE SUBJUNCTIVE AND OPTATIVE . . . . .</b>	130
165. They are 'by-forms of the future and aorist.' 166. They form one <i>subjective</i> mood. 167, 168. Consideration of their tenses. 169. The tense-distinctions chiefly preserved in <i>oratio obliqua</i> . 170. Possible origin of the aorist-subjunctive. 171, 172. Only four tense-forms (the present and aorist subjunctive, and the present and aorist optative) in <i>frequent</i> practical use. 173. The optative mood a refinement of language. 174, 175. Its comparative unimportance and gradual evanescence.	
<b>THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN SIMPLE SENTENCES . . . . .</b>	134
176. Used in Homer as a modified future. Its use in prohibitions; its deliberative, hortative, and elliptic use.	
<b>THE OPTATIVE IN SIMPLE SENTENCES . . . . .</b>	135
177. 1. The optative not, in reality, a separate mood. 2. Its use in <i>wishes</i> due to an ellipse. Its <i>potential</i> force. 3. Used with <i>τινα</i> as a milder future, and 4, as a civil command. 5. Its use to express a hopeless wish. 6. Its use to express <i>indefinite frequency</i> . 7. The correspondence of optatives.	
<b>THE MOODS IN COMPOUND SENTENCES . . . . .</b>	138
178. The chief kinds of compound sentence.	
<b>FINAL SENTENCES . . . . .</b>	138
179. The infinitive and future participle not exactly <i>final</i> . 180. "Ος, δοτης with the future indicative after verbs of sending, &c. 181-183. The moods with final conjunctions. 182. Violations of the rule due to the dramatic tendency. 184. With past tenses of the indicative the final conjunctions express an unfulfilled result. 185. The subjunctive and optative used in the same sentence to express the nearer and the more remote result,	

## CONTENTS.

xix

	PAGE
<b>RELATIVE SENTENCES . . . . .</b>	140
186–188. Use of the moods in relative sentences.	
<b>ORATIO OBLIQUA . . . . .</b>	141
189. Rules of the <i>oratio obliqua</i> . 190, 191. The optative and subjunctive in <i>oratio obliqua</i> , and in indirect questions. 192. The tenses in <i>oratio obliqua</i> . 193. The accusative and infinitive.	
<b>CONDITIONAL SENTENCES . . . . .</b>	143
194–196. Advantage of treating separately the protasis and apodosis.	
<b>THE PROTASIS . . . . .</b>	143
197. <i>Ei</i> and <i>ēv</i> . 198. Four kinds of protasis. 199. <i>Ei</i> with the indicative to express <i>possibility</i> . 200. <i>'Eāv</i> with the subjunctive to express <i>slight probability</i> . 201. <i>Ei</i> with the optative to express <i>complete uncertainty</i> . 202. <i>Ei</i> with past tenses of the indicative (followed by <i>āv</i> with a past tense of the indica- tive) to express <i>impossibility</i> . 203. Difficulty and vague- ness of the English versions of conditional sentences.	
<b>THE APODOSIS . . . . .</b>	147
204. Variation of the apodosis.	
<b>COMPLETE CONDITIONAL SENTENCES . . . . .</b>	147
205–208. Complete and regular conditional sentences, with their English and Latin equivalents. 209, 210. Impossibility of representing them accurately in <i>idiomatic English</i> . 211, 212. Influence of the dramatic tendency. 213. Instances of the four classes of conditional sentences with regular and varied apodoses.	
<b>TEMPORAL SENTENCES . . . . .</b>	152
214. General rules of temporal sentences, with examples.	
<b>SPECIAL USES OF <i>πρίν</i> AND <i>τός</i> . . . . .</b>	153
215. i. <i>πρίν</i> <i>āv</i> never used unless a negative conception precedes. ii. <i>πρίν</i> with the optative in <i>oratio obliqua</i> , or with reference to the thoughts of another. iii. Correspondence of optatives. iv. Difference between <i>πρίν</i> , <i>τός</i> , and <i>πρίν</i> <i>āv</i> , <i>τός</i> <i>āv</i> . The infinitive with <i>πρίν</i> . General summary of the uses of <i>πρίν</i> .	
<b>THE INFINITIVE . . . . .</b>	155
216. The infinitive not properly a mood. 217. Its connection with the noun. 218. Its use in Greek and English more extensive than in Latin. 219. Close analogy between the use of the infinitive in Greek and English. 220. Its use to express a consequence. 221. Qualified by various conjunc-	

	PAGE
tions. 222. The epexegetic infinitive. 223. Adverbial use of the infinitive. 224. Used elliptically in commands, prayers, &c. 225. Tenses of the infinitive. 226-228. The accusative and infinitive. 229. The nominative and infinitive. 230. The infinitive with other cases. 231. Future infinitive after verbs of promising. 232-234. Declension of the infinitive with the article in Greek and other languages.	160
<b>THE PARTICIPLE . . . . .</b>	<b>160</b>
235. Affinities of the participle with the adjective. 236. The Greeks <i>φιλομέτοχοι</i> . 237. Its two main uses. 238. It completes the notion of the verb. 239. Differences between the infinitive and the participle after verbs of knowing, &c. 239. <i>φθάσας, λαβών, δύσας</i> . 241. The participle expresses the <i>accidents</i> of the verbal notion. 242-245. Other uses of the participle. 245. Adverbs used to define participles.	160
<b>VERBALS IN -τέος . . . . .</b>	<b>164</b>
247. Verbal adjectives. 248. Used in the neuter plural. 249. Verbal adjectives in -τός and -τέος.	164
<b>*ΑΥ WITH THE MOODS . . . . .</b>	<b>165</b>
250. Meaning of <i>άν</i> , <i>κέν</i> . 251. Used with three moods. 252. Used with three tenses of the indicative. 253. Potential use of <i>άν</i> . 254. Frequentative use of <i>άν</i> . 255. Illustrated from English usages. 256. <i>Κέν</i> with the present and future indicative. 257, 258. Special uses of <i>άν</i> . 260, 261. When combined with relatives and relative particles <i>άν</i> takes the subjunctive. 262. Exceptions to this rule merely apparent. 263-267. * <i>Άν</i> with the infinitive and participle. 267. i. The verb belonging to <i>άν</i> sometimes omitted. ii. <i>άν</i> sometimes omitted. iii. Sometimes repeated, or iv. misplaced. v. The conjunction <i>άν</i> . vi. Elliptical use of <i>άν</i> .	165
<b>THE FINAL CONJUNCTIONS . . . . .</b>	<b>171</b>
268. <i>ως</i> , <i>ὅπως</i> , <i>ἴα</i> . Rule for their use. 269. Irregularities introduced by the dramatic tendency. 270. <i>ὅπως</i> with the future indicative. 271. Its elliptical use. 272. Final conjunctions with past tenses of the indicative. 273. I. Summary of the uses of <i>ώς</i> . II. Summary of the uses of <i>ὅπως</i> . III. Summary of the uses of <i>ἴα</i> .	171
<b>THE NEGATIVES . . . . .</b>	<b>174</b>
274. Differences of <i>οὐ</i> and <i>μή</i> . 275. Distinctions between <i>οὐ</i> and <i>μή</i> . 276. Cases in which <i>μή</i> is used. 277. <i>μὴ</i> after verbs of fearing, &c. 278. Illustrations of this apparent pleonasm.	174

	PAGE
<b>O<small>ὐ</small></b> . . . . .	177
279. General uses of <i>οὐ</i> . 280. Its power of coalescing with words. 281-283. Special uses of <i>οὐ</i> . 284, 285. Contrasted uses of <i>οὐ</i> and <i>μή</i> . 286, 287. The accumulation of negatives. 288. Omission of negatives.	
<b>O<small>ὐ</small> μ<small>ή</small></b> . . . . .	183
289. Prohibitive and negative uses of <i>οὐ μή</i> . 290, 291. Explanation of them.	
<b>M<small>ή</small> ο<small>ὐ</small></b> . . . . .	184
292. Use of <i>μή οὐ</i> after negative notions. 293, 294. Use of <i>μή οὐ</i> with the infinitive.	
<b>VARIOUS NEGATIVE PHRASES</b> . . . . .	186
295. Negative terms.	
<b>PARTICLES</b> . . . . .	187
296. Importance of the particles. 297-303. Various classes of conjunctions. 304. Particles of emphasis.	
<b>INTERJECTIONS</b> . . . . .	192
305. Importance of the interjections.	
<b>ORDER OF WORDS AND FIGURES OF SPEECH</b> . . . . .	193
306, 307. Difference of order in synthetic and analytic languages. 308. Rhetorical inversions. 309. SENSE-CONSTRUCTIONS. <i>a.</i> Constructio prægnans. <i>b.</i> Zeugma. <i>c.</i> Syllepsis. <i>d.</i> Comparatio compendiaria. <i>f.</i> Various forms of anakolouthon. <i>g.</i> Aposiopesis. 310. HYPERBATON. <i>a.</i> Antiptosis. <i>b.</i> Chiasmus. <i>c.</i> Hysteron Proteron. <i>d.</i> Hypallage. 311. EUPHEMISM. <i>a.</i> Irony. <i>b.</i> Hypokorisma. <i>c.</i> Litotes. <i>d.</i> Antiphrasis. <i>e.</i> Ambiguity. 312. PLEONASM. <i>a.</i> Periphrasis. <i>b.</i> Polyptoton. 313. HENDIADYS. 314. ASYNDETON. 315. PARONOMASIA. <i>a.</i> Onomatopœia. <i>b.</i> Alliteration. <i>c.</i> Oxymoron. <i>d.</i> Antithesis. <i>e.</i> Rhyme. <i>f.</i> Rhythm.	



# A BRIEF GREEK SYNTAX.

## INTRODUCTORY.

### THE GREEK LANGUAGE.

1. THE GREEK LANGUAGE belongs to the Aryan family of languages.

2. There are two great recognised FAMILIES of Language, the Aryan and the Semitic. These languages are spoken by the most advanced and civilised of human races. The other languages of the world, which may be classed together under the names Sporadic or Allophylian, have not yet been reduced to any unity, but fall under a number of different divisions.

3. The Semitic languages are Hebrew, Phœnician, Carthaginian, Aramaic (i.e. Syriac and Chaldee), and Arabic. The name 'Semitic' is purely conventional, and they might conveniently be called, from their geographical limits, Syro-Arabian.

4. The Aryan languages, which are sometimes called Indo-European, consist of eight main divisions, which we may call the Sanskritic, Iranic, Hellenic, Italic, Lithuanian, Sclavonic, Teutonic, and Celtic. The name Aryan is derived from the title *Arya* 'noble,' which was arrogated to themselves by the first founders of the race.

5. The Aryan family of languages is the most perfect family in the world, and Greek is the most perfect language in this family; it is 'the instinctive metaphysics of the most intelligent of nations.'

6. Again, there are four different CLASSES of Languages, divided according to their *structure*.

These morphological or structural divisions are:

i. Isolating languages, which have no proper grammar, and



# A BRIEF GREEK SYNTAX.

## INTRODUCTORY.

### THE GREEK LANGUAGE.

1. THE GREEK LANGUAGE belongs to the Aryan family of languages.

2. There are two great recognised FAMILIES of Language, the Aryan and the Semitic. These languages are spoken by the most advanced and civilised of human races. The other languages of the world, which may be classed together under the names Sporadic or Allophylian, have not yet been reduced to any unity, but fall under a number of different divisions.

3. The Semitic languages are Hebrew, Phœnician, Carthaginian, Aramaic (i.e. Syriac and Chaldee), and Arabic. The name 'Semitic' is purely conventional, and they might conveniently be called, from their geographical limits, Syro-Arabian.

4. The Aryan languages, which are sometimes called Indo-European, consist of eight main divisions, which we may call the Sanskritic, Iranic, Hellenic, Italic, Lithuanian, Sclavonic, Teutonic, and Celtic. The name Aryan is derived from the title *Arya* 'noble,' which was arrogated to themselves by the first founders of the race.

5. The Aryan family of languages is the most perfect family in the world, and Greek is the most perfect language in this family; it is 'the instinctive metaphysics of the most intelligent of nations.'

6. Again, there are four different CLASSES of Languages, divided according to their *structure*.

These morphological or structural divisions are:

i. Isolating languages, which have no proper grammar, and in which

the words suffer no change to express any shades of thought or varieties of circumstance; of these Chinese is the chief. Thus in Chinese the prayer 'Our Father which art in heaven,' assumes the form 'Being heaven me-another (= our) Father who,' a style not unlike the natural language of very young children. Isolating languages are perhaps the oldest of all, and yet by that curious cyclical process which is observable in language, many modern languages in the last stage of their history resemble them. For instance, Chinese has *never possessed* cases or inflections of any kind, and English has *lost* nearly all which it once possessed.

ii. Agglutinating, like the Turkish, in which the material elements of words (root or stem), and the formal elements (pronouns, indicating space, position, &c.) are juxtaposed in one word *without undergoing any modification*. In these languages all compound words are *separable*, i.e. the component parts are not fused together and altered in the process, but are merely parathetic or joined *mechanically*, as in the English words star-fish, railroad, clock-work, &c.

iii. Polysynthetic (also called holophrastic or incorporant), in which, as in Basque, and in the aboriginal languages of America, *each sentence* is one long compound word, and is an agglomeration of simple words 'in a violent state of fusion and apocope,' e.g. in one of these languages *nicalchihua* means 'I build my house,' but neither *ni* 'I,' *cal* 'house,' or *chihua* 'make,' can be employed as separate words.\*

iv. Inflectional languages, in which, as in Greek and Latin, the material elements (roots), and the formal elements (pronouns, &c., expressive of various modifications), are united by synthesis into one inseparable whole, and in which the inflections have so entirely lost their force as separate words that their very origin is often undecipherable.

7. Greek presents the most perfect specimen of an inflectional or synthetic language.

8. A language which gets rid of inflections as far as possible, and substitutes separate words for each part of the conception, is called an *analytic* language; and next to Chinese (which has never attained to synthesis at all) few languages are more analytic than English. Thus in *nouns* we have only retained one case-inflection, viz. the *s* which is a sign of the genitive; and in verbs only one inflection to express *tense*, the *-d* in *pastorista*, as I loved (= I love-did).

9. A synthetic language will express in *one* word what requires many words for its expression in an analytic language, as will be seen by an instance or two: e.g.

\* φιληθήσομαι, *amabor*, I shall be loved, *Ich werde geliebt werden.*

πεφιλήσομαι, I shall have been loved, *Ich werde geliebt worden sein.*

ἐτεγμήμεθα, *honorati eramus*, we had been honoured.

---

\* Strange as this *holophrasis* may appear to us, there are distinct traces of it both in Greek and Latin; see *Origin of Language*, p. 174.

λύσωμαι, que je me suis délié.

λελυσσοίμην, may I have been unloosed! que j'eusse dû être délié!

φχέρο, abierat, il s'en était allé.

Similarly the synthetic character of the *Semitic* languages enables them to express by an affix or a suffix some modification of meaning, which in modern languages would necessitate one or more separate words for its enunciation; e.g. to render the one word וְהִרְכֵּתְךָ vehirkabheeka,\* we require at least six words, 'and I will cause thee to ride;' and yet in spite of this the one Hebrew word expresses more than our six, for it implies that the person addressed is a male, so that in fact to give the full meaning of that one word we should require the eight words, 'I will cause thee, O man, to ride.' No instance could illustrate more forcibly than this the difference between Synthesis and Analysis in language.

10. The tendency of all languages, at least in *historic* times, is from synthesis to analysis, e.g. from case-inflections to the use of prepositions, and from tense-inflections to the use of auxiliaries. This tendency may be seen by comparing any modern language with its ancestor, e.g. Arabic with Hebrew, Bengali with Sanskrit, Persian with Zend, Danish with Icelandic, German with Gothic, or English with Anglo-Saxon.

11. It may also be constantly illustrated by a comparison of Modern with ancient Greek, for which reason Modern Greek is often referred to in the following pages. But the simplest way of studying the tendency is to compare Latin with any of those five Romance languages (Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Wallachian) which have been immediately derived from it; e.g. *amabo* becomes in French *j'aimerai*, which is a corruption of the analytic expression *Ego amare habeo* I have to love.†

\* Ancient Hebrew, says Herder, 'seeks like a child to say all at once.' This reminds us of the remark in *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*. Mons. Jourdain: 'Tant de choses en deux mots?' Cov. Oui, la langue turque est comme cela, elle dit beaucoup en peu de paroles.' Göthe remarks of French, 'O eine Nation ist zu beneiden, die so feine Schattirungen in einem Worte auszudrücken weiß' (*Wilhelm Meister*); but the remark is true in a far higher degree of Greek than of any other language; e.g. to represent fully in French the word ἀποβαῖτε, we should require 'faire sortir une armée en face de l'ennemi, et la mener contre lui'—thirteen words for one. See Burnouf, *Méthode pour étudier la langue grecque*, p. 165.

† For further remarks on this subject see *Origin of Language*, pp. 173–181.

12. The advantage of a synthetic language lies in its compactness, precision, and beauty of form : analytic languages are clumsier, but they possess a kind of greater accuracy of expression, and are less liable to misconception. What they lose in economy, force and poetic concision, they gain in the power of marking the finest shades of thought. What they lose in elasticity they gain in strength. If they are inferior instruments for the imagination, they better serve the purposes of reason. Spiritual effervescence is followed by ripe fruit. In the tragedies of Aeschylus and the odes of Pindar, marvellous as is the power which crams every rigid phrase with the fire of a hidden meaning, we yet feel that the form is cracking under the spirit, or at least that there is a tension injurious to the grace and beauty of the general effect. A language which gets rid of its earlier inflections—English for instance as compared with Anglo-Saxon,—loses far less than might have been supposed.

13. It is most important to observe that no inflection is arbitrary ; it is now certain that every inflection is the fragment of a once separable word, having its own distinct meaning. Among all the richly-multitudinous forms assumed by the Greek and Latin verbs, there is not one which does not follow some definite and ascertainable law. The actual analysis of the inflections has been carried to considerable perfection ; but the derivations of many of them are as yet to a certain extent disputable and uncertain.

14. Parsing,—the hopeless stumbling-block of so many young students,—keeps its difficulty and repulsiveness, when it is once understood that there is a definite recurrence of the same forms in the same meaning, and that the distorted shapes assumed by some words is not due to arbitrary license but to regular and well understood laws of phonetic corruption.

15. i. For instance, the word ἤδοντεςσαρτο means 'they took counsel for themselves ;' we express the same conception by five words, and should require seven, but that we do possess an aorist\* ('took') in English verbs, and also an inflection 's' to express the plural ; but if we analyse the word ἤδοντεςσαρτο we shall have to write it

ē-δοντ-e-s-a-r-t-o.

---

\* When this aorist is formed *quadrilaterally*, i.e. by mere internal modification of the root as in take, took, (which is the ordinary Semitic method,) it is called a *strong* aorist ; when it is formed by the addition of some extraneous word as love, love-did (=loved), it is called a *weak* aorist.

and shall find that it consists of six\* parts, viz. :

1. An augment *é* (the fragment probably of the same root which we find in the preposition *ává*, expressing *indefinite past time*).
  2. A root or stem, *βουλευ*.
  3. A tense-letter, *σ*, here characteristic of the first aorist.
  4. A vowel, *α*, used as a tach between the tense-letter and the person-inflection.
  5. The relic of a pronoun, *ντ*, characteristic of the third person plural. Perhaps we ought to call this the relics of two pronominal roots, *ana*, and the demonstrative *-ta* [*he* and *he=they*].†
  6. A voice letter, *ο*, indicating the passive or middle.
- ii. Similarly, *é-re-τίμη-ντ-ο* consists of six parts, the reduplication being used to mark the perfect, and the augment to place this perfect event still farther back in the past.
- iii. So too in Latin, such a word as *amabantur* is analysed thus : *ama-ba-nt-u-r*=root+sign of the imperfect+sign of the 3rd pers. plur.+junction-vowel+voice-letter. In this instance we know that 'ba' is a fragment of the root which we find in the auxiliary verb *φύ*, *fu*, &c.
- iv. Again, take such a form as *λυθήσομαι*, 'I shall be loosed'; this, when analysed, is *λυ-θ-η-σο-μαι*, and consists, no less than the English phrase, of five parts, viz. :

1. The root *λυ-*.
2. *θ-* the relic of the root *dha*, to do or make.
3. *η-* the representative of the root *ja*=ire (*είμι*), to go.
4. *σο-* the future sign, which we find in *έσο-μαι*, *eso* (*ero*).
5. *μαι*, the first personal pronoun (in oblique case).

The whole conception therefore is synthetically built up of the elements There will be (*σο*) a going (*η*) to make (*θ*) me (*μαι*) loose (*λυ*).‡

**16.** The reasons why we spend so long a time in acquiring a mastery over the Greek language are manifold. We do so partly because it is one of the most delicate and perfect instruments for the expression of thought which was ever elaborated by the mind of man, and because it is therefore admirably adapted, both by its points of resemblance to our own and other modern languages, and by its points of difference from them, to give us the Idea or fundamental con-

\* See Dwight's *Modern Philology*, ii. p. 274.

† See A. Schleicher, *Vergleichende Grammatik*, § 276.

‡ Id. § 300.

ception of all Grammar; i.e. of those laws which regulate the use of the forms by which we express our thoughts. Again, Greek is the key to one of the most astonishing and splendid regions of literature which are open for the intellect to explore,—a literature which enshrines works not only of imperishable interest, but also of imperishable importance (both directly and historically) for the development of human thought. It is the language in which the New Testament was first written, and into which the Old Testament was first translated. It was the language spoken by the greatest poets, the greatest orators, the greatest historians, the profoundest philosophers that the world has ever seen. It was the language of the most ancient, the most eloquent, and in some respects the most important of the Christian fathers. It contains the record of institutions and conceptions which lie at the base of modern civilisation, and at the same time it contains the record, and presents the spectacle, of precisely those virtues in which modern civilisation is most deficient. Nor is it an *end* only; it is also a *means*. Even for those who never succeed in reaping all the advantages which it places within their reach, it has been found to be in various nations and ages\* during many hundred years, one of the very best instruments for the exercise and training of the mind. It may have been studied irrationally, pedantically, and too exclusively; but though it is desirable that much should be superadded, yet with Latin it will probably ever continue to be,—what the great German poet Göthe breathed a wish that it always should be,—the basis of all higher culture. ‘Greek,† the shrine of the genius of the old world, as universal as our race, as individual as ourselves; of infinite flexibility, of indefatigable strength, with the complication and the distinctness of nature herself, to which nothing was vulgar, from which nothing was excluded; speaking to the ear like Italian, speaking to the mind like English; with words like pictures, with words like the gossamer film of the summer; at once the variety and the picturesqueness of Homer, the gloom and the intensity of Aeschylus; not compressed to the closest by Thucydides, not fathomed to the bottom by Plato, not sounding with all its thunders, nor lit up with all its ardours, even under the Promethean touch of Demosthenes himself.’

\* For the study of Greek formed one of the main branches in the education of the young Romans.

† H. N. Coleridge, *Introduction to the Greek Classic Poets*.

## THE ALPHABET.

1. The Greeks borrowed their alphabet from the Phœnicians. It originally consisted of sixteen letters, which are said to have been introduced by Cadmus. Hence Ausonius calls letters, 'Cadni nigellæ filie.'\* The name Cadmus is probably a mere mythical personification of the Hebrew word קָדֵם 'Kedem' 'the East.'

2. These original sixteen letters, called τὰ Φοινικήα (Herod. v. 58, 59), or τὰ ἀπὸ Κάδμου, or τὰ Πελασγικά, were probably as follows:—

A	B	Γ	Δ
Ε	Ϝ	Η	Θ
Ο	Π	Ϙ	Τ

and the liquids Λ Μ Ν Σ.

In this list F is digamma; Q is koppa; H is the sign of the aspirate.

The arrangement of this alphabet is evidently systematic, viz., α followed by three mediae, ε followed by three aspirates, ο followed by three tenues; and the four liquids (see Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, ch. v.).

The other letters of the Semitic alphabet were gradually borrowed. The Semitic alphabets, however, differ from the Aryan: i. in having no vowels; ii. in being arranged in no phonetic order.

3. The digamma, or vau, ϝ (βαῦ), and koppa, ϩ (κόππα), represent the Hebrew ו vau, and פ kooph. Although found in some old inscriptions, they early fell out of use in Greek; but are retained in Latin under the forms of F and Q. The digamma was replaced by ν and φ; † ϩ by κ and χ. H, which

\* Auson. *Ep.* iv. 74. It is sometimes stated that, according to Hesychius, ἐκφοινίκαι may mean 'to read' with a reference to Phœnician letters. This is not the case. His gloss is ἐκφοινίκαι, ἀναγνῶσαι, for which Abresch doubtfully suggested ἀναγνῶναι; but probably the word should be ἀναγνῶσαι.

† The digamma ϝ was evidently in use when the Homeric poems were composed; but it had ceased to be employed as a written character when they were first preserved in manuscripts; hence such apparent hiatuses as δύστα λούκε at the end of an hexameter line. The first grammarian who called attention to it was the celebrated Apollonius Dyscolus, time of Hadrian. In many Greek words ο very early took its place in writing, as we see by finding Φαῖος for Οαῖος on old coins, and by a comparison

was originally an aspirate, and continues to be so in the Latin H, was adopted as a sign of the double ε. Palamedes is the legendary inventor of ν, φ, and ψ; Simonides and Epicharmus are variously asserted to have added the two other double letters ξ and ζ, and the long vowels η and ω (Eurip. *Fr. Palam.*; Plin. *N. H.* vii. 26).

The entire Greek alphabet of twenty-four letters, as it now stands, is said to have been first used by the Ionians of Asia Minor, and hence is called τὰ Ἰωνικὰ γράμματα. It was early adopted by the Samians; and it is very probable that Herodotus, who often resided at Athens, and was a warm friend of the poet Sophocles, first introduced it among the educated Athenians. Hence (even before the archonship of Euclides) when Euripides introduces a peasant who cannot read, *describing* the written characters of the word Θησεύς, he distinguishes between η and ε.\* The passage, which is a very interesting one, is preserved by Athenaeus (*Deipn.* x. 79, 80) in his curious chapters on the Greek alphabet.

4. The Ionic letters were not, however, formally adopted by the Athenians, or used in public monuments, *until* the archonship of Euclides, B.C. 403. Hence they are called τὰ γράμματα τὰ ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἀρχοντος. The alphabet of twenty-one letters (i.e. all except ξ, ψ, ω, the three which were last adopted) is called τὰ Ἀττικά.

5. Besides the obsolete F and φ, the Greeks at one time had a letter Σάν, the representative of the Hebrew Zain; it was

---

οἵσα, οἴκος, οἴλος with the Latin *video*, *vicus*, *vinum*; in others ν, as we see by comparing βασιλεfs (still pronounced *vasilefs* in Modern Greek) with βασιλεύς, and by the absence of contraction in πλέω, βέω, χέω, where the lost letter reappears as ν in the aorists έπλευσα, &c. The digamma was called Ἑολικό, because it was retained latest in that dialect; and the traces of it abound in Latin, which resembles Ἑολικ more than any other form of Greek. It is represented in Latin by various letters, as b, p, f, and especially v. Thus πρᾶfοs becomes *probus*, δαfis *daps*, *Fopplai* *Formiae*, ἄνv, ἔπv, ἔστvερo, ιv, *ovum*, *ver*, *vesper*, *viola*, &c. It may however be considered certain that the F had a complex sound, viz. the sound of a guttural combined with a labial, a fact which is etymologically of the utmost importance, since it accounts for many otherwise impossible letter-changes in Greek words. See Garnett, *Philolog. Essays*, p. 241 *seqq.*

\* He describes the H thus:

πρῶτα μὲν γραμματα δύο  
ταῦτα διέργει δ' ἐν μέσους ἄλλη μία.

and E thus:

ῆν μὲν εἰς δρόθνυ μία

λοξαὶ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς τρεῖς κατεστηγμέναι.

Similarly, Agathon in his *Telephus*.

ousted by  $\zeta$ , which properly was the representative of the Hebrew *Shin*. Both  $\Sigma\alpha\nu$  and *Kóππα* were retained as marks of the breed of horses; a horse branded  $\Sigma\alpha\nu$  was called *Σαμφόρας*,

*οὐκ ἐλάξει οὐ Σαμφόρα;* Arist. *Eg.* 603; cf. *Nub.* 122; and was guaranteed as being of a particular breed. A horse branded with *Kóππα*\* was called *Κοππαῖας*, and was supposed to be of the Corinthian breed descended from the fabled Pegasus. Hitzig, however, thinks that these two letters were used in branding horses to represent the first and last letters of *τῷ π* *Kodesh* 'holy,' i.e. precious.

6. The discovery of the Alphabet, and its representation by signs, must always rank among the very highest discoveries of human ingenuity; probably, however, the discovery was very gradual.

Writing seems to have passed through three stages; viz.:

1. The pictorial stage, in which, as in hieroglyphics, and the Mexican picture writing, each object was represented by its picture, and abstract, immaterial things by some picture which metaphorically indicated them.

2. These pictures were taken to stand not for the *object itself*, but for the syllable which named the object; e.g. a picture of the sun stood no longer for the sun itself, but for the word, sound, or syllable which meant sun (this in Egyptian is *Ra*, so that a picture of the sun would stand in any word in which the syllable *ra* occurred).

3. The picture was taken for the letter with which the syllable it represented commenced (so that in Egyptian a picture of the sun would stand for *r*). We can still trace the pictorial origin of the Hebrew alphabet, from which the Greek is derived. Thus aleph (*alpha*) means *ox*, and is represented by  $\aleph$ , originally  $\wedge$ .

Beth (*beta*) means *house*, and is represented by  $\beth$ , originally  $\wedge$ , a tent, and so on. To this day we can trace back our sign for the letter *m* to the wavy line which was the conventional representation of water. See *Chapters on Language*, p. 139.

### LETTERS AS NUMERALS.

7. The letters of the alphabet from *a* to *ω* are used in regular order to number the twenty-four books of Homer; but, besides this, they had the following numerical values, which should be remembered, because they not unfrequently occur in Greek books. When used as numerals, the letters are distinguished by a dash, as *a'*, *β'*, &c.

*α'* to *ε'* stand respectively for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Then to make up for the lost digamma the sign *ϛ'*, called *stau* or *stigma*, was used for 6. *ζ'* to *ι'* stand respectively for 7, 8, 9, 10. Then

---

\* We still find *Ωδρινθος* in inscriptions, &c., for *Kόρινθος*, and it found in the inscription on a helmet brought by Col. Leake from Olympia, *Οστεος μανοσετεν = Κοῖδος μ' ἐποιήσεν.*

$\alpha'$ ,  $\beta'$ , &c. for 11, 12, &c.  $\kappa'$  is 20,  $\kappa\beta'$  21,  $\kappa\beta\gamma'$  22, &c. Then  $\lambda'=30$ ,  $\mu'=40$ ,  $\nu'=50$ ,  $\xi'=60$ ,  $\sigma'=70$ ,  $\pi'=80$ ; but the next letter  $\rho'=100$ . From this fact we see at once (as in the corresponding numerical gap for the lost digamma between 5 and 6) that a letter has been lost; this is the letter kappa ρ, which is accordingly retained as the sign of 90.

The remaining letters from  $\sigma'$  to  $\omega'$  are used for the hundreds from 200 to 800. For the number 900 the Greeks use the obsolete sanpi  $\beth$  or  $sp$ , the reverse of  $\psi$  or  $ps$ .

For the thousands the dash is placed *beneath* the letter to the left; thus  $\alpha=1000$ ,  $\beta=2000$ ,  $\gamma=3000$ , &c.

Thus 1865 would be expressed in Greek by  $\alpha\omega\xi\varepsilon'$ ; and 10,976 by  $\beta\delta\sigma\omega$ .

8. The word Alphabet, which is comparatively late, is derived from the first two letters  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ .\* The letters considered as elementary sounds are called *στοιχεῖα*; considered as written *sounds γράμματα*.

9. The earliest known piece of Greek writing (not later than B.C. 600) is on a prize vase brought from Athens by Mr. Burgeson. It runs from right to left,† and is—

ΙΜ ΙΩΛΘΑ ΝΟΤ ΑΘΕΝΕΩΝ.

or  $\tauῶν Ἀθηνῆτεν ἀθλῶν εἰμι$ , ‘I am one of the prizes from Athens.’ Here we see  $\sigma$  for  $\omega$ , and  $\epsilon$  for  $\eta$ . The shape of the  $\Lambda$  is, however, more modern than the shape  $\nabla$  which is retained in the Latin L.

### PRONUNCIATION.

10. The Greek consonants were probably pronounced much as we pronounce them now, except that  $\phi$ , which we pronounce as f † (compare  $\phi\omega\rho$  fur,  $\phi\gamma\sigma$  fagus,  $\phi\rho\acute{a}\tau\rho$  frater,

\* The Latin *elementa* has been by some derived from the three liquida, *l*, *m*, *n*; and there is something to be said for this derivation, strange as it may appear. See Hitzig, *Die Erfindung des Alphabetes*, S. 13, 14.

† The modes of writing varied; some inscriptions are found in which the words are written from the top to the bottom, which is called *κιονηθός*; others are written first from right to left, and then from left to right, as the ox turns in the furrow; this style is called *βουντροφηθός*. (Pausan. *Eiac.* i. p. 338.) The *λύρες* and *κύρβεις* of Solon are said to have been written *βουντροφηθός* (Hesych. s. v.), as is the famous Sigean inscription. Originally none but capital letters were used, which is called the Uncial style; the ordinary cursive Greek letters are not found in MSS. till the eighth or ninth century.

‡ Ph is the more frequent Latin equivalent of  $\phi$ , as in *philosophia*, &c.

*φάναι fari, &c.), was probably more often pronounced like *ph* in haphazard. We know that the Macedonians pronounced it like *p*, and talked of Ηλιπτος.*

11. The school of Erasmus used to dispute with that of Reuchlin whether the *η* should be pronounced like our *i*, as in Modern Greek, or like our *e*. This is what is meant by the quarrel between Itacists and Etacists, of which we hear so much at the revival of letters. Neither were exactly right, for *η* must have had the sound of *aa*, since it was used to represent a sheep's bleat, as in the line of Cratinas :

ό δ' ἡλιθως ὁσπερ πρόβατον βῆ βῆ λέγων βαδίζει,  
‘but the booby goes saying baa baa like a sheep.’

*ι* was clearly pronounced as in French, for *κοῖ*, *κοῖ*, is a pig's squeak, Arist. *Acharn.* 780; and *ποῖ*, the peewit's cry, *Av.* 227.

*αῖ* must have been pronounced ‘ow,’ since bow-wow, a dog's bark, is in Greek *αῦ αῦ* (Aristoph. *Vesp.* 903); and to bark is *βαυβάζειν*, *bauvari*.

*οῖ* must have been pronounced oo, as we see in the onomatopoetic\* word *βοῦς* (compare our childish mōo-cow); and the exclamation *ἰοῦ* for ugh !

#### CLASSIFICATION OF LETTERS.

12. i. It is of the utmost importance to know and to remember the divisions of the letters; a division which lies at the root of all etymology. For, as a general rule, it is only letters pronounced by the same organ that are etymologically interchangeable (dentals with dentals, labials with labials, &c.). Whenever it appears to be otherwise,† we may generally assume that both letters existed in the original form. Thus *bis* does not come from *δις*, but the *b* represents the *w* in the Sanskrit *dvis*; nor is *βανά* derived from *γννή* but from the *f* in *γفانá*. Similarly *μιλας* and *κελαινός* are the same word, but the original form of the word was *κμέλας*, and the labial *μ* has not been interchanged with the guttural *κ*. Similarly *σὺν* and *cum* are the same word, but the fact is accounted for by the form *ξύν=κσυν*.

---

\* An onomatopoeia is a word formed in imitation of a sound.

† The digamma *F* was really and originally a compound of *γ* or *v*; ‘and from their combination, and from the different changes they separately and together admit of, arises that great variety of which are traced to an original identity.’ Donaldson, *Gk. Gr.* p.



ii. The vowels (*φωνήεντα*) are *a*, *ε*, *ι*, *υ*, *ω*.

iii. The consonants are divided into : i. semi-vowels (*ἡμί-φωνα*) or liquids, which are *λ μ ν ρ*, and the sibilant *σ*; ii. double letters, *ζ ξ ψ*; and iii. mutes (*ἄφωνα*), which do not form a syllable, unless a vowel follows them.

iv. Mutes are divided into three classes, viz. :

Rough (*aspiratae*, *δασέα*), *φ χ θ*.

Smooth (*tenues*, *ψιλά*), *π κ τ*.

Middle (*mediae*, *μέσα*), *β γ δ*.

It is easy to remember the three *aspirates*, which at once recall the three *tenues*; the *mediae* are the three first consonants, *β, γ, δ*.

**13.** Letters are also divided, according to the organs required to pronounce them,\* into

Labials, or lip-letters, *π β φ μ*.

Dentals, or teeth-letters, *τ δ θ λ ν*.

Gutturals, or throat-letters, *κ γ χ*.

In Hebrew grammar these letters are remembered by useful mnemonic words; e.g. the Labials by the word *bumpah*; the Dentals by *daffanah*; the Gutturals by *gichak*. They are exhibited conveniently in the following table, and should always be borne in mind.

	Tenues	Mediae	Aspiratae
Labials . . . .	π	β	φ
Gutturals . . . .	κ	γ	χ
Dentals . . . .	τ	δ	θ

**14.** No Greek word (except *οὐκ* and *ἐκ*), ends in any consonant except *ν, ρ*, or *ς* (*ξ, ψ*).

**15.** Two laws of euphony are of constant recurrence :

i. When two letters of different organs (e.g. labial and dental) come together, *a tenuis only can precede a tenuis, a medial a medial, and an aspirate an aspirate*.

\* This classification of letters is first found in Dionysius of Halicarnassus *περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων*. R was called by the Latins *litera canina*—‘Irritata canis quod *rr* quam plurima dicit.’ Lucil. S was called *littera serpentina*, and also *solitarium*, because it stands alone.

This is why we have

*πλεχθείς*, not *πλεκθεῖς* from *πλέκω*.  
*τυφθείς*, not *τυπθεῖς* from *τύπτω*.  
*ἐφθίμερος*, not *ἐπθήμερος* from *ἐπτὰ ἡμέραι*.  
*νύχθ' ὅληγ*, not *νυκθ' ὅληγ*  
*λεκτός*, not *λεγτός* from *λέγω*;

and so on.

The only exception admitted is in the case of the preposition *δι*, as in *ἐκδύναι*, *ἐκθείναι*, *ἐκβάλλειν*, &c.

ii. The Greeks dislike the concurrence of aspirates (when not necessitated by the last rule, as is the case in *τεθάφθαι*, *ἐθρέφθην*, &c.), and avoid it when possible.

Thus two aspirates of the same organ cannot stand together, but the former is changed into the corresponding tenuis, as in *Βάκχος*, *Σαπφώ*, *Πιτεύς*.

For the same reason, in reduplication, we have *κεχώρηκα*, *τίθημι*, *πέφυκα*, for *χεχώρηκα*, *θίθημι*, &c.; *έτιθην*, *σώθητι*, for *έθύθην*, *σώθητι*, &c. And this accounts for such peculiarities as *θρίξ*, *τριχός*—*τρέχω*, *θρέξω*—*ταχύ*, *θᾶσσον*—*ἔχω*, *ἔξω*, &c.

Exceptions are i. Some compounds, as *ἀνθοφόρος*, *δρυιθοθήρας*, &c.

ii. The formative syllables -*θη* and -*θι* are not changed, as in *πανταχόθεν*, *Κορινθόθι*, *ώρθώθην*, *τέθναθι*; or, if any change is made, it is not in the -*θη* of the first aorist, but in the aspirate which follows it. Thus we have *τύφθητι*, not *τυπτηθι*.

## VOWELS.

16. Attic Greek avoids *hiatus*, or the concurrence of vowels, as much as possible, especially in verse.

17. The fusion or coalescence of vowels is called *συναλογία*, of which the varieties may be tabulated as follows: i. *Ethlipsis*, or cutting off; ii. *Crasis*, or mixture of two words one; iii. *Synæresis*, or contraction of two *syllables* into one.

## 18. SYNALOGEA.

- |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| i. Ethlipsis or<br>Elision, as <i>ἀφ' οὐ</i><br>for <i>ἀπὸ οὐ</i> . | ii. Crasis or<br>Mixture, as<br><i>κάκ</i> for <i>καὶ ἐκ</i> . | iii. Synæresis<br>Contraction,<br><i>τιμᾶτε</i> for <i>τιμᾶτε</i> |
|---|--|---|

i. *Ecthlipsis*. Elision and hiatus are often avoided by adding *a ν* (called *ν ἐφελκυστικὸν* or *παραγωγικόν*),\* to various datives, neuters, and 3rd persons.

The *i* in *τι*, *δτι*, *περι*, and the datives in the 3rd declension do not suffer elision in Attic.

ii. *Crasis*. The absorption of a short vowel at the beginning of a word is called *improper crasis*; as in *ἡ μη* for *ἡ εμή*, *ἡ γω* for *ἡ εγώ*. This is also called Prodelision.

The aspirate in a compound word may prevent crasis; as *προέξω* from *πρὸ* and *ἔξω*; but *προῦχω* from *πρὸ* and *ἔχω*.

iii. *Synæresis*. The following of the least obvious contractions should be remembered:—

<i>αη</i> = <i>a</i> ,	<i>as τιμάητε</i>	= <i>τιμᾶτε.</i>
<i>οη</i> = <i>o</i> ,	<i>as δηλόητε</i>	= <i>δηλῶτε.</i>
<i>αει</i> = <i>a</i> ,	<i>as τιμαίει</i>	= <i>τιμᾶ.</i>
<i>οει</i> = <i>o</i> ,	<i>as δηλόει</i>	= <i>δηλοῖ.</i>
<i>αι</i> = <i>α</i> ,	<i>as τιμάαιμεν</i>	= <i>τιμῷμεν.</i>
<i>αι</i> = <i>α</i> ,	<i>as τιμάῃ</i>	= <i>τιμᾶ.</i>
<i>οη</i> = <i>o</i> ,	<i>as δηλόῃ</i>	= <i>δηλοῖ.</i>


Besides this, there is an incipient crasis called *Synizesis* or subsidence, by which two written syllables are pronounced as one; thus in verse *θεός* is often a monosyllable, *πόλεως* a dissyllable, &c.

19. While we are on the subject of these changes of form (metaplasms, as they are called), we may mention Apocope, the shortening of a word, as *δῶ* for *δῶμα*; *Aphæresis*, the cutting off an initial sound, as *εἴω* for *λείβω*; *Metathesis*, as *θόρος* for *θρόας*; *Syncope*, as idolatry for *εἰδωλολατρεία*, *τράπεζα* for *τετραπέζα*, &c.

\* It must not however be supposed that this *ν* is a mere *arbitrary* suffix. It may be laid down as a proved fact that in language *nothing* is arbitrary. If the so-called *ν ἐφελκυστικὸν* is not purely a phonetic necessity, it is the mutilated relic of some older termination. Schleicher says, 'Das bekannte *ν ἐφελκυστικὸν* ist kein Rest einer früheren Sprachperiode, sondern eine spezielle griechische junge Erscheinung, z. B. *ἔφερε-ν*, altind. und grundf. *ābhārat*; in diesem Falle trat das *ν* also erst ein, nachdem das ursprüngliche auslautende *t* geschwunden war, und das Sprachgefühl sich gewöhnt hatte die Form als vocalisch schliessend zu empfinden.' *Vergl. Gram.* § 149. (I have not thought it necessary to preserve Schleicher's orthographic innovations.)

## DIALECTS.

20. Greek has three chief dialects, which may be tabulated thus :—



i. The *Old Ionic* or *Epic* of Homer contains many forms which *afterwards* became special in other dialects; hence arose the common absurdity† of old Homeric commentators, when they say that one form is Doric, another Æolic, &c. in the same verse, as though Homer wrote in many different dialects at once.

From its use in the soft regions of Asia Minor, and many Ægean islands, Ionic became pleasant and musical; it rejects aspirates (as  $\deltaέκοματ$ ,  $μῆτρις$ ), tolerates hiatus (as  $\phiιλέεαι$ ), and avoids contraction (as  $\tauυφθίω$ ,  $-έψ$   $-ήη$ ); it uses  $\eta$  where the Doric uses  $a$  (as  $\eta\muέρη$ ),  $ou$  for  $o$  (as  $μουνος$ ),  $w$  for  $oη$  as  $\xi\muωσα$  for  $\xi\muόσα$ ,  $eū$  for  $eo$ , as  $\pi\lambdaeūνες$  for  $\pi\lambdaέονες$ , &c.‡

\* Donaldson derives *Δωρεῖς* from *δα-* and *δρος* = Highlanders; "Ιωνεῖς from *ἱωνία* = Coast-men (cf. "Αχαιοι Sea-men, Αγιαλεῖς Beach-men), *Αἰολεῖς* from *αἰολος* = Mixed men. Attica is "Ἀκτικὴ the shore-land, *ἀκτή* 'shore,' being derived from *ἄγρυμι* 'I break.'

† The grandest instance of this is the remark of Herakleides word *ειλήλουθμεν*, which he says is a mixture of four dialects, *τετσαροι* *τεποιητας διαλέκτοις!* The *v* is Attic; the *o* Boeotian; the *i* Ionic; and the syncope Æolic! Nothing can beat this. (See Kleist, *De Philoxeni Stud. Etymol.* p. 41.)

‡ Numerous Epic forms may be observed by attentively reading any page of Homer, e.g. the infinitives in *εμεναι*, the genitives *in* *ονοι*, the

The chief peculiarity of the *Attic* is its proneness to contractions; this may seem a strong contrast to its kindred dialect the Ionic, but in point of fact the uncontracted vowels of the Ionians spring from the rejection of intermediate consonants, and the Attics only went one step farther by contracting the vowels in order to avoid the resultant hiatus.

iii. The *Aeolic* is chiefly interesting from the points of resemblance which it offers to Latin.

Thus, like Latin, it has no dual.\*

Like the Doric, it makes the first person plural in *μες* (not *μεν*), the Latin *mus*, as *ἡγθομες* *venimus*, *τύπτομες* *verberamus*; and the third person plural in *ντι*, like the Latin *nt*, *τύπτοντι* *verberant*.

Nominatives in *της* it forms in *τᾳ*, as *ιππότᾳ*, *αιχμητᾳ*, like the Latin *poeta*, *nauta*, *scriba*, &c.

iii. Doric was characterised by its *πλαρειασμός* (brogue, or broad sound), especially in the use of *a* for *η*, as *φαμά*, *τεθνακώ*. This very breadth and richness of sound made it better suited for songs and music (as the Scotch dialect among us), and hence (*among other reasons*) its appearance in the tragic choruses.

It puts *a* for *ω*, as *τᾶν μουσᾶν* for the gen. plur.

*a* for *ε*, as *έγώγα*.

*ε* for *ει*, as *τύπτει*, *μελίσδεν* (for *μελίζειν*).

*κ* for *τ*, as *πόκα* for *ποτέ*.

*ν* for *λ*, as *ἡθον*, *βέντιστος*.

*τ* for *σ*, as *τιθητι*, *φαρι*.

iv. The common dialect (*ἡ κοινή*), often called Hellenistic Greek, or Greek spoken by those who had acquired it as a foreign language, owed its origin and dissemination to the conquests of Alexander. It is a somewhat corrupt and loose Attic, with an admixture of Macedonian and Alexandrian words. It adopts various new forms, as *ψεῦσμα*, *νίκος*, *νουθεσία*, *έκχυνειν*, *στήκω*, *δύμνω* for *ψεῦδος*, *νίκη*, *νουθέτησις*, *έκχειν*, *ἰστημι*, *δύμνυμι*; it admits various poetical words, as

---

dative plurals in *ῖσι*, &c.; and new Ionic forms in any page of Herodotus, as *ῶν* for *οὖν*, *ἶναιάντα* for *ἐνταῦθα*, &c.

\* The grammarian Theodosius (Bekker, *Anecd. Græc.* p. 1184) says *Οἱ Αἰολεῖς οὐν τὰς ἔχουσι δικά, θέτεν οὐδὲ οἱ Ρωμαῖοι, ἄποικοι δῆτες τῶν Αἰολέων.* The ‘Cui est sermo noster simillimus’ of Quintilian is well known. *Instt. Or. i. 1-6.*) But no genealogical connection between the two must be dreamed of. The interesting question of the real relation of Greek to Latin belongs to Comparative Philology.

αὐθεντεῖν ‘to lord it,’ ἀλέκτωρ for ἀλεκτρυών, ἔσθω for ἔσθιω, βρέχω ‘to rain,’ &c.; it uses old words in new senses, as συνίστημι ‘I prove,’ ὄψώνιον ‘wages,’ ἐρεύγεσθαι eloqui, γεννήματα ‘fruit,’ λαλιά ‘language;’ and it frames new words and new compounds,\* as γρηγορῶ, παιδιόθεν, καλοποεῖν, αἰματεκχναία, ταπεινοφροσύνη, ἀκροβυστία, σκηνοπηγία, εἰδωλόθυτον. Besides this, it ceases to employ the dual; entirely abandons the use of the optative in oratio obliqua; uses the infinitive instead of the future participle after verbs of going, sending, &c.; admits εἰ with the subjunctive, ὅταν and ἵνα with the pres. ind.; and, finally, shows a tendency to analysis, by using prepositions† where the case-terminations would have been originally sufficient to express the meaning, and by employing the active with ἐαντὸν instead of the middle (ἐτάραξεν ἐαντὸν = ἐτρακάρο).

### PARTS OF SPEECH (τὰ μέρη, τὰ στοιχεῖα, τοῦ λόγου).

21. It is probable that all words may be reduced to roots which are either the bases of *nouns*, or are *pronouns* denoting relations of place; and indeed, at first, roots stood (as is still the case in Chinese) for any or every part of speech. The distinction between their functions is due to the advance of Language. (See *Chapters on Language*, p. 197.)

22. A long time elapsed before men learned to analyse into distinct classes these ‘grammatical categories.’ Plato (*Soph.* p. 261) only recognises the noun and the verb. To these Aristotle adds conjunctions (*σύνδεσμα, συγκατηγορήματα*, see Quint. *Instit. Orat.* l. iv. 12), and the article (Arist. *Poet.* 20). The Stoicks‡ and the Alexandrian grammarians finally adopted the division into *eight* parts of speech, which the Romans borrowed from them, only omitting the article and distinguishing the interjection from the adverb.

### NOUNS ('Ονόματα).

23. The Greek noun has five cases, three numbers, and three genders. There are usually said to be ten declensions

\* Many Latin words in Greek characters occur in the New Testament, as λεγέω, κεντυρίων, σουδάριον, στεκουλάτωρ, κῆπος, &c.

† e.g. ἀποκριτεῖν τι ἀπὸ τίνος, ἔσθιειν ἀπὸ τῶν ψιχίων, προσκυνεῖν ἐνόπλοις τίνος, &c.

‡ For other tentative divisions of the Parts of Speech, see Burggraff, *Principes de Grammaire Générale*, p. 176. They are all contained in the Greek line, πρὸς δὲ ἐμὲ τὸν δινοτρόπον ἔτι φρονέοντ' ἀλέπσον, II. xxii. 59, and in the Latin line, ‘Væ tibi ridenti quia mox post gaudia fibebis.’

(κλίσεις), and it is true that all substantives, not anomalous, may be classed under ten types. But there was originally only one declension, and the various types alluded to, arise from the gradual changes assumed by the inflections in course of time under phonetic influences. In all more modern and philosophical grammars (as, for instance, those of Curtius, Donaldson, &c.) the declensions are more properly ranged under three heads, viz. the vowel declension, which has two divisions, i. the *a* declension, when the *uninflected*\* form of the noun ends in *a* or *η* (*ταῦτα-ς, κριθ-ς*) and the fem. noun in *a* or *η*; ii. the *o* declension, when the *uninflected* form of the noun ends in *o*, as *λόγο-ς*; † and iii. the consonant declension, when the uninflected form ends in a consonant, or (the final consonant having been lost) in *e* or *v*.

There is no doubt that this is the better and truer arrangement; in any case, however, the declension of a certain number of *typical nouns* must be learnt by heart. A better arrangement may enable the student to understand better, and to master with more rapidity, the laws and genius of the language, but there is no royal road by which *labour* in the acquisition of the language can be avoided.

### CASES (Πτώσεις).

**24.** Cases (*πτώσεις, casus, fallings*) were probably so called because the nominative was regarded as the normal or upright form of the word, and the other cases as deflections from it (*πλάγιαι obliqui*). Hence also come the terms *κλίσις, declensio.*

**25.** The cases are—

Nominative † (*ενθεῖα or ὄρθη πτῶσις casus rectus*).

Genitive (*γενική, κτητική, πατρική*).

Dative (*δοτική, ἐπισταλτική*).

Accusative (*αἰτιατική*).

Vocative (*κλητική*).

\* The stem or uninflected form must be carefully distinguished from the nominative case. Thus *πρᾶγμα-* is the stem of the nominative *πρᾶγμα*, gen. *πράγματ-ος*; and *λόγο-* of the nom. *λόγος*.

† This includes nouns like *νόος, νοῦς, δοτέον, λεύς, &c.*, where the uninflected form ends in *oo* or *eo*.

‡ The first passage in which the names of the cases occur is in Chrysippus *τερψ τῶν πέντε πτώσεων* (ap. Diog. Laert. vii. 192). *πλάγιαι δὲ πτώσεις εἰσὶ γενικὴ [καὶ δοτικὴ] καὶ αἰτιατικὴ.* Lersch, *Sprachphilosophie*, ii. 186.

**26.** The nature and use of these cases will be briefly exemplified farther on. We must however observe that neither nominative nor vocative are properly *cases*, nor did the Stoicks, from whom the term is derived, ever call them so; since they are independent and, so to speak, *upright* forms of the word, not resting or depending on other words.

**27.** Besides these cases there was originally a sixth *locative* case, which is still retained as a distinct form in some nouns, as Ἀθήνας, Πλάταιας, Ὄλυμπίας, &c. at Athens, Platæa, Olympia, &c.; θύρασιν 'foris,' out of doors; Μεγαροῦ, Πυθοῖ, Μαραθῶνι, σίκοι at Megara, at Pytho, at Marathon, at home.

**28.** That the case-endings in Greek, as well as in all other languages, are *mere corruptions of words once separable*, is certain; and that in Greek these words were pronominal in their nature (i.e. forms of *pronouns*) may also be considered certain. (See Donaldson's *Gk. Gram.* p. 80, Garnett's *Philolog. Essays*, 217 seqq.) The case-endings, like the pronouns from which they spring, originally represented only conceptions of space (nearness, distance, presence, absence); but they were afterwards extended to express relations of time, cause, &c. Bopp, *Compar. Gram.* § 115.

There are three pronominal elements *π*, *ϙ*, *τ*, or *pa*, *qua*, *ta*, which mean primarily *here*, *near*, and *there*.

1. The first (*π*) under the forms *wa* or *μα*, signifies superposition, and occurs in the first personal pronoun (*με*) and the first numeral (*μείς*, *μία*, *μέν*, compare our 'number one' = I).

2. The second (*ϙ qua*), under a great variety of different forms, signifies *proximity*, and occurs in the second personal pronoun, and in the nominative and dative cases.

3. The third (*τ* denotes) *distance*, and, variously modified, is found in the third personal pronoun, in negatives, in the genitive and the accusative cases.

To make this quite clear, and to follow these elements through their various changes, would require an entire treatise; we may however at once make the important observation that these three main relations of *derivation*, *proximity*, and *direction towards*, are respectively expressed by the genitive, dative, and accusative.

**29.** Language, as it advances, tends to discard cases, and indeed all synthetic forms. The dative has disappeared from Modern Greek. The Romance languages have almost entirely discarded cases, using prepositions instead, i.e. expressing the requisite shades of meaning analytically, not synthetically. So too in English, where the s of the genitive is almost the only remaining case. In some ruder languages (e.g. Basque, Greenland, &c.) there are very many cases.

**30.** The numbers are singular (*ἐνικός*), dual (*δινικός*), and plural (*πληθυντικός*).

## NUMBERS ('Αριθμοί).

**31.** The dual number (in the possession of which the Greek noun resembles the Sanskrit and Hebrew, but differs from Latin and most modern languages) is a mere luxury of language,\* probably arising from the number of things which are usually and necessarily spoken of *in pairs*.† That there is a slight distinction between the conceptions of duality and plurality we may see at once from the fact that we cannot use the word '*all*' of two, though we can of three things. For instance, we could not say '*Two* birds sat *all* together on a tree.' Nothing but an instinctive feeling that such a form corresponded to some external reality, could account for its existence among people so utterly unlike each other as Greenlanders and New Zealanders on the one hand, and Attic Greeks on the other.‡ It is however quite *unnecessary* to have a separate inflectional form for so slight a difference of conception, and as it is the tendency of advancing language to get rid of its original superfluous exuberance, it is mainly in dead languages and obsolete dialects that the dual exists. A language may be too perfect in its synthetic forms, and so tyrannise over the free motion of the intellect. Simplicity, not complexity, is the triumph of language; and an immense wealth and multiplicity (*divitias miseras!*) of grammatical forms§ is mainly to be found in the most savage languages,

\* The dual survives in Lithuanian and Icelandic, and once existed in the Anglo-Saxon personal pronouns.

† Another theory about the dual is that it was an *older plural*, originating in the primary notion of the *Ego* and the *Non-ego*, or in the fact of there being two speakers, *I* and *you*, which stamps a character of dualism on the very essence of speech. It is curious that *nos* and *vos* in Latin are obviously connected not with ήμεῖς, ὑμεῖς, but with the duals νῶ, σφῶ. (Cf. *vōt̄ēpos nōst̄er*.) Donaldson accepts the theory that the dual is an older and weaker form of the plural, and mentions that some considered the Latin forms *dixere*, &c. for *dixerunt*, &c. as duals. (Quint. i. 5, § 42; *New Crat.* p. 396.)

‡ See on this whole subject the very interesting pamphlet of W. von Humboldt, *Ueber den Dualis*, Berlin, 1828. He quotes from Lactantius the remark, 'Ex quo intelligimus quantum dualis numerus, una et simplici compage solidatus, ad rerum valeat perfectionem.' *De Opif. Dei*.

§ The Abipones, a tribe in Paraguay, have two kinds of plurals, one for two or three objects, and another ending in *-ripi* for larger numbers. We may observe that as long as language is regarded as in itself an *end*, it abounds in forms capable of expressing the minutest distinctions; but, as civilisation advances, language becomes more and more a mere *instrument*, and therefore only retains those forms which are necessary to produce immediate comprehension.

such as Kaffir, and the languages of the American aborigines. Hence the dual, being unnecessary, early begins to evanesce, and to be treated as quite subordinate to the plural; \* until, in Hellenistic Greek and in Modern Greek, it has ceased to exist. It is not found in the Aëolic dialect, and has been discarded by Latin.† Long before it disappeared, the sense of it as a grammatical form is so vague that it may always be put with a plural verb; and as in Hebrew we find such collocations as *לְמַתָּה עֵינִים* ‘lofty eyes,’ where the noun is dual and the adjective plural, so in Plato we have ἐγελασάτην ἄμφω, βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους (Plato, *Euthyd.* 273 D); and even in Homer we find such concords as ὅσαι φαεινά, and βασιλῆς . . . πεπνυμένω ἄμφω, *Od.* xviii. 64. No doubt, however, the possession of a dual stamps on language some of that beauty of form which is so remarkable in Greek; and the κρατερόφοροι γείναρο παιδε of Homer is more lively and expressive than the ‘Ambo conspicui, nive candidioribus ambo Vectabantur equis’ of Ovid. Besides the word *ambo*, the only trace of a dual in Latin is the neuter dual termination *i* in *viginti* (see Corssen, *Krit. Nachr. zur Latein. Formenl.* S. 96).

### GENDERS (*γένη*).

32. In the ancient, and in many modern languages, the substantive expresses the gender (*γένος*), real or imaginary, of the object which it names. There are usually, as in Greek, three genders, masculine (*ἀρσενικόν*), feminine (*θηλυκόν*), and neuter (*οὐδέτερον*); ‡ but some languages (e.g. the Hebrew), §

\* Another trace of this fact is that the *masc.* of the dual in the article, and in *abtós*, *obtós*, *éubós*, &c., is constantly put with *fem.* nouns; as *δύο τινὲς ιδέα* (Plato), *τοβέτω τὸ ημέρα, τὰ χεῖρε*, &c. (Xen.). Observe, too, that the dual has only two case-terminations; having only three even in Sanskrit. (Meyer, *Gedränge Vergl. d. Gr. und Lat. Decl.* S. 54.)

† Except in the word *ambo*. Chærobovius wrongly argues from this fact, *τὰ δύικά οὐδερογενῆ ἔστιν· δυτερον γάρ ἐπενόηησαν τὰ δύικά*. (Bekk. *Anecd. Græc.* iii. 1184.)

‡ Words like *τίκτως*, *τίθρωντος*, &c., are common; and words which do not change their gender, though applied to different sexes, are called *ἐπίκοινα* epicene; e.g. Aristotle says, *καὶ δι θῆλυν δὲ ὄρεθς ἐπληρώθη*, *Hist. Anim.* xxiv. The sophist Protagoras is said to have been the first to call marked attention to the genders of words. See Aristoph. *Nub.* 669.

§ Hence we have the *fem.* for the *neut.* in the LXX. version of Ps. cxix. 60, cxviii. 23. The names *οὐδέτερον*, *neutrūm*, ‘neither of the two,’ show how purely negative was the conception of the neuter gender; in Sanskrit it is called *kīva*, ‘eunuch;’ in Servian *srednji*, ‘intermediate gender;’ in Dutch *onzijdig*, unsided, ‘qui ne penche d’aucun côté.’—Du Méril, p. 356.

use the feminine to express the neuter, to which we find something analogous in the fact that, in Greek and Latin, feminine names are often of a neuter form, as Πλόκιον, Glycerium,\* just as in German all diminutives in *-chen* and *-lein* are neuter (*das Madchen*, *das Fräulein*), even when they signify females. The feminine is generally indicated by a *weakening* of the masculine termination.

33. The attribution of any gender to inanimate things only leads to endless confusion and anomaly, and a multiplication of rules and exceptions, for the most part admitting of no rational explanation, but due to the varying influences of fancy or caprice. It is the relic of a time when the imagination was much more active than now, and when the energetic fancy of mankind attributed a life, analogous in some respects to its own, to the whole external world; and, as some would express it, tinged everything with which it dealt with some faint trace of its own subjectivity. The necessity of regarding everything as partaking of life, and therefore as having some gender, is a heritage of the childish-poetic stage of human intelligence, when† language was regarded as *an end* as well as *a means*, and when the mind felt an imperious necessity that the forms of language should faithfully reflect the slightest variations of conception.

The fancifulness of genders may be seen by comparing the same word in different languages. Thus *καρδία* ‘heart’ is feminine; but *cor* is neuter, and *cœur* masculine. In French *labeur* is masculine, *douleur* feminine; and *couleur* though derived from color is feminine, *arbre* though from arbor is masculine. In most languages, for obvious reasons, the sun is masc., the moon fem.; but in Gothic, Anglo-Saxon,‡ and German, it is the reverse, *der Mond*, *die Sonne*, and in Russian the sun is neuter. Again, in German, a spoon is masc. (*der*

\* It is a well-known rule in Greek that when women speak of themselves in the *plural*, they also use the *masculine*.

† See the author's *Origin of Language*, p. 45; *Chapters on Language*, p. 212. There is really no more *necessity* for gender in nouns and adjectives than there is in verbs which also express gender in Hebrew, Arabic, and Berber. The American languages are without it.

‡ ‘Mundilfori had two children, a *son* Mâni, and a *daughter* Sôl.’ —The prose Edda. See Latham, *Engl. Lang.* ii. 156. In Hebrew שׁׁמֶן sun is sometimes fem., 달 moon is masc. But another word for moon 달בָּתְּ is fem. (cf. δ μήν, ἡ σελήνη. ‘Dispicite . . . masculum Lunam.’ Tertul. *Apol.* 15. Forcellini, *s. v. Lunus*).

Löffel), a fork fem. (*die Gabel*), a knife neuter (*das Messer*) : so too a jug is masc. (*der Krug*), a cup fem. (*die Tasse*), a basin neuter (*das Becken*) ; wine is masc., milk fem., beer neuter (*der Wein*, *die Milch*, *das Bier*) ; the beginning is masc., the middle fem., and the end neuter (*der Anfang*, *die Mitte*, *das Ende*). And to crown this capricious absurdity, the word for *wife*, of all things in the world, is neuter (*das Weib*!). French has discarded the neuter gender ; and English (like Persian and Chinese) abandons genders altogether, or only expresses them (when necessary) by a separate word, except in the 3rd personal pronoun (*he*, *she*, *it*), and the relative (*who*, *which*). We may well congratulate ourselves, therefore, that our language has been one of the very few which have had the wisdom to disrobe itself of this useless rag of antiquity, and to make *all* inanimate objects *neuter*, except in the rare cases where they are personified for the purposes of poetry (Prosopopoeia).

Many of these anomalies are accounted for by the fact that sometimes the *form* of the word determines its gender, entirely irrespective of its meaning, and sometimes the meaning irrespective of the form. Thus rivers and hills are generally masc., but Αἴρνη, Οσσα, Δήθη, Στύξ, are fem., Λίκαιον neut. And in spite of their meaning μεράκιον, παιδίον, ἀνδράποδον are neuter ; while in spite of their form κάρδοπος and κάμινος are feminine.

It is curious to observe that in Modern Greek the prevalence of diminutive forms—(e.g. φίδι from ὄφιδιον=snake, ψάρι from ὄψαριον=fish, and in the Tzaconian dialect, spoken about the Gulf of Nauplia,\* ψιουχαροῦδα = butterfly, a diminutive of ψυχή, &c.)—is due partly to a desire to secure uniformity of genders.

#### RULES OF GENDER.

##### 34. The following are the general rules of gender :—

1. Names of male persons and animals, of rivers (ὁ ποραμός), hills (ὁ λόφος), winds (ὁ ανεμος), and months (ὁ μήν), are *masculine*.
2. Names of female persons and animals, of trees, lands (ἡ γῆ), islands (ἡ νῆσος), and cities (ἡ πόλις), are *feminine* ; also most abstract substantives, as ἡ ἐλπίς hope, ἡ νίκη victory, ἡ ἀρετὴ virtue.

---

\* See *Le Dialecte tzaconien*, par G. Deville. Paris, 1866.

Exception.—A few trees and plants are masculine; of which the commonest are φοίνιξ palm, ἔρυθρης wild fig, λαντάς lotus, πότασος, ἀνδράκος, ἄρπελος, ἄλλιθρος.

3. Most diminutives, names of fruits, and names of things regarded as mere material objects, especially if they are regarded collectively as forming a class, are neuter; also all infinitives used substantively, as τὸ ζῆν life. Such phrases as τὸ ἄνθρωπος mean ‘the word’ ‘man.’

The following common words, which are fem. though they end in *ος*, should be remembered:—

- i. Names of countries, islands, cities, plants.
- ii. Names of earths and stones, as ἡ ψάμμος sand, ἡ πλίνθος the brick, ἡ ψῆφος the pebble, ἡ λίθος the gem.
- iii. Different words for ‘a way,’ as ὁδός, τελευθός, ἀτραπός, ἀμαζιτός.
- iv. Various receptacles, as γυαθός jaw, κυβωτός chest, ληνός wine-vat.
- v. Adjectives used substantively, as ἡ ἥπειρος, χέρσος, ἔρημος (sc. γῆ), ἡ τέρπος (οὐρά), ἡ ἐιδέλεκτος (φωνή).

A few other feminines in *ος* are difficult to class, as νόσος disease, δρόσος dew, δοκός beam, ράβδος staff, βιβλός book.

The feminine also denotes a collection of things, as ἡ ἵππος cavalry, ἡ κάμηλος a troop of camels; in the case of animals this is probably due to the fact that in a number of animals the females largely predominate.

#### DECLENSIONS (Κλίσεις).

35. Besides the ordinary forms of declension, there are traces of *another* declension formed by suffixes: -θεν for the genitive, -θι for the locative, -τε for the accusative. These terminations answer the questions πόθεν; ποῦ; ποῖ;

Thus—ποῦ; where? οἴκοι at home, θύρασι at the doors, Πύθαι at Pytho, ἄλλοθι elsewhere.

πόθεν; whence? οἴκοθεν from home, θύραθεν from the door, οὐρανοθεν from heaven, ρίζοθεν from the root (*radicitus*).

ποῖ; whither? οἴκαζε (domum) homewards, θύραζε towards the door, Ἀθηναζε to Athens, πόλινε to the city, ἔραζε to the earth.

36. Homer also uses -phi for the gen. and dat. both sing. and plur. (evidently analogous to the Sanskrit instrumental *bhyas, bhis*) ; of which we find a trace in the Latin *ibi* (dat. of *is*), *tibi*, *alicubi*, *sicub*i**, *vobis*, *nobis*, and the dat. plurals in -*bus*. (Corssen, *Latin. Forment.* S. 206.)

#### HETEROCLITES, &c.

37. Words that mix two declensions are called heteroclites, as *σκότος* gen. *σκότου* and *σκότους*, *Táρπαρος* plur. *Táρπαρα*, *σίτος* pl. *σίτα*.

#### ADJECTIVES ('Επιθέτα).

38. Adjectives, though highly convenient, are not indispensable to a language. The fact that substantives are frequently used adjectively (e.g. *mahogany* table, *door* lock, *artillery* officer, &c.), and that their place can always be supplied by a periphrasis of the noun and preposition (e.g. *aurea corona*=une couronne *d'or*, *multi homines*=beaucoup d'*hommes*, *ein goldener Ring*=*ein ring von Golde*, &c.), accounts for the non-existence in many languages of adjectival forms which occur in languages cognate to them. For instance, the Latin *tot*, *quot*, *quotus*, *pauci*, &c. can only be rendered in French by *autant*, *tant*, *combien*, *peu*, &c. with *de*. In Arabic, 'all men,' 'no men,' 'some men,' &c. can only be expressed by 'the totality of men,' 'not one among men,' 'a portion of men,'\* &c. In Greek, as in all languages, many adjectives are used for nouns, especially in poetry; as *πέντεροζος* the five-pronged, i.e. the hand, *φερέουκος* the house-bearer, i.e. the snail, *άνοστεος* the boneless, i.e. the cuttlefish, &c.; and in English, 'the deep,' 'the blue,' 'the true and the beautiful,' &c. Milton uses many such adjectival substantives, e.g. 'the palpable *obscure*', 'the vast *abrupt*', &c.†

39. As there was no *prima facie* reason why the adjective should so closely reflect the nature of the substantive with which it is joined as to express its gender by a different inflection, we find many adjectives (especially those compounded with *δυσ-*, *ει-*, *ά-*) which have only *two* terminations, and do *not* express the feminine by a separate termination; nouns also are often used in apposition with other nouns in an adjectival manner, and these do not change their gender, as *ἡ μαινάς γυνή*, *ἡ παρπίς γῆ*, &c.

\* Silv. de Sacy, *Gram. Gén.* p. 54; Lobeck, *Aglaopham.* p. 845; Édéléstand du Méril, *Sur la formation de la langue fran<sup>c</sup>ç.* p. 54.

† In French many nouns have been formed from adjectives, e. g. *sanglier* (*porcus singularis*), *bouclier* (*scutum bucculatum*), &c.

4. The following recommendations are made:  
a) That the Board of Education of the City of New York  
make application to the State Board of Education for  
the right to establish a new school system which will  
be known as the New York City Board of Education.  
b) That the Board of Education of the City of New York  
make application to the State Board of Education for  
the right to establish a new school system which will  
be known as the New York City Board of Education.

5. The following recommendations are made:  
a) That the Board of Education of the City of New York  
make application to the State Board of Education for  
the right to establish a new school system which will  
be known as the New York City Board of Education.

6. The following recommendations are made:  
a) That the Board of Education of the City of New York  
make application to the State Board of Education for  
the right to establish a new school system which will  
be known as the New York City Board of Education.

7. The following recommendations are made:  
a) That the Board of Education of the City of New York  
make application to the State Board of Education for  
the right to establish a new school system which will  
be known as the New York City Board of Education.

8. The following recommendations are made:  
a) That the Board of Education of the City of New York  
make application to the State Board of Education for  
the right to establish a new school system which will  
be known as the New York City Board of Education.

9. The following recommendations are made:  
a) That the Board of Education of the City of New York  
make application to the State Board of Education for  
the right to establish a new school system which will  
be known as the New York City Board of Education.

45. Ἀγαθὸς *good*, and κακός *bad*, borrow several comparatives and superlatives from other forms; but these comparatives and superlatives are not absolutely synonymous.

Ἀγαθὸς <i>good</i> ,	ἀμείνων*	<i>better</i>	ἀριστος (from Ἄρης the War-god).
	κρείττων	<i>stronger</i> ,	κράτιστος (from κράτος).
	βελτίων	<i>morally better</i> ,	βέλτιστος (Latin bonus, comp. Ionic βέτηστος).
	λίψιν	<i>preferable</i> ,	λύπτος (from λάω to choose).
	φέρερος	<i>more profitable</i> ,	φέργατος.
Κακός <i>bad</i> ,	κακίων	<i>baser</i> , <i>more cowardly</i> ,	κάκιστος.
	χείρων	<i>inferior</i> ,	χείριστος (from χείρ, χείρος subject).
	ήσσων	<i>weaker</i> ,	ήκιστα (adv.).

N. B. ὕστερος, ὕστατος are derived from ὕπό; πρότερος, πρώτος from πρό; ἔσχατος from ἔξι.

### PRONOUNS ('Αντωνυμίαι).

46. A few words of explanation will perhaps throw some light on the nature of pronouns.

Language is a sort of drama, in which, as in the older tragedies, there are only three characters (*πρόσωπα*),† who have different rôles to play.

These three characters are :

1. The speaker, ἐγώ *I*.
2. The person to whom I speak, σὺ *thou*.
3. The person about whom the conversation is occupied, ἡ *he*; for which the Greeks have no precise or definite form, but use demonstratives, οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, αὐτός, ὅδε, as will be seen immediately.

\* On these forms see Donaldson, *New Crat.* § 262. They are also distinguished in Donaldson's grammar, and partially in Burnouf's, § 197.

† πρόσωπον, *persona*, originally the *mask* worn by an actor in playing his part; hence the remark of Rousseau in his cynical old age, 'Le mot latin PERSONA signifie un masque, nom très convenable assurément à la plupart des gens qui portent parmi nous celui de Personnes.'—*Lettres sur la Botanique*. Milton uses it in its classic sense: 'If it were an honour to that person which he sustained.'—*Hist. of Engl.*

'Which was thy part,

And person, hadst thou known thyself aright.'—P. L. x. 155.

**47.** The noun *names*, and specifies exactly, as Cæsar, Lucullus, the king, &c.; the pronoun only *indicates* the part which the speaker plays in the dialogue, and is therefore not *merely* in the place of the noun. ‘I’ may be any one in the world, from the king to the peasant, but necessarily implies some one who is speaking of himself; ‘thou’ may be any one, but *must* mean the person addressed; ‘he’ may be any one, from Adam to the child of yesterday, but *must* imply the person spoken of.

**48.** ‘I’ and ‘thou’ are declinable in Greek, but have no gender. The third person is expressed by *various* words which are not only declinable, but also (as in English) express gender, as *αὐτὸς ipse*, *οὗτος hic*, *ὅδε hicce*, *ἴκεινος iste*, *ille*.

**49.** The reason of this is that ‘I’ ‘thou’ suppose two interlocutors who are *present*, and who therefore need no further specification, their gender being regarded as obvious; *one* word, without gender, suffices for each. But the third person is or may be absent, so that for clearness the gender must be indicated (he, she, it); and this person may be *more* or *less* near, as *ὅδε hicce*, the person here, *questo* (pointing to him, *δεκτικώς*); or close *by me*, *cotesto* (*οὗτος hic*); or there, *by you*, *quello*, *ἴκεινος ille, iste*.

**50.** Greek however is far from being the only language which has no distinct and separate form for the third personal pronoun. Some languages have, for the third personal pronoun, expressions which imply a person sitting, standing, lying down, &c.; others, as is partly the case in Greek, have pronouns which represent the third person as being at nearer or further distances from the speaker; but many have not arrived so far in the analysis of conceptions as to have any one word for the abstract ‘he.’ (See W. v. Humboldt *Ueber den Dualis*, § 21, and *Ueber die Verwandtschaft der Ortsadverbien mit dem Pronomen in einigen Sprachen.*)

**51.** The uses of *οὗ*, which is given in grammars as the third personal pronoun in Greek, are very liable to lead to confusion: first of all it is *defective*, having lost its nominative; and secondly, in Attic Greek (though not in Ionic), it is not a personal, but mainly a *reflexive* pronoun.

**52.** A reflexive pronoun is one which *refers back to the subject of the sentence*, or one which expresses that the *object* of the sentence (i.e. the person spoken of) is also the *subject* (or the person speaking); as *ἔτυψα ἡμαυτόν*, I struck my *self*; *ἐδίδασκεν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ παιδία*, he was teaching his own son.

53. The reflexive pronouns are *οὐ* of himself,\* *ἐμαυτοῦ* of myself, *σεαυτοῦ* of thyself, *ἴαυτοῦ* of himself.† It will be observed that they have no nominatives. Why? For the obvious reason that they never serve as the subject of a principal sentence, but as the complement to some other word; i.e. they are used when the subject of the verb is also its object, as *I strike myself*. Such a sentence as *ἔγώ αὐτὸς ἐπράξα τούτο* is not reflexive. The reason why *οὐ* once had a nominative is because it was a demonstrative pronoun; but when its reflexive use prevailed the nom. became obsolete.‡

54. In Attic Greek, then, what is placed as the third personal pronoun is not a personal pronoun at all, but reflexive; and as its nominative *τις* is obsolete, it borrows *αὐτὸς* instead; thus:

- αὐτός, η, ο*, himself, herself, itself (obsolete *τις*);
- οὐ* of himself, &c.;
- οἱ* to himself, &c. (*οἱ* enclitic = to him);
- ἢ* himself, &c.;

and so on, reflexively throughout; but *ἴαυτον* is used more frequently than *ἢ*, as *ἀπέκτεινεν ίαυτόν*, he killed himself.

55. As for the third personal pronoun, there is none in the nominative, in Attic, but the demonstratives are used instead; but for the other cases, the oblique cases of *αὐτὸς* (derived by some from *αὖτες again he?*) are used, so that we have really:

- Nom. *οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, δόθε* used for 'he.'
- Gen. *αὐτοῦ* of him.
- Dat. *αὐτῷ* to him.
- Acc. *αὐτὸν* or *νιν* him, &c.

\* The plurals of *ἐμαυτοῦ*, *σεαυτοῦ*, are *ἡμῶν αὐτῶν*, *ὑμῶν αὐτῶν*; of *ἴαυτοῦ* either *ἴαυτῶν*, or *σφῶν αὐτῶν*.

† The French language uses *même* to form a reflexive for the first and second personal pronouns; as, Je me suis blessé *moi-même*. Other languages use a periphrasis for this purpose; e.g. in Hebrew and Arabic it would be 'I have wounded my soul,' &c. Silvestre de Sacy, *Gram. Gén.* p. 51. The simple pronouns are sometimes in poetry used reflexively in English, as 'He sat him down at a pillar's base.'—Byron. 'I will lay me down and sleep.' 'I gat me to my Lord right humbly.' 'But go, shew me to prestis.'—Wyclif's *Bible*.

‡ We have traces of the obsolete nominative *τις* or *τι* in *Iva*, Lat. *is*, Engl. *it*; and also in *μήν*, and *νήν*; a dative and accusative *τις* are found in fragments. *τι, himself* or *herself*, is only found in objective sentences, as in a fragment of Sophocles, preserved by Apollonius Dyscolus (*De Pronom.* p. 70):

ἢ μὴ ἦς τι θάσσον, η δὲ ἦς τι τέκοι  
ταῦτη

'One woman said that *she* (herself), the other that *she* (herself), bore the swifter son.' *οὐ, οἱ, τι* are both demonstrative and reflexive in Ionic and Epic. For the authorities on *τι* see Donaldson, *New Crat.* § 139.

56. For 'him,' 'her,' 'it,' *μιν* is used in Ionic; in the Tragœdians *νίν*, and *σφέ*; *νίν* sometimes, though rarely, also stands for *αὐτοὺς αὐτὰς αὐτά*. The root *σφέ*, Doric *ψέ*, is seen in the Latin *ipse*.

### POSSESSIVE PRONOUNS.

57. In most languages the possessive pronoun is either directly formed from, or closely allied to, the genitive case of the personal.\*

58. Greek is richer than Latin in possessive pronouns (*κτητικαὶ ἀντωνυμίαι*). Besides *ἐμὸς meus*, *σὸς tuus*, *ἡμέτερος noster*, *ἱμέτερος vester*, it possesses *σφὸς his, her, their, σφέτερος their*, and in Ionic *νωτίρεπος belonging to us two*, *σφωτίρεπος belonging to you two*. The Latin has no simple possessive adj. of the third person (his, her, its, their), for *suis* is reflexive; it uses instead *ejus, illorum, &c.* (It is remarkable that the neuter possessive pronoun of the third person 'its' is quite modern in English also, see Lev. xxv. 5, ed. 1611.)

### Αὐτός.

59. i. Observe that *αὐτὸς* means *ipse, -self (reflexive)*; but *αὐτὸν* of *him*, *αὐτῷ* to *him, &c.* (demonstrative).

ii. *ὁ αὐτὸς* means 'the same.'

iii. Although *αὐτὸ* is the neut. of *αὐτός*, yet for 'the same' in the neuter, the Attic form is generally *ταὐτὸν* not *ταὐτό*.

### Οστις.

60. *ὅστις, quicumque*, is a compound of the relative and the indefinite. Its declension in Attic is *ὅτον*, *ὅτῳ*, *ὅτων*, *ὅτις*. In the neut. plur. *ὅττα* is the contraction of *ὅτινα*, and must not be confused with *ὅττα*, which is used in Attic for the neut. plur. *τινὰ quædam*.

61. There is no relative pronoun (*ἀναφορικὴ ἀντωνυμία*) in Homer, for *ὅς*, *ἥ*, *ὅ* in Homer is demonstrative; to form a relative he adds *τε* to *ὅς*, so that 'and he' is equivalent to 'who' (*qui=et is*). Similarly in Hebrew *นִי* 'this,' is sometimes a relative (Ps. lxxiv. 2, &c.), and in German 'der.'

---

\* See Garnett, *Philol. Ess.* p. 260.

## NUMERALS.

## CARDINALS.

**62.** i. Cardinals answer the question ‘how many?’ The word is derived from *cardo* *a hinge*.

ii. The first *four* cardinals only are declinable, from their being the most frequently used; but after 200 they are regular adjectives of three terminations, as *διακόσιοι*, *αι*, *α*.

*Obs.* 18 and 19 may be expressed either by *όκτωκαιδεκά*, *έννεακαιδεκά*, or by *δυοῖν*, *ένδες δέοντες εἴκοσιν*. Similarly 28, 29 may be *δυοῖν*, *ένδες δέοντες τριάκοντα*, &c.; and even 7000, 8000 may be *τριακοσίων*, *διακοσίων δέοντα μύρια* (*Thuc.* ii. 18). This resembles the Latin *duodeviginti*, *undeviginti*, &c., and the German way of reckoning time (e.g. *drei Viertel auf acht* = a quarter to eight, &c.).

iii. 21, 22, &c., may be either *εἴκοσιν εἷς*, *εἴκοσι δύο* or *εἷς δύο καὶ εἴκοσιν* just as in English it may be twenty-one, or one and twenty; the rule being that if the *smaller* number precedes, the copula must be used.

iv. Distinguish between *μύριοι* 10,000, and *μυρίοι* indefinitely numerous; the regular number has the regular accent.

## ORDINALS.

**63.** i. Ordinals express the position or *order*; and answer the question ‘which of the number?’

ii. Except *δεύτερος*, which has the form of the comparative, they all take the superlative termination *τος*. They are all declinable adjectives of three terminations.

iii. The student should distinguish carefully between the decades and the hundreds; 30th, 40th, &c., are *τριακοστός*, *τεσσαρακοστός*, &c.; but 300th, 400th, &c., are *τριακοσιοστός*, *τεσσαρακοσιοστός*, &c.

iv. 21st, 22nd, &c., may be expressed in three ways, viz.: *εἷς καὶ είκοστός*, *πρῶτος καὶ είκοστός*, or *είκοστός πρῶτος*; similarly 32nd, &c.=*δύο καὶ τριακοστός*, *δεύτερος καὶ τριακοστός*, or *τριακοστός δεύτερος*; and so on.

## OTHER NUMERALS.

**64.** Both Greek and Latin are particularly rich in their forms for numerals; e.g.

*Multiplicatives.* ἀπλοῦς, διπλοῦς, τριπλοῦς, κ.τ.λ. *simplex*, *duplex*, &c., from which are derived our English multiplicatives *simple*, *double*, *triple*, &c., referring to size.

*Proportionals.* διπλάσιος, τριπλάσιος, κ.τ.λ. *duplicis*, *triplicis*, &c., our *twofold*, *threefold*, &c., referring to number.\*

*Numerical Adverbs.* δίχα, τρίχα, τέτραχα, κ.τ.λ. in two, three, four ways, &c., answering to multiplicatives. ἅπαξ, δὶς, τρὶς, κ.τ.λ. once, twice, thrice, &c., answering to proportionals.

We have also δευτεραῖος, τριταῖος, τετραταῖος, κ.τ.λ. on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th day, &c.; ποσταῖος; on what day?

#### ADVERBS ('Επιφρήματα).

65. 'When some case of a declinable word—whether substantive, adjective, or pronoun—has fixed itself absolutely for the expression of certain secondary predications, it is called an adverb. The prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections which are generally considered as distinct parts of speech, are, in regard to their origin and primitive use, neither more nor less than adverbs. Their right to a separate place in the grammar of an inflected language depends on their syntactical functions only. The preposition is an adverb of place, . . . . the conjunction an adverb of manner, . . . the interjection an exclamatory adverb.'—Donaldson, *Greek Gram.* p. 148. Hence, in spite of Horne Tooke's sneer, 'the old grammarian was right, who said that when we know not what else to call a part of speech, we may safely call it an adverb.'

66. Almost every adjective, and many participles, furnish an adverb in -ως, a termination derived from the old ablative case. The neuter accusative of adjectives both singular and plural is often used adverbially. Adverbs derived from adjectives are compared by taking the neuter sing. of the adjective for the comparative, and the neuter plur. for the superlative, as ἡδέως, ἡδίστων, ἡδίστρα.

67. Other adverbs coincide with the actual cases of nouns, as κοινῶς exactly, δημοσίᾳ publicly, ἴδιᾳ privately, κοινῷ in

---

\* This distinction is due to Ammonius (*de Diff.* p. 43), διπλοῦς κατὰ μέγεθος, διπλάσιος κατ' ἀριθμόν. (Donaldson.)

common, *σπουδῇ* zealously, *σχολῇ* leisurely\*; *ἀρχὴν* at all, *ἀκμὴν* just, or hardly, *δωρεάν*, *τροῖκα* gratis, *μακρὰν* afar.

**68.** Others consist of a preposition and noun, as *παραχρῆμα* immediately, *καθάπερ* just as, *προύργον* advantageously, *ἐκποδῶν* out of the way, *ἐνσχερῷ* in order, &c.

N.B. i. Observe that *εὐθὺς* is 'immediately,' and *εὐθὺν* (with the gen.) 'straight towards.' Similarly *ἀντίκρυς* = outright, *ἀντίκρὺ* = opposite.

ii. The *ω-ς* of Greek adverbs is the Sanskrit *ā-t* (cf. *δίδωσι* *didāti*); thus *όμως* = the Sanskrit *samā-t* 'simili'; *t* is the case-ending of the Sanskrit ablative, and in some Greek adverbs it is suppressed (e.g. *οὐρώ*), in others it becomes *ς*. Compare the Latin adverbial *ablatives* *raro*, *perpetuo*, *quomodo*, &c. For the proofs of this identification see Bopp, § 183.

### VERBS ('Pήματα').

**69.** The nature of the verb† (*βῆμα* verbum, i.e. *the word par excellence*) has been variously defined by different grammarians. All acknowledge its importance; 'Alterum est quod loquimur,' says Quintilian, 'alterum de quo loquimur.'

1. According to most ancient grammarians its distinctive peculiarity is the expression of *Time* (*βῆμα δέ ἔστι τὸ προσ-σημαῖνον χρόνον*, Arist. *De Interp.* iii. 1). Hence the Germans call it *Zeitwort* time-word, and the Chinese ho-tseu *living word* (just as Plato calls the verb and noun *τὰ ἐμψυχό-ταρα μέρη τοῦ λόγου*). But verbs which should express no circumstance of time are quite conceivable, and actually exist in some North American languages.

2. Others say that it necessarily expresses an *Action*, and hence some Germans call it *Thätigkeitswort*. Thus in Chinese a *hand* added to a hieroglyphic shows that a verb is intended; for instance, a bent bow and a hand signify 'to shoot an arrow.' In Chinese also 'to be' is 'to make' (*wei*). Obviously however many verbs imply *inaction* rather than *action*.

3. In the *Grammaire Générale* of Port-Royal the verb is

\* Compare Shakspeare's 'I'll trust *by leisure* him that mocks me once.'

† See Burggraaff, *Principes de Gram. Gén.* p. 345-349; *Origin of Language*, p. 104; Du Méril, p. 56.

defined as 'un mot qui signifie l'affirmation,' and this definition may stand if we make affirmation include negation.

4. Humboldt and others say that the verb must involve the abstract conception of *existence*, and so furnish the connection between the subject and the attribute (*Die reine Synthesis des Seins mit dem Begriff*). This is only true if with Harris we resolve every verb into a participle with the verb 'to be,' so that, e.g.  $\gamma\acute{r}\alpha\phi\omega = \dot{\epsilon}\gamma\acute{w}$  ( $\epsilon\mu\mu$ )  $\gamma\acute{r}\alpha\phi\omega\nu$ . No analysis of the verb however can succeed in reducing it into a participle coupled with the verb to be. What is there participial in the root  $\gamma\acute{r}\alpha\phi$ ? 'A verb divested of its paraphernalia may become an *Irish* participle, which is *merely an abstract noun*, but certainly not a Greek, Latin, or even an English one.'

5. Mr. Garnett, following out a hint in Dr. Prichard on the Celtic language, first showed that verbs do not differ from nouns by any inherent vitality; they are simply *nouns with a pronominal affix*. 'Motion or action is no more inherent in a verbal root than the power of forging a horseshoe in a smith's hammer. It requires an extensive moving power to make it efficient, and so do the roots of verbs.' Their power of expressing action, motion, sensation, or their opposites, resides only in the addition to them of the person or agent. In other words, a verb is *ex necessario* a complex, and not a simple term, and as such it could not have been a primary part of speech.

70. The chief peculiarities in the syntactical usage of voices ( $\delta\alpha\theta\acute{e}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ ), moods ( $\dot{\epsilon}\gamma\kappa\lambda\acute{i}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ ), and tenses ( $\chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\iota\varsigma$ ) will be explained in the Syntax.

71. The inflections by which a verb expresses its various modifications are called its conjugation ( $\sigma v\acute{v}y\acute{a}$ ).

72. The endings or inflections by which the Greek expresses the three persons in the singular are really the three personal pronouns (*I, thou, he*), although all trace of this fact has been nearly obliterated in the course of time. Thus to take a verb in  $-μ\acute{u}$  (those verbs being the oldest, and therefore the least disguised in their person-endings), it is easy to see that in  $\epsilon i\text{-}μ\acute{u}$ ,  $\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\text{-}σ\acute{t}\iota$ ,  $\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\text{-}r\acute{i}(ν)$ ,  $μ\acute{u}$  is connected with the stem  $μ\acute{e}$ ,  $-σ\acute{t}\iota$  with  $σ\acute{e}$ , and  $r\acute{i}$  with the article\*  $r\acute{o}$ . The passive termina-

---

\* We shall see in the Syntax the close connection between the article and the third personal pronoun. It is the same in German, where the definite article *der, die, das* is constantly used as a pronoun; and the French article *le* is derived from *ille*, as is the Italian *il, lo*, and the

tions *-μαι*, *-σαι*, and *-ραι* show the same fact no less distinctly. The termination *ω* looks as if it were connected with ἐγώ, *Æolic iών*; but it is certain that the person-ending comes *not* from the nominative but from *objective* cases of the pronouns, so that διδώμι\* would mean ‘giving *here*, i.e. my giving,’ and διδώσι ‘giving *there*, i.e. his giving.’ It is the object of Comparative Grammar to analyse all inflections in a similar way, and to show their original significance. At present however the results are not all certain, and the explanation of them would require a separate treatise, because each termination has to be traced through a long series of phonetic changes; and in Sanskrit and Greek especially ‘a vast number of articulations have been sacrificed to euphony, the restoration of which is often conjectural, and sometimes impracticable.’

73. Many grammars throw no light whatever on the ordinary omission of a first person dual in the active. Thus we find for the dual of the pres. act.

— τύπτετον, τύπτετον,

but for the dual of the pres. pass.

τυπτόμεθον, τύπτεσθον, τύπτεσθον,

with no explanation of the reason why we should have no form for ‘we two are striking,’ and yet should have one for ‘we two are being struck.’ The reason is that in the act. the first pers. plural is always used for the first person dual. We can only conjecture why no distinct form was retained, or why in the passive the *aorist* alone should have no *first* person dual.

Spanish *lo*, *la*. In the third person plural the termination is due to phonetic change; e.g. *trátoron-i* = *trátoro-ti* = verberant. In Welsh (which is an Aryan language), the pronoun of the third person plural actually ends in nt, *uynnt* or *huint* = they. In the Greek and Latin verb, however, *n* is the sign of the *plural*, *t* of the *person* (comp. § 15, 5).

\* Only two Latin verbs, *inquam* and *sum*, retain a trace of the old termination in *μ*. The first philologer to point out that the person-endings were pronouns in *oblique cases* was Mr. Garnett, and he illustrated the fact from Syriac, in which *iθ* = existence, *iθai-ch* existences of thee = *thou art*, *iθai'-hun* existences of them = *they are*. The same result becomes very clear from a comparison of the Hungarian *olvas-on* I read, *olvas-od* thou readest, *olvas-atok* ye read, &c., with *olma-m* my apple, *olma-d* thy apple, *olma-tok* your apple. See Garnett's *Philolog. Essays*, p. 291; Dr. Latham, *Lect. on the Study of Language*. Obviously, as Bopp observes, the moment that language began to mark persons by the addition of suffixes to the verb, those suffixes could not have been anything but personal pronouns.

74. There is an ingenious theory on the subject of the dual in the article 'Dual' in the 'Penny Cyclopaedia.' Believing that the dual is an older plural which was only colloquially retained, the author points out how easily a termination in *r* might have been changed into one in *s* (compare *τίττορεν* and *τύπτομες* *verberamus*; shoon and shoes, eyne and eyes, housen and houses, &c.), and how easily this *s* might be dropped; on this theory *τύττερον* and *τύττερε*, &c. might also very easily have been phonetic varieties of the same form.

75. In many grammars both the second and third pers. dual of the historical tenses (imperf., plupf., and aorists) are made to end in *vv*, as in the impf. act. of *τύττω*

*ἔτυττέτην, ἔτυττέτην;*

but in other modern grammars (and even in that of E. Burnouf) the second person dual even in historical tenses is made to end in *ov*, so that we find

*ἔτυττέτον, ἔτυττέτην;*

this latter is the more correct, for the Attics always prefer the form in *ov* for the second person of the dual, if we may trust the best MSS.

### VOICES (*Διαθήσεις*).

76. The Greek verb has three voices—

1. Active (*διάθεσις ἐνεργητική*),\* as *τύττω I am striking*.

This may be either transitive (*ἄλλοκαθής*), i.e. the action may pass on to some object, as *δίδωμι ἄρτον I am giving bread*.

Or intransitive (*αὐτοκαθής*), i.e. the action may stop with the agent, as *τρέχω I run*. These verbs are also called neuter.

2. Passive (*ταθητική*), as *τύπτομαι I am being struck*.

3. Middle (*μέση*), as *τύττομαι I am striking myself*.

77. The only tenses for which the Middle has any special

---

\* The Stoicks called the Active *καττυγόρημα δρόσον* 'upright,' the Passive *ἵππειον* 'supinum,' and the Neuter *οὐδέτερον* 'neither of the two.' Dionysius Thrax (p. 886) says that the two former names were suggested by a metaphor from the position of athletes. On the derivation of the Latin word 'supine,' Priscian remarks, 'Supina vero nominantur, quia a passivis participiis, quae quidem supina nominantur, nascuntur' (p. 811). Lersch, *Sprachphil. d. Altin*, ii. 197; Burggraff, p. 357.

forms are the future and aorist.\* What are usually called the perf. and plupf. middle are not middle forms at all, but are other forms of the perf. and plupf. act. The name *perfect middle* for such forms as *τέρτυα* ought to be finally discarded; the error of calling them so, rose from the instances in which this second perfect has an intransitive meaning, as *ἐγρίγορα I am awake*, *πέποιθα I am confident*, *ἔσαντα I am broken*, *τίτηνα I stick fast*, *ἔρρωντα I burst forth*, &c. But this is a mere speciality of meaning.

**78.** Verbs which have an active *meaning*, but only a passive or middle form, are called deponents (from *depono I lay aside*). It is probable however that they have not *laid aside* the active form, but never had one at all; it is generally believed that the *-μαι* form of verbs is the oldest of all. For it was most natural that verbs should be primarily regarded as *middle*, i.e. as expressing direct reference to the subject (or self). Hence the *μαι* forms often exist in Homer side by side with the forms in *ω*. Reflexive forms are far more common in other languages (e.g. French, Italian, German) than they are in English. That the transitive form and meaning of verbs was due to a later development of language is clear, since, as we have seen, the *cases* represent adverbial additions to the noun, and would therefore be originally *independent of all verbal government*, so that it would have been needless for the verb to have a transitive sense. Hence we find many Greek verbs that fluctuate between a transitive and intransitive meaning, as *ἔχω* 'I have' and 'I am,' *ἄγω* 'I lead' and 'I move,' *ἀἴρω* 'I raise' and 'I rise' (e.g. of the sun, Soph. *Phil.* 1315), *ἔλαύνω* 'I drive' and 'I ride,' *πράσσω* 'I do' and 'I fare.' The same is true in other languages; e.g. in Latin, *vertere*, *mutare*, &c.; in German, *ziehen*, *brechen*, *schmelzen*, &c.; in French, *décliner*, *changer*, *sortir*, &c.; in English, to *move*, *break*, *turn*, &c. (Jelf, § 360).

\* This is just what we should expect from the close connection between the passive and middle, of which the middle or reflexive form was probably the *earliest*. We have very few reflexive forms (I bethink me, fear me, &c.) in English, but we represent many of the German, Italian, and French reflexive verbs by passive or neuter verbs; e.g. *Ich freue mich* I rejoice; *si dice* it is said; *se emplearon diez hombres* *Ten men were employed*, &c. The gradual evanescence of the middle in Greek is analogous to the disuse of many old reflexive verbs in French, such as *se mourir*, *se partir*, &c. Pellissier, *La Langue franq.* p. 177.

REDUPLICATION (*Αναδίπλωσις*).

**79.** i. Reduplication, i.e. a repetition of the root twice over, was a very primitive process, found in all languages, and adopted as the simplest known method of strengthening the meaning of the word to which it is applied.

ii. Thus it is found in substantives both in Greek and Latin, as βάρβαρος, παιπάλη, βόμβος, marmor, murmur, turtur, papilio, &c.

iii. And in verbs both in Greek and Latin, πέπηγα, λέλυκα, &c., pepigi, tutudi, cucurri, tetigi, memini, &c.

iv. It is by no means confined to the perfect and pluperfect. Distinct traces of it appear in many presents, as μίμνω, τίττω, γιγνώσκω; especially in the older verba, viz. those in μι, as δίδωμι, τίθημι, (σ)ιστημι, τίμιτλημι, τίμιτρημι, ὀνίνημι, sisto, gigno, pipilo, titubo, &c.; and in the paulo-post-futurum, as τετύφομαι, λελύσυμαι, &c.

v. It is also frequently found in the aorist, as ἤγαγον, ἤραρον. In Homer these reduplicated second aorists abound, as πέπιθον, κέκλυθι, ἀμπεταλών, τε-αρπόμην, λέλαθον, πέφραδον. It will be seen that it always emphasises\* the meaning of the verb, and is therefore peculiarly adapted to represent repeated or continued actions, such as vibration (ἀμπεταλών), thought (πέφραδον), careful attention (κέκλυθι), scolding (ἤνιπακον), &c.

vi. It is natural therefore that it should be mainly characteristic of the primary tenses, and especially of the perfect. (Besides such perfects as momordi in Latin, we find traces of reduplication in many others, as feci (= fe-fici), jeci (je-jici), vēni (ve-veni), and many more.)

vii. Unlike the augment, which is a mere prefix or extraneous adjunct, the reduplication is regarded as an organic part of the word, and therefore is retained through all the moods, while the augment is found in the indicative alone.

\* Precisely on the same principle as in Hebrew, in Armorican, in Hindoo, and in Modern Greek, an adjective is repeated to represent the superlative, as מִשְׁרָךְ קָדָשָׁךְ holy of holies = holiest; μια ψηλὴ ψηλὴ κρεμάθρα a very high gallows. The process is constantly resorted to in common conversation, and is a regular idiom of Italian e.g. 'Ella sen va notando lenta, lenta,' Dante, = very slowly, &c.

## CHIEF RULES OF REDUPLICATION.

**80.** 1. Words beginning with  $\beta$ , with  $\gamma r$ , with double letters  $\zeta$ ,  $\xi$ ,  $\psi$ , with two mutes,\* or with vowels, cannot take reduplication, but substitute the augment for it. This is only for the sake of euphony;  $\beta\acute{e}\beta\acute{r}\phi\alpha$ ,  $\psi\acute{e}\psi\acute{l}ak\alpha$ , &c. would sound intolerable, and therefore  $\acute{e}\beta\acute{r}\phi\alpha$ ,  $\acute{e}\psi\acute{l}ak\alpha$ , &c. are used instead.

2. Verbs beginning with an *aspirate*, use the *tenuis* in reduplication, as  $\tau\acute{e}\theta\acute{u}ka$ ,  $\pi\acute{e}\phi\acute{l}ηka$ .

3. Three verbs take  $\epsilon i$  instead of the reduplication, viz.:—

- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| λαμβάνω, | ε̄ιληφα.   |
| λαγχάνω, | ε̄ιληχα.   |
| μείρω,   | ε̄ιμαρραι. |

We have also  $\epsilon i\epsilon r\eta ka$  used as the perfect of  $\phi\eta\mu\acute{i}$ .  $\lambda\acute{e}\gamma\omega$  makes both  $\lambda\acute{e}\lambda\acute{e}\gamma\mu\acute{m}ai$  and  $\epsilon i\epsilon l\acute{e}\gamma\mu\acute{m}ai$  in composition.

4. Some verbs, beginning with a vowel, take what is called the Attic reduplication, as

- |          |           |             |
|----------|-----------|-------------|
| ἀγείρω,  | ἀγήγερκα, | ἀγήγερμαι.  |
| ἀκούω,   | ἀκήκοα.   |             |
| ἐγείρω,  | ἐγήγερκα, | ἐγήγερμαι.  |
| ἐσθίω,   | ἐδήδοκα,  | ἐδήδεσμαι.  |
| ἐλαύνω,  | ἐλήλακα,  | ἐλίγλαμαι.  |
| ἐρείδω,  | ἐρήρεικα, | ἐρήρεισμαι. |
| ὅμνυμι,  | ὅμώμυκα,  | ὅμώμοσμαι.  |
| οὐρίσσω, | οὐρώρυχα, | οὐρώρυγμαι. |

We also have  $\acute{e}\lambda\acute{h}\lambda\nu\theta\acute{\alpha}$ ,  $\acute{e}\nu\acute{h}\nu\acute{o}χ\acute{\alpha}$  used as perfects of  $\acute{e}\rho\chi\mu\acute{m}ai$ ,  $\acute{e}\phi\acute{r}\omega$ .

5. Verbs in  $\omega$  with a reduplicated present, as  $\beta\acute{i}\beta\acute{r}\omega\acute{s}kw$ ,  $\gamma\acute{i}\gamma\acute{n}\omega\acute{s}kw$ ,  $\delta\acute{i}\delta\acute{r}\acute{a}s\acute{sk}w$ ,  $\mu\acute{i}\mu\acute{n}\acute{h}s\acute{sk}w$ ,  $\pi\acute{i}\pi\acute{r}\acute{a}s\acute{sk}w$ ,  $\tau\acute{i}\tau\acute{r}\acute{a}s\acute{sk}w$ , drop the reduplication in other tenses; hence their futures are  $\beta\acute{r}\omega\acute{s}om\acute{m}ai$ ,  $\gamma\acute{n}\acute{h}s\acute{om}ai$ ,  $\delta\acute{r}\acute{a}s\acute{om}ai$ ,  $\mu\acute{n}\acute{h}s\acute{om}ai$ , &c.†

## AUGMENT (Αὔξησις).

**81.** The Augment entirely differs from the Reduplication, both in meaning and usage.

a. It is probably a fragment of the root which we also find in  $\acute{a}n\acute{a}$ , signifying remoteness, and merely refers an action to

\* Except  $\kappa\acute{t}\acute{d}\mu\acute{m}ai$ ,  $\kappa\acute{e}\kappa\acute{t}\eta\mu\acute{m}ai$ ,  $\mu\acute{n}\acute{d}\mu\acute{m}ai$ ,  $\mu\acute{e}\mu\acute{m}η\mu\acute{m}ai$ .

† But  $\delta\acute{i}\delta\acute{d}\acute{s}kw$  fut.  $\delta\acute{i}\delta\acute{d}\acute{\xi}w$ ,  $\beta\acute{i}\beta\acute{d}\acute{\xi}w$  fut.  $\beta\acute{i}\beta\acute{d}\acute{sw}$ .

the past. It was originally ‘a demonstrative particle, primarily expressing *remote place*, and secondarily *remote time*’\*; and was no original part of the verbal root.

**β.** It properly belongs only to the historical tenses.

**γ.** It is dropped in all moods but the indicative, except where it is used instead of reduplication. This is a trace of its independent existence as having once been a separate word. In the older Sanskrit, for instance, it is separable from the verb, and (as in Homer) it may be omitted at pleasure.† This helps to account for the fact that Latin has lost all traces of a syllabic augment.

**82.** Augment is of two kinds; syllabic (*συλλαβική*), which adds the syllable *ε*, and temporal (*χρονική*), which only increases the length of a vowel.

The chief peculiarities in augments are as follows:

1. *βούλομαι*, *δύναμαι*, and (sometimes) *μέλλω* make *ἡβουλόμην*, *ἡδυνάμην*, *ἡμελλον*; chiefly in *later Attic*.

2. The diphthongs *ei* and *ou* are not augmented; ‡ the other diphthongs are augmented by giving the augment to the first vowel of the diphthong, and subscribing the second if it be *i*, as *αἰρέω*, *ἥρουν*, *αὐξάνω*, *ἥξανον*.

3. Ten verbs beginning with *e* take the augment *ει*. The commonest of them are :

- ἐάω *I permit*, *εἴων*.
- ἐλίσσω *I roll*, *εἴλισσον*.
- ἐλκύω *I drag*, *εἴλκυον*.
- ἐπομαι *I follow*, *εἴπομην*, 2nd aor. *ἔσπομην*.
- ἐργάζομαι *I work*, *εἴργαζόμην*.
- ἐρπω *I creep*, *εἴρπων*.
- ἔχω *I have*, *εἴχον*, 2nd aor. *ἔσχον*.

We have also *εἴπον*, and *εἴλον*.

4. *ρ̄* is doubled after an augment, as *ρίπτω*, *ἔρριπτον*.

\* Garnett's *Philolog. Essays*, p. 206. He adduces analogous forms from many other languages. Buttmann's conjecture that it is a mutilation of the reduplicate prefix, and Bopp's that it is a relic of the negative prefix, are justly exploded.

† Max Müller, *Sanskrit. Gram.* p. 144.

‡ It is now generally believed that the diphthong *eo* can be augmented.

5. A few verba take both the temporal and syllabic augment, as ὄράω impf. ἐώρων pf. ἐώρακα  
                   „ „ ἀνέφηγον „ ἀνέφηγα  
                   οίνοχέω „ ἐψυνοχόουν.

Notice the pluperfects δέκειν I seemed, δέπλειν I hoped, δέφηγειν I did.

6. In synthetic compounds, i.e. compounds where the two parts are not separable, but are so fused together that they cannot exist as two separate words, the augment is placed at the beginning of the word, as in οἰκοδομέω ϕοδόμησα, κάθημαι ἐκαθήμητ, ἐπίσταμαι ἡπιστάμην.

But where the compound is parathetic, i.e. where the two parts are separable, and are merely juxtaposed, the augment is put between them, as in προσφέω, προσέφερον; and this is the case in most verba compounded with prepositions.

7. The augment, which is constantly omitted in Homer, is never omitted in Attic except in χρῆν for ἔχρῆν.\* But there are a few words, 'quibus augmentum non proponunt tragicis,' e.g. ἀνωγα, καθεζόμην, καθήμην. Porson *Præf. ad Hec. xvi.* (He adds καθιῦδον, but see Veitch, *Greek Verbs*, p. 300.)

### MOODS ('Εγκλίσεις).

83. The moods (*mōdi*) in Greek are: 1. The Indicative (ὁριστικὴ ἔγκλισις). 2. The Subjunctive (ὑποτακτική). 3. The Optative (εὐκτική). 4. The Imperative (προστακτική). Besides these, there are: 5. the Infinitive (ἀπαρέμφατος); and 6. the Participle (μέροχος); but the two latter, including the verbal adjective in -τέος, are by modern grammarians usually treated as verbal nouns, and not as moods.

Protagoras is said to have been the first to distinguish the different moods of verbs.†

The first four of these moods are called personal, the latter impersonal, as having less formal reference to a subject.

The nomenclature of the moods is far from perfect. 'The indicative, i.e. mood of declaration, is continually used where no declaration is made,—in interrogatives for example, and in conditionals. The optative has very many uses with which the expression of a wish has no concern, and has moreover quite as good a claim to the title of subjunctive.' (Harper.)

\* Exclusive of *prodelisions* like those in *Ed. T.* 1602, 1608, *Hec.* 387, there are only a few instances of an omission of the augment in tragedy at the beginning of lines in the speeches of messengers. And the augment is sometimes omitted in the pluperfect—usually so in the New Testament. See Winer's *Gram.* § xiii. 8.

† See the authorities quoted in Donaldson, *New Crat.* p. 204, 2nd ed.

## CLASSES OF VERBS.

VERBS IN  $\mu$ .

84. There are two main classes of verbs, those in  $\omega$ , and those in  $\mu$ .

The former (verbs in  $\omega$ ) are far the most numerous; the latter are the oldest. That this is the case appears, because :

1. The pronouns which formed all person-endings are least obliterated, and most easily recognisable in verbs in  $\mu$  (see ante § 72); and besides, these person-endings are attached directly to the stem, as  $\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\text{-}\mu\epsilon\nu$ ,  $\dot{\delta}\dot{\iota}\text{-}\dot{\chi}\text{-}\mu\epsilon\nu$ , whereas the verbs in  $\omega$  require a *connecting vowel*, as  $\lambda\dot{u}\text{-}\omega\text{-}\mu\epsilon\nu$ ,  $\tau\mu\dot{a}\text{-}\omega\text{-}\mu\epsilon\nu$ .

2. The verbs in  $\mu$  contain the simplest roots, and involve the most elementary notions, as 'being,' 'going,' 'giving,' 'saying,' 'placing,' &c.

3. This form in  $\mu$  is predominant in Sanskrit, and the *oldest* languages of the Indo-European family.\*

85. Observe that : a. This form of conjugation is only found in a few tenses,—chiefly in the present, impf., and 2nd aor.; but

$\beta$ . *Traces* of a similar form of conjugation appear, especially in the 2nd aorists, in many other verbs, as  $\dot{\epsilon}\beta\eta\nu$  I went,  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\delta}\rho\alpha\nu$  I ran,  $\dot{\epsilon}\tau\lambda\eta\nu$  I endured,  $\dot{\epsilon}\psi\theta\eta\nu$  I anticipated,  $\sigma\chi\epsilon\zeta$  hold! the imperative of  $\dot{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\eta\nu$ ,  $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu$  I was caught,  $\dot{\epsilon}\gamma\eta\omega\nu$  I knew, the imperative  $\pi\dot{\iota}\theta\iota$  drink, and others.

γ. In Latin we find traces of it in *inquam*, *sum*, and in the endings of the 3rd person sing. (as, *stat*=*i\sigma\tau\alpha\iota*, &c.), and 3rd pers. plur. (*dant*=*\delta\dot{\iota}\delta\sigma\tau\iota*), &c.

N. B. i. In the imperf. *\tau\iota\theta\eta\mu* and *\delta\dot{\iota}\delta\omega\mu* follow the analogy of verbs in  $\omega$ , having  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\iota}\theta\eta\eta\nu$ ,  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\iota}\theta\eta\epsilon\zeta$ ,  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\iota}\theta\eta\epsilon\iota$ , and  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\delta}\dot{\iota}\delta\eta\eta\nu$ ,  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\delta}\dot{\iota}\delta\eta\epsilon\zeta$ ,  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\delta}\dot{\iota}\delta\eta\epsilon\iota$  more usually than  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\iota}\theta\eta\nu$ ,  $\eta\zeta$ ,  $\eta$ , and  $\dot{\epsilon}\dot{\delta}\dot{\iota}\delta\omega\nu$ ,  $\omega\zeta$ ,  $\omega$ .

ii. *i\sigma\tau\eta\mu* varies in its tenses between a transitive and intransitive meaning; thus *i\sigma\tau\eta\mu* I place, *i\sigma\tau\eta\nu* I was placing, *\sigma\tau\eta\omega\nu* I will place, *i\sigma\tau\eta\sigma\alpha* I placed; *\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\kappa\alpha* I stand, *\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu* I was standing, *\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\nu* I stood. [Similarly from the present of

\* The *rarity* of verbs in  $\mu$  is no argument against this conclusion; for, when one form has been *nearly* superseded by another, the feeling of analogy works so powerfully in language that the few remaining specimens of the old form soon disappear; thus in Modern Greek even  $\delta\dot{\iota}\delta\omega\mu$ ,  $\tau\iota\theta\eta\mu$  have given way for  $\delta\cdot\delta\hat{\omega}$ ,  $\theta\sigma\hat{\omega}$ .

the German verb *ich stehe* we get our transitive verb *to stay*, and from the perfect *ich stand* our intrans. verb *to stand*. [Don.]

iii. There are 3 aorists in *κα*, *ἔθηκα* I *placed* (pf. *τέθεικα*), *ἔδωκα* I *gave*, *ήκα* I *sent* (pf. *είκα*). Whether these represent an *older*, or merely a modified form of the aorist is uncertain.\* It is remarkable that they are used *mainly* in the singular, the *second* aor. being more common in the plural. On the varying use of first and second aorists, see the admirable *Greek Verbs* of Mr. Veitch, p. 46.

#### VERBS IN -ω.

86. The Dorians made the fut. mid. in *οῦμαι*, hence the following are called *Doric* futures:—

- πίπτω* fut. *πεσοῦμαι*
- κλαίω* fut. *κλαυσοῦμαι* (or *ομαι*)†
- πλέω* fut. *πλευσοῦμαι* (or *ομαι*)
- πνέω* fut. *πνευσοῦμαι* (or *ομαι*)
- φεύγω* fut. *φευξοῦμαι* (or *ομαι*).

87. Contracted futures like *κομιῶ* from *κομίζω* I convey, *σκεδάζω* I scatter, fut. *σκεδῶ*, *τελέω* I accomplish, fut. *τελῶ*, are called *Attic* futures.‡

88. The following futures have no tense sign:—*χέω* I shall pour, *ἐρῶ* I shall say, *ἔδομαι* and *φάγομαι* I shall eat, *πίομαι* I shall drink, *νέομαι* I shall return, *εἰμι*, I will go (compare the English 'I am going (=I shall go) next week.' In fact the verb 'go' involves a notion of futurity,§ as when we are *going to do* a thing; and as in 'The first said unto him, I go, Sir, and went not').

89. There are fourteen verbs in which the fut. mid. has a

\* In *ἴνεγκα*, the borrowed aor. of *φέρω*, the *σ* has been lost; as also in *εἴτα*, *ἔχεα*, *ἔστενα*, and *κέας* from *καίω*.

† In English in the same way we often have *two* forms coexisting, as in swelled and swollen, chided and chode, hanged and hung, rang and rung, &c., but the *tendency* always is to give different meanings to them (i.e. to desynonymise them). We are more alive to these varieties of form assumed by the same tense in Greek, because we have specimens of their language extending over the space of hundreds of years.

‡ A few rare dialectic forms like *κένσω*, *πεφύρομαι*, &c., are called *Æolic* futures.

§ So in Spanish 'Nosotros nos vamos mañana, y ellos salen el dia despues,' we go to-morrow, and they leave the next day. Del Mar's *Span. Gram.* p. 139. See too Veitch, *Greek Verbs*, p. 200.

passive meaning, partly for metrical reasons, partly because the fut. passive was not in use; \* such are

- λέγεσθαι *I shall be said.*
- μισεσθαι, στηνύφεσθαι *I shall be hated.*
- ἀλεσθαι *I shall be taken.*
- δρόσεσθαι *I shall be ruled.*
- έστορεσθαι *I shall be suffered.*
- οἰκεσθαι *I shall be inhabited.*
- τιμήσεσθαι *I shall be honoured.*
- ἐπιτίσεσθαι *I shall be injured.*
- ζημιώσεσθαι *I shall be punished.*

90. The following verbs among others (especially denoting some bodily activity) use the fut. mid. in an *active* meaning. These verbs present an analogy to such verbs as *se taire*, *s'en aller*, &c., which are similarly reflective in form but not in sense.

- φέρεσθαι *I shall bring.*
- ἀκούεσθαι *I shall hear.*
- δακταίσθαι, ἀπολαυσθαι *I shall enjoy.*
- βαίνεσθαι, ἔρχομαι *I shall go (Je m'en irai).*
- γνωσθαι, γνῶσθαι *I shall know.*
- γέλεσθαι *I shall laugh (Je me rirai de).*
- διδρόσκω, διπούσθαι *I shall run.*
- θαυμάζεσθαι, θαυμάσκω *I shall wonder (Je m'étonnerai).*
- θηρίωσθαι *I shall hunt.*
- πλέσθαι, πλέψθαι *I shall steal.*
- στήνειν, στήνομαι στήνοιν *I shall be still (Je me tairai).*
- σωτίζεσθαι, σωτίζομαι ταροῦν *I shall hold my tongue.*
- σπουδάζεσθαι, σπουδάσκω *I shall be busy (Je m'étudierai à).†*

91. The present *πῶς I have come*, *εἰχομαι I have gone*, have a perfect meaning.

The perfects *ἀρώνται I did*, *ἔνεκται I seem*, *εἰκέπομαι I possess*,

\* These verbs tend to prove the theory of the original identity of the passive and middle; and the evolution of the passive *out of* the middle, as is actually the case in the Scandinavian languages. A similar argument might be deduced from the fact that several ancient middle have a passive sense and yet also possess a middle sense, as *διελέγεσθαι I consulted*, *διελέγομαι I desired*, &c. (Chode's *Séminaire*, p. 37.) In the New Testament, *διελέγεσθαι* is constantly used in the sense of *discussing*.

† A list of peculiarities 'to these, as well as of the *commonest* irregular verbs, nouns, &c., has been drawn up by the author, in a little card of three pages, for the use of Hellenic Schools.

οἶδα *I know*, νοίη, μέμνημαι *I remember*, μεμίνι, and some others, have a present meaning.\*

92. The four verbs ζάω *I live*, πεινάω *I hunger*, διψάω *I thirst*, χρόνωμαι *I use*, contract into η not into a; thus the infinitives are ζῆν, πεινῆν, διψῆν, χρῆσθαι,† being contracted from older forms of the infinitive ζάεν, πεινάεν, &c.

93. When a verb has tenses derived from several stems the reason is that originally several verbs were synonymous in meaning. Language at an early stage abounds in synonyms; but at a later period cannot be burdened with this superfluous exuberance, and either desynonymises the words (i.e. uses them to express different shades of meaning) or drops them altogether. Sometimes, as in the cases before us, it retains only one tense of a verb, dropping all the others. Thus the tenses of φέρω are borrowed from three verbs, and also those of φημί, τρέχω, ὄράω, and ἐσθίω.

94. The irregular verbs are precisely those which the learner will encounter most frequently; he can hardly read any page of Greek without finding some which are of constant occurrence. In truth, the irregularity of verbs is often due to their antiquity, and to the fact of their expressing conceptions so common as to be most liable to phonetic corruption from the wear and tear of language. Philologically speaking, too, such verbs are generally the most interesting, since their very peculiarities often reveal to us secrets respecting the growth and structure of language at which we might otherwise guess in vain.

95. Verbs in ἀω, ἐω, εύω, ὥσσω, imply *to be* or *to have* that which the name signifies, as κομάω *I have long hair*, φιλέω *I am a friend*, φονεύω *I am a murderer*, ὑπνώσσω *I am sleeping*.

96. *Causatives* usually end in ὁω, ιζω, ὄζω, ὑνω, as δουλώω *I make a slave*, πολεμίζω *I make war*, ἄρμόζω *I fit*, ἡδύνω *I sweeten*, σημίνω *I signify*, κοιλαίνω *I make hollow*.

\* Rien n'est plus facile que d'expliquer cette irrégularité apparente : θνήσκω je meurs, τέθυνκα j'ai souffert la mort ; donc, je suis mort ; κτένωμαι j'acquiers, κέκτημαι j'ai acquis ; donc, je possède.'—Burnouf, *Gr. Gram.* § 254.

† The infinitive of these contract verbs should not have the *iota subscript*, as they have in many editions; τὰ εἰς ἄν ἀπαρέμφατα οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐπογγεγραμμένον. Έτι τὰ εἰς ν λήγοντα βήματα οὐδέποτε ἔχει πρὸ τοῦ ν τις αιεκφάνητον.—*Etym. Magn.* See Viger, *Idiot.* p. 220.

97. When a noun gives rise to several derivative forms they differ in meaning, as

*πολεμώ* I make hostile,\* *πολεμέω* I am at war, *πολεμίζω* I make war.

*πλουτέω* I am rich, *πλουτίζω* I enrich.

*δουλώω* I enslave, *δουλεύω* I am a slave.

*όρμέω* I lie at anchor, *όρμιζω* I bring to anchor (*όρμαω* I stir up, is from a different root).

*βίπτω jacio* I throw, *βιπτώ jacto* I boast, *βιπτάζω* I throw often.

98. *Frequentatives* usually end in *άζω*, *ίζω*, *ύζω*, as *στενάζω*, *ώθιζω*, *έρπυζω*.

99. *Inceptives* in *σκω*,† as *ηβάσκω juvenesco*, *γηράσκω senesco*, *μεθύσκω* I begin to make drunk, &c.

100. *Desideratives* in *σείω*, as *γελασείω* I am inclined to laugh, *δρασείω* I want to do, *πολεμησείω* I should like to go to war, *έργασείω* I long to work; cf. esurio, parturio, &c.

Obs. i. The inceptive form *σκω* has the same *iterative* meaning as the Epic substitution of *σκον* for the augment, e.g. *δινεύσκε* for *ἐδίνενε*, *γόασκεν* for *ἔγέα*.

ii. The desiderative form *σείω* is probably ‘an old future in *-σείω*, of which the corresponding aorist is found in the so-called *Æolic* aorist optative in *σεια*, as *τύψεια*.‡

### COMPOUND WORDS.

101. There are two kinds of compounds, *Synthetic* and *Parathetic*.

102. i. Parathetic compounds are formed by the mere juxtaposition of two separate words, as *ναυσικλυτός*, *famous for ships* (*ναυσὶ κλυτός*), *γαστρίμαργος* *greedy*, *κυνόσσημα* *the dog's tomb*, &c.

ii. The commonest class of parathetic compounds in Greek is furnished by the junction of verbs with prepositions, hence these compounds admit of *tmesis*, as *κατὰ πίονα μήρι' ἔκπαι*, or *ἐκ δέ οἱ ἡγίοχος πλήγη φρένας*; this tmesis is found, though

\* Where a verb has two forms, one in *δω* and one in *έω*, the former is usually transitive, the latter neuter; e.g. *πολεμοῦν* to make an enemy of, *πολεμεῖν* to be at war.

† Some verbs in *ιδω* have a quasi inceptive meaning, as *ἰλιγγίω* I grow dizzy, *κελαινίω* I grow black, *ώχριω* I grow pale, &c.

‡ See *New Cratylus*, § 386.

rarely, even in Attic, as *ἐκ δ' ἤστ'* (Soph. *Tr.* 565), *ἐκ δὲ πηδήσας* (*Eur. Hec.* 1172). See too *Ant.* 420, 427, 432.

Sometimes even, in Homer, the preposition follows, as *ἐνάριζον ἄπ' ἔντεα*.

iii. Yet merely parathetic as the compound is, a verb is often entirely altered in meaning by the preposition with which it is compounded; e.g. *γνώσκω* is *I know*, but *ἀναγιγνώσκω* *I read*; *καταγιγνώσκω* *I condemn*, *ἐπαγγιγνώσκω* *I decide*, *μεταγιγνώσκω* *I change my mind*, *συγγιγνώσκω* *I pardon*. Hence such a sentence as '*Ανέγνως ἀλλ' οὐκ έγνως· εἰ γὰρ έγνως οὐκ ἀν κατέγνως*', you read it but did not understand; for had you understood you would not have condemned.

So, too, *ἀκοίω* *I hear*; *ἐπακούω* *I overhear*; *ἐπακούω* *I answer the door*; *εἰπακούω* *I obey*; *παρακούω* *I mishear*, &c.

**103.** Synthetic compounds consist of elements which are not separable, but have been modified before being moulded into one organic whole, as *μεγαλόδοξος*, *παντομίσης*.

**104.** i. Adjectives and nouns in composition usually assume their crude form, as *πολύπονος*, *μεγαλόπολις*, and if any connecting vowel be needed, *o* is generally used, as in *πατροκτόνος*, *φυαιολόγος*.

ii. This *o* is not contracted if the second part of the word originally began with a digamma, as in *μηνοειδής*, *όρθοεπής*, *μενοεικής*.

iii. Some synthetic compounds are however joined by the letter *η*, as *ξιφηφόρος*, *έλαφηβόλος*, *άσπιδηφόρος*, *θανατηφόρος*, *στεφανηφόρος*. This may possibly have arisen from a desire to avoid the concurrence of short syllables, since side by side with these forms we find *ξιφοκτόνος*, *έλαφοκτόνος*, *άσπιδοφέρμων*, *στεφανοτούς*.

**105.** In these compounds both words are generally significant, as in *ζυγηφόρος*. Sometimes however one half is merely poetical and ornamental, as in *μονόσκηπτρος θρόνος*, *γίννα θηλύσπορος*, *ἄνηρ οἰστ' αντονος*. And frequently one half of the word has become superfluous, and lost all its meaning, the entire compound being only accepted in some secondary sense, as *μονόψηφον ξίφος* a single (-voting) sword, *οιόφρων πέτρα* a lonely (-minded) rock, *ιπποκόμος καμήλων* a (horse-) groom of camels, *νέκταρ ἐφνοχέει*, &c. So in Sanskrit *aṣwa-gō-shṭha* a horse cow-stall, and even *gō-gō-shṭha* a cow-cow-stall.\*

N.B. i. Notice that *λιθόβιλος*=pelted; *λιθοβόλος*=pelting; *μητρόκτονος*=killed by his mother; *μητροκτόνος*=matricide.

\* See Pott, *Zählmethode*, p. 127. I have collected many other instances in my *Chapters on Language*, p. 217, and may add 'brass fire-irons,' 'tin shoe-horns,' 'wooden mile-stones,' &c.

ii. Compounds of *ἴργάζομαι*, if they imply *bodily action* only are oxytone, as *λιθουργός*, *ἀμτελουργός*; but on the other hand we have *πανούργος*, *κακοῦργος*, *περίεργος*, &c. implying moral action.

**106.** Latin has to a great extent lost—perhaps by contact with some aboriginal language—the rich power of composition possessed by Sanskrit and by Greek. ‘Faciliore ad duplicanda verba Græco sermone.’—Liv. xxvii, 11. Even in historical times we can trace something of the loss. Virgil, for instance, has no compound words to compare with the ‘*Ubi cerva silvicultrix ubi aper nemorivagus*’ of Catullus.

**107.** It is an important and almost invariable law in Greek that a verb never occurs as a synthetic compound except as derived from some other synthetic compound. ‘Verba non possunt nisi per flexuram quandam cum aliis orationis partibus præter præpositiones consociari,’ observes Lobeck. In other words, ‘a verb, without losing its nature, can only be compounded with a preposition. When any other word is to be compounded with a verbal stem a noun is first formed of the two, and then a verb is derived from the noun.’ Hence such words as *λιθοβάλλω*, *ἰπποτρέφω*, *ναυμάχομαι*, *εἰνυγχάνειν*, *μετριοπάσχειν*, &c. would be simple monstrosities in Greek; the only admissible forms being *λιθοβολέω* (from the intermediate substantive *λιθοβόλος*), *ἱπποτρόφεω* (from *ἱπποτρόφος*), *ναυμαχέω* (from *ναύμαχος*), *εύτυχέω* (from *εὐτυχής*), *μετριοπαθεῖν* (from *μετριοπαθής*).

**108.** Apparent violations of this rule are either wrong readings or the result of carelessness, as in Euripides *συνασφεῖν*, *δυσθνήσκειν*, *σταδιοδραμοῦμαι*, *κακοβούλευθεῖσα*. The latter however should be *σταδιοδρομήσω* (*Herc. F. 863*), *κακοβούληθεῖσα* (*Ion, 867*), and were probably altered by some ignorant copyist.

In the N. Test. we have *εὐδόκεῖν* *to be well pleased*; and *καραδοκεῖν* *to expect earnestly* is found in some writers. Even Scaliger had seen that such a verb as *εἴναγγέλλω* is not Greek, ‘nam τὸ εὖ καὶ τὰ στερητικὰ μόρια componuntur non cum verbis sed cum nominibus.’ The careless violation of analogy in the *δυσθνήσκω* of Euripides (*Rhes. 791, El. 834*) may be due to the metrical impossibility of *δυσθνανατέω*; yet in any other dramatist we should have been more surprised to find it.\*

---

\* *New Cratylus*, p. 624. For a list of other careless peculiarities of Euripides see Bernhardy, *Griechische Syntax*, s. 14.

**109.** The same rule applies to *abstract substantives*. Compounds like λιθοβολή, ναυμάχη, εύπρᾶξις would be impossibilities in Greek; the substantive must receive a derivative ending as λιθοβολία, ναυμαχία, εύπρᾶξία.

**110.** Hence the word ‘telegram’ is a monstrosity,—‘a spot of barbarity impressed so deep on the English language that criticism never can wash it away.’ From the words τῆλε and γράφω might have been formed the substantive τηλεγράφος, and then through the verb τηλεγραφέω the abstract substantive *telegrapheme*.\* ‘*Telegram*’ violates the laws of Greek synthesis, and if it meant anything, could only mean ‘a letter at a distance.’ It must be regarded as a convenient English hybrid; and unfortunately many English hybrids are by no means convenient. It is said that we owe many of them, and this among the number, to the French.

\* Cf. from ζῷον and γράφω, ζωγράφος, ζωγραφέω, and then ζωγραφημα  
a painting. Plat. *Phil.* 39 D.

## SYNTAX.

1. SYNTAX (*σύνταξις*, *constructio*, arrangement) gives the rules for expressing or arranging sentences.

2. When a sentence, however short, offers a complete sense, it is called a *proposition* (*ἀποτελής λόγος oratio*), i.e. an expression of judgment.

3. A sentence must consist of three parts—

*a.* The *subject*, or thing spoken of.

*β.* The *predicate*, i.e. what is stated of the subject.

*γ.* The *copula*,\* some separate verb expressed or understood, or *some lingual contrivance* to express the mental act which connects the subject and predicate.

N.B. i. As both the copula and subject are often *understood*, or merely implied in the termination of a verb, a sentence may be expressed in Greek and Latin by a *single word*, as *ἵστη*, *θρονᾷ*, *ἔσεισε*, *σακνίζει*, it rains, it thunders, there is an earthquake, the trumpeter is blowing. In English and most modern languages, at least two words are required, since, owing to the analysing tendency, we *express* the pronouns even when they are unemphatic.

ii. Most forms of the finite verb make a sentence, containing these three parts; e.g. *τίκτω* means 'I (*subject*) am (*copula*) striking (*predicate*).'

iii. Whatever may be the length of a simple sentence (i.e. a sentence that contains but one finite verb), it can always be reduced to these three parts, all other words being accessory either to the subject or the *predicate*; e.g. The virtuous and happy old man lived in peace and prosperity; here 'the virtuous, &c. man' is the subject, 'was' is the copula, 'living in,' &c. is the predicate.

iv. A compound sentence (i.e. a sentence that has more than one finite verb in it) may contain many simple sentences which are called its *clauses*.

v. Clauses are either *coordinate*, i.e. of equal importance with the main sentence, as 'Alexander conquered Darius, and died young' (*καρδιτάτις*); or *subordinate*, as 'Alexander collected an army that he might conquer' (*δικτραξις*).

---

\* The copula belongs however rather to logic than to syntax; in Greek it is constantly omitted. Thus *ἄγαθὸς δὲ ἄνθρ* means 'the man *is* good,' but we in English must express the 'is,' to give any meaning. On the supposed necessity of this copula, see *Origin of Language*, p. 104 seqq.

## THE ARTICLE ("Αρθρον").\*

**4.** The Article ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, was originally a demonstrative pronoun, which also served as a personal pronoun; as in Homer—

φθίσει σε τὸ σὸν μένος *that courage of thine will ruin thee.*†

τὴν ἐγώ οὐ λύσω *her I will not set free.*

Δητοῦς καὶ Διὸς νιός· ὁ γὰρ βασιλῆς χολωθεῖς κ.τ.λ. *the son of Leto and of Zeus; for he angry with the king, &c.*

ὡς ἔφατ· ἔδεισεν δὲ ὁ γέρων· *So said he; but he, the old man, feared.*

N.B. In this last, and in similar instances, ὁ is not an article,† but a pronoun in apposition, as in '*The Lord, He is the God.*'

'*My banks, they are furnished with bees.*'—Shenstone.

**5.** Even when ὁ, ἡ, τὸ had developed into a definite article (like our 'the'), it was used as a demonstrative; § as

τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, 'for we are also *his* offspring.'

—Aratus, quoted in *Acts xvii. 28.*

τρὸ τοῦ, before this (German *ehedem*).

ἡ τοῖσιν ἡ τοῖς πόλεμον αἱρεσθαι to take up war against *these or those.*

οἱ ἐν ἀστει *those in the city.*

\* The word *Ἄρθρον* in this sense is first found in Aristotle, *Poet. xx.* It means 'a joint' or 'limb'; see Egger, *Apollon. Dyscol.* pp. 112, 118.

† The τὸ in this, and similar examples, merely adds to the emphasis, and is like the use of the Latin 'ille' before possessive pronouns, as 'ille tuus pater,' that father of yours; it is retained in the Romance languages,—as '*il mio cavallo*,' &c. It is a constant Spanish idiom to use the article in a demonstrative sense as a personal pronoun, as '*El que es sabio*' *He* (lit. *the*) that is wise.

‡ In some instances however this demonstrative is, even in Homer, *to all intents and purposes* an article; e.g. *Il. vii. 412, xii. 289, τὸ δὲ τεῖχος ὅπερ πᾶν δῶντος δρόπει,* &c. Apollonius *Dyscol. Synt.* i. 31. But these instances are not numerous; and on the other hand it is often omitted where an article is required, as *ηῆν δέ μοι ήδ' ἔστηκεν ἐπ' ἄγρου νοσφὶ πολῆσος* far from the city.

ἢλλοι μέν ἡα θεοί τε καὶ ἀνέρες *the rest of gods and men.*

§ Similarly, in Hebrew הַ was originally a demonstrative, and occasionally retains its demonstrative force, as in *הַיּוֹם this day.*

6. Especially with various particles, as *μέν*, *δέ*, *καὶ*, &c.

*ἴβλαψέ με ὁ δεῖνα τὸ καὶ τὸ ποιήσας* so and so injured me  
doing this and that (or doing such and such a thing).  
*καὶ μοι κάλει τὸν καὶ τὸν* now call me so and so.  
*οἱ μὲν ἐθαίμαζον, οἱ δὲ ἐβόων* some were in astonishment,  
others were shouting.

7. This demonstrative pronoun (*ό*, *ἡ*, *τὸ*) also served originally for the relative (*ὅς* *ἥ* *ὅ*),\* with which it is most closely connected. In fact *ὅς τε* not *ὅς* means 'who' in Homer (*τε* = *qui*); or, in other words, language originally states *co-ordinatively* what was afterwards made *subordinate*.

*ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πολιῶν ἐξεπράθομεν τὰ δέδασται* the things  
which we sacked from the cities *those things* have been  
divided.—*Il. i.* 125.

This usage continued in Ionic, and even in Attic, as

*τὰ μὲν Ὁράνης εἶπε . . . λελέχθω κάμοι ταῦτα* the things  
which Otanes said, &c.

*διπλῆ μάστιγι, τὴν Ἀρης φιλεῖ* (*Aesch. Ag. 642*), with  
the double scourge, which Ares loves.

It is even continued in Modern Greek, as *τὰ φέρνει η θρα* what an hour  
brings. (Clyde.)

8. Possibly *ὅς* *ἥ* *τὸ* was the original form of this demonstrative, and the *ς* was dropped because (e.g.) *ὁ(ς)* *ἄγαθὸς ἄνηρ* would not sound well; just as in German we have *der gute Mann* not *der gute(r) Mann*. "Ος in Attic is still demonstrative in the phrases *καὶ ὅς* and *he*, *ἥ δ'* *ὅς* *said he*, &c.

9. We see then that the article, the demonstrative, and the relative are merely developments of one and the same form.† This is illustrated by the fact that—

a. There is no article in Latin, in which *hic* and *ille* serve the same purpose, when anything very definite is wanted. '*Noster sermo articulos non desiderat*,' says Quintilian (*Instt. Or. i. iv. 19*). It must however be admitted that the article if unnecessary is at any rate very convenient. So far from

\* 'Thus too in English the demonstrative *that* has come to be also a relative'—Clyde, *Gr. Synt.* p. 9.

† In fact they are all three simply *determinative adjectives*. Du Méril, *Form. de la Langue franq.* p. 60.

being, as J. C. Scaliger called it, ‘*otiosum loquacissime gentis instrumentum*,’ it adds to language a most desirable precision.\*

β. The article has been developed by the Romance languages (i.e. those derived from Latin) *out of the demonstrative pronoun ille*, as:

In French *le, la, les.*

In Italian *il, lo, la, i, gli, le.*

In Spanish *el, la, los, las.*

In Wallachian *lu, a; le, i.*†

In Sanskrit the article did not exist, the demonstrative *sas, sa, tat* being used instead (as in Latin); nor does it occur in Slavonic and Lithuanian.

γ. The same three uses of the article (as article, demonstrative, and relative) are found in German, as *Der Mensch, den* (relative) *ich befriedete, der* (demonstrative) *hat's gethan, the man whom I befriended, he* has done it (Clyde). The demonstrative *der* has been applied as a definite article, just as the Anglo-Saxon ‘*that*’ has become ‘*the*.’ Similarly, in many languages, the indefinite article *a* or *an* (the Scotch *ane*) has been developed out of the numeral *one*.

\* Duclos cites, as instances of the precision attainable by the use of articles, the sentences—

α. Charles est fils de Louis

β. — un fils —

γ. — le fils —

Here α. expresses the general fact; β. shows that Charles has brothers; γ. shows that Charles is an only son. Here then one may see both the desirability of the article, and the absurdity of Scaliger’s remark, ‘Displeased with the redundancy of particles in the Greek, the Romans extended their displeasure to the article, which they totally banished!’ Prof. Tritthen observes that his arrogant dictum ‘*Articulus nobis nullus, et Grecis superfluous*’ is much as if he had said ‘There are no Alps in England; they exist in Switzerland, but they are superfluous.’ (*Trans. of the Philolog. Soc.* 1850, p. 11.) Moreover, colloquial Latin in all probability did use the pronouns as definite articles, and the numeral as an indefinite article; hence such phrases as Terence’s ‘*Forte unam aspicio adolescentulam.*’—*Andria*, i. i. 91. This is an instance of one of ‘those instincts of clearness which anticipate grammatical development.’ For other methods by which the Latin makes up for its want of an article, see Nägelsbach, *Latinische Stylistik*, § 3.

† See Clyde’s *Gr. Syntax*. In Wallachian the article is *suffixed*, just as *ille* may follow its word in Latin, as *ochiu’l* for *ochiu’ il*, *Musc’ei* for *Musc’ lei*. (Du Méril, p. 362.) It has also formed the articles *aquestu*, *aquelu*, from *hic iste, hic ille*. In the Romance languages the article still constantly retains its demonstrative force, as in Spanish, ‘*Mis libros y los que el tiene*,’ *my books and the* which he has; ‘*Los de vuestra nacion*,’ *those of your nation*; in French ‘*Le roi le veut*,’ the king wills it, &c.

## CHIEF USES OF THE ARTICLE.

10. The Greek article (as in English) either (i.) specifies and individualises, as—

οὗτοῦ ἐσφάχθη *the ox* (which you know of) has been killed:

Or (ii.) generalises, i.e. represents an *individual* as belonging to a *class*—

οὗτοῦ καὶ τῶν χρησιμώτατον ἐστι *the ox is a most useful animal.*

Both uses exist in modern languages. Thus, in German, *Der Mensch* ist sterblich *Man* is mortal; in Spanish, *El caballo es animal noble* *The horse is a noble animal*, &c.

11. In the latter case we often use our indefinite article *a*, *an*, as—

τὰ σημεῖα τοῦ ἀποστόλου *the signs of an apostle.*—2 Cor. xiii. 12.

οὐδὲ . . . τιθέασιν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῷ λαχνῷ they do not put it under a bushel but on a candlestick.—Mt. v. 15.

δεῖ τὸν στρατιώτην τὸν ἄρχοντα φοβεῖσθαι *a soldier should fear his general.*

12. The article is only used with proper names\* when they have been previously mentioned, or to call special attention to them, as οἱ Σωκράτες; but not generally if *any* designation is added, as Σωκράτης ὁ οὐλόσοφος, Θουκυδίης ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, Κροῖσος ὁ τῶν Λέων βασιλεὺς. So in Southern Germany *Der Johann* (i.e. John, i.e. our servant John) soll das Pferd bringen is to bring the horse. And we talk of *the* O'Donoghue, *the* Chisholm, &c. (*Clyde.*) In French this is common when names are used familiarly, as ‘*la Taglioni*, &c.

13. Words signifying objects of which only *one* exists, are

\* Names of places are expressed very variously with the article, as Ηράκλειον *the* river Euphrates; ἡ Άιτνη *the* Mount Etna; Ήπειρος *the* Mount Parnes; Σαλαμίς *the* Sicily; ἡ πόλις of Tarsos (the city of Tarsus &c.). The *αὐτός* order however is δέ Εδέράτης ποταμὸς *the* river Eudeates; δέ Βολβός *the* lake Bolbe; τὸ Αἰγαλέων ὄρος *Mount Aegaleus*; δέ θεραπεύη *the* Thesprotian land; ἡ Δῆλος *the* Delos. The substantive and proper name are really in apposition, and a similar collation is not uncommon in English poetry, as *Ungovern'd Nature striveth*, &c.

used as proper names, and need take no article, as Βασιλεὺς the king of Persia,\* ἐν ἀστεῖ ‘in town,’ ἐν ἀγορᾷ at market, ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ at sea, νυκτὶς by night, &c. Hence ἥλιος, γῆ, &c. and the names of virtues and vices are often anarthrous.

14. The article distinguishes the *subject* from the predicate, as :

Βασιλεὺς ἐγένετο τὸ πτωχάριον the beggar became a king.  
νῦν ἡ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο day was turned into night.

Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος the Word was God.

15. Often Greek (like French) uses the article where we use the possessive pronoun ;† as :

ἄλγω τὴν κεφαλὴν j'ai mal à la tête, my head aches.

ὁ βασιλεὺς σὸν τῷ στρατεύματι the king with his army.

ἔχει ὄξεις τοὺς ὄφθαλμοὺς his eyes are sharp (compare the French il a les yeux beaux, and the Italian egli ha la vista acuta).

16. You may say in Greek either ἄγαθὸς ἄνηρ, or ἄνηρ ἄγαθὸς for a good man; but ‘the good man’ (and every similar collocation) must be in Greek in the same order as the English :

ὁ ἄγαθὸς ἄνηρ the good man,

or which is equally correct but more pleonastic ὁ ἄνηρ ὁ ἄγαθος.

17. The attributive genitive follows the same order, as ἡ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀρετὴ or ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ Θεμιστοκλέους, δ'Αθηναίων δῆμος or δῆμος δ'Αθηναίων; and this holds true no matter how many intermediate words are interposed, as in

τὸ τῆς τοῦ ϕαινοτος τέχνης ἔργον the work of the wool-carder's art.

ἡ τῶν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα πραττόντων ἀρετὴ the virtue of our statesmen.

In phrases like ‘my mother,’ ‘thy word,’ the order is ἡ ἔμη μήτηρ, or ἡ μήτηρ μου, δ σὸς λόγος, or δ λόγος σου.

N.B.—The attributive genitive must have the article, if the noun on which it depends has it, unless there be some special reason to the contrary, as

ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα the husbandman's opinion.

τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς κάλλος the beauty of virtue.

18. But if the adjective, when it occurs with a substantive

\* The king of Persia was called *βασιλεὺς* king, or *β. δ. μέγας*, but not *δ. β.*, e.g. *οἱ πρόγονοι* of *βασιλέως*.

† ‘The Greek article here denotes that the *subject* has a definite kind of property it is known to possess.’—Winer, III. § xviii. 2.

## CHIEF USES OF THE ARTICLE.

**10.** The Greek article (as in English) either (i.) specifies and individualises, as—

ὁ βοῦς ἐσφάχθη *the ox* (which you know of) has been killed;

Or (ii.) generalises, i.e. represents *an individual* as belonging to a class—

ὁ βοῦς ζῷον χρησιμώτατόν ἐστι *the ox* is a most useful animal.

Both uses exist in modern languages. Thus, in German, *Der Mensch* ist sterblich *Man* is mortal; in Spanish, *El caballo* es animal noble *The horse* is a noble animal, &c.

**11.** In the latter case we often use our indefinite article *a*, *an*, as—

τὰ σημεῖα τοῦ ἀποστόλου *the signs of an apostle*.—2 Cor. xii. 12.

οὐδὲ . . . τιθέασιν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τὸν μόδιον ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τὴν λυχνίαν they do not put it under a bushel but on a candlestick.—Mt. v. 15.

δεῖ τὸν στρατιώτην τὸν ἄρχοντα φοβεῖσθαι a soldier should fear his general.

**12.** The article is only used with proper names\* when they have been previously mentioned, or to call special attention to them, as ὁ Σωκράτης; but not generally if *any* designation is added, as Σωκράτης ὁ φιλόσοφος, Θουκυδίδης ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, Κροῖσος ὁ τῶν Λιδῶν βασιλεὺς. So in Southern Germany *Der Johann* (*the John*, i.e. our servant John) soll das Pferd bringen is to bring *the horse*. And we talk of *the O'Donoghue*, *the Chisholm*, &c. (*Clyde*.) In French this is common when names are used familiarly, as 'la Taglioni,' &c.

**13.** Words signifying objects of which only *one* exists, are

\* Names of places are expressed very variously with the article, as δοταμὸς ὁ Εὐφράτης *the river Euphrates*; ἡ Αἴτη τὸ ὄρος Mount Etna; Πάρνης τὸ ὄρος Mount Parnes; Σικελία ἡ νῆσος Sicily; ἡ πόλις τοῦ Ταρσοῦ the city of Tarsus, &c. The common order however is ὁ Εὐφράτης ποταμὸς the river Euphrates; ἡ Βολβὴ λίμνη the lake Bolbe; τὸ Αἰγαλεῖον ὄρος Mount Egeleum; ἡ Θεσπρωτίς γῆ the Thesprotian land; ἡ Δῆλος νῆσος the isle of Delos. The substantive and proper name are really in *apposition*, and a similar collocation is not uncommon in English poetry, as 'This great Oxus stream,' &c.

used as proper names, and need take no article, as Βασιλεὺς the king of Persia,\* ἐν ἀστει 'in town,' ἐν ἀγορᾷ at market, ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ at sea, νυκτὸς by night, &c. Hence ἥλιος, γῆ, &c. and the names of virtues and vices are often anarthrous.

14. The article distinguishes the *subject* from the predicate, as :

βασιλεὺς ἐγένετο τὸ πτωχάριον the beggar became a king.  
νῦξ ἡ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο day was turned into night.

Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος the Word was God.

15. Often Greek (like French) uses the article where we use the possessive pronoun ;† as :

ἀλγῶ τὴν κεφαλὴν j'ai mal à la tête, my head aches.

ὁ βασιλεὺς σὺν τῷ στρατεύματι the king with his army.

ἔχει οἱεῖς τοὺς ὄφθαλμους his eyes are sharp (compare the French il a les yeux beaux, and the Italian egli ha la vista acuta).

16. You may say in Greek either ἄγαθὸς ἀνήρ, or ἀνὴρ ἄγαθὸς for a good man; but 'the good man' (and every similar collocation) *must be in Greek in the same order as the English*:

ὁ ἄγαθὸς ἀνὴρ the good man,

or which is equally correct but more pleonastic ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἄγαθος.

17. The attributive genitive follows the same order, as ἡ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀρετὴ or ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ Θεμιστοκλέους, δ' Αθηναίων δῆμος or δῆμος δ' Αθηναίων; and this holds true no matter how many intermediate words are interposed, as in

τὸ τῆς τοῦ ξανινούτος τέχνης ἔργον the work of the wool-carder's art.

ἡ τῶν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα πραττόντων ἀρετὴ the virtue of our statesmen.

In phrases like 'my mother,' 'thy word,' the order is ἡ ἔμη μήτηρ, or ἡ μήτηρ μου, δος λόγος, or δ λόγος σου.

N.B.—The attributive genitive must have the article, if the noun on which it depends has it, unless there be some special reason to the contrary, as

ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα the husbandman's opinion.

τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καλλος the beauty of virtue.

18. But if the adjective, when it occurs with a substantive

\* The king of Persia was called *Βασιλεὺς* king, or *β. δ μέγας*, but not *δ β.*, e.g. *οι πρέγονοι οι Βασιλέως*.

† 'The Greek article here denotes that the *subject* has a definite kind of property it is known to possess.'—Winer, III. § xviii. 2.

and article, is placed *either first or last*, it becomes a *predicate*; as:

ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἄνηρ good (is) the man.  
ὁ ἄνηρ ἀγαθός the man (is) good.

**19.** This must be specially noticed in all the cases; thus:

οἱ λόγοι ψευδεῖς ἐλέχθησαν not 'the false words' but 'the words spoken' were *false*.

ὅ μάντης τοὺς λόγους ψευδεῖς λέγει the words which the prophet utters are *false*.

**20.** When the adjective thus occurs in the accus. after a *verbo* it is called a *tertiary predicate*, and must often be rendered in English by a relative sentence, as:

ὅξιν ἔχει τὸν πέλεκυν the axe which *he has* is sharp.

ἔχει τὴν δορὰν ισχυροτάτην the hide which *it has* is very strong.

ἀρχαῖα δρῶμαι τὰ πῆματα the woes which *I see* are ancient.

διπλᾶ δὲ ἔτισαν θάμαρτια the penalty which *they paid* has been two-fold.

οὐ γὰρ βάναυσον τὴν τέχνην ἐκτησάμην for the art which *I acquired* is no mean one.

ἀφίεσαν τὴν δοκὸν χαλαραῖς ταῖς ἀλύσεσι they let down the beam with the chains loosened.

ἐνέπρησαν τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους they burned down the tents, deserted as they were.

ζεύχθη δένυχολος ταῖς δρύαντος the son of Dryas, because *he was keen in wrath*, was bound.

κανταῦθ' ὁ παῖς δίντηνος οὐτ' ὁδυρμάτων ἐλείπετ' ὁνδὲν and thereupon the boy, unhappy as he was, was neither lacking in lamentations, &c.

**21.** Sometimes the law of the position of the article *appears* to be violated, as in

μηθὲν ὁ λυμεδὼν ἐμὸς nor he who is my outrager.—Soph. *Aj.* 572.

Ζεὺς σ' ὁ γεννήτωρ ἐμὸς Zeus who is my father.—Eur. *Hipp.* 683.

τῶμπέχονον ποίησας ἐμὸν ράκος you've made my dress a rag.—Theocr. xxvii. 58.

In all these instances probably the true reading is ἐμοὶ (*New Crat.* p. 487). Some editors however think that the

possessive is emphatic, and content themselves with the remark, '*Articuli collocatio valde inusitata.*'

22. The following examples will illustrate the chief peculiarities of the article:

i. δὶς τοῦ μηνὸς twice a month.

τρία ἡμιδαρεικὰ τοῦ μηνὸς τῷ στρατώγῃ three half darics a month to each soldier.

δραχμὴν τῆς ἡμέρας a drachma a day.

This is called the distributive use of the article; Clyde compares the German, Zweimal *den Monat*, and the Italian due volte *il mese*; so too in French, *un franc la bouteille*, &c.

ii. οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ \* this man.

ἐκεῖνος ὁ λόγος that argument.

ἡδε ἡ γνώμη this opinion.

ἐκάστη ἡ ἀρχὴ each kingdom; or, which is equally correct though less emphatic, ὁ ἀνήρ οὗτος, ἡ γνώμη ἡδε, &c.; but ὁ must NEVER immediately PRECEDE οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, ὅδε, ἔκαστος, ἐκάτερος; preceding αὐτὸς it means 'the same,' as:

ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος the same man; † (homo *idem*).

but ὁ ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς } the man himself; (homo *ipse*).

iii. Notice the difference made by the article in the following phrases:

τριάκοντα thirty, οἱ τριάκοντα the thirty (tyrants).

ένδεκα eleven, οἱ ἔνδεκα the eleven (executioners).

ὅλγοι few, οἱ ὅλγοι the oligarchy.

πλείους more, οἱ πλείους the majority; sometimes=the dead (cf. 'abiit ad *plures*').

πολλοὶ many, οἱ πολλοὶ most, the mob.

ἄλλοι others, οἱ ἄλλοι the rest.

πάντα δέκα ten of each, τὰ πάντα δέκα ten in all.

δύο μέρη two parts, τὰ δύο μέρη two thirds.

ἄλλη χώρα another land, ἡ ἄλλη χώρα, the rest of the land.

ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν every day, ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ἡμέραν all day long.

πᾶσα πόλις every city, πᾶσα ἡ πόλις or ἡ πᾶσα πόλις the whole city. †

\* When οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος, &c. are used without the article, they are in apposition, as ταῦτην ἔχει τέχνην he has this as an art; τούτῳ παραδείγματι χρόμενος using this as an example.

† αὐτὸς, αὐτή, ταῦτο or ταῦτόν, are used for δ αὐτός, ἡ αὐτή, τὸ αὐτό.

‡ The difference between δ πᾶ and πᾶς δ is much the same as that

δοῦλος ἐμὸς a slave of mine, ὁ ἐμὸς δοῦλος that slave of mine.  
ἐσχατον τὸ ὄρος the farthest part of the mountain, τὸ  
ἐσχατον ὄρος the farthest mountain.

ἡ μέση πόλις the middle city, μέση ἡ πόλις or ἡ πόλις  
μέση the middle of the city.

τὸ μέσον τεῖχος the middle wall, μέσον τὸ τεῖχος the  
middle of the wall.

τοὺς ἄκρους ποσὶν with the toes, ἄκρους τοῖς ποσὶν on tiptoe.  
βασιλεύων ὁ Κύρος Cyrus when he was king, Κύρος ὁ  
βασιλεύων Cyrus, who is king.

τὰ καλὰ the beautiful, τὰ καλὰ things beautiful.

**23.** The article can turn any infinitive into a substantive;

τλήσομαι τὸ κατθανεῖν I will endure to die.

τὸ λέγειν speaking, τοῦ λέγειν of speaking, &c.

So our 'to,' as

'To err is human, to forgive divine'

(like the Italian *il peccare*. Clyde); and even in oblique cases, as Spenser's

'For not to have been dipped in Lethe's stream  
Could save the son of Thetis *from to die*.'

**24.** Observe the phrases *οἱ πάντες*\* the élite, *οἱ πάλαι* the men of old, *τὸ σύμπαν* on the whole, *τὰλλα* for the rest, *τὰ πολλὰ* for the most part, *τὰ μάλιστα* in the highest degree, *τὸ ἐπ' ἑμοὶ* for my part, *τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦδε* henceforth, *τὸ ἀρετὴν* the word 'virtue.'

*ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*=*omnium primi*.—Thuc. i. 6.

*ἐν τοῖς πλεῖσται* quite the most.

*τὸ* and *τὸ* *ἐπεὶ* sometimes=therefore (at the beginning of sentences).

*τὸ τῶνδε εὐγονούν* the good will of these; cf. *OEd. Col.* 8, 579, &c., vide § 38.

between 'the whole' and 'all the'; i.e. the difference is almost inappreciable. We might say that *δῶς*, like the Italian *tutto*, meant an indivisible whole; and that *δῶς δ*, like *ogni*, was a distributive whole;—but in point of fact both orders are used in the same clause, as *πᾶσι τοῖς κριταῖς καὶ τοῖς θεαταῖς πᾶσι*.—Ar. *Av.* 444.

\* This *adjectival* use of adverbs is not unknown in English; e.g.

'My *sometime* daughter.'—*King Lear*, Act i. sc. i.

'Mild innocence

A *seldom* comet is.'—*Donne*.

'They hoped for a *soon* and prosperous issue.'—Sidney. 'The *then* Parliament voted,' &c. Even in Latin, though it has no definite article, we find such phrases as '*discessu tum meo*', by my *then* departure. Cic. *Pis.* ix. 21; '*ipsorum deorum sēpe præsentia*', the *frequent* presences of the gods, &c.—Cic. *De Nat. Deor.* II. lxvi. 166; Nügelsbach, *Lat. Styl.* § 75.

## CONCORD.

25. The rules for the three concords are the same in Greek as in Latin. The numerous violations of them which are given below are nearly all self-explaining, and arise from the fact that the Greeks being an extremely quick race, often allowed the *sense* to overrule the *grammar*, or substituted the logic of thought to that of grammatical forms. They saw through the form, and often disregarded it. This important principle of construction is called the *sense-figure*,—*σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημανόμενον*, *constructio ad sensum*, or briefly *kata σύνεσιν*. Hence all such expressions as the following:—

· ὁ ὄχλος . . . ἐπικαράπτοι εἰσιν the people . . . are accursed.—John vii. 49.

φίλα τέκνων dear child.

τὸ μειράκιον ἐγένετο καλὸς the boy grew up handsome.

Τροίαν ἐλόντες . . . στόλος the host, after taking Troy.

φεύγει ἐς Κερκύραν ὡς αὐτῶν εὐεργέτης\* he flies to Corcyra, as being their benefactor.

ἐξ ἐτὴν Σπάρτην ὡς ἡγγέλθη . . . ἐδόξεν αὐτοῖς when it was announced at Sparta, they decided, &c. [compare Gibbon's expression 'Each legion, to whom was allotted,' &c.].

τερπνὸν τράπεζα πλήρης a full table is a good thing.

οἱ παιδές εἰσιν ἀνιαρόν boys are a bore.

ἀδύνατά ἔστιν ἀποφυγεῖν it is impossible (*neut. plur.*) to fly.

ἀμυντέα ἔστιν αὐτῷ we must defend him.

Ἐδέκαν ταῦτα when this had been decreed.

δοκεῖ μοι ὅρῶν it seems to me, seeing, &c.

ἐμὰ κῆδεα θυμοῦ the woes of my heart.

26. Neuter plurals take a verb singular, because mere multitude or mass implies no plurality, or separation of agencies; † in fact, the neut. plur. is an accusative or objective

\* Expressions like 'The ship sailed, and *they* (i.e. the crew) were brave,' or 'The city was in confusion, and *they* voted,' &c., are very common in Greek, which very properly despised a pedantic accuracy of grammatical structure, when the meaning could be quite as clearly expressed with more brevity. In Thuc. i. 110 we find *τρήψεις . . . οὐκ εἰδότες*.

† The neuter plural governing, as they call it, a singular verb, is one of the many instances in Greek of the inward and metaphysic grammar

case, things not animate being regarded as only capable of being acted on. Hence *τὰ ζῶα τρέχει* properly means ‘as to the animals there is running.’ This is called the Attic figure (*σχῆμα Ἀττικόν*), and it exists also in Hebrew and Arabic.

27. But here also the *sense* often controls the *form*, when requisite:

*τὰ τέλη ἐξέτεμψαν* the magistrates sent out.

*σκάρτα λελυταὶ* the ropes have grown slack (i.e. one and all of the ropes).

*τοσάδες ἴθνη ἑστράτευον* so many nations were going to war.

28. Duals agree with plurals, because the dual is a subordinate plural, as

*εἶλετο δ' ἀλκιμα δύοπε* and he grasped two stout spears.—Hom.

In *ἄμφω τὰ τόλες* both the cities (Thuc.) we have a masc. dual with a fem. noun (*τὰ* for *ταὶ*).

29. Sometimes by what is called the *Pindaric or Boeotian figure* a singular verb is put with a plural noun, as *μελιγάρνες υἱονοὶ ὑστέρων ἄρχαι λόγων τέλλεται*.—*Olymp.* xi. 4. Honeyed hymns becomes the origins of later songs. The exigencies of metre have even forced from Shakespeare this violation of syntax, as

‘Hark! hark! the lark at heaven’s gate sings,  
    And Phœbus’ gins arise,  
    His steeds to water at those springs  
        On chaliced flowers that lies.’

This is confined in Attic to *εἰμί*, used impersonally at the beginning of sentences.

*ἔστι γάρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοὶ* I too have altars.

*ἔστιν οἱ=ἴνοι= sunt qui* (cf. *Il est des hommes*).

*ἔστι δ' ἔπτα στάδοι εἴξ* ‘*Ἄβύδον* it is seven stades from Abydos.

*ἥν δὲ ἀμφίπλεκτοι κλίμακες* there was wrestling tricks.—Soph. *Tr.* 520.

resisting successfully the tyranny of formal grammar. In truth, there may be *multeity* in things, but there can only be *plurality* in persons. Observe also that, in fact, a neuter noun in Greek has no real nominative case, though it has a formal one—that is to say, the same word in the accusative. The reason is, a *thing* has no subjectivity or nominative case; it exists only as an object in the accusative or oblique case.’—Coleridge, *Table Talk*.

We have the same idiom; e.g. 'it is now a hundred years since,' &c. Dr. Priestley defends the propriety of a singular verb after 'there' even when a plural follows.\* Compare the French *il y a des hommes*; and the German '*Es sind Menschen.*'

30. A singular and plural are often mixed† by what is called 'the whole and part figure' (*σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος*); as

*ἴμενον ἐν τῇ ἑωτοῦ τάξει ἔκαστος* *they stayed, each in his own rank.*

*οὐτοὶ μὲν ἄλλος ὅλο λέγει* *they say, some one thing, some another* (cf. Matt. xviii. 35).

31. The plural of excellence (by which a person says 'we') often leads to a mixture of concords,‡ as

*ἢν θάνω θανούμεθα* if I die, we will die.

So in Ovid:

'Et flesi et *nostros* vidisti *flentis* ocellos.'

32. A woman using the plural also uses the masculine; thus Electra says:

*πεσούμεθ' εἰ χρὴ πατρὶ τιμωρούμενοι.*—Soph. *El.* 391.

33. *ἄγε, φέρε, ιδέ,* *εἰπέ,* being merely interjectional, can be put with plurals; as

*εἰπέ μοι, τι πάσχετ', Θυδρες;*—Ar. *Pax*, 325.

### CASES (Πτώσεις). §

34. The case-endings, which once were separate words although in course of time they have got inseparably united to

\* Such a construction apparently used not to be uncommon; e.g. we find in Dowsing's record of his desecration of Cove Hythe Church in 1643, 'There was four steps with a vault underneath. There was many inscriptions to Jesus in capital letters,' &c.

† Rarely a plural is put between two singulars, as in

*εἰ δέ κ' Ἀρη ἄρχωσι μάχης ἢ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.*—*Π. v.* 138.

This is called the *σχῆμα Ἀλκμανικόν* (see *Lesbonax*, p. 179), from the occurrence in Alcman of the phrase *Κάστωρ τε πάλων ταχέων δυττῆρες καὶ Πολυθεύης* Castor, *tamers* of swift steeds, and Pollux. Bernhardy, *Griech. Synt.* s. 421.

‡ Compare in Hebrew בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל.

§ The word *πτῶσις* 'case' from *πτίτειν* is first found in this sense in Aristotle, *Categor.* i. For a full account of it see Lersch, *Sprachphilos.*

the noun-stems, originally denoted the simplest and most obvious relations, viz. those of place. From these relations, which, as we have seen, were expressed by pronominal elements, the others were developed. There are some languages in which the cases are expressed by entirely separate words; e.g. in Chinese the word *tchi* 'bud' is used for the genitive case, as metaphorically indicating the ideas of dependence and causality.

**35.** The relations of objects may be considered from so many points of view, that we must not be surprised to find that the border-limits of the cases are by no means very definite, and that different cases can be used to express nearly the same conception. Thus *ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς* (*a dextrâ*), *ἐν ἀριστερᾷ*, *ἐκ ἀριστεράν* (*zur Rechten*), *ἐπ' ἀριστερά* are all good Greek for *on the left*; and we can say equally well in English *on the left*, *at the left*, and *to the left*. (Clyde.) The nominative and vocative are generally treated as cases, but they are not really so, because they express no objective relations. The word *πτῶσις casus* in its original meaning (*falling*) is entirely inapplicable to either of them.

**36.** The metaphysical nicety with which the Greek cases are employed rendered their use very difficult to foreigners. This is one of the reasons why in the New Testament prepositions are so often employed where they would be superfluous in classic Greek, as in *διδόται ἐκ*, *ἐσθίειν ἀπό*, *πολεμεῖν μετά*, &c. In Modern Greek the dative case (and the genitive plural) have been entirely displaced by analytical phrases (prepositions, &c.).\*

**37.** Of the eight cases found in Sanskrit (which is probably the oldest language of the Aryan family) the Greek retains but five, and the Latin six; so that we have these three tables:

---

der Alten, ii. 182 seqq. Indeclinable words are called *ἄπτωτα*. The nominative was not regarded as a *πτῶσις*, and hence in Aristotle it is called simply *ὑπομένη*; but each other case was considered *ὡς ἄπτωτος τοῦ δύναμος πεπτωκύα*; they were called *πτῶσεις πλάγιαι, obliqui casus*; and also, by Chrysippus, *ὕπται*. The number of cases differ greatly in different languages. Many modern languages (e.g. French, Italian, &c.) have lost them altogether; Hebrew has two, Arabic three, German four, Greek five, Latin six, Russian seven, Sanskrit eight; while some languages, like Basque and the American languages, have as many cases as there are prepositions, or rather postpositions. See Burggraaff, *Princ. de Gram. Gén.* p. 243.

\* Deville, *Dialecte tzaonien*, p. 98.

<i>Sanskrit.</i>	<i>Greek.</i>	<i>Latin.</i>
1. Nominative.	1. Nominative.	1. Nominative.
2. Genitive.	2. Genitive. Ablative.	2. Genitive.
3. Dative.	3. Dative. Instrumental. Locative.	3. Dative.
4. Instrumental.	4. Accusative.	4. Accusative.
5. Locative.	5. Vocative.	5. Vocative.
6. Accusative.		6. Ablative. Instrumental. Locative.
7. Vocative.		
8. Ablative.		

On this view of the cases see Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* i. 4-26), who points out the distinct traces of a *locative* in the Latin (*militiae, humi, domi*), just as we have similar traces in the Greek *οἰκοι*, &c. Moreover Greek possesses the *ablative* forms *οὐρανόθεν, θύραθεν*, &c.

### NOMINATIVE (Πρῶτις ὁρθή, εὐθεῖα, ὀνομαστική).

**38.** By an example of the *constructio ad sensum*, the nominative is sometimes placed in independent apposition to the *notion* of the sentence, though not to the form in which it is expressed. This is called the nominative absolute, as

αἰδώς μ' ἔχει (=αἰδοῦμαι) τάδε πράξας I am ashamed at such conduct.

λόγοι δ' ἐν ἀλλήλοισιν ἐρρόθουν κακοί,

φύλαξ ἐλέγχων φύλακα there was an angry dashing of mutual reproaches, *guard reviling guard*.—Soph. *Antig.* 259.

*Obs.* Such phrases as *οὐδὲν δέον* where it was not necessary, *οὐδὲν προσήκον αὐτοῖς* though it did not concern them, *εἰρημένον* although it had been said, *δεδογμένον* after it had been resolved, *δόξαν ταῦτα* when this resolve had been taken, &c., have been sometimes regarded as nominatives absolute; but this, as we shall hereafter see, is an error.

The nominative absolute, which is not unfrequent in English, especially in poetry, is of a different kind from this; e.g. ‘And we being exceedingly tossed with a tempest, the next day they lightened the ship.’—Acts xxvii. 18.

These instances are not like the so-called Greek nominative absolute, but like the *genitive absolute*. They have risen from the loss of case-endings in English, exactly like the nom. absol. of Modern Greek. See § 52 *inf.*

**39.** Copulative words (implying existence, seeming, being called, chosen, &c.) take the same case after as before them (as in English ‘it is I,’ &c.); as

καθέστηκε βασιλεὺς he is appointed king.

Θεὸς ὄνομά το ο he was styled ‘a god.’

So too ἀκοίω in the sense *I am called*, as in ἐχθροὶ ἀκούονται they are called enemies.\*

N. B. Bopp connects the c, which is the common suffix of the nominative, with the Sanskrit pronominal theme *sa* 'he,' 'that person there' (*Comp. Gram.* § 134).

### THE VOCATIVE (Κλητική).

**40.** The vocative is the slightest of all cases, and has no influence on the syntax. Hence in many languages it does not exist at all; even in Latin it is almost non-existent, for the nominative is constantly used for it in the 2nd declension, in which alone it is found at all. Greek does not possess it in neuter words, and even in some masculines, as ὁ θεός, ὁ φίλος, ὁ Πέλιος; and Buttmann observes further (*Gram.* p. 180), that the nominative is used for it in all instances where its occurrence would naturally be rare, e.g. ὁ ποῦς.

**41.** Hence too the nominative (especially with the article) is often substituted for it, as

δημοβάρος βασιλεὺς ἐπει ὑπιδάγονται ἀνάσσεις people-eating king! since thou lordest it over weaklings.

—*Il.* i. 231.

ὁ οὐρανὸς Αἴας ho Ajax!

σὺ δὲ πρεσβύτατος you, the eldest.—*Xen. Cyrop.* iv. v. 17.

χαῖρε δὲ βασιλεὺς τῶν Ιουδαίων hail, king of the Jews!

Compare *Degener o populus*.—*Luc.* ii. 11. *Vos o Pompilius sanguis*.—*Hor. A. P.* 293.

**42.** It is not unreasonable to conjecture that when a separate form for the vocative exists, it is merely due to the change produced in the nominative when used *rapidly* in calling or addressing others; in fact, that it is due like other phonetic corruptions to what Prof. Müller calls 'muscular effeminacy.' It usually contains the *stem* of the word, occasionally modified by euphonic laws (Bopp, § 205).

### THE GENITIVE (Γενική).†

**43.** The name of this case is probably due to a simple mistake. The Stoic grammarians called it πτῶσις γενικῆ or

\* So *audio* in Latin—'Seu Jane libentius audis,' or whether you prefer *to be called* Janus; and in English, 'Do I *hear* ill of that side too?' = Am I *ill spok'n* of in that quarter also?—(Ford.)

'Or *hear'st* thou rather, pure ethereal stream,  
Whose fountain who shall tell?'—*Par. Lost*, iii. 6.

Cf. Spenser, *F. Q.* i. 23.

† Genitivus would have been a translation, not of γενικῆ but of

*general case*, because it expresses the genus or kind; in fact, there are many languages in which the genitive is directly formed from the nominative by adding to it the *adjectival* termination, and it is often a matter of indifference whether we use an adjective or a genitive case, e.g. 'an aquatic bird' is the same thing as 'a bird of the water.'

**44.** All the multitudinous uses of the genitive are traceable to its employment for the expression of three\* main conceptions; and these are so wide that they are often almost interchangeable,—in fact, both ablation and partition fall in reality under the head of relation.

1. *Ablation*, in which it is an ablative case, and corresponds to the English 'from.'

2. *Partition*, in which it implies 'some of.'

3. *Relation*, in which it involves the notion of connection or comparison, &c. The vagueness of this term is quite in accordance with the essence of the genitive, of which the characteristic suffixes in Greek are *-ος*, *οι-ο*, derived from the Sanskrit pronoun *sya*; and of which the general function is 'to personify an object in attaching to it a secondary idea of local relation' (Bopp, §§ 189, 194).

**45.** To the first head *Ablation* † belong the genitives of *cause*, *material*, *fulness*, *exclusion*, *motion from*, *perceptions*, both mental and physical (as derived *from* an object), &c.; a very little thought will show how these conceptions can be arranged under this head, although some of them (e.g. full *of*, made *of*, &c.) might be, from some points of view, equally well arranged under the genitive of partition. The close connection of the two classes of conceptions may be seen from

*γενητικός*. (See some valuable remarks on this point in Max Müller's *Lectures*, i. 103–105.) Obviously, the Latin names of this case (*genitivus*, *patricus*, *possessivus*, &c.) cover but a very small part of its signification. Some authors call it the *whence-case*. The nomenclature of the cases is very inadequate, though Priscian observes of it, 'Multas et diversas unusquisque causae habet significations, sed a notioribus et frequentioribus acceperunt nominationem' (lib. v. *de Casu*).

\* Donaldson, *Gr. Gram.* p. 464 seqq.

† Although Greek has not a distinct ablative (*ἀφαιρετική πτῶσις*) like the Latin, yet some Greek grammarians recognised the forms *οἴησθε*, *διέθε* as a sixth case. The name *ablativus* for the sixth case is believed to have been first used, if not invented, by *Julius Cæsar*, in his treatise *De Analogia*, Lersch. ii. 231.

the possible interchanges of our ‘*of*’ and ‘*from*,’ the German *von*, the French *de*, and the Greek ἐξ and ἀπό.

Causal Genitives;

κύματα παντοίων ἀνέμων waves caused by all kinds of wind.

“*Ηρας ἀλατεῖαι* wanderings caused by Hera.

ἐάλωσαν προδοσίας they were condemned for treachery.

εὐχωλῆς ἐπιμέμφεται he blames me for a vow (unpaid).

χώμενος γυναικός angry about the woman.

οἵμοι τῆς τύχης\* alas for my misfortune (Germ. O des Leides!).

τῆς μωρίας what folly!

χρηστοῦ ἀνδρὸς excellent fellow!

εἴτε τεν ἀγγελίς μέρ' ἔμ' ἥλυθες; didst thou visit me for the sake of some message?

τοῦ δὲ ἔφυν ἐγὼ from him I sprang.

κρατίστον πατρὸς τραφεὶς nurtured by a noble sire.

Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου Socrates the son of Sophroniscus.

Material; †

νόμισμα ἄργυρίου a coin of silver.

πωρίνου λίθου ποιέειν τὸν ναὸν to build the temple of tuff.

Fulness, or Emptiness; ‡

ἔκπωμα οἴνου a cup of wine.

ἄλις δὲ παῖδων· but enough of sons!

πληρῆς στεναγμῶν οὐδὲ δακρύων κενὸς full of groans, nor void of tears.

Exclusion, or Separation; §

ἀπέχομαι οἴνου I abstain from wine.

\* *De* is used after exclamations in Spanish, as *Infeliz de mi!* Ah poor me! Ay *de mi hijo*, alas! my poor son!

† It might be better perhaps to regard the genitive of material as falling under the head of partition—something detached from the whole. In Modern Greek it is expressed by ἀπό, as *σταθλὸν ἀπὸ ξύλου* a sword of wood.

‡ So in English, ‘empty of all good’—Milton; and in Italian, ‘*Dei beni della fortuna abbondante*.’—Boccaccio. With these we may range genitives implying skill, ignorance, as *μάχης εἰδότε πάσης*; compare ‘*Pugnæ sciens*,’ Hor.; and Milton’s ‘Intelligent of seasons,’ *Par. Lost*, vii. 427; and

‘Yet oft his heart, *divine of something ill,*  
Misgave him.’—Id. ix. 845

(‘mens præsaga futuri,’ Claud.). Similarly in Italian, *pratico*, ‘skilled in,’ takes a genitive; e.g. ‘*pratichissimo di questa sorte d’ antichità*'; and in Spanish, ‘*Dotado de ciencia*,’ gifted with learning; ‘*escaso de medios*,’ scanty in means.

§ Here belong the genitives after compounds in a privative, as *ἄφωνος ἄρπας*, *ἄγευστὸς κακῶν*, *ἄπεπλος φαρέων λευκῶν*, *ἄπταις τέκνων*, &c., and the

λῆγε χόλοιο cease from wrath (cf. *Abstine irarum, desine querelarum, &c.*, Hor.).

σφάλλομαι τῆς ἐλπίδος I am balked of my hope.  
ἔλευθερος φόβου free from fear.

πλήν γ' ἐμοῦ except me.

ἀπῆλλαγμαι τῆς νόσου I am quit of the disease.

ημαρτον σκόπου I missed the mark.

ἴστασθε βάθρων get up from the steps.

ἄλλοθι γαῖης elsewhere in the earth.

Motion from;

γῆς ὅποιας ἥλθον from what land I came.

Perceptions;

δέουσι πίπτης they smell of pitch.

ἀκούων τοῦ διδασκάλου I listen to the teacher.

καὶ κωφοῦ συνίημι I even understand the dumb.

46. Under the second head 'Genitive of Partition' fall those which express time, possession, place, and all which can possibly imply that the action affects a *part* of the object.

The following are all partitive genitives of one or other class:

καὶ θέρεος καὶ χειμῶνος both winter and summer.\*

νυκτὸς by night, ἡμέρας by day.

σὺν σοι μετεῖχον τῶν ἵσων with thee I shared an equal fortune.

συμβάλλεται δὲ πολλὰ τοῦδε δείματος many things contribute to this terror.

ἐστιας μεσομφάλου ἐστηκεν ἡδη μῆλα, *Aesch. Ag.* 1054,  
already the victims stand on the central altar.†

τῆς γῆς ἔτερον they laid waste some of the land.

κρητῆρις ἐπεστέψαντο ποτοῖο they crowned the goblets  
with wine.‡

Latin imitations 'Immodicus iræ,' *Stat. Th.* ii. 41; 'Immunis aratri,' *Ov. M.* iii. 11; 'interritus leti,' *Id. x.* 616. We have something like it in English, as in Shakspeare's 'Unwhipped of justice;' and Milton's 'the teats Unsucked of lamb or kid;' and Keats' 'Innumerable of hues and splendid dyes;' and still more closely Sheridan, 'The land-lord was unfurnished of every kind of provisions.'—*Life of Swift*. It is probably to an imitation of this idiom that we owe the much-abused line—'Yet virgin of Proserpina from Jove.'—*Par. Lost*, ix. 396.

\* Like our 'o' nights'; Italian, *di notte*; French, *de nuit*; German, *Nachts*, *eines Abends*; Spanish, *de noche*, &c.

† The genitive of place is confined (mainly) to poetry, but is found in the local adverbs *οὗ*, *ποῦ*, *ἀποῦ*, &c. Cf. the German, *Ich gehe des Weges*.

‡ Buttmann, in his *Lexilogus*, shows that even the learned Virgil misunderstood this genitive, and took it to mean 'they crowned (with flowers) the goblets of wine'; hence his expressions '*Vina coronant*', and '*Magnum cratera corond Induit implevitque mero*'.

βεβρωκώς κρειῶν τε καὶ αἷματος battened on flesh and gore.\*

πάσσε δ' ἀλὸς and he sprinkled *some* salt over it.

χεῖρας νιψάμενος πολιῆς ἀλὸς washing his hands in the foamy brine.

ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῦ λέγοντος but he is at the mercy of the speaker.

† πόλις ἀνδρός ἐσθ' ἐνὸς the state belongs to one man.

οὐκ ἔστε ἔαντων ye are not your own.

πολλῆς ἀνοίᾳ ἔπι it is a matter of no slight folly.

οὐν παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εἰς Κόρινθόν ἐσθ' οὐ πλοῦς it isn't every man who can sail to Corinth.

οὐνι μὴ λάχωσι τοῦδε συμμάχου they shall certainly not gain me as an ally.

ποδῶν ἔλαβεν he grasped him by the feet.

κισσὸς δρῦς ἔχεται the ivy clings to the oak.

γενελού ἀψάμενος touching his beard.

εἰς τόδ' ἡμέρας to this day.—Eur. *Phæn.* 428.

εἰς τοῦτο κινδύνου to such a pitch of danger.

47. Under the wide term of Genitives of Relation (which is in point of fact merely a convenient term for such genitives as do not obviously fall under the two other heads) are classed those which express or involve comparison,† value, price, &c.

\* Cf. the French 'manger de,' and our 'eat of my venison.' Similar is the Latin 'Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguisque ferina.' Many such idioms in Latin are mere imitations of the Greek idiom, only admissible in the poetic style. They abound in Silius Italicus, who has been called by Jani 'the great patron of the genitive case.'

† The instances in which the possessive genitive sinks into a mere epithet are few; as in ἄστρων εὐφρύνη a night of stars, χιόνος πτέρυξ a wing of snow, στολῆς τρυφᾶς a robe of luxury, τραύματα αἵματος wounds of blood. This is frequent in English poetry, as in Crabbe's

His cap of darkness on his head he placed.

His feet of swiftness on his feet he braced.

His sword of sharpness in his hand he took, &c.

And in Hebrew, as 'Ships of desire,' Job ix. 26=pleasant ships, &c.

† Some may prefer to arrange the genitive of comparison under the head of *ablation*, as in Latin; in Modern Greek, comparison is expressed by ἀντί, as δὲ κανόνς εἰνε ἐλαφρότερος ἀντὶ τὸν ἀρέα. Sophocles, *Mod. Gr. Gram.* p. 125. 'When two objects are compared, it is natural to say that one is the better, &c. of the two, and it is an easy transition to say that one is better of the other.'—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Romance Languages*, p. 148. Compare the Italian 'più ricco di me,' more rich than I; 'meno grande della città,' less large than the city, &c.

*μείζων ἐστὶ τοῦ πατρὸς* he is taller than his father.  
*διπλάσιος αὐτὸς ἐωντοῦ ἐγένετο* became twice as great as before.

*ὅτε δεινόταρας σαυτοῦ ἦσθα* when you were at your best.  
*οὐδενὸς δεύτερος* second to none.

*ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων* things other than what is just.  
*κρείσσον' ὄγχοντς* things worse than hanging.  
*δῖα θεάων* divine of goddesses.\*

*κρεισσόνων νικώμενοι* conquered by superiors.  
*περιδόσθαι τῆς κεφαλῆς* to bet one's head.  
*ἀμείβειν χρύσεα χαλκείων* to exchange golden for brazen.  
*κέκρισθε . . . μηδενὸς ἀν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων*  
 προέσθαι ye have determined that for no gain would  
 ye abandon the common interests of the Greeks.

*πόσου τιμᾶται;* how much is it worth?  
*τιμᾶται ροι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου* he fixes my penalty at death.  
*θανάτου ἐδίκασε* he brought a capital charge.

*ώς εἰχον τάχους* with all the speed they could.

† *χρημάτων εὐ ηκοντες* being well off for money.  
*μετρίως ἔχειν φρενῶν* to be fairly intelligent.  
*πῶς ἔχεις τῆς γνώμης;* what do you think?  
*τῶς ἀγῶνος ηκομεν*; how does the contest stand with us?  
*ὁ φόβος τῶν πολεμίων* the fear of the enemy (i.e. which  
 they feel; subjective genitive).

**48.** This last instance may also mean 'the fear about the enemy,' i.e. with respect to them. This is often called the objective genitive. It may sometimes be regarded as *causal*; but it usually belongs rather to the *ablative* meaning of the genitive than to its meaning of *relation*. Other instances of the so-called objective genitive are *λύσις θανάτου* deliverance from death, *ἀφορμὴ ἔργων* a stimulus to deeds, *ἀπόστασις τῶν Ἀθηναίων* defection from the Athenians, *πόθος νιοῦ* desire felt by a son (subjective), or desire felt towards or in respect to a son (objective). This possibility of a genitive being either

\* Here the *δια* is a quasi superlative; compare Milton's 'O sovran, virtuous, precious of all trees in Paradise.'—*P. L.* ix. 795. *Virg. Aen.* iv. 576: 'Sequimur te, sancte Deorum.'

† Compare the Italian 'Antico *di* sangue, nobile *di* costumi,' Boccaccio; and the Spanish *agudo de ingenio*, acute of intellect; *ancho de boca*, wide of mouth, &c. Similar too are such genitives as 'holy and humble men of heart,' and in *Chevy Chase*—

'For a better man of heart, nare of hande  
 Was not in all the north countree.'

objective or subjective (*amphibologia*) leads occasionally to uncertainty, e.g. *εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ* may be either the Gospel about Christ (objective), or which emanated from Christ (subjective). The objective genitive is common in Hebrew; and in Latin after *injuria*, *metus*, &c. Addison has ‘such of my readers as have a taste of [=for] fine writing.’ ‘*Η ἀγαπὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ* *לְאֱמֹר דָּתָה* amor Dei, l’ amour di Dio, l’amour de Dieu, all involve the same ambiguity.\*

**49.** Very frequently we find a double genitive after a word, as *Ζεὺς, ὅστ' ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμου τέτυκται* Zeus who is the arbiter of war *for* mortals.—*Il.* iv. 84.

**50.** The Genitive Absolute properly falls under the *causal* use of the genitive, as *ὅρῶν τοῦ χωρίου χαλεποῦ ὄντος τοὺς τριπάρχοντας . . . ἀποκνύντας* seeing the captains hesitating because the place was steep. It is therefore a genitive of *ablation*, and so resembles the Latin ablative absolute. It is used also however to express time and circumstance, as *ἐμοῦ καθεύδοντος* while I was sleeping, *τούτων οὖτως ἔχόντων* such being the case, *σαλπίζοντος* while the trumpeter was blowing. It derives its temporal and other meanings from the participle with which it is joined.

**51.** This construction is less frequent than the ablative absolute, because Greek possesses past participles active, and Latin does not, e.g. *ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἀπῆμεν his dictis egrediebamur*; this could not be in Greek *τούτων λεχθέντων*, which could only mean when this had been said by others. (Madvig; see too Nägelsbach, *Lat. Stylistik*, § 97.)

**52.** This genitive absolute is found in German, in such phrases as ‘*Stehenden Fusses*’ (Curtius). In Modern Greek the nominative absolute has superseded it, as ‘*Αποθανόντας ὁ Σωκάρτης ὁ Πλάτωνας πῆγε ἐξ τὴν Αἴγυπτο*. So too in English we use the nominative absolute† where the Greek would require the genitive, and the Latin the ablative; as ‘*Summer being ended, the leaves begin to die.*’ But this nominative is due to the loss of case-endings.

\* Crombie, *Etym. and Synt.* p. 34.

† The absolute objective case is much more rare in modern English, as  
‘him destroyed,

Or won to what may work his bitter loss.’—Milton.

The *him* here is a *dative*; the Anglo-Saxon having no ablative, used instead the *dative* absolute; e.g. *up-a-sprungēnre sunnan*, the sun having risen. See Latham, *The Engl. Language*, ii. 437. So we find in Wiclif’s Bible (Matt. viii.), ‘and hym seen, thei preiden hym that he shulde pass fro her coostis,’ which becomes in Tyndale’s Bible, ‘when they sawe him.’

THE DATIVE (*Δοτική*).

**53.** The fundamental conception of the dative case is juxtaposition. It corresponds both in the sing. and plur. to the Sanskrit locative. The *τ*, which is its characteristic suffix, is used to indicate *permanence* in space and time, and is the root of the demonstrative pronoun (Bopp, §§ 177, 201).

Hence the dative is diametrically opposed to the genitive, of which the fundamental conception is ablation. Thus the dative is used with *ἐν*, *σύν*, *ἐπί*; the genitive with *ἔξ*, *ἀπό*.

- a. The dative signifies proximity, the genitive separation; as  
*Πολυκράτεις ὡμίλησε* he associated with Polycrates,  
but *πάλιν τράπεθ' εἰος* he turned back *from* his son.
- b. The dative denotes addition, the genitive subtraction; as  
*δίδωμι σοι τὰ χρήματα* I give the money *to* you,  
but *δέχομαι σου τὰ χρήματα* I receive the money *from* you.
- c. The dative expresses equality or sameness, the genitive comparison of things different; as

*οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔκεινῳ* this man is the *same* as that.  
*ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης διάφορος* one science differs *from* another.\*

**54.** Hence the dative expresses *accidents, accessories, circumstances, instruments*; as

1. *Place.* We have already seen traces of the locative case in the dative, in such phrases as *Μαραθῶνι at Marathon*, *οἴκοι at home*. Thus we find *in the poets*—

*τόξ’ ὄμοισιν ἔχων* having his bow *on* his shoulder.

*αἰθέρι ναυων* dwelling in the sky.

*μίμνει ἄγρῳ* he is staying in the country.

But in prose, and even in poetry, the preposition *ἐν* is usually added to express place.

2. *Time.* Though *ἐν* is not so frequent with the locative of time, it *may* be used; as

*τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ* on the third day.

*τῇ νοεμηνίᾳ* on the first of the month.

*ἐν τῷ παρόντι* in present circumstances.

\* Donaldson's *Gr. Gram.* p. 486. Horace imitates this use of the dative with idem—'Invitum qui servat idem facit occidenti,' which might be in Greek *ταῦτα ποιεῖ τῷ κτείνοντι*. Burnouf, p. 257.

3. The *manner* of a thing, i.e. limit, specification, accompaniment, resemblance; as

*βίᾳ ἐσέναι* to enter by force (*εο σκουδῆ, σιγῆ, ἔργη, τῷ ὄντι, ίδιᾳ*).

*γένει Ἑλλήν* by race a Greek.

*ναυσὶν ἰσχύειν* to be strong in ships.

*κατεστραπεδένσατο τῷ πεζῷ* he encamped with the foot.  
*τοῖς κακοῖς ὁμιλῶν* associating with the bad.

*δούλῳ ἔσκας* you are like a slave.

N.B. The dative of accompaniment is more usually expressed by *σὺν*, except when *αὐτὸς* is used; as

*τῇλ' αὐτῇ πήληκι κάρῃ βάλε* he flung away the helmet  
head and all.

*μιαν ναῦν ἔλαβον αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν* they took one ship crew  
and all.

And *σὺν* may be used even with *αὐτός*, as *ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλ-*  
*λεὺς αὐτῇ σὺν φόρμιγγι* uprose Achilles, harp in hand.

4. Instruments of all kinds, as *κάμνειν νόσῳ, πατάσσειν*  
*ῥάβδῳ, ὥθετιν ταις χερσὶν, πολέμῳ προστάσθαι*.

Hence with such verbs as *χρήσθαι, αἰσχύνεσθαι, λυπεῖσθαι,*  
*τεκμαίρεσθαι*, &c.

5. Agents, as being in one point of view instruments; thus  
after passive verbs we may have either *ὑπὸ* with the *genitive*,  
or the dative; as

*προσπόλοις φυλάσσεται* he is guarded by attendants.

*ταῦτα λέλεκται ἡμῖν* these things have been said by us\*  
(or *ὑφ' ἡμῶν*).

*τι πέπρακται τοῖς ἄλλοις*; what has been done by the  
others? (or *ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων*; just as in Latin poetry,  
'Non intelligor ulli' or *ab ullo*; 'cui non sunt auditæ,'  
*or a quo*, &c.).

6. General reference, advantage, and disadvantage.

Hence with such verbs as *δίδωμι, ὑπισχνοῦμαι, πιστεύω, εἰμι,*  
*ἀρήγω, ὑπακούω,† ὑπηρετῶ, ἡγοῦμαι, μαχομαι, πολεμῶ*, &c.;  
after each verb it expresses the remote or indirect object.

\* Burnouf compares the French 'c'est bien dit à vous.'

† The verb 'to obey' used to take a dative in English, no less than in Greek and Latin; e.g. 'That as a harp obeyeth to the hand.'—Chaucer, *Legend of Women*. 'Yet to their general's voice they soon obeyed.'—Milton, *Par. Lost*, i. 337. Comp. Spenser, *F. Q.* iii. xi. 35.

*ἴστι μοι I have.\**

*ἔγώ σιωπῶ τῷδε; am I to hold my tongue for this fellow?*

*τῷδε δ' οὐχομαι as far as he is concerned, I am dead.*

*δέξατό οι σκῆπτρον he received at his hand the sceptre.*

*ἐπ' ἄριστερι ἐστάλεοντι to the left as one sails in.*

*ἀνάξαι γὰρ πᾶσιν ἔστε δυστυχεῖν ye are unworthy of misfortune in the judgment of all.—Soph. O. C. 1446.†*

This is especially found with various participles; as

*εἴ σοι βούλομένως ἔστι if you please (cf. Tac. Agric. 18, 'Quibus bellum volentibus erat').*

*συνελόντι εἰπεῖν to speak briefly.*

*ἔμοι δὲ κεν ἀσμένῳ εἴη I should be glad of it.*

*θέλοντι κάροι τοῦτ' ἀν ἦν I too should have wished for this.*

*Ὦς ἔμοι, or ὥς γ' ἔμοι κρίτη meo quidem judicio.*

**55.** To this dative of reference belongs what is called the *ethic* (i.e. *emotional*) *dative*; the apparently superfluous introduction of personal pronouns to show the speaker's or hearer's interest in what is said; as

*μή μοί γε, μή μοι, μὴ διασκανδικίσῃς don't, don't, I beg of you, dose me with cabbage.*

*ὦ μῆτερ, ὡς καλός μοι δὲ τάππος bless me! mother, how handsome my grandfather is.—Xen. Cyr. i. 32.*

*Ἀλλά μοι ἐσθίειεν καὶ πίνειεν but eat, I pray you, and drink.*

*δᾶ δέ εἰμι' ἔγώ σοι κεῖνος look you, I am that famous man.*

N.B. a. The same use is found in Modern Greek, where however the dative case has disappeared and resigned its functions to the genitive, as *σου τὸν ἔτιναζαν ἔνα καλὸ ράβδι* they thrashed him soundly—I know you are pleased to hear it. See Sophocles, *Mod. Gr. Gram.* p. 151.

\* Thus the dative as well as the genitive may be used to express possession. In Hebrew 'to' is used for possession, and the Gascon says 'la fille à Mr. N.' instead of *de*. In Greek such a phrase as *ἡ κεφαλὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ* for *τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* was called the *σχῆμα Κολοφώνιον*. Lesbonax περὶ Σχημάτων, p. 181. The collocation is rather clumsy, but similar phrases are common, as *ἀνατροπιν τοῖς νεκροῖς*, Thuc. vi. 18; *ἀναθήματα Κροίσῳ*, Hdt. ii. 113.

† Cf. *ἄλιον γὰρ Ἑλλάδη*, Ar. Ach. 8; *ἡμῖν δὲ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἄξιος τιμῆς, γύναι*, Eur. Hec. 313; and many other instances in Bernhardy, *Griech. Synt.* S. 78. Under this head fall such phrases as *οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων*, Thuc. i. 6. *abr̄q* is frequently used in this way in Thuc. and Plato; and *sibi* has a somewhat similar redundancy in some Latin sentences.

3. This ethic dative is common in other languages; as  
 ‘At *tibi* repente . . . venit ad me Caninius’ *to you* of a sudden comes Caninius to me!—Cic.  
 Quid *michi* Celsus agit? what is my Celsus doing?—Hor.  
 Non *michi* bellus homo es *I* don’t think you a good-looking person.  
 Es lief *mir* ein Hund über den Weg there ran *me* a dog across the road.\*  
 ‘Afin qu’il fût plus frais et de meilleur débit  
 On lui lia les pieds, on *vous* le suspendit.—Fénelon, *Fables*, iii. 1.  
 7. It was extremely common in English, e.g.  
 ‘Look how this river comes *me* cranking in.’—Henry IV.  
 ‘This scull has lain *you* in the ground these three years’—Hamlet.†

It is not unknown even in modern writers; e.g. in Taylor’s ‘Philip von Artevelde’ we have

- ‘Mount *me* a messenger.’  
 ‘Gag *me* this graybeard.’  
 ‘And twinkling *me* his dagger in the sun.’  
 ‘I might eat four hoofs of an ox yet my stomach would flap *you*, look *you*, and droop *you*, *look you*, like an empty sail.’

This latter phrase, ‘look you’ (or ‘for you’), is the most common modern substitute for the Ethic Dative.

### THE ACCUSATIVE (*Aἰτιαρυνή*).‡

56. The fundamental conception of the accusative is *motion towards*, and therefore also *extension over space*. It is the case

\* ‘Einen Apfel schiesst der Vater *dir* vom Baum auf hundert Schritte.’ My father shoots *you* an apple from a tree at a hundred yards.—Schiller, *Tell.*

+ In the *Taming of the Shrew*, Act i. sc. 2, Grumio affects to misunderstand it.

‘Petr. Villain, I say, knock *me* here soundly.  
 Grum. Knock *you* here, sir; why, sir, what am *I*, sir, that I should knock *you* here, sir?  
 Petr. Villain, I say, knock *me* at this gate  
 And rap *me* well, or I’ll knock your knave’s pate.’

‡ Varro renders this ‘*accusandei casus*,’ deriving it from *aἰτιόπους* *I accuse*; but more probably it comes from *aἴτια a cause*. Hence Friesian calls it *causativus*. See Tredelenburg, *Act. Soc. Græc.* 1836, i. 119

*To which,\* and is therefore put after transitive verbs to express the end of the motion or action; as τύπτω αὐτὸν I strike him, i.e. the direction of my blow is towards him. It also expresses the action itself, as τύπτω τληγῆν I strike a blow.* Three accusatives may occur after one verb, in each of which this fundamental conception is discernible, as νύκτα ἀγγέλους Ἀθῆνας ἐπεμπεν he was sending messengers all night long towards Athens. (Compare ‘docere aliquem philosophiam aliquot annos.’)

57. In accordance therefore with the idea of the case (*motion towards † and extension over*) it expresses

1. Space, as ἀπέχει πεντήκοντα σταδίους it is fifty stades distant.

2. Time, as τρεῖς μῆνας ἔμεινεν he stayed three months.

3. Any notion cognate to, i.e. connected in meaning ‡ with that of, the verb, even when the verb is neuter, as κακίστην δουλείαν ἐδούλευσε he served the worst slavery.

This cognate notion is capable of a very considerable extension, as in

στεῖχε γύας go to the fields.—Eur. *Med.* 668. (Comp. Go home; but even this phrase has become analytic in the American ‘Go to home,’ and the Cornish ‘Is she to home?’)

§ πολλοὺς ἄγωνται ἵξιαν going out for many contests.—*Soph. Tr.* 185.

---

seqq.; Lersch, *Sprachphil. d. Alten*, ii. 186. The characteristic suffix of the accusative is in Greek *v*, in Sanskrit and Latin *m*; for its pronominal origin, see Bopp, § 156.

\* Donaldson connects the form *ðe* in accusatives like *Обльюпъðе* with *ðe*, just as in English *two, too, to*, are different stages of the same word.

† The particle *eth* which so often precedes the accusative in Hebrew signifies *towards*. The same fact is well illustrated in Spanish, where, by a strong extension of the analytic tendency, the preposition *a* usually precedes the accusative if it expresses a person; e.g. ‘Amar á Dios,’ to love [*to or towards*] God; ‘Cain mató á Abel,’ Cain killed Abel, &c.

‡ This form of the cognate accusative (*πόλεμον πολεμένι*, &c.) is called *Figura etymologica*. See Lobeck, *Paralip. Gram. Græc.* dissert. viii.

§ Cf. the Latin *exequias*, *supperbias*, *infirias ire*; and see Lobeck’s note to Soph. *Aj.* 290. Milton, who has left few classical idioms unadapted, even ventures on the cognate accusative after a neuter verb of motion:

‘Upborne with indefatigable wings  
Over the vast abrupt, ere he arrive  
The happy isle.’—*Par. Lost.* ii. 410.

And ‘Whatever creeps the ground, Insect or worm.’—Id. vii. 475. Early English admitted a wider use of the accusative than modern; e.g. we find

ὅμνυμι τοὺς θεοὺς I swear by the gods.

νικᾶν Ὀλύμπια to win in the Olympic games.

βλέπειν γάτην, ὅμφακας, γαύρφακτον to look mustard and cress, sour grapes, a three-decker.\*

γραφήν διώκειν to bring an action.

τί ἔηται ποιμανεῖς τὴνδ' ἐπεμπίπτει βάσιν; why did he thus rush striding (=έμπεσών βαίνει) on the flocks?—Soph. *Aj.* 42 (πόδα and χέρα are frequently thus used).†

4. It defines or localises the action of the word to which it is joined, i.e. in strict accordance with the idea of the case, it expresses the *extent* affected by the word on which it depends.

ἀλγῶ τὴν κεφαλὴν I have a headache.

τούτου μᾶλλον τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ its nature is rather of this kind.—Arist. *Meteor.* iv. 4.

πυρίτης τὴν τέχνην a smith by trade.

καλὸς τὰ ὄμματα with beautiful eyes.

δεινοὶ μάχην skilled in battle.

οὐδεὶς ἀτανατος σοφὸς no one is wise in everything.

These and similar instances used to be explained by the ellipse of *kárá*; the fact is however the *very reverse*, since the case expresses these conceptions by *its own natural force and meaning*, and when *kárá* is expressed it is due to the analysing tendency of all language in its progress from its original condition. The superfluous preposition only shows that the true meaning of the case is a little worn out.

### 58. As some verbs may have two objects, a nearer and a

in Wiclif's version of the Bible, 'Blessid be thei that *hungren and thirsten rightioisnesse*'; and in Milton, 'I gazed the ample sky.'

\* This is a favourite idiom of Aristophanes; he even uses it with a neuter participle, as κλέπτον βλέπει he looks *thievish*; and with an infinitive, as τιμᾶν βλέπω.—*Ach.* 879. Theocritus has the exquisite expression λαπ δρόσωσα looking spring.—*Id.* xiii. 45. So we talk of 'looking daggers,' 'a vinegar aspect.'

† *Διόσις* means *I rush*, yet Sophocles (*Aj.* 40) has πρός τι δυσλόγυστον δοθῆνεν χέρα; 'for what inexplicable cause did he thus rush (i.e. wield) his hand?' This accusative describing the *result* of the verbal notion is common in English; e.g. 'to walk a horse, 'to dance a baby,' 'to boil a kettle,' &c. Such verbs are said to be used *factualiter*, and, as in Hebrew, all *absolute* verbs admit this causative use. (Ewald, *Hebr. Gram.* § 102, and Lobeck, *ad Aj.* 40.) Latin uses the accusative in the same bold manner in apposition with the notion contained in the verb, and expressing the extent affected by it, as in 'pedibus plaudunt chores,' Virg. *En.* vi. 644; 'Bacchanalia vivunt,' Juv. &c. Comp. *Par. Lost*, i. 738, 'The ascending pile Stood fixed her stately height.'

more remote, a person and a thing, an external object and an internal, such verbs (especially those of asking, teaching, clothing, depriving, doing good or ill to) may take a double accusative.\*

*ἔδιδαξα τὸν παιδα τὴν μουσικὴν* I taught the boy music.  
*Θηβαίον χρήματα ἤγησαν* they asked the Thebans for money.

59. In one large class of instances in which there is *apparently* a double accusative, one of the two may be regarded as being in *apposition* with the other, and defines it; this is called the 'whole and part figure,' *συῆμα κάθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος*, as

"*Ἐκτόρα δὲ αἰνὸν ἄχος πίκασε φρίνας* dread grief crowded the soul of Hector [lit. Hector, (as to) his soul].  
*Τρῶας δὲ τρόμος αἰνὸς ὑπῆλυθε γυνίᾳ ἔκαστος* dread tremor invaded each Trojan's limbs (lit. the Trojans, each one, as to his limbs).

60. The accusative of the thing still remains when the verb itself is the passive, as

*ἀφήρημαι τὸν ἵππον* I have been robbed of my horse.  
*πεπίστευμαι τῷ εὐαγγελον* I have been entrusted with the gospel.

61. The accusative is sometimes put in *apposition* to the sentence, as

"*Ἐλένην κτάνωμεν, Μενελέῳ λύπην πικρὰν* let us kill Helen, a bitter grief to Menelaus.  
*ρίψει ἀπὸ πύργου, λυγρὸν ὅλεθρον* you will be flung from a tower, a terrible death.

62. The verb on which an accusative depends is often omitted,† as in

*σὲ δὴ σὲ τὴν νεύονταν ἐς πέδον κάρα* (sc. λέγω).—Soph. *Ant.* 441 (cf. *Aj.* 1228). *μὴ τριβάς ἔτ'*.—Soph. *Ant.* 577. *οὐκ εἰς ὅλεθρον*.—*O. R.* 415. *Finem inquit interrogandi!*—Cic.

*ἄλλὰ τίς χρέα σ' ἔμοῦ* (sc. ἔχει);—Eur. *Hec.* 976.

\* In such instances one of the accusatives expresses the object directly affected by the verb, and the other expresses some notion cognate to the meaning of the verb.

† The verb thus omitted is often some subjective conception, like 'knowing,' &c.; e.g. *ἡμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου*, *καὶ οὐδὲν δν πρᾶγμα εἰ καὶ ἀνοθάνοι*.—Plat. *Euthyp.* 4. D.

63. Not unfrequently the nominative of a dependent clause is anticipated by being made the accusative of a principal clause, as

*ταρβεῖν τὸν εὐ πράσσοντα μὴ σφαλῇ ποτε* to dread the prosperous man, lest he should slip.

This is called *Antiptosis*, and is also found in Latin, as

'Nosti *Marcellum* quam tardus sit.' You know Marcellus how slow he is.—Cic.

'*Eam* veretur, ne perierit.' He fears her lest she should perish.—Plaut.

And in English, as

'I know *thee*, who thou art.'—Luke iv. 34

'Conceal me what I am.'—Shakspeare.

64. Sometimes this accusative is placed first in the sentence, and is called by some the *accusativus de quo*, as

*τὸνς κρίτας ἀ κερδαίνοντι βουλόμεσθ' ἡμῖν φράσαι* the judges, what they get, we want to tell you.—Ar. *Nub.* 1113.

*ἀνήρετο ψύλλαν ὄπόσους ἄλλοισι τὸνς αὐτῆς πόδας;* he asked—a flea, how many of its own feet it jumped?

So in Latin, *Urbem* quam statuo vestra est.—Virg. *Aen.* i. 577. Cf. Is. i. 7, 'Your land, strangers devour it in your presence.'

65. i. The accusative is used absolutely,\* chiefly in the case of certain participles, as δόξαν *ταῦτα* on this decision, *προσήκον* it being fit, ἔξον, *παρόν*, whilst it is allowed, &c.; and in certain neuter adverbial expressions like *τίνα τρόπον*; how? *πρόφασιν* in pretext, ἐμὴν χάριν for my sake, ἀμφότερα both ways, *τὸ λοιπὸν* for the future, &c.

Some call these nominatives absolute, but this is less correct, since, as we have seen already, neutrals have, properly speaking, no nominative. They are rather adverbial indeclinable expressions, in which however the accusatival conception of duration may generally be detected.

ii. ὅ, ἄ, *τοῦτο*, ἑκεῖνο (like the Latin *Quod* in adjurations, as *Quod per te lacrimas oro*, &c.), sometimes mean *wherefore*, *therefore* with the same sense as δι' ὅ, as in Eur. *Hec.* 13, &c.; and in the phrase *αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἤκω* I have come for this very purpose. See *Phæn.* 145, 263; *Thuc.* ii. 40, iii. 12, &c.

\* The accusative absolute, when the expression is not adverbial or impersonal, is very rare, as in *τέκν' εἰ φανέντ' οὐελπτα μηκύνω λόγουν*.

## CONTRASTED MEANINGS OF THE CASES.

**66.** 'From this examination, the learner may derive brief rules as to the meaning of the cases.

The genitive denotes *motion from*, and separation.

The dative " rest in, and conjunction.

The accusative " motion to, and approach.'—

*Donaldson.*

**67.** The so-called 'absolute' use of the cases springs from their simple meanings; e.g.

The genitive absolute expresses time as a cause *τοῦ έαρος ἐλθόντος τὰ ἄνθη θάλλει* when spring comes the flowers bloom.

The dative absolute represents time considered as a point, as *τεριστί τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ* at the return of the year.

The accusative absolute, duration in time, as *ταύτην τὴν νύκτα* during this night.

**68.** A few instances in which the distinctions of the cases are brought into prominence or contrast, are added.

*νυκτὸς* during the night; *noctu* (part.).

*νύκτα* all night; 'noctem;' answering the question 'how long?'

*νυκτὶ* in the night; *nocte*; answering the question 'when?' *ἡμέρας* during the day (part.).

*ἡμέραν* throughout the day (duration).

*ἡμέρᾳ* in the day time (limit).

*πέντε μνᾶν* worth five minæ, as a *price* (relation).

*πέντε μνᾶς* worth five minæ, as an *instrument*.

*πέντε μνᾶς* five mina (*extension over a certain value*).

*πόσου πωλεῖς*; at how much do you sell? (cause).

*πόσῳ ὡνεῖ* for (=with) how much do you buy (instrument).

*πόσον δύναται*; *how much* is it worth? (extension).

*τέρπομαι τούτου* I am delighted for this (cause).

" *τούτῳ* I am delighted with this (instrument).

" *τοῦτο* I am delighted at this (cognate notion = *τοῦτο χάρμα*).

*παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως* from the king (motion).

*παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ* with the king (rest).

*παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα* to the king (approach).

*προορᾶν τοῦ πολέμου* to provide about the war.

" *τῷ πολέμῳ* to provide for the war.

" *τον πόλεμον* to foresee the war.

*μεθίημι σε* I dismiss you; *μεθίεμαί σου* I let go of you.  
*ἔλαβόν σε* I caught you; *ἔλαβόμην σου* I seized hold of you.  
*ἔχειν τι* to possess a thing; *ἔχομαι βρετέων* I cling to the images.  
*ῆψε βρόχους* he fastened nooses; *ῆψατο τοῦ τείχους* he grasped the wall.  
*ἀρέε τὴν κύλικα* he held out the cup; *οὐ παιδὸς ὁρέατο* he yearned for his son.

### ADJECTIVES.

69. The chief peculiarities in the use of adjectives will here be given, and a line of explanation appended when required.

- i. *πολλὰ τε καὶ κακὰ ἔλεγεν* he uttered many reproaches.  
*συνειδὼς αἰτῷ πολλὰ καὶ πονηρὰ* being conscious of many wicked deeds.

The Greek and Latin idioms requires 'many *and* wicked,' &c.

- ii. *πταρὸν δίωγμα πώλων* winged pursuit of steeds, i.e. pursuit of winged steeds.  
*λευκοπήχεις κτύποι χερῶν* white-armed clappings of hands,  
 i.e. clappings of white-armed hands.  
*γραῖαι ὄσσων πηγαὶ* grey fountains of eyes, i.e. tears from aged eyes.  
*πολιάς πόντου θινὸς* of the hoary sea-beach, i.e. beach of the hoary sea.

It will be seen from these instances that the adjective is liable to a strange inversion\* of order, agreeing with the wrong word, or rather with the whole notion implied. This is an instance of the *constructio ad sensum*, and is called Hypallage.

---

\* In Latin we find 'Alexandri *Phrygio* sub pectore,' Lucret. i. 475, and '*Nemeæus* hiatus Leonis,' id. 24. We have something like it in Ossian, 'The hunter's early eye.' Carlyle, in his French Revolution, speaks of 'the housemaid *with* early broom.'

The genitive may be even involved in the epithet, as *δξύχειρ κτύπος* a sharp clapping of hands. See Lobeck's *Aj.* p. 63, on epithets in general. Often, by a kind of metonymy, the adjective represents the general conception or result of the substantive, as '*pallida mors*', *χλωρὸς θέος*, '*Rugosum piper et pallentis grana cumini*', Pers.; '*vulnera despirationis*', Plin.; 'The sound of the churchgoing bell,' Cowper, &c.

- iii. Σκύθην ἐς οἰμον to the Scythian track (=Σκυθικήν).  
 τὴν Ἑλλάδα φωνὴν ἐξέμαθον I learned the Greek tongue  
 (=Ἑλληνικήν).

Here we see that substantives (especially the names of countries) are sometimes used adjectivally, as in the Latin *Asia* prata, Virg. *G. i.* 383; *Aqua* *Baiae*, Prop. *i. xi.* 30\*; and our *India* rubber, *Russia* leather, *China* bowl, *Turkey* carpet, &c. A substantive in apposition often defines another in an adjectival way, as ἀνὴρ βασιλεὺς, ἀνὴρ ναύτης, ἄνθρωπος γεωργός, &c.; as in the Latin *hostes turme*, Stat. *Th. xi.* 22; *Fabulæ manes*, Hor. *Od. i. iv.* 16; and our a *sailor man*, a *butcher fellow*, a *warrior host*, &c.

- iv. Νεστορέη παρὰ γῆ by the Nestorean ship (i.e. Nestor's).  
 Βερενικεῖα θυγάτηρ Bereniceian daughter (i.e. of Berenice).  
 νόστιμον ἡμέρα returning day, i.e. day of return.

In all such instances the adjective is used for the genitive of the noun; as in Milton's

'Above the flight of *Pegasean wing*.'—*Par. Lost, vii. 4*;  
 and in Tennyson's

'A Niobeian daughter, one arm out  
 Appealing to the bolts of heaven.'—*The Princess*.

- v. δαῖτα πένοντο δειελινοὶ they in the evening were preparing their meal.  
 σκοταιῶς† ἦλθεν he came in the dark.  
 τεταρταιῶς ἀφίκετο he arrived on the fourth day.  
 δρκιός σοι λέγω I tell you on oath.

Hence observe that the Greek uses adjectives in many instances in which we use prepositions with a substantive, and that this is especially the case in expressions of time. Compare the Latin

'Eneas se matutinus agebat' was bestirring himself in the morning.  
*Hesterni Quirites citizens of yesterday.*  
*Domesticis otior I am at ease in my home.*

\* See Jani's *Art of Poetry*, Engl. Tr. p. 44.

† Compare Milton's 'As the wakeful bird Sings darkling.' Clyde compares Virgil's 'Ibant obscuri.'

We have precisely the same idiom in English, as

'Gently they laid them down as *evening sheep*.'—Dryden.

'The *nightly* hunter lifting up his eyes,' &c.—Words-worth.

'The *noonday* nightingales.'—Shelley.

vi. *ἐήλη ἡ οἰκοδομία ἔτι ὅτε καὶ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο* it is still evident on the face of it that the building was hurriedly done.

*δῆλός ἐστιν ὃς τι δρασεῖων κακὸν* it is evident that he means some mischief.

*στέργυρων φανερὸς ἢν οὐδένα* it was obvious that he loved no one.

The Greeks are much less fond than ourselves of the *impersonal\** construction; they substitute the personal construction for it. (There is *no* true impersonal in Greek; either the nom. is merely understood, or the *sentence* is the nom.)

vii. *τῶν σῶν ἀδέρκτων ὄμμάτων τητάμενος*.—Soph. *O. C.* 1200, robbed of thy blinded eyes, i.e. robbed of thine eyes so that they are blind.

*εὗφημον ὡ τάλαινα κάιμησον στόμα*.—*Æsch. Ag.* 1247, lull thy tongue to silence, O hapless one.

*εἴσοκε θερμὰ λόετρα θερμήνη* till he warmed the baths hot.

This is what is called the proleptic or anticipative† use of the adjective. It is found quite as strongly in Latin; e.g. in Virgil,

*Submersas obrue puppes overwhelm the ships in the depths.*

*Scuta latentia condunt they conceal the shields in hiding.*

*Spicula lucida tergunt they wipe their darts bright.*

\* In fact, the constant use of 'it' is a strange idiom, in which English differs from most languages, ancient and modern; e.g. *It was they who did it* = *ἔκεινοι ἐποίησαν*, *isti fecerunt*, *Eran ellos los que hicieron*, etc.

† Some call it the factitive adjective. For abundant instances, see Lobeck, *Paralip. Gram. Græc.* p. 531 seqq., and *id. ad Aj.* 517. The neglect of this has led to strange errors. Thus, in Soph. *Ant.* 883, *τὸν ἔμον πότρουν ἀδάκρυτον οὐδεὶς στενάζει* 'no one groans for my fearless fate.' Valcknär, not observing that the *ἀδάκρυτον* is proleptic of the result, makes it = *πολυδάκρυτον*, adopting the purely fictitious *alpha intensivum*.

We also find it in English,\* as

‘The Norman set his foot upon the *conquered* shore.’—  
Drayton.

‘Heat me these irons *hot*.’—Shakspeare.

‘Who with our spleens  
Would all themselves laugh *mortal*?—Id.

‘And strikes *him dead* for thine and thee.’—Tennyson.

viii. By what is called *antimeria* the adjective is often used where the adverb would be more correct; as in

*λῦσαν δ' ἀγορὴν αἰψηρὴν* ‘they loosed the assembly *quick*.’

*θοὰν νύμφαν ἄγαγες*, thou leddest a *swift* bride, i.e.  
swifly (Soph. Tr. 862. Lobeck on *Aj.* 249).

*κρήνη ἀφθονος φέουστα* a fountain flowing abundantly.

*ἀσμενος ὑμᾶς εἶδον* I saw you gladly.

Similarly in Milton we find

‘Meanwhile inhabit *lax* (i.e. loosely), ye heavenly powers.’  
—Par. L. vii. 161.

Compare the Biblical expressions ‘Open thy hand *wide*,’  
‘Cry *shrill* with thy voice,’ &c.

### COMPARATIVES.

70. The following instances illustrate the chief idioms in the use of comparatives:—

i. *ἀγροικότερόν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν* it is *somewhat rude* to say.  
*ἀμεινόν ἔστι κ.τ.λ.* it is *as well to*, &c.

ii. *ἢν οἱ ἀδελφεδος ὑπομαργύότερος* he had a brother *rather mad*.

These instances merely express degree. The want of two forms in Greek, one *comparative*, and one *qualitative*, has already been pointed out. (See § 44, p. 26.)

*ἐλαφρότεροι η ἀφνειότεροι* swifter than richer (i.e. rather swift than rich).†

\* There is a fine and ghastly instance of prolepsis in Keats's *Pot of Basil*,

‘So those two brothers, and their *murdered* man,  
Rode to fair Florence.’

† ‘He was more of a knave than fool,’ might be expressed in Greek, *μοχθηρότερος ἢν η ἀνούστερος*. One way of hinting at a superlative is *εἴ τις καὶ οὐλος* ‘if any one ever was you are,’ as *εἴ τις καὶ οὐλος σώφρων* ‘you are the most temperate of men.’

*έπειρα ταχότερα ἢ σοφότερα more quickly than (more) wisely.*

Notice the *two* comparatives, like the Latin ‘*Subtilius quam versus*.’

Phrases like the following are common with comparatives:—

iii. ἀσφειότερος γίγεται αἰτός ἐντοῦ he grows braver than he ever was.

ἀμάλιγτα αἰτός ἐντοῦ ἀσφ. he sees more dully than ever.  
μεῖον οὐδεῖον ἡ τοῦ αἰτός αἴτη a burden too great for him  
(lit. greater than in proportion\* to himself).

κακά μεῖον ἡ κακά δύστεια or ἡ ὥστε δύστεια or ἡ c. woes  
too big for tears.

μεῖον οὐδεῖον αἴτη too great for man.

λόγου μεῖον too big for words.

Θανὼν ἦν εἴη μᾶλλον εὐτυχεστέρος he would be more fortunate (literally ‘more happier’) when dead.

Compare *μᾶλλον ἀστερ*, Soph. *Ant.* 1210; Eur. *Hip.* 485; *Hec.* 377.

This last phrase shows a tendency to that analytic mode of expressing the comparative,† which began in the similar Latin phrases ‘magis certius,’ ‘magis dulcius,’ &c. So in the Bible ‘*The Most Highest*:’ and in *King Lear* ‘I am sure my heart’s *more richer* than my tongue.’ The gradually analytic tendency in comparatives and superlatives may be seen from the fact that we should no longer use such terms as grievousest, famousest, artificialest, &c., which we find in Bacon, Shakespeare, Milton, &c., or even the ‘impudentest’ of Gray.

iv. On the other hand *μᾶλλον* is sometimes omitted, as θάρατον ἢ βίον αἰσθάνετο choosing death (rather) than life. This is frequent in the New Test., as Mk. ix. 43; Lk. xv. 7, xvii. 2; 1 Cor. xiv. 19; and in the LXX., as ισχὺει οὐνος ἢ ἡμεῖς he is stronger than we.—Num. xxii. 6. So in Plaut. *Rud.* iv. iv. 70, Tacita bona est mulier semper quam loquens; *Liv.* vii. 8, Ipsorum quam Annibal is interest, &c.

v. Another peculiarity of *μᾶλλον ἢ* is, that *οὐ* is sometimes inserted after it, as

\* πρό. ἀντί, and πρὸ are often used after comparatives. (Cf. Virg. *Aen.* i. 346, ‘Pygmalion scelerē ante omnes *iumentior* omnes.’)

† The analytic comparative begins to appear in later Latin; e.g.

‘*Plus tamen esse meus, plus est formosus Iollas.*’—Calpurn. The instances from Plautus show that it always existed colloquially.

οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἡμέας μᾶλλον η οὐ καὶ ἐπ' ὑμέας, Hdt.  
iv. 118, no whit *more* against us *than* against you.

πόλιν δῆλη διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον η οὐ τὸν αἰτίον, Thuc. iii.  
36, to destroy a whole city *rather than* the guilty.

[Donaldson compares the English vulgarism ‘*rather nor*;’ and Clyde the redundant negative after comparisons in Italian as Io scrivo più che io *non* parlo I write more than I (lit. don’t) speak. Still closer is the Spanish parallel, El es mas rico que *no* ella he is richer than she; mejor es el trabajo que *no la* ociosidad labour is better than idleness.]

vi. The common *Comparatio Compendiaria*, or *Brachylogy of Comparison*, should be noticed; as πυραμὶς μείζων πατρὸς a pyramid larger than (*that of*) his father. Instances of it will be found in the *Syntaxis Ornata* at the end.

## SUPERLATIVES.

71. The superlative, like the comparative, sometimes merely expresses *degree*, as στοι δ' Ἀχιλλεῦ οὔτις ἀνὴρ προπάροιθε μακάρατος no one, Achilles, was ever before *so very happy as you* (*Keiner war mehr so ganz glücklich als du*).

72. The Greeks had a peculiar idiom with superlatives. Instead of saying ‘*more beautiful than all others*,’ they said ‘*most beautiful of all others*,’ as

Νιρεὺς δὲ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ οὐπὸς Ἰλιον ἥλθεν  
τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν.—Hom. Il. ii. 673.

ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων more worthy of narration than any that preceded it.

Milton boldly imitates this *inclusive* use of the superlative in the lines

‘ Adam the goodliest of all men since born  
His sons, the fairest of her daughters Eve ; ’

where not only ignorant critics, but even Addison and Bentley, have censured him for making Adam one of his own sons, and Eve one of her own daughters! For an explanation of this idiom see *supra* § 47 note. Cf. Hor. Sat. i. i. 100: ‘fortissima Tyndaridarum’ *braver than* the Tyndarids; ‘ Diana . . . comitum pulcherrima’ *fairer than* all her comrades.

73. The following are phrases to strengthen superlatives\* :—

\* One of the ways of expressing the superlative in Hebrew is by a mere repetition of the word, as ‘good good’ = *very good*. We find a

*ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἵναντίος τῷ δῆμῳ especially opposed to democracy.*

*εἰς ἀνὴρ πλεῖστον τόνον παρασχὼν giving more trouble than any one.*

*πάγου οἵους δεινότατον of the sharpest possible frost.*

*ὅπως ἄριστα in the best possible way.*

*ὅσον τάχιστα as speedily as possible.*

*ώς οἶον τε βέλτιστον in the best possible manner.*

*ὅτι μάλιστα as much as possible.*

N. B. i. In St. John (i. 15; xv. 18) *πρῶτος* is used as a comparative,—*ἔμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν ὅτι πρῶτος μου ἦν.*

ii. There is sometimes a reduplication of superlatives, especially in comic writers, as in the words *έλαχιστότερος*, *πρώτιστος*, *αὐτρότατος* (Plaut. *ipsissimus*).

### PREPOSITIONS (Προθέσεις).

74. The prepositions (as we still see in Homer) were originally mere *local adverbs*, i.e. like the case-endings, they originally denoted relations of *place*, but their meaning was gradually extended to express all kinds of metaphysical or figurative relations.

75. Cases, without prepositions, are sufficient for languages which are at their simplest stage. But every language, as it advances from synthesis to analysis, develops prepositions, and uses them more and more to give precision to the obliterated forms and more extended meanings of the case-terminations. Moreover as the requirements of language become more and more complicated, the quickness of the mind is naturally diminished and encumbered. In fact, prepositions become more and more necessary to distinctness and accuracy in language,\* and hence they are often used in prose where they would be omitted in poetry. It should then be clearly understood that it is the *case* which indicates the meaning of

---

trace of this in Heb. x. 37, *Ἐτι γὰρ μικρὸν δύον δύον very, very soon.* There is something like it in *δύον δύον στήλην*, Ar. *Vesp.* 213, *A tiny tiny drop=quantillum.* (Winer, Gr. N. T. § 35.) By a similar principle we find *μεγέθει μέγας = μέγιστος* in Pausanias.

\* See some excellent remarks on this subject in Burggraaff, p. 268 seqq. As Mr. D'Arcy Thompson expresses it, modern languages have all discarded (or nearly so) the tight affixes (or case-endings) of the ancient languages for loose prefixes or prepositions.

the *preposition*, and not the preposition which gives the meaning to the case. Each preposition has some one distinct meaning of its own, varied by the cases with which it is used. Its purpose is only to supplement and to define. Thus ἀπὸ meaning ‘from’ entirely coincides with the conception of ablation, and hence is used with the genitive only; ἐν denotes ‘position in,’ and therefore coincides with the meaning of the dative, and is joined with the dative only; εἰς indicates *motion towards*, and therefore (naturally) is only joined with the accusative. Παρὰ means ‘alongside of,’ and really retains this sense with all three cases, παρὰ σοῦ=from (alongside of) you; παρὰ σοι at alongside of you=with you; παρὰ σὲ to alongside of you=to you. It is therefore not strictly accurate to talk of prepositions *governing* cases; since in point of fact they merely *define* the exact sense in which the case is used. It is the case which borrows the aid of the preposition, not the preposition which requires the case. It should be observed also that where prepositions appear to change their meanings with the cases which they define, it is really a difference in the meaning *not* of the preposition but of the case.

**76.** We are not therefore surprised to find that prepositions have nearly superseded cases in Modern Greek and in the Romance languages; and we can see the *tendency* to use them (which ended in the final evanescence of case-distinctions), on the one hand in the New Testament where they *abound*; and on the other in the practice of the Emperor Augustus,\* who was observed to make great use of them in the endeavour to speak as *perspicuously* as possible. Thus he preferred to say or speak ‘impendere in aliquam rem,’ and ‘includere in carmine,’ when most of his contemporaries would have used the phrases ‘impendere alicui rei,’ and ‘includere carmine,’ or carmini. In doing this he was only a little before his age; but the same *tendency* is found often enough, as ‘ad carnificem dare,’ Plaut.; ‘Fulgorem reverentur ab auro,’ Virg.; ‘Genera de ulmo,’ Plin. Lucilius

---

\* See Egger, *Gram. Comp.* p. 195. The very interesting passage in Suetonius, which mentions this analysing phraseology of the careful emperor, is as follows: ‘Præcipuam curam duxit sensum animi quam apertissime exprimere; quod quo facilius exprimeret, aut necibi lectorem vel auditorem obturaret ac moraretur, nec *prepositiones verbis addere*, neque coniunctiones sepius iterare dubitavit, *quaes detracte afferunt aliquid obscuritatis eti gratiam augent.*’ The passage might have been used to describe the style of Lord Macaulay, and the last clause hints at the respective advantages of synthetic and analytic languages, the latter gaining in accuracy what they lose in vivid conciseness.

77. Several prepositions (called *improper* or *spurious*) are also adverbs, as ἐγγύς, ἀμα, πόρω, πέλας; χάρις, &c., as in English ‘before,’ ‘after,’ &c. This *adverbial* use of prepositions is most frequent, as might have been expected, in the older writers.

78. The name Προθέσεις *præverbia*, is due to their use in *composition* with verbs, &c. When they stand alone many of them may (especially in poetry) be placed *after\** the words they govern. When this is the case, the accent is thrown back by what is called *anastrophe*, as τέκνων πέρι, μάχη ἐπι, &c.† Διὰ and ἀνά are excepted from the law of anastrophe, lest they should be confused with the accusative of Ζεύς, and the vocative of ἄναξ.

79. There are eighteen prepositions, of which four, ἀπό, ἐπί, ἀντί, πρό, govern the genitive; two, ἐν and σύν, the dative; one, ἀνά, the dative and accusative; three, διά, κατά, ὑπέρ, the genitive and accusative; and seven, ἀμφί, περί, ἐπί, μετά, παρά, πρός, ὑπό, take three cases, the genitive, dative, and accusative. Besides these there are the improper prepositions.

80. Examples will only be given where the meaning is peculiar or not obvious; and those usages which are very rare or quite abnormal, are omitted; for completeness in treating of the prepositions *cannot* be combined with brevity. In all languages the usages and phrases connected with prepositions are too numerous to be briefly exhausted. For instance, in English the *same* prepositions may even have *opposite* meanings, as ‘I fight with you,’ which may either mean ‘at your side and for you,’ or ‘*against* you’; so in Latin we may have ‘pugnare cum hostibus,’ and ‘ire cum sociis’; and πρὸς τινος may mean either *against* or *for* a person, according to the context, &c. The reason of this is that even the commonest matters may be viewed under *many* aspects; compare, for instance, the phrases ‘to talk *about* a thing, λέγειν περὶ τινος dicere de aliqua re, ἢ γεγένη über etwas sprechen.’ Here

\* In many languages (e.g. Turkish) they are *entirely* postpositions; in Latin we have *mecum*, *vobiscum*, &c.; in English *wherein*, *wherewith*, &c.; in German *Deinetwegen*, &c.

† But otherwise πάρα, ἐπί, μέτρα, πέρι, ὑπό, ἔνι (notice the *accents*), stand for πάρεστι, ἐπεστι, &c., and ἄνα for ἀνάστηθι *stand up!* or for the vocative of ἄναξ (*in Homer*). A change of meaning is in all languages naturally accompanied by a change of accent, or spelling; thus in English ‘sith’ is a causal particle, but *since* (*sithens*) is also a preposition and an adverb.

we and the Greeks regard the object spoken of as something *encompassed*; the Latins as a *whole* of which *part* is supplied; the Hebrew as a ground to stand *on*; the Germans as a ground to be gone *over*' (Winer, *Gram. N. T.* ii. § 47). Besides, when mental and metaphysical relations have to be figuratively expressed by words and cases which originally had only a local meaning, it is obvious that the metaphor must be of so very general a character that the same relation may be expressed with equal propriety in several ways. It is generally easy with a little thought and care to trace the metaphysical meaning directly from the physical, but, as the explanation would require an entire treatise, and as views differ on the subject, this is best left to the student himself.

**81.** The student should accustom himself to notice the manner in which the meaning of a verb alters according to the prepositions with which it is compounded; e.g.

*δίδωμι* I give; *ἐκδίδοναι* to disembogue; *ἐνδιδόναι* to yield; *ἐπιδίδοναι* to increase; *παραδίδοναι* to hand down; *προδίδοναι* to betray; *ἀποδίδοσθαι* to sell, &c.

*τείχισμα* a fort; *διστείχισμα* a partition; *ἐπιτείχισμα* a fort built in an enemy's country; *παρατείχισμα* a cross-wall; *προτείχισμα* a bulwark; *περιτείχισμα* a line of circumvallation, &c.

*ἰστημι* I place; *συνιστημι* I introduce; *ἔξιστημι* I drive mad; *καθίστημι* I establish.

*ἴημι* I send; *ἀνιέναι* to remit; *ἀφιέναι* to set sail; *ἔφιέναι* to give up to; *μεθιέναι* to relax, &c.

*ἔχω* I have; *ἀνέχειν* to continue, to rise up; *ἔξέχειν* to project; *προσέχειν* to attend; *κατέχειν* appellere, to touch at a shore; *ὑπερέχειν* to excel; *ἀντέχειν* to resist; *ἐπέχειν* to wait for; (*ἀνεχε καὶ πάρεχε* 'bear and forbear.'

*σείω* I shake; *προσείω* I threaten, or entice by waving; *ἐπισείω* I hark on, &c.

*ἔρχομαι* I come; *κατέρχομαι* I return from exile; *μετέρχομαι* I go after, &c.

#### PREPOSITIONS WHICH GOVERN THE GENITIVE.

**82.** These are:

1. *ἄντι opposite to, contra*; then *instead of, for*. (Compare the words *ἄντα*, *ἄντην*, *ἀντικρύ*, *ἐναντίος*, *ante*).  
*ἀντ' ἐμοῦ instead of me.*  
*ἀνθ' οὐ on account of which.*

ἀλλάττεσθαι ἀντὶ χρυσοῦ to change for gold.

χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος grace for grace, i.e. unceasingly renewed.

ii. πρὸ (præ) before, both of time, place, and preference.

It is closely connected with, but slightly more general than, ἀντὶ; hence ἀντ' ὄφθαλμῶν=πρὸ τῶν ὄφθαλμῶν.

iii. ἐκ, ἐξ 'from out of,' extrinsecus.

ἐκ παιδῶν from boyhood.

ἐξ often=after, as

γελᾶν ἐκ δακρύων to laugh after tears.

ἐκ δείπνων ὑπνος ἡδὺς sweet is sleep after dinner.

τυφλός ἐκ δεδόρκοτος blind after seeing.

ἐκ κύματων γαλήνη ὥρω I see after storms a calm.

Compare the Latin *ex*: e.g. Scriba *ex* quinqueviro; *ex* homine factus est Verres (Cic. *Div.*, *Verr.* 17 f.)

Our *of* is used in just the same way by Milton, as

'I of brute, human, ye of human, gods.'—*Par. Lost*, ix. 712.

'How cam'st thou speakable of mute?'—Id. ix. 563.

'Is of a king become a banished man.'—Shakspeare.

iv. ἀπὸ (a, ab, abs, off) 'from'; ἀπὸ means 'from the outside,' ἐξ from the *inside* of a thing; as ἀπὸ Γαλιλαίας, ἐξ πόλεως Νάζαρετ.—Luke ii. 4. It expresses place, time, and cause; also sometimes the agent, as ἐπράχθη ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔργον ἀξιώλογον.

Besides these four, the spurious prepositions ἀνεν without, ἀχρι, μέχρι until, μεταξὺ between, ἐνεκα and ἐκαρι for the sake of, εἰνδὺ straight towards, πλὴν except, τρόπον and δικῆν like, and χάριν for the sake of, govern a genitive.

N. B. εἰνθὲν=immediately, εἰθὲν with the gen.=straight towards; μεταξὺ by a curious ellipse sometimes omits one of the two things between which another is placed, as μεταξὺ τῶν Ἰνοῦς (Ar. *Ach.* 434) between those of Ino (*and the ones last mentioned*). Compare our word 'twilight,' i.e. twixt light (and darkness). Cf. *Par. Lost*, ix. 50, and Shilleto *Dem. de F. Leg.* § 181. μεταξὺ δειπνῶν=whilst dining.

#### PREPOSITIONS WITH THE DATIVE, ἐν, σύν.

83. i. ἐν (in with the ablative) of place and time; also of the instrument and manner, as

ἐν or σὺν τάχει with speed.

ἐν ὄφθαλμοις ὥρῶν seeing with the eyes.

ἢν ἐν τοῖς Ἱεροσολύμοις (place), ἐν τῷ πάσχα (time), ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ (circumstance).—2 Cor. vii. 16.

ii. Σύν (ξύν, cum) *with*. It implies a closer union than μετά. See Soph. Ant. 115. πολλῶν μεθ' ὅπλων, σύν θ' *in ποκύμοις κορύθεσσι* (Donaldson). σύν τινι implies coherence; μετά τινος coexistence (Winer).

N.B. Σύν is by no means coextensive with the English 'with'; thus 'they fought with him,' would be not *σὺν αὐτῷ* but *πρὸς αὐτόν*.

#### WITH THE ACCUSATIVE, εἰς, ὡς.

**84.** i. εἰς (*in with accusative*), *into*, of place. Also *up to* of time, as ἔτος εἰς ἔτος year by year, εἰς εἴκοσι μάλιστα up to about twenty. Also of *purpose*, as εἰς τόδε ἥκομεν for this purpose we have come.

εἰς *into* stands in the same relation to πρὸς *towards*, as ἐξ *out of* does to ἀπὸ *away from*.

εἰς sometimes, in the tragedians, means 'as regards'; ὡς οὐρὶς ἀνδρῶν εἰς ἄπαντ' εὐδαιμονεῖ since no man is happy *in all respects* (cf. Eur. *Phæn.* 619, 1645; *Or.* 529).

εἰς is often used with ellipses, as ἐξ διδασκάλου into the teacher's (house), ἐξ "Αἰδον το (the realm of) Hades, &c.

ii. ὡς *to only with persons*, or words that involve persons, as

ἔπεμψεν αὐτὸν ὡς βασιλέα he sent him to the king.  
ὡς τάσδε χεῖρας to these hands of mine.

Probably it is a merely elliptic expression for ὡς πρός, ὡς ἐπί, &c. which we frequently find; e.g. εἰς Φωκέας, ὡς πρὸς συμμάχονες.—Demosth. Constructions like ὡς "Αβύδον 'to Abydos,' are very rare.

#### WITH THE GENITIVE AND ACCUSATIVE, διά, κατά, ὑπέρ.

**85.** i. διά *through* (connected with δύο; δι' ἐκ = right through).

a. With genitive=per.\*

δι' ἀγγέλων by means of messengers.

---

\* Διὰ with the genitive is rarely used of the direct *agent* (which is ὥνδ or παρὰ with the genitive); δι' οὗ is not 'by whom,' but 'by whose means,' *per quem* not *a quo*.

- διὰ τῶν ὄφθαλμῶν ὥρᾶμεν we see with our eyes.  
 διὰ χερῶν ἔχειν to have in hand.  
 διὰ φιλίας λέναι to be on friendly terms.\*  
 διὰ στόματος ἔχειν to talk about.  
 διὰ μακροῦ after a long interval.  
 διὰ δέκα ἐπάλξεων πύργοι towers at intervals of ten battle-ments.

*β.* With the accusative, *through* or *about* (poet.), as διὰ δώματα. Also *on account of*=*propter*, as ἐχω γάρ δέχω διά σε.

Thus διὰ νῆσου λέναι would be to *pass through* an island; διὰ νῆσου λέναι would be in poetry to *make a tour through* an island; and we should say διὰ πεδίου ἐμάχηρο he was fighting all *about* the plain, but διὰ πεδίου ἐδραμεν he ran through the plain. 1 Cor. xi. 9, οὐκ ἐκτίσθη ἀνήρ διὰ τὴν γυναικά ‘for the sake of’; id. vers. 12, ὁ ἀνήρ διὰ τῆς γυναικός ‘by means of’ δι’ ὅν τὰ πάντα καὶ δι’ οὖν τὰ πάντα, Heb. ii. 11, for *whose sake*, and by *whose means* all things exist.  
 διὰ σοῦ *per te*, by your means; αὐτὸς δι’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίει he was doing it by himself, sua unius opera.  
 διὰ σὲ *propter te*, because of you; εἰ μὴ δι’ αὐτὸν but for him.  
 διὰ τούτων by means of these things, *per hæc*.  
 διὰ ταῦτα wherefore, *propter hæc*.

N.B. διὰ νυκτὸς and διὰ νύκτα differ very little; the former calls attention to the fact that a thing lasted *till next morning*, the latter that it occupied *all night long*.

ii. *κατά* ‘down.’

a. With genitive, *down from*; also *against*, as λέγειν *κατά τινος* to speak against any one.

*β.* With accusative, *along*, *about*, *according to*, *in reference to*.†

*κατὰ ρόον* down stream.  
*κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον* about the same time.  
*κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν* according to my notion.  
*τὸ κατὰ Μάρκον εὐαγγέλιον* the gospel according to Mark.

\* Cf. ἀγειν διὰ φροντίδος *curare*, διὰ μνήμης *mentionem facere*, δι’ αἰδοῦς *venerari*, δι’ εὐχῆς *in votis habere*, &c.

† Hence both *καθ’ ἑαυτόν*, and δι’ ἑαυτοῦ, mean ‘*by himself*,’ *scorsum*; but the former implies ‘*in reference to*,’ the latter ‘*by means of*’

Compare the following: ↓ *κατὰ* with the genitive, vertical motion; → *κατὰ* with the accusative, horizontal motion.

*οἱ κατὰ χθονὸς* the dead.

*οἱ κατὰ χθόνα* the living.

*κατ' Οὐλύμπιον καρήνων* down from the crest of Olympus.  
*κατὰ θάλασσαν ἐπορεύετο* he went by sea.

### iii. ὑπὲρ over.

a. With the genitive, *position over, super*; also *on behalf of,\** as in *ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι* I will answer on your behalf.

β. With the accusative, *over and beyond, ultra*; as *ρίπτειν ὑπὲρ τὸν δόμον* to fling over the house.

### WITH THE DATIVE AND ACCUSATIVE.

'Ανὰ 'up.'

a. With the dative, only in Epic and lyric poetry, *on*.  
*εῦδει δ' ἀνὰ σκάπτῳ Διὸς αἰεὶς* and the eagle slumbers *on* the sceptre of Zeus.

β. With the accusative, *up, throughout, &c.*

ἀνὰ βόον up stream.

ἀνὰ πᾶν ἔτος quotannis.

ἀνὰ πᾶν τὸ ἔτος throughout the year.

N.B. i. 'Ανά, *κατά*, are probably the origin of the hypothetical particles *ἄν*, *κέν*.

ii. They are used in constant contrast, as *ἄνω κάτω* up and down, *sursum deorsum*; *ἀνὰ κατὰ* *ultra citroque*, *ἀνέβη* he went inland, *κατέβη* he went to the sea, *ἀνέδη* it rose, *κατέψυ* it set, *ἀναγείνω* I throw back the head in token of dissent, *καταγείνω* I nod assent.

iii. And yet, since *up* and *down* are but two ways of regarding motion along the same line, it is often indifferent which of the two we use; † hence we find either *κατὰ* or *ἀνὰ*

\* Both *ὑπὲρ* and *πρὸς* with the genitive mean 'on behalf of,' because a champion in battle stood in both positions, as *μὴ θυῆσθαι* 'ὑπὲρ τοῦ' *ἀνδρός*, *οὐδὲ ἐγὼ πρὸς σοῦ*.—*Alc.* 690. (Donaldson.)

† We must not suppose because two prepositions are interchangeable, even with different cases (as *ἐπὶ τεττάρων* and *ἀνὰ τέτταρας*) that they *mean the same thing*. The explanation is that the same relation may be regarded from two entirely different points of view. In German *Auf die Bedingung* and *Unter die Bedingung* both mean 'on the condition,' but *auf 'on'* is not = *unter, 'under'*. (Winer, iii. § xlvi.)

**κράτος** forcibly; **κατὰ** or **ἀνὰ στρατὸν** throughout the army; **κατὰ** or **ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχειν** to talk about, **κατὰ** or **ἀνὰ τέτταρας** by fours (also **ἐπὶ τεττάρων**), **κατὰ** or **ἀνὰ πόλεις** about the cities.

WITH GENITIVE, DATIVE, OR ACCUSATIVE, **Ἄμφι, περὶ, ἐπὶ,**  
**μετά, παρά, πρός, ὑπό.**

**86. i.** **ἄμφι** (Lat. *amb-*, *apud*, German *um*). ‘It is mostly confined to Ionic Greek\* and to poetry, and it is the only preposition which has disappeared in Modern Greek.’ (Clyde.) As usual, we may trace its comparative insignificance in the fact that it *never occurs in the New Testament*.

With all three cases it means *around* or *about*.

**ἄμφι τὸν χειμῶνα** about winter.

**ἄμφι τοὺς μυρίους** about ten thousand.

**οἱ ἄμφι Πλάτωνα** Plato and his school.\*

It is not used with the dat. in Attic prose.

**ii. περὶ** *around* and *about* (Lat. *per-*, as adv. *πέρι=very*).

a. With the genitive=*de* about. Also *πρε*; **περὶ ὀργῆς πρε** *ird*, and ‘*above*,’ as **περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι** to place above much, or estimate highly.

**β.** With the dative,† *around*, of place, and *concerning*, as **θαρρεῖν περὶ τινι** to be of good cheer about any one.

**γ.** With the accusative *around*, and *in regard to*, and *about*, as **περὶ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον** about this time.

In these two prepositions the distinctions of meaning with the different cases are not at all *distinctly* marked. Hence we find in the same sentence **εἰνφράνειν θυμὸν ἄμφι τινι**, and **ἄμφι τινα**, and in the same sentence of Herodotus, vii. 61, **περὶ μὲν τῆσι κεφαλῆσι εἰλογεῖ τιάρας . . . περὶ δὲ τὸ σῶμα κιθῶνας**. And ‘both are used with vague indications of time or number.’ —Donaldson.

**iii. ἐπὶ upon.** It has various meanings, which can generally be deduced from its adverbial sense, and the meaning of the case with which it is joined. Thus with the genitive it

\* In later Greek (e.g. in Plutarch and Lucian), by a wild extension of the dislike to all *directness* or *personality* of speech, **οἱ ἄμφι Πλάτωνα** simply means **Plato!** In Herod. i. 62, **οἱ ἄμφι Πεισίστρατον . . . ἀπικνέεται** is due not to this phrase, but to anacoluthon.

† **περὶ** and **ὑπὸ** are never used with the dative in the New Testament.

implies *partial* superposition; with the dative absolute superposition, or rest upon; and with the accusative motion with a view to superposition (Donaldson).

a. With the genitive—

*ἐφ' ἵππων ὁχεῖσθαι* to ride on horseback.

*πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σάμου* to sail *towards* Samos.

*ἐπὶ Δαρείου ἐγένετο* it happened in the time of Darius.\*

*ἐφ' ἡμῶν* in our days.

β. With the dative—

*ἐπὶ τῇ θαλάσσῃ οἰκεῖν* to live *near* the sea (i.e. *upon* the shore).

*ἐπὶ τούτοις* thereupon, or besides.

*ἐφ' οἷς τε* on condition that.

*ἐπὶ θήρας* or *ἐπὶ θήραν* *ἔξιένται* to go a hunting.

*ἐπὶ τόκοις δανείζειν* to lend on interest.

*τὸ ἐπὶ σοι* as far as you can; nearly = *τὸ ἐπὶ σὲ quantum in te est.*

γ. With the accusative, *motion towards*—

*ἀναβαίνειν ἐφ' ἵππον* to mount *on* horseback.

*στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Λύδων* to go on an expedition *against* the Lydians.

*τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι* as far as depended on them.†

iv. *Μετὰ* with (connected with *μέσος*, German *mit*), implies *separable connection*.

a. With the genitive = *with*, (Lat. *cum*) *accompanied by* (but never our ‘*with*’ in the sense of an instrument, as ‘*with a sword*’).

β. With the dative = *among* (only in poetry).

γ. With the accusative = ‘*after*,’ either in space or time; e.g. *βῆ δὲ μετ' Ἰδομενῆ* he went after (i.e. in quest of) Idomeneus; *μετὰ ταῦτα* *after these things*.

Our ‘*after*’ has the same *two* meanings, for we say (colloquially), ‘To send *after* a person, a book,’ &c. Succession in

\* This temporal meaning of *ἐπὶ* is partly derived from the participles with which it is generally joined; we use a very similar phrase when we say ‘*upon this*’ = when this happened; ‘*Upon his coming to the throne*, &c.

† In several of its meanings *ἐπὶ* resembles the German *auf*, which is used both of hills and plains; as *ἐπ' ἐρημαῖς* = *auf dem Felde*. (Winer.)

*place* and *time* are constantly confused, as in the word ‘*interval*,’ used of time, but properly *a space between two ramparts*.

v. *παρὰ beside (apud)*.

a. With the genitive, *from*, ἐλθεῖν *παρά τινος* = *venir de chez quelqu'un*.

β. With the dative, *near*, ἦν *παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ* he was with the king.

γ. With the accusative, *towards*. All its shades of meanings with the accusative are derived from the notion of ‘motion near, or with a view to conjunction.’

*ιέναι παρὰ νῆας* to go to the ships.

*παρὰ θίνε θαλάσσης* along the sea beach.

*παρὰ δόλου τὸν βίον* during one's whole life.

*παρ'* ἐλπίδα beyond expectation.

*ἀμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ πάντας* sinners beyond all.

*παρὰ νόμου* contrary to the law.

*παρὰ ταῦτα* besides these things.

*παρὰ μικρὸν* within a little.

*παρ'* ἡμαρ from day to day.

The *causal* meaning of *παρά*, as in *παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν* is exactly paralleled by our colloquial, ‘it's all along of his own neglect.’

*παρὰ σοῦ* = *apud me a te*, i.e. *from you*; *παρὰ σοὶ* = *apud te a me*, i.e. with or by you; *παρὰ σὲ* a me ita ut *apud te sit*, i.e. towards you. It is however simpler to explain it as meaning *from (alongside of) you*, *near (alongside of) you*, *towards (alongside of) you*.

vi. *πρὸς\** (*adversus*), *to*.

a. With the genitive, *on the side of*, &c. *πρὸς μητρὸς* on the mother's side (*cognati a matre versus me*).

*οἱ πρὸς αἵματος* blood relations.

*πρὸς θεῶν* by the gods.

*οὐδαμῶς πρὸς σοῦ λέγεις* you're not talking at all *like yourself*.

*πρὸς τινος λέγειν* to speak for a person.

\* Since ‘*from*’ and ‘*to*’ may imply motion along the same line, only regarded from two different points, we are not surprised to find in the same sentence *τὸν μὲν πρὸς βορέω ἔστεῶτα τὸν δὲ πρὸς νότον* one standing from (i.e. towards) the north (as in Latin ‘*ab oriente*’ = *versus orientem*), the other towards the south.—Herod. ii. 121.

*β. With the dative, at, to, besides.*

*γ. With the accusative, towards, with respect to; οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔμε it's nothing to me; πρὸς βίᾳ violently, &c.*

*πρὸς τούτων in consequence of this (motive).*

*πρὸς τούτοις in addition to this (juxtaposition).*

*πρὸς ταῦτα therefore (with reference to this) 'so then.'*  
*πρὸς σὲ Θεῶν αἴτοῦμαι per te Deos oro: notice the position of the pronoun.*

See Eur. *Phan.* 524; *Aesch. P. V.* 992.

vii. *ὑπὸ under.* The physical meanings of *ὑπὸ* are very distinct; thus

*α. With the genitive=from under (motion from),*

*ὑπὸ πτερῶν σπάσας dragging from under the wings.*

*β. With the dative=(at) under (position),*

*καλῇ ὑπὸ πλατανίστῳ under a fair plane tree.*

*γ. With the accusative=to under (motion to),*

*ἵπ' Ἰλιον ὥπρο sped under (the walls of) Ilium.*

*ὑπὸ* with the genitive is the commonest method of expressing the agent after passive verbs, as

*ἴδλω ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων it was taken by the Greeks.*

Notice the phrases,

*ὑπὸ νύκτα=sub noctem, about nightfall.*

*ὑπὸ σάλπιγγος πίνειν to the sound of the trumpet.*

87. Donaldson quotes an interesting passage of Philo Judaeus (i. 162), in which he says that the efficient cause or agent (*ὑφ' οὗ*) in creation was God; the material cause (*ἔξ οὗ*) was substance (*ἢ ὑλὴ*); the instrument (*δι' οὗ*) was the Word; the final cause or reason for it (*δι' οὗ*) is the goodness of God.

#### PREPOSITIONS IN COMPOSITION.

88. In compounds, the use of the prepositions is generally obvious; but the following may be noticed. Sometimes *ἀπὸ* has a negative force, as in *ἀπόφημι* nego, *ἀπαρέσκω* displeaseo; *ἀντὶ* resembles the Latin *re-* in *ἀντιθέμα* retracto, *ἀναβάλλω* rejicio; *διὰ* has a reciprocal force, as in *διαμάχονται* they fight together; *ἐπὶ* means *besides*, as *ἐπιγαμεῖν* to marry a second wife; *παρὰ*=*malè*, &c. as *παραφρονεῖν* to be mad, *παρακρούειν* to cheat; *ὑπὸ* = secretly or slightly, as *ὑπογελᾶν* subridere, *ὑπόλευκος* whitish, *ὑπεκπέμπειν* to send out secretly.

## COMMON CONSTRUCTIONS WITH PREPOSITIONS.

**89.** i. The agility of intellect among the Greeks, and their love of terseness, led them to a frequent use of what is called the *constructio prægnans* (one of the forms of the *constructio κατὰ σύνεσιν* or *ad sensum*), by which they put a preposition implying *rest* with a verb implying *motion*, or *vice versa*, so that two clauses are compressed into one, as

ἐφάνη λίς . . . εἰς ὁδὸν a lion appeared *into* the road (i.e. came *into* and appeared *in*).

οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀπέφυγον those who were *in* the forum fled *from* it.

καθήμεθ ἄκρων ἐκ πάγων we sat (on and looked) *from* the hill tops.

στᾶσ' ἐξ Οὐλύμπου standing (on and looking) *from* Olympus.

πρὸς τὸ πῦρ καθήμενος sitting *to* the fire (i.e. going to and sitting at).

Φίλιππος δὲ εὑρέθη εἰς Ἀζωτον Philip was found *into* (=at) Azotus.\*

ii. So in Latin we find

*In amicitiâ receptus*.—Sall.

*In aquam macerare*.—Cat.

*Responde ubi cadaver abjeceris*.—Tac.

And in English, ‘To place a thing in (=into) his hands;’ ‘to hang something from (=on) a peg;’ ‘where (=whither) are you going?’ But our instances are fewer and far less strongly marked.†

**90.** In poetry, if there be two substantives the preposition is often put with the *last* only, as

ἢ Νεῖλον ἢ πὲ Μέμφιν.—Anacr.

ἢ ἀλός ἢ ἐπὶ γῆς.—Od. i. 247.

ἢ θει ναοὺς, ἢ θει πρὸς βωμούς.—Eur. *Hec.* 146.

\* In the New Testament this occurs all the more frequently from its also being a Hebrew idiom, as בְּ נִזְבֵּן εἰσέρχεσθαι εἰς. (Winer.) Compare ‘Ye shall be beaten *into* (εἰς) the synagogues.’—Mark xiii. 9. In Col. iv. 16, τὴν ἐκ Λαοδικείας ἔπιστολὴν means the letter written *to* L. and sent *thence* to you; not ‘from L.’ as it has been erroneously taken by those who were not aware of this *constructio prægnans*. Winer, § lxi. 6. Cf. Ps. lxxxix. 39.

† The strongest instance I have found is in the ballad of Sir Patrick Spens—

‘ And lang lang may the ladies sit,  
With their kaims *into* their hands;’

unless this be a Scoticism.

It is the same in Latin, as

‘Quæ nemora, aut quos agor *in specus?*’—Hor.

‘Baias et *ad* Ostia currunt.’—Juv.

**91.** On the other hand, the preposition is omitted from the *second* of two verbs, as

προβάτε βάτε.—*Œd. Col.* 859.

κατῆγεν, ἡγεν, ἡγεν, ἐς μέλαν πέδον.—*Eur. Bacch.* 1018.

So, too, in Latin—

‘Retinete, tenete.’—*Pacuvius in Niptris*, Cic.

**92.** Two prepositions are often used with the same word for the sake of greater distinctness, as

ἀμφὶ σοῦνεκα, *Soph. Phil.* 554.

ἀπὸ βοῆς ἔνεκα, *Thuc. viii.* 92.

μὴ πρὸς ισχύνος χάριν, *Eur. Med.* 538.

And we find compounds such as ὑπεκπέμπειν, ἔξαποφθείρειν, προπροβιάζεσθαι, &c.

#### VARIOUS INSTANCES OF THE USE OF PREPOSITIONS.

**93.** The prepositions are *often varied in the same clause*, which shows how often the shades of difference between their meaning are very slight; as οὐτε ἐπὶ γῆν οὐτε διὰ θαλάσσης, *Thuc.*; τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀγγικὴν ὁδοῦ καὶ τῆς εἰς Πελοπόννησον, *Demosth.*; μὴ περὶ τῶν δικαίων μηδὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἔξω πραγμάτων εἴναι σιν βουλήν, *id.*; ἐκ τε τῆς Κερκύρας καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἡπείρου, *Thuc. vii.* 33; ἐκ πολέμου μὲν . . . ἀφ' ἡσυχίας δέ, *Thuc. i.* 124.

**94.** i. We find the same variety in the New Testament, as δικαιώσει τὴν περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως (the source) καὶ τὴν ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως (the means), *Rom. iii.* 30. ἀπὸ and ἐκ are synonymous in *John xi.* 1; *Rev. ix.* 18.

ii. We might say

Χριστὸς ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀπέθανε, *Rom. v.* 6, 8, *xiv.* 15; οἱ δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν, *Matt. xx.* 28; οἱ αἷμα τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον, *Matt. xxvi.* 28.

In all these passages we might use ‘for’ in English, but ὑπὲρ means *in behalf of*, ἀντὶ instead of (*loc.*), and περὶ on account of us, as the cause. Yet the difference of meaning is so slight that the readings often differ, as in *Gal. i.* 4.

N.B. i. *οὐ*, *ἴτινα*, are not found in Attic prose; *οἰ* is rare in the orators.

ii. The reflexive is often used when the *thoughts* of another are referred to, as *κελεύει δέ οἱ συμπέμψαι ἄνδρας* and bids them to send him (*self*) men.

iii. The dramatic and graphic tendency of Greek writers is generally sufficient to account for any apparent inaccuracy in the use of the pronouns.

iv. There is no reciprocal pronoun in Latin; its absence is supplied by such phrases as *inter se*, *invicem*, *alius alium*, &c. (See Nügelsbach, *Lat. Stylistik*, § 89.)

Compare *ἔτυψαν ἀλλήλους* verberavit *alius alium* (ils s'entre-frappèrent, or ils se frappèrent l'un l'autre).

**100.** Reflexive pronouns are often substituted for reciprocal, as

*ἐδουλώθησαν οἵνα ἀμύνοντές σφισιν αὐτοῖς* they were enslaved, not defending themselves (=one another).

*διελεγόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς* we conversed with ourselves (i.e. with one another).

i. e. the reciprocity is extended into identity, just as in the German ‘*Wir sehen uns wieder*,’ ‘we see *one another again*,’ and in the French *se battre*, *s'entendre*, *se disputer*, &c. ‘*les républiques italiennes acharnées à se détruire*.’ So in Italian, ‘*S’ amano l’ un l’ altro*,’ they love each other.—Boccaccio. In Spanish, *se aman*, they love one another. The case is reversed in this sentence of the ‘*Spectator*,’ ‘The greatest masters of critical learning differ *among one another*’ (reciprocal, instead of ‘*among themselves*,’ reflexive).\*

#### DEMONSTRATIVE PRONOUNS.

**101.** i. *ὅδε hicce, οὗτος hic, ille,*† *ἴκετος iste*; compare the Spanish *este* *hic*, *ese* *ille*, *aquel* *iste*; and the Italian *questo*, *cotesto*, *quello*.

ii. *ὅδε* like *questo* is often used of the first person; in the tragedians *ἄντης* *ὅδε=ἴγια*.

\* Dr. Latham has adduced many instances of reflexive pronouns becoming reciprocal and vice versa. *Philolog. Trans.* 1844. So the Hebrew *Hithpahel* or middle voice is often reciprocal, as *hishtakshak*, to run to and fro among one another. Ewald, *Hebr. Gram.* § 243.

† *ὅδε οὗτος* &c. are still more emphatic forms.

iii. So ὅδε=ἴμος, Soph. *Ant.* 43, εἰ τὸν νεκρὸν σὺν τῷδε κουφεῖς χερὶ with my aid.

The avoidance of the personal pronoun as being too positive and self-assertive, leads to the most curious page in the history of language; e.g. the use of the first person plural by royal personages, the editorial 'we,' &c.; the invariable substitution of the second person plural for the second person singular, 'you' for 'thou,' until in modern languages to 'tutoyer' a person is either a great familiarity or an insult. In Spanish, instead of *thou* and *you*, we have Usted, Ustedes (written Vmd.) which are contractions of Vuestra Merced, &c. *your honour*. The use of a demonstrative (as οὗτος, ὅδε for ἔγώ) is carried to most extravagant lengths in Chinese, where a person speaking of himself to a superior says, 'this thief,' or 'this little dog,' 'this pigeon,' &c.

iv. ὅδε also ushers a new character on the stage=δεῦρο or ὥδε. ἀλλ' ήδ' ὄπαδῶν ἐκ δόμων τις ἔρχεται but lo ! one of the attendants is coming hither from the palace.

v. οὗτος often *calls* a person ; (cf. Heus tu !) as

'Ω οὗτος οὗτος Οἰδίπονς, τι μέλλομεν ; what ho ! Edipus, why are we lingering ?—*Ed. C.* 1627.  
οὗτος σὺ you there !—*Ed. T.* 532.

vi. καὶ ταῦτα=and that too ; καὶ ταῦτα δὴ τοιαῦτα so much then for that.

vii. ταῦτα and τοιαῦτα usually refer to what goes before, τάδε and τοιάδε to what is coming ; as

εἰ μὴ ταῦτά ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τάδε if it isn't *that*, neither is it *this*.—Plat. *Phæd.* 76 E.

ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωμεν, τόδε λέγομεν when we say that, we say as follows.

τοῦτο μὲν σὺ λέγεις, παρ' ἡμῶν δὲ ἀπάγγελλε τάδε so you say, but announce our reply as follows.

δὰ τήνδε αἰτίαν for the following reason.

viii. ἑκεῖνος has the sense of 'the famous,' like the Latin *ille*,\* as

ὅδ' εἰμ' ἔγώ σοι κεῖνος look, I am that famous man.

τοῦτ' ἑκεῖνο, κτᾶσθ' ἐταῖρονς this is the well-known proverb 'get friends.'

\* Cf. Cic. *Tusc. Ques.* v. 103, 'Hic est ille Demosthenes.' 'Hec illa Charybdis,' &c., Virg.

ix. *aὐτὸς*=he himself; as

*aὐτὸς ὁ ἄνδρας* the man himself.

but *ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνδρας* the same (or self-same) man.

*ταῦτα τὰ χρήματα* these things.

*τὰ αὐτὰ χρήματα* the same things.

x. The supposed distinction between *αὕτως* 'likewise' and *αὖτος* 'in vain' is a mere fiction of the grammarians. They are one and the same word passing through various phases of meaning.\*

#### RELATIVE PRONOUNS.

102. i. It has already been pointed out that *ὅς*, *ἥ*, *ὅς*, was originally a demonstrative, not a relative pronoun, and was probably another form of *ὅ*, *ἥ*, *τό*.† Hence such phrases as *καὶ ὅς* and *he, ἥ ὅς* said *he*, &c.

*ὅς μὲν πεινᾷ ὃς δὲ μεθύει* one man is hungry, another drunken.—1 Cor. xi. 21.

*ὅν μὲν ἔδειφαν, ὃν δὲ ἀπέκτειναν*.—Matt. xxi. 35.

ii. *ὅς*=who (definite), *ὅστις* whoever, referring to a class (indef.); *ὅσπερ* the very person who, referring to a distinct person, as

*ἔστιν δίκης ὄφθαλμός, ὃς τὰ πάνθ' ὄφα* there is an eye of justice, which sees all things.

*φεύγειν μὲν οὖν χρὴ πόλεμον ὅστις εὖ φρονεῖ* nay rather, any one who (quicunque) is wise should avoid war.

*ἥμετες κτενοῦμεν οἵτερος ἐξεφύσαμεν* I, the very person who bore them, will slay them.

iii. But *ὅστις* does not always retain this indefinite sense; as *ἥ πόλις ήτις ἐν Δελφοῖς κτίζεται*.

iv. The demonstrative is often pleonastic after the relative, as  
*ὅν ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν* of which one of them.

*οἵτες Ολύμπιοι θεοὶ δοῖεν ποτ' αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.*

to whom may the Olympian gods grant to them, &c.

From the frequency of this idiom in Hebrew, we find it constantly in the LXX. and N. T. See 1 Pet. ii. 24, &c.

This is precisely analogous to the English vulgarism 'which

\* See Hermann, *Annot. de Pronom.* *αὐτός*, § xv. In such phrases as *αὐτὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν sola mecum, τοῖς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ πήμασιν βαρύνεται*, &c., the aspirate shows that *αὐτὴν*, &c., are contractions for cases of the reflexive *ταυτοῦ*, &c.

† Sanskrit offers a remarkable analogy to this dropping of the final s; see Monier Williams, *Sanskrit. Gram.* § 67.

*it's a shame;* see especially Hdt. iv. 44, ‘the Indus, which it's the second river that,’ &c. In Chaucer we find such expressions as ‘*Crist which that is to every wound triacle.*’—*Man of Law's Tale.*

v. ὅστις, ὅποιος, ὅποσος, ὅπως, ὅπου, &c.\* are used in indirect (or repeated) questions and sentences, for τίς; ποῖος; πῶς; &c. Thus

τίς ἐποιησεν; who did it? οὐκ οἶδ̄ ὅστις ἡν̄ I don't know who it was.

οὐτός τι ποιεῖς; you sir, what are you doing? ὅτι ποιῶ; what, quotha?

πῶς δή, φράσω ἔγώ. “Οπως; φήσει ‘How then, I shall say. How, quotha? he will say, &c.

vi. The contemptuous use of ποῖος, especially with the article in repeated questions, should be noticed, as

ποῖον τὸν μῆθον ἔειπες; what manner of speech is this of thine!

Κ. οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρὰ βασιλέως. Δ. ποίου βασιλέως; Her. The ambassadors from the king. Dic. Fine king forsooth!—Ar. Ach. 62; cf. 157, &c.

vii. Pronouns (and especially relatives) are peculiarly liable to attraction, as

μέμνησθε οὖν ὁμαμόκατε remember the oath which you swore.

χρῶμαι οἰς ἔχω βιβλίοις I use the books I have.

ἄντρον δὲ Μακρὰς κικλήσκομεν a cave which we call Macræ.

In English, by a reverse process, the antecedent is sometimes attracted into the case of the relative; as ‘When him we serve’s away.’—*Ant. and Cleop.* iii. 1; cf. *Coriol.* v. 5.

viii. Notice the phrases,

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπου nowhere.

οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως nullo modo.

οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οἴη most certainly.

δὲ δὲ ἔζηλωσας ἡμᾶς *quant à ce que vous nous portez envie, as for your jealousy of us* (cf. *quod* in Latin).

\* These being mere luxuries, not necessities of language, have for the most part disappeared in the New Testament; and, as usual, in Modern Greek. When the question is not repeated out of any surprise, irony, misapprehension, &c., then these forms are not used; e.g.

Π. καὶ πῶς ἐν ἄντρῳ παῖδα σὺν λικεῖν ἔτλης;

Κρ. πῶς δέ;—*Ion*, 958.

And how didst thou endure to leave thy child in the cave? Cr. Ah! how indeed! [‘You may well ask how.’]

ix. Notice the following pronominal adverbs:

$\pi\hat{\nu}\hat{s}$ ; how?	<i>quomodo?</i>	$\pi\hat{\nu}s$ , somehow; <i>aliquo modo.</i>
$\pi\hat{o}\hat{v}$ ; where?	<i>ubi?</i>	$\pi\hat{o}\hat{v}$ , somewhere; <i>alicubi.</i>
$\pi\hat{y}$ ; which way?	<i>qua?</i>	$\pi\hat{y}$ , some way; <i>aliqua.</i>
$\pi\hat{o}\hat{t}\hat{e}$ ; when?	<i>quando?</i>	$\pi\hat{o}\hat{t}\hat{e}$ , at some time; <i>aliquando.</i>
$\pi\hat{o}\hat{i}$ ; whither?	<i>quo?</i>	$\pi\hat{o}\hat{i}$ , some whither; <i>aliquo.</i>

The forms  $\delta\pi\hat{o}\hat{v}$ ,  $\delta\pi\hat{o}\hat{t}\hat{e}$ , &c., are used in *indirect* sentences;  $\pi\hat{o}\hat{i}$ ,  $\pi\hat{y}$ , are the dative masculine and feminine of an obsolete pronoun  $\pi\hat{\nu}\hat{s}$  (as  $\delta$  from  $\delta\pi\hat{s}$ ).

### INDEFINITE PRONOUNS.

103. i.  $\tau\hat{i}\hat{s}$ ; =who?  $\tau\hat{i}\hat{s}$  enclitic = *a*, or *a certain*.

$\eta\ \tau\hat{i}\hat{s}\ \eta\ o\hat{v}\delta\hat{e}\hat{i}\hat{s}$  scarcely any one.

$\tau\hat{r}\hat{e}\hat{i}\hat{s}\ t\hat{i}\hat{n}\hat{e}\hat{s}$  some three, 'one or two.'

ii. The indefinite is sometimes politely put for the definite, as we say 'some one shall smart for it' = you.

$\kappa\hat{v}\hat{i}\hat{\zeta}\hat{w}\ \tau\hat{i}\hat{n}\hat{a}$  I'm annoying *some one* = you.

iii. The indefinite  $\tau\hat{i}\hat{s}$  resembles our 'one,' the German *man*, the French *on*, as

$r\hat{o}\hat{u}\hat{r}\hat{o}\ \delta\hat{h}\ \tau\hat{i}\hat{s}\ \hat{a}\pi\hat{o}\hat{k}\hat{r}\hat{v}\hat{a}\hat{r}\hat{i}\hat{s}$   $\hat{a}\nu$  *on* pourrait répondre, cela;  
hoc juste responderis.

$\pi\hat{o}\hat{i}\ \tau\hat{i}\hat{s}\ \tau\hat{r}\hat{e}\hat{f}\hat{e}\hat{r}\hat{a}\hat{i}\hat{s}$ ; whither shall one turn oneself?

iv.  $\delta\ \delta\hat{e}\hat{i}\hat{v}\hat{a}$  'a certain person,' 'so and so,' some one whom we do not know, or do not choose to name.

$\delta\ \delta\hat{e}\hat{i}\hat{v}\hat{a}\ k\hat{a}\ \delta\ \delta\hat{e}\hat{i}\hat{v}\hat{a}$  = 'John Doe and Richard Roe,' 'Brown, Jones, and Robinson'; compare the Latin 'Caius et Sempronius.'

v. Observe the phrases,

$\tau\hat{i}\ \pi\hat{a}\hat{\theta}\hat{w}\hat{r}$ ;	from what cause?	$\}=\text{why?}$
$\tau\hat{i}\ \mu\hat{a}\hat{\theta}\hat{w}\hat{r}$ ;	on what inducement?	
$\tau\hat{i}\ \hat{e}\hat{x}\hat{h}\hat{w}\hat{r}$ ;	with what reason?	
$\tau\hat{i}\ \gamma\hat{a}\hat{p}$ ;	why then? $\hat{i}\hat{v}\hat{a}\ \tau\hat{i}$ ;	
$\tau\hat{i}\ \mu\hat{h}\hat{v}$ ;	of course.	why not?

### DISTRIBUTIVE PRONOUNS.

104. i. "Αλλος *alius*, *another*; έτερος *the other of two*, *alter*; έκαστος *uniusquisque*, *ékáteros utorque*.

$\hat{\alpha}\hat{l}\hat{l}\hat{o}\hat{i}\hat{s}$  = others;  $o\hat{i}\ \hat{\alpha}\hat{l}\hat{l}\hat{o}\hat{i}\hat{s}$  the rest, *cæteri*.

$o\hat{i}\ \hat{\epsilon}\hat{t}\hat{e}\hat{r}\hat{o}\hat{i}\hat{s}$  the opposite party, *pars altera*;  $\hat{\epsilon}\hat{t}\hat{e}\hat{r}\hat{o}\hat{\phi}\hat{\theta}\hat{a}\hat{l}\hat{m}\hat{o}\hat{s}$  having lost one eye.

*μετατίθεσθε . . . εἰς ἔτερον εὐαγγελιον, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο,*  
Gal. i. 6, Ye are changed to a *quite different* Gospel,  
which is not *another of the same kind* (Clyde).

ii. By a curious *apposition* of ἄλλος with its substantive, we get the common Greek form of expression, ‘sheep and other camels’—sheep, and other animals, viz. camels; as

ἴκαδ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ξένων, Plat. *Gorg.* 473 c,  
by the citizens and the rest, viz. foreigners.

Ὕγουστο δὲ καὶ ἔτεροι δύο κακοῦργοι σὺν αὐτῷ ἀναιρεθῆναι,  
Luke xxiii. 32, And two *different persons*, viz. *malefactors*, were led to be crucified with him (not as in the Eng. Ver. ‘two other malefactors’).

N.B. “*Ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο* one thing *after* another.

*ἄλλος ἄλλο λέγει* one man says *one thing, another another*.

Cf. ‘*Alia ex aliis in fata vocamus*,’ *AEn.* iii. 496, We are summoned into one destiny after another.


‘*Alii alio intueri*,’ *Liv. ix. v. 8.*

It will be seen how much more awkward is the English idiom.

### THE VERB.

105. i. The very name Verb (*ῥῆμα verbum*) implies that it is *the word*, the most important word, in the sentence (see § 69).

ii. The forms of verbs may be tabulated thus:



### VOICES (*διαθέσεις*).

106. A Greek verb has three voices, active, passive, and middle.

107. ACTIVE VOICE.—We have already seen that the reason why so many transitive verbs have also an intransitive meaning, is that the latter is the *older* meaning out of which the other was developed.

108. DEONENT VERBS have only a middle form, and it is

probable that they were all originally reflexive. It is not surprising that many deponents have also tenses of a passive form (e.g. ἐκεάμην excepti, ἐκέχθην exceptus sum; ἐβιασάμην coegi, ἐβιασθην coactus sum, &c.); or that their tenses are used in a passive sense,\* as is so commonly the case with the future middle (ἀρκομαι, τιμήσομαι, δηλώσομαι, λέξομαι, κηρύξομαι, ἀλώσομαι, &c.).

**109. i. PASSIVE VOICE.**—The passive form implies that the subject of the preposition is not the agent; the agent is usually expressed by ὑπο with the genitive, or, in verbs which imply comparison, by the genitive alone; also by ἐκ (poet.), and παρα (more rarely by τρόπος and ἀπό) with the genitive; and, especially after the perf. pass., by the dative case; as ἔμοι πέτρακται τούργον the deed has been done by me.

ii. Even those verbs which govern a genitive or dative may in Greek be used passively, and this genitive or dative may become the subject of the passive verb; e.g. ἀποτέμνειν τινὸς τὴν κεφαλήν, and in the passive οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀποτημθέντες τὰς κεφαλὰς; πιστεύω τινὶ τι, and in the passive πεπιστευμέναι τι I have been entrusted with something.

N.B. Notice the difference between the Greek and Latin idiom in ψεύσης οὐ πιστεύεται mendaci non creditur.

**110. MIDDLE VOICE.**—The middle voice always refers to *self* in some relation or other, which may be expressed *a.* by the genitive, *b.* dative, *c.* accusative, or *d.* by a pronominal adjective; as

- a.* ἀπωσάμενος pushing away *from* myself.
- b.* παρασκενάζομαι I prepare *for* myself.
- c.* ἀτάγξασθαι to hang *oneself*.
- d.* τύπτομαι τὴν κεφαλήν I beat *my own* head.

In later Greek a reflexive pronoun with the active is often used instead of the middle, as ὥντινειτο ἔαντόρ, John xxi. 18; and this reflexive pronoun is even added to the middle, as διεμερίσαντο ἔαντοῖς, John xix. 24.

**111. There are four chief uses of the middle.**

i. **Simply reflexive**, as λούομαι I wash myself.

---

\* Just as, on the other hand, some passive forms are used in the sense of neuters, as πορεύθην to march, κουμῆθην to sleep, φοβηθῆναι, ἀπαλλαγῆναι, &c. In later Greek, the middle is often used in a passive sense. Such peculiarities cause no practical confusion; in French the reflexive verb is often passive, as in 'Votre heureux larcin ne se peut plus celer.'—Racine.

- ii. Causative, as *παραίθεμαι τράπεζαν* I get a table spread for me; *διδάσκομαι τὸν νιὸν* I get my son taught (docendum curo). This is like the German reflexive (sich) *lassen*.
- iii. Indirect or appropriative, as *παρασκενάζομαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια* apparo mihi commeatum; *κατεστρέψατο τὸν Μῆδον* he subdued the Mede to himself; *πράττομαι χρήματα* I get myself money.
- iv. Reciprocal, as *τύπτονται* they strike each other; *διακελεύονται* they exhort each other; *διαμάχονται* they fight each other. (Cf. the Latin deponents *convicior*, *cohortor*, &c.)

Sometimes too a distinctly reflexive middle takes an accusative of the object affected by the state, as in Homer, *εἴπερ ἀναίροντας ταχέες τε κύνες* even though swift dogs should stir themselves in pursuit of him; *κόπτομαι τινα* I beat my breast for a person.

**112.** Notice the difference of *θεῖναι νόμους* of a despot; *θέσθαι νόμους* of a legislator who will himself be bound by the laws he makes.

*θεῖναι οἰκίαν* to mortgage a house; *θέσθαι οἰκίαν* to take a house on mortgage.

*λύσσαι* to set free; *λύσασθαι* to ransom.

*χρήσσαι* to lend (or give an oracle); *χρήσασθαι* to borrow (or consult an oracle).

*δανείζω* I lend; *δανείζομαι* I borrow.

*λανθάρω* I lie hid; *λανθάνομαι* I forget.

*φοβέω* I frighten; *φοβοῦμαι* I fear.

*παίνω* I make to cease; *παίνομαι* I cease.

*αἱρέω* I take; *αἱροῦμαι* I choose.

*βουλεύω* I counsel; *βούλεύομαι* I consult.

*ἀποδίδωμι* I restore; *ἀποδίδομαι* I sell.

*περιδίδωμι* I give round; *περιδίδομαι* I wager.

*γράφω* I enrol; *γράφομαι* I indict.

*φράζω* I speak; *φράζομαι* I think.

*μισθῶ* I let; *μισθοῦμαι* I hire.

*πείθω* I persuade; *πείθομαι* I obey.

*ἄρχω* I rule; *ἄρχομαι* I begin.

*στέλλω* I send; *στέλλομαι* I set out.

*γαμῶ duco uxorem* (of a man); *γαμοῦμαι nubo* (of a woman).

*σπένδω* I pour a libation; *σπένδομαι* I make a truce.

*σκοπῶ* I look; *σκοποῦμαι* I look mentally, I consider.

*ποιῶ λόγον* to compose a speech; *ποιοῦμαι λόγον* I make a speech.

*πολιτεύω* I am a citizen; *πολιτεύομαι* I live as a citizen.

The last two instances are typical of many others.

113. The following passages will illustrate some uses of the middle:

'Ανέρα τις λιπόγυνον ὑπὲρ γάτου λιπανγῆσ  
ἡγε, πόδας χρήσας, ὅμματα χηρσάμενος (*Anthol.*) a blind man was carrying on his back a lame man, *lending* his feet, *borrowing* his eyes.

ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἔγημεν ἀλλ' ἔγήμαρο (*Anacr.* 84) he didn't marry her, but she married him (of a henpecked husband; comp. Martial's 'uxori nubere nolo meæ,' I don't want my wife to marry me).

τὸν τε ἄετὸν ἀνεσωσάμην καὶ τὸν στρατοπεδάρχην ἔσωσα (Dion H. iv. 2088) I saved *my* eagle and saved the tribune.

αἰτεῖτε καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε, διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε (Jas. iv. 2)  
Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask for yourselves amiss.

114. It will be observed that the active form of verbs is often used when the meaning is simply physical, the middle when some action of the mind is involved; compare, for instance, *ποιεῖν δῶμα* and *ποιεῖσθαι ἀναβολήν*, *βρόχους ἵπτειν* and *ἄφασθαι πέπλων* (sc. in supplication), *ἀρεξε κύλικα* and *παιδὸς ἀρέξατο*.

N.B. i. The Hebrew middle voice (Hithpael) is closely analogous to the Greek, and is similarly reflexive, indirect, and reciprocal. (Ewald, *Hebr. Gram.* § 243.)

ii. The middle voice exists in Latin, though not developed to the same extent as in Greek; e.g. *accingi*, to gird oneself; *provolvi ad pedes*, to roll oneself at a person's feet; *misceri*, to mix with others; *mutari*, to change; *vertor*, *volvor*, *versor*, *plangor*, *circumfundor*, &c.

iii. There is no middle voice in English; in such sentences as 'the book *reads* badly,' 'the doors *open* at six,' &c., the verbs are merely transitives used intransitively. The same remark applies to many Latin verbs, such as *muto*, &c.

#### TENSES (*χρόνοι*).—COMPARISON OF THE GREEK, LATIN, AND ENGLISH VERBS.

115. A tense (*tempus χρόνος*) is properly speaking a form of the verb which by its termination (or inflection) expresses time.

**116.** There are two main classes of tenses, primary and historical.

Since there are only three primary modes of regarding time, viz. present, past, and future,\* the three primary tenses are

1. Present (*ὁ ἔνεστῶς χρόνος*).
2. Perfect (or past, *perfectum=finished*) (*ὁ παρακείμενος*).
3. Future *ὁ μέλλων*.

All the other tenses are called historical,† viz. aorist (*ἀόριστος*), imperfect (*παρατακός*), and pluperfect (*ἱπερσυντελικός*).

**117.** Observe that the 3rd pers. dual of the primary tenses (and also of the subjunctive mood) ends in *ov*; but the 3rd pers. dual of the historical tenses (and of the optative mood) ends in *ην*.

Besides this difference, simple reduplication belongs mainly to the primary, and the pure augment *only* to the historical tenses.

**118.** Since any action can only be regarded as either 1. present, 2. past, or 3. future; and since every action may be *a.* finished, or perfect; *b.* going on, i.e. unfinished, or imperfect; and *c.* indefinite; it is clear that any verb, to be faultlessly synthetic, would provide *nine* tenses ‡ in the indicative mood, viz. three past tenses, three present tenses, and three future tenses; or, which is another way of expressing the same thing, three tenses (past, present, and future) to express that an action is, was, or will be *going on*; three (past, present, future) to express that it is, has been, or will be *finished*; and three (past, present, future) to express that it is, has been, or will be *indefinite*. [‘Nullā dum temporis habiā ratione, res quæque potest tripliciter significari, et ut futura, et ut inchoata, et ut absoluta. Jam tempus in universum triplex est, præteritum, instans, futurum.’—Reizius.]

**119.** These tenses may be tabulated thus, and a thorough mastery of their classification is *essential* to a right under-

\* Hence the inscription on the veil of the mystic Isis, ‘I am that which *is*, *hath been*, and *shall be*.’—Plut. *Ibid.* ix.

† This distinction of primary and historic tenses applies mainly to the indicative, and with far less precision to the other moods; e.g. in the imperative *λέγε* is as much a primary tense as *λέγε*.

‡ The number of tenses varies greatly in different languages. In Sanskrit there are six, in Hebrew only two, in French five, in English two, &c. It will be observed that I confine the name *tense* to actual inflected forms of the verb, and do not include in it compound tenses, i.e. expressions formed by auxiliaries.

standing of tenses. It is easy to master, and when once mastered, cannot well be forgotten: \*

1. Three present tenses—

<i>Time.</i>	<i>English.</i>	<i>Greek and Latin.</i>
a. Finished or perfect . . . }	I have (sc. now) dined	{ δεδειπνηκα cœnavi.
β. Unfinished or imperfect . . . }	I am dining.	{ δειπνω cœno.
γ. Indefinite or aorist . . . }	I dine.†	{ [wanting both in Greek and Latin]

2. Three past tenses—

a. Finished or perfect . . . }	I had dined.	{ δεδειπνήκειν cœnaueram.
β. Unfinished or imperfect . . . }	I was dining.	{ δειπνουσ cœnabam.
γ. Indefinite or aorist . . . }	I dined.	{ δειπνησα [wanting in Latin]

3. Three future tenses—

a. Finished or perfect . . . }	I shall have dined.	{ [wanting] cœnavero.
β. Unfinished or imperfect . . . }	I shall be dining.‡	{ [wanting both in Greek and Latin]
γ. Indefinite or aorist . . . }	I shall dine.	{ δειπνήσω cœnabo.

\* Harris, in his celebrated *Hermes*, has the credit of originating (by improvements on the hints of the Stoicks and Varro) this very lucid and philosophical view of the tenses. It is admirably developed in a useful book of Mr. F. Whalley Harper's—*Powers of the Greek Tenses*. An inferior but ingenious tabulation had been previously given in S. Clarke's note on Hom. II. i. 37, which Wolf called the best note in his edition. For a vast amount about the whole subject, see Herm. Schmidt, *Doctrina Temporum verbi Graeci et Latini*, 1836. It was partially, but independently, elaborated by Reizius, *Dissert. de temporibus et modis verbi*. Lips. 1766. Burnouf's classification, adopted by Donaldson and others, appears to me much less accurate and philosophical.

† The unfinished present or present-imperfect, δειπνω, cœno, used instead.

‡ ἔσομαι δειπνῶν (comp. New Testament, Matt. xxiv. 9. ξεσθε μεθε μενοι, Luke i. 20, v. 20) would be admissible for the future-imperfect 'I shall be dining,' and this is an approach which the Greek verb makes to the use of auxiliaries for the purpose of conjugation. But the instances are not common, as πεποιηκάς ἔσομαι I shall have done it.—Isoc. π. ἀντιδ. § 317. οὐκέτ' ἐκ καλυμμάτων ἔσται δεδορκώς.—Æsch. Ag. 1178. γεγραμμένος ἤσθα you were painted. Of course we find the auxiliary in the moods of the perfect passive τετυμμένος θ, &c. Another instance of this tendency is the occasional resolution of a future into θέλω or μέλλω with the infinitive, an analytical proceeding which has ousted the synthetic future from Modern Greek; as θὰ πολεμᾶμεν we shall be fighting; θὰ

120. Or we may have the *same* scheme *reversed*, and as it is very important that it should be understood, let us give it in the reverse order, as follows :

a. Three finished or perfect tenses—

<i>Time.</i>	<i>English.</i>	<i>Greek.</i>	<i>Latin.</i>
1. Present . . .	I have (now) dined	δεδειπνηκα	cœnavi
2. Past . . .	I had dined	δεδειπνήκειν	cœnaveram
3. Future . . .	I shall have dined [wanting]	[wanting]	cœnavero

b. Three unfinished or imperfect tenses—

1. Present . . .	I am dining	δειπνω	cœno
2. Past . . .	I was dining	δειπνουν	cœnabam
3. Future . . .	I shall be dining [wanting]	[wanting]	[wanting]


c. Three indefinite or aorist tenses—

1. Present . . .	I dine	[wanting]	[wanting]
2. Past . . .	I dined	δειπνοσ	[wanting]
3. Future . . .	I shall dine	δειπνήσω	cœnabo

Or the same arrangement might be tabulated as follows :

OBJECTIVE TENSES

(i.e. tenses of the Indicative, expressive of facts),



121. This scheme of tenses suggests several important remarks and inferences.

- Observe that it offers us a means of comparing the

ἔχε I shall have. Such forms as ἀτιμός ἔχει, Soph.; ήτε πάσχοντες τὰς, Eur., are not mere auxiliaries, but periphrases adopted to imply continuance (cf. Ps. cxxii. 2. *Heb.* Matt. vii. 29); and the same remark applies to the σχῆμα Χαλκίδικην (or Oropism) of τυγχάνω, θέτω, &c. with various participles (cf. Mark i. 4).

Greek, the Latin, and the English verb, and that taking the word 'tense' to mean an *inflected verbal-form* significant of time, there are

In Greek	six	of the nine tenses;
In Latin	six	" "
In English	two	" "

The six Greek tenses are not however the *same* as the six Latin, for Greek *has* a separate aorist (*ἔδειπνησα*) which Latin *has not*; \* and Latin has a future perfect (*cœnavero*) which Greek has not. The only tense which is wanting *both* in Greek and Latin is the *aorist-present or indefinite-present* ('I *dine*'), which *strange to say is one of the only two tenses which English possesses*; the other English tense, the *aorist-past or indefinite-past* ('I *dined*'), being also wanting in Latin, though it exists in Greek (*ἔδειπνησα*).

The other so-called *tenses* of the English verb (I have dined, I shall dine, &c.) are not properly speaking *tenses* at all, not being formed by inflection, but by a mere use of the auxiliary, which is much less neat and expressive than the synthetic or inflectional forms of Greek and Latin.

2. Observe particularly that, whenever strictly and properly used,

*τίνπτω* is not 'I strike,' but 'I am striking.' †

*τίνπτομαι* is not 'I am struck,' but 'I am *being* struck.'

In other words, they are *unfinished* (imperfect) tenses; and if the tenses were at all correctly named, *τίνπτω*, *τίνπτομαι* would not be called presents (as though there were only *one* present in each voice, whereas as we have seen there are *three*) but *present-imperfects*. Thus *δείκυνται ταῦτα* is, 'these things are *being proved*', but most boys would render it quite wrongly,

\* It has been said that 'the superiority of the Greek verb to the Latin, consists in the possession of another voice, another mood, another tense, and a much greater variety of participles.' This judgment is by no means correct. We shall see hereafter that Latin is *not* destitute of a middle; that the optative is no mood at all, but merely a name for past tenses of the subjunctive, and that Latin *has* an optative; that if it has no *separate* form for the *past-aorist* (I dined, *ἔδειπνησα*) it has on the other hand in the active a future-perfect (*cœnavero*, I shall have dined), which Greek has not; and that, although it has fewer participles, it has gerundives and supines which are wanting to Greek.

† So that in this respect Greek is the reverse of German, which has, like the English, a present aorist (*Ich lese*, I read), but no present imperfect, 'I am reading,' for which they must use *Ich lese jetzt* or *eben*.

'these things *are proved*,' which would be the rendering (not of δείκνυται but) of δέδεικται. Frequently indeed, just as the Greeks have no present-aorist, and sometimes use the present-imperfect for it (i.e. they say δειπνῶ 'I am dining' when they mean 'I dine'), so we translate their present-imperfect by our present-aorist; thus

Στρ. πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι δρᾶς ἀντιβολῶ κάτειπέ μοι.

Σωκρ. ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ηλιον.

This has been racily rendered

Streps. First tell me, I implore, what are you doing ?

Socr. I tread the air and circumspect the sun.

But literally it is, 'I am treading the air,' &c., which is much more *vivid* in Greek; it would also be more vivid in English, but for the intolerable awkwardness of the English periphrasis ('I am' with the present-participle) for the Greek present-imperfect. In many cases however we must brave this awkwardness for the sake of giving the full sense, e.g. Col. iii. 6, δι' ἡ ἐρχεται ἡ ὄργη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς νιεῖς τῆς ἀπειθείας not 'cometh,' but 'the wrath of God is (by a process of natural laws) ever coming upon the children of disobedience.'

3. Clearly then the present nomenclature of tenses is very misleading unless we are specially careful to see through it, and not suffer it to mislead us; it is of course far too deeply rooted to be superseded, but any one who has understood the above tables will see that

*The so-called present is a present-imperfect*

'I am dining;' i.e. an action is going on, which is not yet finished.

*The so-called imperfect is a past-imperfect*

'I was (at some past time) dining' (and the action was not finished). -

*The so-called perfect is a present-perfect*

'I have (at this moment) dined.'

*The so-called pluperfect is a past-perfect*

'I had (at some past time) dined,' or 'finished dining.'

*The so-called aorists (1st and 2nd) are past-aorists*

'I (at some time or other not specified) dined.' The Greek has no present-aorist, 'I dine.'

*The so-called future is a future-aorist*

'I shall (at some time or other not specified) dine.'

4. It may be asked why in the above scheme no notice is taken of the second aorist? Simply because the first?

second aorists, when both exist, are merely two different forms to express the same\* meaning.

**122.** The terms first and second aorist are misleading; indeed the second aorist is always the *older* form of the two;† for the second aorist is formed directly from the stem, thus preserving the simplest form of the verb, and its most unqualified meaning (e.g. *ἔτυπον* from *τύπω*), whereas the first aorist is formed not only by the prefix of an augment, but also by the suffix of the letter *σ* (which is no doubt connected with *ἐσ-μι*, *ἐσ-τι*), denoting futurity.

The reason why the first and second aorist have the same meaning is because the second aorist (e.g. *ἔτυπον*) by simply prefixing the augment to the pure stem of the verb, implies a momentary action in the *past*. And the first aorist by prefixing the augment (which indicates past time) and suffixing *σ*, which indicates future time, implies an action which was future and is past, i.e. an indefinite past action, which thus coincides in meaning with the second aorist.‡ (Clyde, *Gk. Syntax*.)

**123.** A most important rule, constantly violated even by good scholars, is this:

‘Never translate the aorist indicative by *have*.’

*Have* is the sign of the present-perfect [I have (now) dined], and not of the aorist.

**124.** Whatever difference there is in English between

I dined (e.g. ten years ago at Rome)

and

I have dined (this evening),§

\* The same remark applies to the first and second perfect, except that in this case it is disputed among grammarians which of the two forms is really the older. The grounds on which Donaldson decides in favour of the second perfect being a younger and mutilated form, seem to me very unconvincing. (*New Crat.* p. 566.)

† Few verbs have both the first and second aor. in use. The existence of two forms, one older and one more recent, side by side, may be paralleled by the English, as in *climb* *climbed*, *squeeze* *squeezed*, *clave* *cleft*, &c. The archaic forms *clomb*, *squoze*, *clave*, &c., are analogous to the Greek second aorist (so-called).

‡ Curtius calls the second the *strong*, and the first the *weak* aorist, because the latter is formed by extraneous additions to the stem. Thus in English ‘I took’ is a strong aorist, being formed from ‘I take’ by a modification of the vowel (called by Pott a *qualitative* change, as in Hebrew, and named by German philologists *ablaut*, and by the French *apophonie*, as in *sing*, *sang*, *sung*); but ‘I loved’ is a *weak* aorist, being I love-d = I love-did, and thus being formed by an auxiliary.

§ Burnouf says, ‘Le parfait exprime une action accomplie, mais dont

the same difference exists in Greek between

$\hat{\epsilon}\delta\epsilon\pi\nu\eta\sigma\alpha$ =I dined.

$\hat{\delta}\epsilon\delta\epsilon\pi\nu\eta\kappa\alpha$ =I have dined.

It is one of the main defects of the indicative of the Latin verb, that it is obliged to use *one* form *cenavi* for those two very different meanings. In fact the existence of the aoristic termination in such perfects as *vixi*, *scrip-si*, &c. shows clearly that in Latin verbs there is *sometimes* a perfect, formed by reduplication, and sometimes an aorist substituted for it. Thus the Latin perfect has *both* meanings, but is *more often* an aorist than a perfect. This accounts for the fact that *veni ut videam* and *veni ut viderem* are both right; the former meaning 'I have come that I *may* see,' the latter 'I *came* that I *might* see.' It is extremely probable that a slight difference in pronunciation may have helped to distinguish between the meanings.\*

125. The aorist, which most English boys look upon as some unknown Greek monster, ought to be the most familiar tense of all, because *the only tenses in their own language are aorists*; 'I *dine*' (the present aorist), 'I *dined*' (the past aorist).

126. The word aorist, which is first found in Dionysius Thrax, simply means indefinite,† being derived from *ἀ* not, and *όπιζω* I limit (whence comes our word horizon, the bounding line). A boy usually takes 'I *dine*', 'I *strike*', &c. for presents, and 'I *dined*', 'I *struck*', &c. for perfects; yet in answer to the question 'what are you doing?' he would not dream of using the aorist 'I *dine*', but the present 'I *am dining*'; nor when leaving the table would he say 'I *dined*', but 'I *have dined*'.

127. Thus it will be seen that the aorist, as the *tense of*

l'effet subsiste au moment où l'on parle; tandis que l'aoriste présente l'action *comme simplement passée*; e.g. if I say 'he has lived well,' I can only be speaking of some one yet alive, or just dead; if I say 'he lived well,' I may be referring to any one since the days of Adam.

\* Burggraft suggests that when the aorist meaning was intended, the word may have been pronounced *slightly* more rapidly. (*Principes de Gram. Gén.* p. 373.)

† It is the same word as 'infinitive,' which also means 'indefinite,' being a form of the verb not limited to any subject. Curiously enough the aorist is called in French 'le *présent défini*' (e.g. *j'écrivis*). The reason is that it is definite with reference to some other action which may be in the mind; e.g. '*À l'arrivée du messager j'écrivis une lettre*'? Greek often uses it when no other term to mark time is employed; but French does not. E. Burnouf, *Grammaire grecque*, § 60.

*narration*, the tense in which all history is written, is one of the most necessary tenses of all! Consequently it is more important and more frequently used than the perfect, which belongs to *the present* rather than to *the past*. Hence in Modern Greek the aorist has almost superseded the perfect, and the so-called Latin perfect is far more frequently aoristic in sense.

128. *Very rarely indeed* we are compelled by the English idiom to introduce the present-perfect (or perfect with ‘have’) in rendering the aorist (especially the aorist participle);\* but the rule is, never translate the aorist by ‘have.’ The past-aorist must often be rendered by a present aorist, because the Greek uses it in this sense, having, as we have seen, no special form for the present aorist; e.g. ‘many things happen contrary to experience,’ would be in Greek πολλὰ παρὰ γνώμην ἔπεστ.

129. Unless the student is alive to the true nature of the aorist, and the fact that it is often used with imperfect tenses to express the contrast between *momentary* and *continuous actions*, he will miss half the beauty and picturesqueness of the best Greek authors.

Take some instances:

Κροῖσος “Αλυν διαβάς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει  
not ‘having crossed the Halys,’ but ‘Cresus on crossing  
the Halys will ruin a great kingdom.’

παθὼν ζέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω ‘even a child learns by suffering,’  
not ‘having suffered.’

γελάσας εἶπε not ‘having laughed,’ but ‘he exclaimed,  
laughing,’ or ‘he burst out laughing, and said.’

130. In our English version of the Bible the aorist is often

\* ‘χρονικὰ ἐπιφῆματα aoristo conjungi solent; ἄρτι ἐποίησα, πολλάκις ἔθαιμασα, &c.; unde naturam perfecti quodam modo induere videtur.’ Shilleto on Demosth. *De Fals. Legat.* § 228. Mr. Cope (*Pref. to his edition of the Gorgias*, p. xvi.) quotes ἐφύγον κακόν, ἔθρον ἄμεινον, the exultant cry of the newly-initiated, as an instance of the aorist where we should use the perfect. All such cases prove, *not any identity of meaning between the tenses*, but a different intellectual stand-point; the aorists here (as in Modern Greek) express merely a finished past action, with no reference to the time of completion. And the same is true of the gnomic aorist (§ 154); e.g. in such a line as ‘Qui ne sait se borner ne sut jamais écrire’ (Boileau), either ‘ne sait pas,’ or ‘n'a jamais su’ would have done equally well; but this does not prove any identity between the tenses.

wrongly rendered by have, and the picturesque difference between aorists and imperfects lost; \* e.g.

*Luke viii. 23 :*

*κατέβη λαῖλαψ . . . καὶ συνεπληροῦντο* there came down a gust of wind and they (not 'were filled,' but) *began to be filled.*

*Mark vii. 35 :*

*ἔλύθη ὁ δεσμὸς τῆς γλώσσης αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐλάλει ὥρθως* the string of his tongue was loosed, and he *began to speak plainly.*

*John vii. 14 :*

*ἀνέβη . . . καὶ ἐδίδασκεν* went up, and *began to teach.*

*John xii. 13 :*

*ἔξηλθον . . . καὶ ἔκραζον* went out, and *kept crying.*

*John xiii. 27 :*

*δὲ ποιεῖς ποίησον* do (at once) what you *are about.*

*Acts xi. 6 :*

*ἀτενίσας κατενόουν καὶ εἶδον gazing,* I began to distinguish (impf.), and saw (aor.), &c.  
*κρείσον γαμῆσαι* it is better to marry (once for all) than *to be burning.*

**131.** In classical Greek take one or two further instances:

*Nub. 233 :*

*εἴπερ βάλλει τὸν ἐπιόρκους πῶς οὐχὶ Σίμων' ἐνέπρησε;*  
 'If his way is to strike the perjured, why does he not blast Simon?'

*οἱ Ἑλληνες ἑταίριζον . . . καὶ ἄμα τὰ δόρατα καθίσσαν·*  
*ἐνταῦθα οὐκέτι ἐδέξαντο οἱ πολέμοι ἀλλ' ἔφενγον* the Greeks began the war song, and at the same moment levelled their spears; whereon the enemy no longer awaited them, but began to fly.

*Iph. Taur. 1306 :*

*ἀνωλόνεε καὶ κατῆδε* 'She raised her voice, and *began to sing.*'

*Plat. Parmen. 127 :*

*ἴβαδίζομεν καὶ κατελάβομεντὸν Ἀντιφῶντα* we were walking and overtook Antipho.

---

\* German, like Latin, has no aorist; it therefore uses the imperf. regularly in its place.

*χαλεπὸν τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ κελεῦσαι ῥᾴδιον* it is difficult to carry out a thing, but to give the order is easy.

*μὴ τύπτε* do not be striking (a general prohibition); *μὴ τύψῃς* do not strike (a special prohibition).\*

*έάν τις κάμηνται τῶν οἰκετῶν* should any of the servants be sick [κάμηρ=should fall sick] *παρακαλεῖς ιατροὺς δίκως*

*μὴ ἀποθάνῃς.*

*τοῦτον ἡμεῖς φοβώμεθα*; are we to be afraid of him? *τοῦτον ἡμεῖς φοβησώμεθα*; are we to take alarm at him?

132. Owing to the use of the past-aorist [e.g. *ἔδεικνησα*] to supply the absence of any present-aorist ['I dine'] in Greek, many past-aorists have permanently acquired a present sense, as *ῆνεσα* I praise, *άπέπνυσα* I hate, *έθαύμασα* I wonder, *έξεξάμην* I accept, &c. For a list of such expressions see Hermann in *Vigerum*, 162. Dr. Clyde thinks that the usage may have gained ground because a personal statement becomes less obtrusive if put into a past tense (cf. *odi*, *novi*, &c.).

133. The same scheme of tenses might of course be made for the passive, the only difference being (which is curious) that in the passive the Latin *has not* and the Greek *has a* future-perfect. What anomaly it was which gave the Greek a form for 'I shall have been struck,' and no form for 'I shall have struck' cannot be explained.†

In the passive, therefore, we have

Three finished tenses, or perfects.

Present. I have been struck . . *τέτυμμαι* verberatus sum.

Past. I had been struck . . *ἐτετύμμην* verberatus useram.

Future. I shall have been struck *τετύφομαι* verberatus fuero.

Three unfinished tenses, or imperfects.

Present. I am being struck . . *τύπτομαι* verberor.

Past. I was being struck . . *ἐτυπτόμην* verberabar.

Future. I shall be being struck. [wanting] [wanting].

\* Donaldson points out that in John xx. 17, *μή μου διπτού* is not 'touch me not' (which would be *ἀψη*), but 'do not be clinging to me'—a most important difference.

† One or two Greek verbs have an active future-perfect, as *ἴστηξε*, *τεθῆξε*. Deponents have to make their future-perfect by the auxiliary, as *εἰργασμένος ζομαί*. The comparative want of future-forms may be due to the fact that men care to speak with less precision of the unknown future than of the past.

Three aorist tenses, or indefinites.

Present. I am struck . . . . [wanting] [wanting].  
 (*τέτυμμαι* and *verberatus sum*  
 used instead).

Past. I was struck . . . . [wanting] [wanting].  
 Future. I shall be struck . . . . *τυφθήσομαι* verberabor.

To complete therefore our comparison of the indicatives of the Greek, Latin, and English verb, we see that of the nine possible tenses, in the passive,

Greek has six tenses,  
 Latin has three tenses only, and  
 English has no tenses.

The only passive form in English is that of the participle ('struck' = having been struck).

#### CHIEF IDIOMATIC USES OF THE TENSES.

**134.** When a language has a *peculiar* form or mode of expression this is called the *idiom* of the language (*ἰδίωμα* from *ἴδιος* 'private,' 'peculiar'); and these idioms are what specially need to be learned and remembered; for the *ordinary* meanings and uses present no difficulty.

#### THE PRESENT AND IMPERFECT.

**135.** The present, used dramatically in narratives in order to represent the events narrated as *going on before the eyes*, is called the historical present;\* and the imperfect is used in the same way for the same reason; as

\* The historical present, seldom used except colloquially in English, is very common in German; and tolerably so in French, as in the lines of Racine:

'J'ai vu, seigneur, j'ai vu votre malheureux fils,  
 Traîné par les chevaux que sa main a nourris.  
 Il veut les rappeler, et sa voix les effraie.  
 Ils courent. Tout son corps n'est bientôt qu'une plaie.'

Of English writers Carlyle uses it most frequently; e.g. 'Far down in their vaults the seven prisoners hear muffled din as of earthquakes; their turnkeys answer vaguely,' &c. In one passage of Milton, the historical present is powerfully used for the future:

'If from this hour  
 Within those hallowed limits thou appear,  
 Back to the infernal pit I drag thee chained  
 And seal thee so,' &c.—*Par. Lost*, iv. 965.

Comp. *Aen.* iii. 367. So far as I am aware no such usage is found in classical Greek.

καὶ ἐπιτρέψες σε οὐκ ἤγειρον ἴνα ὅτε ἡὲστα διάγγει; I was not awaking you on purpose, that you may be going on as pleasantly as possible.

ἔρχεται τρόποις μαθητῶν καὶ εὑρίσκει αὐτοὺς καθεύδοντας he cometh to the disciples and findeth them sleeping.

The historic present, in the sequence of tenses, is treated as an historical tense, and is therefore followed by the optative.

**136.** Both the present and the imperfect are used to express *an attempt* (*conatus rei efficiendae*):

ἢὰ τοῖοις αὐτῶν ἵργον λιθᾶζετέ με: for which work of these are you for stoning me?—John x. 32.

Κύρι, σύ μου ρίζεις τοὺς τόξας; Lord, dost Thou mean to wash my feet?—John xiii. 6.

ἐκάλουν αὐτὸν... Ζαχαρίας they wished to call him Zacharias.—Luke i. 59.

οὐ δὲ Ἰωάννης ἀπεκάλυψεν αὐτὸν John tried to prevent him.—Matt. iii. 14.

ἔξαρεχόμενος τὰ εἰρημένα he tried to back out of his words.—Thuc. iv. 28.

**137.** Hence the *impf.* alone is often, rhetorically, used where the *impf.* with *ἂν* would have been more regular, as

τις μοι φύλαξ ἢρ εἰ σὺ συμφορᾶς τύχοις; (Eur. *Bacch.* 612)  
who were my guardian (=would have been) should you have met with a misfortune?

This suppression of *ἂν* is very common in conditional sentences, as

οὐκ εἶχες ἔξοντας... εἰ μὴ you would not have had power, unless, &c.—John xix. 11.

ταῦλος ἢρ αὐτῷ εἰ οὐκ ἐγένετο it were well for him if he had never been born.—Matt. xxvi. 24.

A similar potential use of the *impf.* is not unknown in Latin; as

Respublica poterat esse perpetua, si patriis viveretur institutis.—Cic. *de R. P.* iii. 29.

**138.** The present is used with *πάλαι* 'long ago,' &c.; as ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μετ' ἐμοῦ ἴστε ye are (=have been) with me from the beginning.—John xv. 27.  
γῆ τοσεῖ πάλαι the land has long been sick.—Eur.

So in Latin :

*Jampridem cupio Alexandriam visere.*—Cic.

And in German :

*'Fünf Jahre trag' ich schon den glüh'nden Hass.'*—  
Schiller, *Turandot*.

And in French :

'Il y a longtemps que je suis ici.'  
'Je le regarde depuis longtemps.'

And very rarely in English. Mr. Boyes quotes from Heywood :

'Tis dinner-time at least *an hour ago*'.

And in Walpole's letters :

'Lord Dalkeith *is* dead of small-pox in three days.'

**139.** κλύω, ἀκούω, μανθάνω, γιγνώσκω (verbs of perception), and those which indicate an abiding result (as νικᾶ, φεύγω), are used in the present where we use the perfect; as

ἄρτι γιγνώσκεις τόδε; have you only just learnt this?  
ἀκαγγέλλετε ὅτι ἡμεῖς νικῶμεν βασιλέα answer that we  
*have conquered* the king.

**140.** The imperfect expresses incompleteness, continuance, and (especially with ἀν) repetition. Rarely it is used as giving a more emphatic meaning, where we should use the present; as

ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθηται μάλα τ' ἔκλυνον αἴνου whosoever  
obeys the gods, him *they ever* hear (cf. *Il.* i. 418).  
'Tempus erat dapibus, sodales' (Hor. *Od.* i. 37) 'Tis full  
time for banquets, my comrades.

**141.** ἤδει, ἔχρην, εἰκὸς ἦν, ὄφελον imply dissatisfaction, and a wish that something else had happened; as

εἰκὸς ἦν ὑμᾶς μὴ μαλακῶς, ὥσπερ νῦν, συμμαχεῖν you  
ought not in all fairness to prove yourselves such  
feeble allies as you do.

Here 'it was right' means 'it would have been right,' and is equivalent to εἰκὸς ἀν ἦν, precisely as in these two English sentences:

'Was man like his maker . . . I should be for allowing,' &c. (Addison) [=if man had been].

'It were well for the insurgents . . . if the blood that was now shed had been thought a sufficient expiation for the offence' (Goldsmith) [=it would have been well χρηστὸν ἂν ήν].\*

So in Latin :

'Si mihi omnes, ut erat æquum, faverent.'—Cic. *de Div.* iii. 10.

142. Notice the graceful and modest use of the *imperfect* in the inscriptions used by old artists, Πολύκετος ἦρατε; this implied how far they felt themselves to fall short of ideal perfection, '*tamquam inchoatis semper arte et imperfecta*' (Plin. *Nat. Hist.* i. 20), and it showed them to be imbued with the highest spirit of art.

143. Sometimes the imperfect expresses what *was* but *is not*, as Eur. *Troad.* 585, πρὶν ποτὲ ήμευ we once were (*but are no longer!*)! Compare *Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium*, Virg. *Aen.* ii. 325. After the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators, Cicero said of them, *Vixerunt*. 'Probablement à midi j'aurai vécu, pour parler le langage romain.'—*Letter of Charlotte Corday*.

#### THE FUTURE.

144. The future active answers to our *shall* and *will*, even in its imperative use; as

ἔξεις ἀγρέμας; *will you keep quiet?*†

ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι be ye therefore perfect!

145. The periphrases of μέλλω, θέλω, βούλομαι with the infinitive are by no means 'periphrastic futures,' as they are sometimes called, but differ from the simple future in meaning, by emphasising the *purpose* or *wish* to do a thing. Μέλλω with the future also means to be *on the point* of doing a thing.

N. B. ποιήσω I will do, *faciam*; μέλλω ποιήσειν I am on the point of doing (cf. the Italian *sono per lasciarti* I am *on the point* of leaving you); μέλλω ποιεῖν I intend to do.

146. Few verbs have all the four -μαι forms of the future in use (*τυφθήσομαι*, *τυπήσομαι* I shall be struck, *τίψομαι* I shall strike myself, *τετύψομαι* I shall have been struck).

\* Compare 'Gold were as good as twenty orators' (= *would be*). Observe however that 'were' is the English *subjunctive*.

† Both in English and Latin the future is a polite substitute for the imperative; e.g. *Valebis et salvebis*=*vale et salve*!

'Tu interea non cessabis.'—Cic. *Epp. ad Fam.* v. 12.

'Inter cuncta leges et percunctabere doctos.'—Hor. *Epp.* i. xviii. 26.

**147.** The future-perfect\* (*ό μετ' ὀλίγον μέλλων*, paullo-post-futurum), as its name implies, mingles the future and the perfect both in form and meaning (as in English ‘I shall have been struck’). It also expresses *rapidity*; as

φράζε καὶ πεπράξει speak and it shall be done *at once*; †  
and a *continued result*; as

οὐδεὶς κατὰ σπουδὰς μετεγγραφήσεται,  
ἄλλ' ἄσκερ ήν τὸ πρῶτον ἔγγεγράψεται

‘No one shall be transferred to another list by favour,  
but shall remain inscribed as he was at first.’

**148.** Since *μέμρηναι*, *κέκτημαι*, &c. have the sense of presents, *μεμνήσομαι* I shall remember, *κεκτήσομαι* I shall possess, &c., are simple futures.

## THE PERFECT.

**149.** The perfect corresponds to the English perfect with ‘have’; it is a *present*-perfect, e.g. ‘I have struck’ means ‘I have *now* struck,’ or ‘I struck *and the effect continues*.’ ‡ Hence it is substituted for the aorist (which is the ordinary tense in which events are *narrated*) to describe past events of which *the result remains*; as

πενεστέρους πεποίκη καὶ πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὑπομένειν  
ἡγάκασε: it has made us poorer (and we still are so),  
and it compelled us to undergo many dangers.

**150.** This explains such meanings as *κέκτημαι* I possess, *τεθάνυμακα* I wonder, *κέκλημαι* I am called, *ἔρρωμαι* I am strong, § &c.; and it is curiously paralleled by the German idiom (see Clyde, *Greek Syntax*, p. 69). In the same way such a phrase as ‘I have often wondered’ generally implies that the effect still continues. For another view of these perfects with a present sense, see p. 45, note \*.

\* Being a mere luxury of language, it occurs but once in the New Testament (Luke xix. 40), *κεκράσονται*, and there, only because the simple future of *κράσομαι* is not used. The name *Futurum exactum* was invented by Pomponius Laetus (1497).

† Cf. Cicero, *Ep.*—‘Tu invita mulieres, ego accivero pueros.’

‡ This use of the perfect in Homer is very common; e.g. in describing a chariot he says, ἄμφοι δὲ πέπλοι Πέππατα τapestries hang around it. II. v. 195. (*Exiguā tantum ratione habitā præteriti temporis, quo stragula illa expansa fuerunt, sed præsentis præcipue, quo expansa sunt.*—Schmidt, *Doctr. Temp.* ii. 10.)

§ Compare the Italian *ho capito* I understand. Clyde.

**153.** Obviously what *has* taken place (especially if it be frequently) in the past, *will* probably recur in the future,\* so that either aorist or future may be used, for instance, in *comparisons*, and so far there is a connection between the tenses. Further than this no theory has ever established what was the *historical* connection between these tenses, except that the *σ* of both aorist and future is derived from the auxiliary verb 'as' to be (*ἐσμέν*, *ἰστι*).

**154.** The aorist is used in proverbs, &c. (gnomic aorist), to express what *once happened*, and has thereby established a precedent for all time; as

πολλὰ παρὰ γνώμην ἔπεσε many things fall out contrary  
to expectation.†

### THE PLUPERFECT.

**155.** This tense is comparatively neglected in Greek,‡ the aorist being substituted for it in many instances where it would be used in Latin, and even in English; e.g.

ώς ήκουσαν τοὺς λόγους . . . διηπέρον when they (had)  
heard the words, they began to doubt.

Its chief idiomatic use is to express *rapidity*; as

οὐδὲ ἀπίθησε  
μύθῳ Ἀθηναῖς· ή δὲ Οὐλύμπουνδε βεβήκει  
nor did he disobey the order of Athene; but she had  
*already vanished heavenwards*.—*Il.* i. 221.

\* Οτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐπλησίαζον, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς Πέρσας  
ἐνενικήσαν when the allies were approaching, the  
Athenians had *already conquered the Persians*.

\* Burnouf's view that the future expresses *posteriority* relative to the present moment, and the aorist, posteriority with reference to some other (unspecified) time, does not seem to me free from objection; e.g. his explanation of the aorist in the line 'Je chante le héros qui régna sur la France,' seems to me impossible on his own principles.

† The Latin aorist has a similar use, as 'Hinc apicem rapax Fortuna cum stridore acuto Sustulit,' Hor. *Od.* i. 34, = solet tollere. Non tam praecepit bijugo certamine campum Corripuerunt.—*En.* v. 145.

‡ The form of the pluperfect in *η* (*ἐγεράσθη*, &c.) is older than that in *ειν*.

MOODS (*Ἐγκλίσεις*).

156. In coming to treat of the moods, we have reached by far the most difficult part of Greek syntax. The clumsy analytic periphrases of our own and most modern languages are quite inadequate to represent the delicate accuracy and beauty of those slight nuances of thought which the Greek reflected in the synthetic and manifold forms of his verb. One of the chief reasons for the study of Greek is the fact that it presents us with the most perfect instrument for the expression of thought. Our own language is singularly noble, powerful, and splendid, but its points of excellence differ entirely from those of Greek.

But the study of Greek would not be valuable as a mental discipline if it presented no difficulty. There is no royal road to anything worth acquiring: *νεαρά τα καλά*. Yet after a thoughtful and careful study of the following pages, the student ought at least to have some clear notions which will serve as a guide to further study.

157. The moods express the aspects or *modes* under which the action is regarded, and are three in number, viz.:

The indicative, which deals with facts, *certainties*, direct questions, &c., i.e. it is the objective mood; and therefore the tense-distinctions exist mainly in this mood.

The imperative, which deals with commands.

The subjunctive and optative, which deals with suppositions, uncertainties, contingencies,\* &c. The subjunctive connects such modes of conception with the present or future; the optative connects them with the past. The two together form but one *subjunctive mood*.

158. The infinitive is no mood at all, since it represents the verb absolutely, in no particular aspect, and with no relation to any subject (*χάλον ἀναπτυγμένον*).

159. It will be convenient to treat of the moods first as they occur in *single sentences*, and afterwards in compound.

But we may observe at once that the names of the moods

\* Indicatives res per se, sed modis potius, conjunctives autem res ex novis agentis speciebus (velis hancis ratiōne non 'factio' vel in cogitatione inclusus nota). — *In Formis dictorum et sententiarum*, F. Ellendt-Klemp, 1827. The Dissertation is an exceedingly good one, but the treatise itself is not very clear.

are as unsatisfactory as those of the tenses.\* The indicative mood, or mood of declaration, does not declare at all in interrogative or conditional sentences. The optative, or *wishing* mood, does indeed sometimes express a wish, but this is a *very* small part of its meanings, and it is quite as much subjoined as the so-called subjunctive, of which, as we shall see, it forms a part.

#### THE INDICATIVE.

**160.** The indicative mood (*ἐγκλισις ὁρίστική*) denotes an *actual*, or (in the future tense) a *certain* state. In treating of the separate tenses we have given all its most distinctive usages.

#### THE IMPERATIVE.

**161.** The imperative mood (*προστακτική*) commands,† and, with negatives, prohibits. As all commands must refer to the *future*, we see that the *temporal* meanings of the indicative tenses vanish in the imperative; the distinctions between the tenses in the imperative not being those of *time*.

**162.** *μὴ πράττε* don't be doing it (of continuous or recurring actions).

*μὴ πράξῃς* don't do it (of momentary or single actions).  
*αβὲ τὰς μαρνηας καὶ ἀραγίγνωσκε* take the depositions  
 (aor. imp.=an instantaneous act), and read them (pres.  
 imp.=a continued act).

**163.** The perfect imperative denotes the *permanence of the result*; as

*τέθναθι lie dead!* = *κεῖσο τεθυηκώς.*  
*εἰς τὸν Πυριφλεγέθοντα ἐμβεβλήσθω* let him be flung (at once, and for all) into Phlegethon!

**164.** Other ways of expressing command are

a. By the infinitive; as

*τούτον τοίνυν ήν δ' ἔγω φάναι* tell him, then, said I.

β. By the optative with *ἄν*; as

*χωροῖς ἄν εἴσω* like our 'perhaps you would go in.'

\* See F. Whalley Harper *On the Powers of the Greek Tenses*, p. 137.

† In Sanskrit the imperative has a first as well as a second and third person. This is also the case in English, though only in poetry and in the plural, as 'Leave we the theme.' 'Charge we the foe.'—*New Crat.* p. 593.

7. By the subjunctive: as

*ἴωμεν λετούς γε* go.

2. By various periphrases: as

*αἰσθάνεσθαι τινα*: do then—know'st thou what?\*

*αἰσθάνεσθαι τινα*: do—know'st thou how?

*όρας ἄρχας εἰσέβη* see that ye be men.

*φέπεται οὐαράρη τας παυτριας* come now let me read you  
the evidence.

*μή θέτηται ἀδικηθείη* let me not be injured.—Soph. *O. C.* 174;

cf. *Tr. &c.* 2. ‘Prima conjunctivi persona sic usurpatur  
ut admittit ad secundam spectet.’—Herm.

### THE SUBJUNCTIVE (*ὑπόθετις*) AND OPTATIVE (*εὐθυτις*).

165. ‘The subjunctive is a byform of the future, the optative a byform of the aorist.’†

We have already seen the points of connection between the *future* and the *subjunctive*,‡ and in fact the notion of futurity is essentially involved in the subjunctive, since that which is contingent and dependent must *necessarily* be analogous to what is future. Hence the student must not be misled by such names as perfect subjunctive, &c. to suppose that the forms of the subj. and opt. express time in the same way as their cognate indicative tenses.

166. The subjunctive and optative are not two moods, but one *subjective mood*,§ which expresses *not* facts and realities, but suppositions and contingencies: the subjunctive forms are the present or future tenses of this mood, and the optative forms its past tenses. In other words, the optative *is merely*

\* Mr. Boyce quotes a close parallel from Chaucer:

‘And deemith you, what we shall do therfor?’

Go thanketh now my lady there, quoth he.’

We find the same idiom in Latin; ‘*Tange, sed scin quomodo?*’—Plaut. *Rudens*. III. v. 18.

† ‘The subjunctive and optative are by-forms of the future and aorist.’—Don. p. 546. The connection is indicated by a *similarity* of form; e.g. compare *τίθεσθαι* with *τίθεσθαι*, *έργεσθαι* with *έργεσθαι*, &c.

‡ We see it also in Latin, where *dico* is both future indicative and present subjunctive, the termination -m being a relic of the old *mu-* form of verbs.

§ In treating this part of the subject, I have on the whole received more assistance from Mr. F. Whalley Harper and Dr. Clyde's *Greek Syntax*, than from any other of the numerous treatises which I have consulted.

*the subjunctive of the past or historic tenses.* It carries with it a reference to the past.

Everything that we say about these moods will illustrate and explain this fundamental fact, which the student is urged to master and to keep steadily in mind throughout the following observations.

**167.** The Greek *subjective mood* furnishes seven separate forms, usually called tenses; e.g.

pres. subj. δειπνῶ, aor. subj. δειπνήσω, perf. sub. δεδειπνήκω,  
pres. opt. δειπνοίην, aor. opt. δειπνήσαιμι, perf. opt. δε-  
δειπνήσοιμι, fut. opt. δειπνήσοιμι.\*


**168.** And Latin offers four, as *cænem*, *cænarem*, *cænaverim*, *cænavissem*.

We shall find that on examination these forms evaporate considerably; but before discussing them let us try to understand them in the form of a table.

We have already tabulated the actual and possible Indicative tenses; the table of the Subjective tenses should be compared with it, although it will be seen immediately that these tense-forms are in reality evanescent, and in part illusory.

### SUBJECTIVE TENSES

(i.e. Tenses of the Subjective Mood, expressive of suppositions, &c.).



On this table we have to remark—1. That very little stress must be laid on the exactness of any direct English or Latin equivalents; the *idiomatic* uses of Greek being very strongly marked in the use of the moods. Even the French equivalents, as λέω que j'aie délié; λέσσαι que j'eusse délié, are quite inadequate. 2. Observe however that the English *MAY* is the best general representative of the Greek subjunctive, *MIGHT* of the optative. 3. Two of the future forms are wanting; and the

\* Some verbs have also second aorist optatives and subjunctives, but these being merely other forms of the same tense, are not noticed; e.g. in English no one regards *hung* and *hanged* as two separate tenses.

other future form, although it occurs, is merely a *choix de luxe*, because the whole mood involves futurity, so that the present forms serve instead.

4. The past tenses of the Latin subjunctive are equivalent to the Greek optative.

169. Further: of the seven Greek forms, *three* are very rarely used, viz. the perfect subj., the perf. optative, and the future optative. We may in fact *dismiss* those three forms, with the remark that the perfect forms are only used where something is *specially* to be marked out as completed; and the future opt. only in *oratio obliqua* (or reported speech), and that *very rarely*, to represent the future indicative. Thus, in direct speech:

*Σύννεσις λέλοιπε τὰ ἄκρα* Syleness has left the heights;  
in reported speech:

*ἔλεγεν ὅτι Σύννεσις λελοιπόντως εἴη τὰ ἄκρα* he said that  
Syleness had left the heights.

Direct speech:

*ἡ ὁδὸς ἔσται πρὸς βασιλέα* our march will be to the great  
king.

Reported speech:

*ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἡ ὁδὸς ἵστωτο πρὸς βασιλέα* he kept saying that  
their march would be to the great king.

We may then draw this conclusion: *the tenses of the optative only retain a tense-meaning in oratio obliqua.*

170. But it may be asked how come we to have an *aorist subjunctive δειπνήσω*, if the subjunctive be merely *the form assumed by the primary tenses in the subjective mood?* for the aorist is an historical and not a primary tense, and therefore its form in the subjective mood ought to be only *δειπνήσουμι*.

The answer to this very natural objection appears to be that the *past aorist* is necessarily sometimes used in Greek for the *present aorist* ('I dined' for 'I dine'), as we have seen already (§ 128); and it is perhaps this use of the past aorist so frequently as a present that accounts for the existence of such a form as *δειπνήσω*. And in full accordance with this hypothesis we find that the present and aorist forms of the subjective mood are in many sentences used interchangeably and almost indifferently.

171. We have then considerably reduced the importance of the number of tenses in the subjective mood, by showing that in practical use *three of them at least are nearly eliminated.*

Further than this, as we have just observed, the differences between δειπνῶ δειπνήσω, and between δειπνοίην δειπνήσαιμι, are very slightly marked, and are not distinctions of time; the present forms merely imply that the result continues, the aorist forms draw no attention to more than the momentary fact. Thus we may say *almost indifferently*

σκονδάζω ἵνα μανθάνω ορ μάθω.

ἐσκούδαζον ἵνα μανθάνοιμι ορ μάθοιμι.

172. And since these are the only forms in constant use, it will be seen that the subjective mood for all ordinary practical purposes contains (as in Latin) but four tenses, viz. a present and an aorist form which follow the primary tenses; and a present and an aorist form which follow the historical tenses.\*

173. Then, further, notice that this so-called optative mood (which we have, as far as any frequent use is concerned, reduced to a present and an aorist form, differing but little from each other in meaning, and used as the dependent and subjective form of the historical tenses) was itself a refinement of language but little needed; and therefore that it gradually fell into desuetude, and in Modern Greek nearly disappears, the few forms in which it appears (such as μὴ γένοιτο) being, as Dr. Clyde says, 'merely the coffin of the dead optative.'

174. Even by Attic writers the distinction between subjunctive and optative was (if we may believe the MSS. rather than the editors) very negligently observed; in the New Testament and in later Greek writers the optative in final sentences (see *inf.* § 179) almost disappears; † and it is very probable that in the speech of the vulgar the optative hardly existed at all, being too delicate in its distinctions for daily use. Probably the very existence of such a mood would have been unknown to an Athenian cobbler. Observe too that whereas (owing to the dramatic principle which led the Greeks to omit the reference to the past, and to represent past things as still going on before

\* It has already been pointed out that the third person dual of the subjunctive (like that of primary tenses) ends in *ov*; and of the optative (like that of the historical tenses) in *vv*.

† The past tenses of the French subjunctive (which correspond to the Greek optative) are disappearing in the same way. In English, the whole subjunctive mood is very rapidly disappearing, and its evanescence is much to be regretted; by all our best writers it was, and still is, used regularly after all causal and hypothetical conjunctions; but in common conversation it is now rarely heard.

the eyes) the *subjunctive* is often used where the *optative* would be more regular, the *reverse* of this is never the case, i.e. we never find the optative for the subjunctive.

**175.** We shall continue to use the names subjunctive and optative, but it must not be forgotten that by optative we do not mean a *different mood* from the subjunctive, but only a name for those subjective forms which correspond to the historical tenses of the indicative.

#### THE SUBJUNCTIVE IN SIMPLE SENTENCES.

**176.** 1. Used absolutely, the subjunctive in Homer differs but little from a future,\* as is also the case with the subjunctive aorist after *οὐ μὴ* in strong negations; as

*οὐ μὴ ποιήσω* I certainly *won't* do it; *οὐ μὴ φύγῃς* you certainly *will not* escape.

2. It is used (in the aor. 2nd per. sing. and plur.) in prohibitions; as

*μὴ κλέψῃς* don't steal (this or that).

3. Deliberatively (1st pers. sing. and plur.); as

*πῶ βῶ;* whither am I to go? *ποῦ στῶ;* where am I to stand?

*τί φῶ;* what am I to say?†

4. Hortatively (1st pers. sing. and plur.); as

*ἴωμεν let us go;* *ἐγκονῶμεν let us exert ourselves;* especially with *φέρε,* *ἄγε,* *ἰθί,* *εἰπέ,* &c.

5. It is often used elliptically after *βούλεται,* *θέλεις,* *κ.τ.λ.*; as

*θέλετε θηραπώμεθα;* do you wish that we should hunt?  
—Eur. *Bacch.* 719.

*θέλεις μείνωμεν αἴτοῦ;* do you wish that we should remain on the spot?—Soph. *El.* 80. Compare Ov. *Met.* ix. 734, *Vellem nulla forem.*

6. In Plato and Demosthenes the subjunctive is often used with *ἄν=ἴάν,* *ἢν.* Thus:

*ἄν σωφρονῆ.*—Phæd. 61 B; *ἄν θεός ἐθέλη.*—Id. 80 D.

\* e.g. in *Il.* vi. 459, *καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπεις* corresponds to *ὦ ποτέ τις ἔρεις* a little further on. Cf. *Il.* i. 262; *Od.* xvi. 437, vi. 201.

† Cf. *οὐκ ιώ;* shall I not go? which resembles the Latin *quoniam!* with the present indicative. *Quoniam redimus!*—Plaut. *Menachm.* II. i. 22.

[This is curiously analogous to the obsolete English ‘an’ with the subjunctive ‘an God be willing,’ &c.]

## THE OPTATIVE IN SIMPLE SENTENCES.

177. ‘L’optatif n’est point réellement un mode à part; c’est une simple dénomination sous laquelle on a rangé les temps secondaires du subjonctif.’—Burnouf.

1. The optative gains the credit of being a separate mood, as well as its name (*εγκλισίς εὐκτική*), simply because when used absolutely it often expresses a wish; as

*ὦ παῖ, γένετο πατρὸς εὐτυχέστερος,*  
τὰ δ’ ἄλλ’ ὅμοιος· καὶ γένοι’ ἀν οὐν κακός.—Soph. *Aj.* 550.

‘Boy, *mayest thou* (lit. *mightest thou be*) more fortunate than thy father, but like him in all else, and then thou wouldest be noble.’

*οὐτ’ ἀν δυναίμην μήτ’ ἐπιστράψην λέγειν* (Soph. *Ant.* 682) I could not, and may I never know how to say.

We express wishes by ‘*mayest thou*, &c., using the *subjunctive*, which, by referring to the present time, hints at the *possibility* of the thing becoming realised; the Greek, more accurately, uses a mood which refers altogether to the *past*,\* and therefore can be regarded as a wish, *and a wish only*. We however use ‘*might*’ after ‘*would that*;’ and probably the wishing-power of the optative is *merely due to an ellipse* † of one of those frequent formulas which are used with it, as *εἰ, εἴ γαρ, εἴθε, ὅφελον, πῶς ξν, εἴθε ὅφελον* [which, in the case of *impossible* wishes, are used with *past* tenses of the indicative, as *εἴθε σοι τότε συνεγενόμην* would I had then been with you!]. In *Ζεῦ πάτερ, ως Χαλύβων πᾶν ἀπόλοιτο γένος* Callim. (Jupiter, ut Chalybum omne genus pereat, Cat. lxiii. 54), every one would at once recognise an ellipse; is there any less reason for the ellipse, if *ως* be omitted?

N.B.—*Mή* is used (*not οὐ*) in negative wishes, as *Mή γένετο* would that it might not be! God forbid! [*μή γένετο* utinam ne fiat! *μή γενέσθω* jubeo ne fiat! *μή γένηται* cavendum ne fiat!]

*ὅμην δὲ τοιοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἦν μήτε γένετο τοῦ λοιποῦ* but in your case nothing of the kind ever happened, and may it never happen hereafter.

2. If it be correct to suppose that this *votive* force of the opt. is merely due to an *ellipse*, the name ‘*optative*’ becomes more unfortunate than ever. *No* separate name for it is needed, because, as we have seen, it consists merely of the past tenses

\* Latin uses both subjunctive and optative, the former for *possible* wishes, as *Utinam dives fiam*; the latter for *impossible*, as *Utinam Deus essem*. ‘The subjunctive gives a notion of the *realisation* of the proposed end; the optative represents it as a *mere possibility*.’—Jelf, § 809.

† Just as in the Italian *wolesse Iddio*=plut à Dieu. (Clyde.)

of the subjunctive; but, if it must be named, *potential* would perhaps be better, since it not only regularly expresses potentiality (*could, might, &c.*) with *ἂν* (which makes the possibility depend on *conditions*), but even without it, especially in poetry. If this view be correct, the prevalence of *ἂν* with the optative was due to the analytic tendency of all advancing language. This potential use of the optative without *ἂν* would not be so rare as it is, if the MSS. had not been repeatedly altered by scholars who wished to square them with their own views. The following are instances:

*νεογυνὸς ἀνθρώπων μάθοις* a mere child might understand it.—*Æsch. Ag.* 1163.

*ἐν εἴκοσι πᾶσι μάθοις νιν* you might know him among a score.—*Mosch.*

*πείθοι' ἀν εἰ πείθοι', ἀπειθοίης δ' ἵσως* (*Æsch. Ag.* 1048) comply (a mild imperative) if thou wouldest comply, but perhaps thou *wouldst* not comply (sc. under *any* circumstances). See Paley's notes to *Æsch. Ag.* 535, 1133, 1847; and Jelf, 426, 1.

*τὸ δὲ ἐπος οὐξερῶ τάχα*  
*ηδοιο μέν, πῶς δ' οὐκ ἀν, ἀσχάλλοις δ' ἵσως.*—*Soph. O. T.* 936.

'You *might possibly* rejoice at what I am about to say—how should you not?—but you *might* be grieved.'

Some however would understand the *ἂν* (from the previous clause) in the clause where it is not expressed; as in *Xen. Hier.* ii. 11:

*οὐ μόνον φιλοὶ' ἀν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐρῆσθαι.*

3. With *ἂν* the optative is often used as a milder future, or less positive assertion. This is due to the refinement and sensitiveness of the Greek intellect, and their dislike of what is blunt, and downright, and uncontingent; as

*οὐκ ἀν ἀπέλθοιμ' ἀλλὰ κόψω τὴν θύραν* I won't go away  
but I'll knock at the door.

*οὐκ ἀν ἔγωγε θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίσιι μαχοίμην* I will not fight  
with heavenly gods.

*οὐκ ἀν φθάνοις λέγων;* quantocius dicas! quin statim  
loquere? speak at once!

*οὐκ οἶδ' ἀν εἰ πείσαμι* I doubt whether I could persuade.  
—*Eur. Med.* 941.

*οὐκ ἀν οἶδ' εἰ δυναίμην* I doubt whether I should be able.  
—*Plat. Tim.* p. 26.

In the last two examples the *āν* belongs to the optative, but is merely transposed by a spurious hyperbaton; as

*οὐκ οἴδ' εἰ* = I doubt whether, *πείσαιμ' ἄν* = I could persuade him.  
*οὐκ οἴδ' εἰ* = haud scio an.

4. In civil commands, the optative is often used with *ἄν* which points to a suppressed protasis; as

*χωροῖς ἄν εἰσῶ* go in, please! (literally ‘you would go in if it should please you.’)

*ἔρδοι τις ήν ἔκαστος εἰδείη τέχνην* = ne sutor ultra crepidam.

*ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἄν εἴποιεν* (Herod. ix. 71) but people might say this even out of envy (sc. εἰ εἴποιεν if they were to say it).

5. It expresses a sort of *hopeless* wish (hopeless because the optative throws it in connection with things past); as

*ποῖ τις φύγοι* (*Ar. Plut.* 438) whither could one fly?  
but

*ποῖ τις ἄν φύγοι* ‘whither in the world’  
is more common, and *ποῖ τις φύγῃ*.

6. The optative is often used in sentences which imply iteration, or indefinite frequency; \* as

*όπότε προσβλέψει τινα whenever he saw any one.*

*δεινότατον δὲ ήν ἡ ἀθυμία όπότε τις αἰσθοιτο κάμνων* but most terrible was the despair whenever any one felt that he was falling ill.

This is also the case in English where ‘*might*’ is used to express recurrence, as in Shelley:

‘The sweet nightingale  
Ever sang more sweet as day *might* fail.’

7. What is called the *correspondence of optatives* should be noticed, where the principal verb in the optative seems to attract the dependent verb into the same mood; as

*γενοίμαν κ.τ.λ. ὅπως προσείποιμεν Ἀθάνας* (*Soph. Aj.* 1217) would that I were, &c., that we might address Athens.

\* Not that the mood of itself necessarily involves this conception. Burggraaff acutely remarks, ‘L’emploi d’un temps dans telle ou telle circonstance et son emploi pour exprimer cette circonstance, sont deux choses différentes que les grammairiens ont souvent confondues.’—p. 412.

*ὅλοος μήτω πρὶν μάθωμε* (Soph. *Phil.*) may you perish—  
not till I have learnt.

N.B. It may be as well to repeat, that as an all but invariable rule *εἰ* takes the optative, *ἔάν*, *ἢ* the subjunctive; *ἄν* by itself the optative.

#### THE MOODS IN COMPOUND SENTENCES.

178. Of the different kinds of possible sentences, those which chiefly need elucidation are :

1. Final sentences ('in order that').
2. Declarative sentences (*oratio obliqua*).
3. Conditional or hypothetical ('if' &c., 'then,' &c.).
4. Temporal ('when, until,' &c.).

#### FINAL SENTENCES.

179. A final sentence is one which expresses a purpose, motive, or end (*finis*). In English it is generally expressed by 'to,' but *never* by the infinitive in *Latin*, and not properly in Greek.

It may sometimes appear to be expressed by the infinitive; \* as

*ῆλθεν ἀδικεῖν* or *ώς*, *ῶστε ἀδικεῖν* he came to do wrong.

*στρατηγεῖν* *ἡρμένος* chosen to be a general.

*βῆ ὁ ιέραι* he started to go.

But here it is rather a *fact* or *consequence* which is indicated; and when the final sentence appears to be expressed by a future participle it is really *temporal*; as

*ῆλθεν ἀδικήσων* he came to do wrong.

*ἔρχομαι φράσων* I come to tell.

180. After verbs of sending, coming, &c., *ὅς*, *ὅστις* are used with the *future indicative* (whereas in similar Latin instances *qui* requires the subjunctive); as

*πέμπειν τινὰς . . . οἵτινες κατηγορήσουσι τῶν τὰ Φιλίππου πραττόντων* (Demosth. *De F. Leg.* § 349) to send some to accuse Philip's faction.

*κήρυκα προαπεστείλατε ὅστις ἡμῖν σκείσεται* (*Id.* § 180) ye sent a herald before us to make a truce for us.

N.B. "Oc cum *conjunctivo* nunquam ponitur post *verba* *mittendi*, *veniendi*, *similia*."—Shilleto.

\* But see Jelf, § 669, p. 300, and *supra*.

**181.** Sentences *really final*, or expressive of *purpose*, are expressed by *ἴνα*, *ὅπως*, *ὡς* *in order that* (*always with μὴ not οὐ in negative clauses*); and the rule about them both in Greek, Latin, and English is, that they are followed *by the subjunctive after primary tenses, and by the optative after the historical tenses*; as

γράψω, γράψω, γέγραφα *ἴνα μανθάνης* or *μάθης*  
scribo, scribam, scripsi (perfect) ut *discas*

I am writing, will write, have written that you *MAY* be learning, or *MAY* learn;

ἔγραφον, ἔγραψα, ἔγεγράφη *ἴνα μανθάνοις* or *μάθοις*  
scribebam, scripsi (aorist) scripseram ut *disceres*

I was writing, wrote, had written that you *MIGHT* learn.

**182.** This rule is constantly violated in the New Testament, and by later writers (e.g. Lucian), because the optative fell out of general use. When it is violated by any Attic writer, the reason is the same as that which leads to the use of the imperfect tenses (historic present, &c.), namely, a desire to be graphic (*πρὸ δημάτων ποιεῖν*) by representing the event as passing under the eyes; e.g.

κτείνει με χρυσοῦ τὸν ταλαιπώρον χάριν  
ξένος πατρός, καὶ κτανὼν ἐς οἶδμ' ἀλὸς  
μεθῆχ' *ἴν'* αὐτὸς χρυσὸν ἐν δόμοις ἔχη.

'My father's friend *slays* me, unhappy that I am, for the sake of gold, and after slaying, he *flung* me into the sea-wave, that he *may be having* (=may keep, the effect being represented as present and continuous) the gold in his house.'—Eur. *Hec.*

**183.** i. The historic present is syntactically regarded as an *aorist*, and is therefore followed by the optative.

ii. The subjunctive and imperative, as they connect the action with the *future*, are regarded as *primary tenses*, and are therefore regularly followed by the subjunctive.

**184.** When the final particles *ὡς*, *ἴνα*, *ὅπως* are used with *past tenses of the indicative*, they imply an *impossible* or *unfulfilled result*; as

*τί μ' οὐ λαβῶν*  
ἔκτεινας εἰθὺς *ὡς* ἔδειξα μήποτε, κ.τ.λ.—O. T. 1393.  
'why didst thou not seize and slay me instantly, that I might never have shown,' &c.

187. In relative sentences ἀν follows the relative when the subjunctive is required ; as

οὐ ἀν ἵδη κολάζει he punishes whomsoever he sees ;  
but

οὐ ἴδοι ἐκάλαζεν he kept punishing every one whom he saw (i.e. as often as he saw them,—the opt. implying iteration).

The reason of this is obvious ; it is here due to the futurity involved in the subjunctive, which requires an ἀν to qualify it.

188. And here we may add the important rule that ὡς ἀν, ὅπως ἀν, ὃς ἀν, ὅταν, ἐπειδάν, εἰ ἀν (ἐάν), &c. go regularly with the subj.; in the rare cases in which ὃς, ὅτις, ὡς, ὅπως, εἰ, followed by ἀν, occur with an optative, the ἀν belongs, not to them, but to the verb ; as

οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον δστις ἀν κατακράνοι there is no one who would kill him [not δστις ἀν whoever, but δστις who ἀν κτάνοι would kill].

οὐκ ἔστιν δ,τι ἀν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι there is no evil which (δ,τι) one could suffer (ἀν πάθοι) greater than this.

ἐπιμέλονται ὡς ἀν βέλτιστοι εἰεν οἱ πολῖται they take pains how (ὡς) the citizens might be (ἀν εἰεν) most excellent.

οὐκ-οἰδά-γ'-ει φθαίης-ἀν I almost doubt whether you will be in time (φθαίης ἀν)=I'm afraid you won't.

N. B. The general rule is that the relative, when *definite*, takes the indicative, as οὐς εἶδεν those whom he saw; when indefinite the optative, as οὐς ἴδοι those whom he might see; when combined with ἀν, invariably the subjunctive, as οὐς ἀν ἵδη whomsoever he may see.

### ORATIO OBLIQUA.

189. In oratio obliqua (indirect assertion, reported speech), when it is not expressed by the accus. and inf., the indicative may be used with ὡς or δτι,

- i. when the exact words of another are quoted ; or
- ii. when the statement is vouched for as a fact ; or
- iii. when some special emphasis attaches to one part of the sentence ; as

ἰ λέγει δτι ὁ ἀνὴρ Θηγρός ἔστι he says that 'the man is mortal.'

φὰς ἐπὶ χώρην δέξειν δθεν χρυσὸν οἰσονται saying that he will lead them against a country from which they will (for a certainty) win gold.

- ii. ἔλεγον δτι Κύρος μὲν τέθυκεν, Ἀριαῖος δὲ πεφενγὼς ἐγ τῷ σταθμῷ εἶη, καὶ λέγοι δτι περιμένειν ἀν αὐτοὺς εἰ μέλλοιεν ἥκειν they said that Cyrus was dead [a fact], and that Arizetus having fled was in his camp, and that he said he would wait for them if they intended to come [assertions which might be true or not].
- iii. ἐκέλευε τῆς ἑωντοῦ χώρης οἰκέτειν δκου βούλονται (Herod. i. 186) he bade them live in his own country *wherever they prefer*.  
θαυμάζοντες δποι ποτὲ τρέψονται οι "Ελληνες καὶ τι ἐν τῷ ἔχοντι wondering whether the Greeks *will turn themselves*, and what their purpose *possibly could be*.

In Latin, this opinion as to the truth or doubtfulness of what is reported cannot be shown by the form of the sentence, because the accusative and infinitive is their only form for indirect assertions;\* nor can it be shown in English. But in German the distinction is just the same as in Greek, i.e. the indicative is used of certainties (*Er sagt er ist gefallen*), the subjunctive of uncertainties (*Er sagt er sei gefallen*).

**190.** The optative however is *the ordinary mood for oratio obliqua* after historical tenses (including the historical present); as

ἢρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο he asked whether he felt it.

This subjunctive is only used irregularly when the reporter involuntarily slips back into the *oratio recta*, generally from some allusion to the future; as

ἔλεγον, ὃς χρῆν ἴμας εἰλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε I kept telling you that 'you ought to be on your guard that you *may not* be deceived by *me*.'

**191.** The same rule holds good of indirect interrogation.

**192.** The *tenses* used are those which would be used in *oratio recta*, or direct speech; thus the three assertions 'he

\* The reason of this is that Latin has no equivalent to the Greek *δτι* with the indicative merely stating a *fact*; *ut* is a *final conjunction* in Latin. The difference between *δτι* and *δς* in declarative sentences is slight, but of the two *δτι* implies rather 'the *fact* that,' and *δς* the *assertion* that.

did it,' 'he has done it,' 'he will do it,' would be respectively in oratio obliqua, ἔλεγον δτι ποιήσει, πεποιηκώς είη, ποιήσοι.

**193.** The accusative and infinitive may always be used in oratio obliqua; as

ἥγγειλαν τὸν Κύρον νικᾶν they announced that Cyrus was victor.

## CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

**194.** Every complete conditional sentence consists of two clauses, of which the clause which contains the condition ('if') is called the protasis, and the clause which expresses the inference or consequence is called the apodosis.

**195.** Since, in these sentences, Greek is able to express very numerous shades of thought (modified even by the passing emotion of the moment), which English does not, and often cannot *idiomatically* (i. e. in accordance with the *ordinary* use of the language) express; and since, in consequence of this, the apodosis often places the statement in a slightly different point of view from that on which the protasis is framed, it will be convenient to treat the forms of protasis and apodosis separately, and then to give instances of them in combination.

**196.** A categorical proposition declares that something actually took place; a conditional proposition only states a connection between two events of which one depends on the other.

## THE PROTASIS.

**197.** The common way of expressing the protasis is by *ei* or *ἴαν*.

Ei,\* 'if' is derived by Donaldson from the dative of the pronoun *i*, gen *oū*. It would therefore mean 'on this condition.' It is joined with the indicative (generally the imperfect or aorist), and the optative; *very rarely* with the subjunctive.

**198.** The protasis may imply: I. Possibility, or mere

\* *ei* also = δτι 'that;' for which it is a politer form, after verbs implying disapprobation; and *verba affectuum* generally (*θαυμάζω*, *διγάρω*, *δεινόν δοττι*, &c.). It also has the sense of *num?* *si?* *whether?* in indirect questions.

assumption (*sumptio dati*). II. Slight probability. III. Uncertainty, or mere supposition. IV. Impossibility (*sumptio ficti*); as in the following typical sentences to which the English and Latin equivalents are appended:

**199. I. Possibility; as**

*εἰ τι ἔχει* if he has anything, si quid habet.

*εἰ λέγει τοῦτο* if he says this, si hoc dicat.

*εἰ γενήσεται\* ταῦτα* if this shall happen, si hæc accident. *εἰ τοῦτο ἐπεπράχει* if he had done this (the *result* still continuing): this is a *nuance* of meaning which we cannot express in English.

We see then that *εἰ* with the indicative implies a mere assumption; and is equivalent to our ‘*assuming that*.’ It is purely *neutral*, and expresses no opinion either way.

N. B. In this sense *εἰ* may go with *any* tense of the indicative; it only indicates *impossibility* (or that a thing *is not the case*) when it is followed by the indicative with *ἄν*, e.g.

*εἰ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ' ἐπὶ ηγὸν ἔρεψα*

. . . τόδε μοι ἀργύρον ἔέλθωρ.—*Il.* i. 39.

‘If ever I reared for thee a beauteous fane . . . accomplish for me this my desire.’

*εἰ τις καὶ τότε ὡργίζετό μοι . . . ἀναπειθέσθω* (Thuc. vi. 89) if *then* any one was angry with me . . . let him now change his opinion.

*σοὶ εἰ πῆ ἄλλη δέσοκται λέγε* if you have come to any different conclusion, tell me.

**200. II. Slight probability; as**

*ἔάν τι ἔχῃ* if he *have†* anything, si quid habeat.

*ἔάν τοῦτο λέγη* if he *say* this, si hoc dicat.

*ἔάν γένηται ταῦτα* if this *happen*, si hæc accident (or acciderent).

\* *εἰ, si, 'if'* with the *future* is comparatively rare in all three languages. Notice the difference between *εἰ θεῖ νέφη λοτι*, if it is raining there are clouds, and *εἰ θεῖ νικήσουμεν*, if it rains (at some future time) we shall win.

† The English *subjunctive*, in this phrase, implies the same *shade* of probability; whereas ‘if he *has*’ like *εἰ ἔχει*, expresses no probability whatever, but merely ‘*assuming that, then*,’ &c. Yet the difference between the two is so slight that both may be used in the same clause. (Herod. iii. 36.)

*'Èav* is a compound of *ei* and *àv*, and calls attention to some *condition*; it is *invariably* joined to the subjunctive; hence it differs from I. because it *must* always refer to *future* time.\*

**201. III.** *Complete uncertainty*; or sometimes *indefinite frequency*; as

*ei* *ti* *èxoi* if he were (or, *should be*) having anything, si quid habeat.

*ei* *toùro* *léyou* if he were (or, *should be*) saying this, si hoc dicat.

*ei* *yérotro* *raúra* if this were to (or, *should*) happen, si hæc accidant.

Both the English ‘were’ and the Greek optative strictly belong to the past, but in these instances *the supposition refers to the present* (if he were *now* to, &c.). This form of protasis might also be correctly rendered in English by ‘If he *had*,’ ‘if he *said*,’ &c.; but this, though more idiomatic, would not be *strictly* correct or accurate.

Latin makes no distinction between this and I., using the pres. subj. for both; or else employing ‘si quid haberet,’ &c. for both this and IV.

N.B. When *ei* is used with the optative, the sense varies with the tense; e.g.

*ei* *raúra* *nowi* if he should be doing this (now),

“ “ *ποιήσοι* if he should do this (hereafter),

“ “ *ποιήσει* if he *did* this.

\* *Ei* (as well as *èd*) may, *very rarely*, be joined even in good writers with the subjunctive. (See Hermann, *ad Soph. Aj.* 491, *de particula à* p. 96.) The distinction between the *very rare* *ei* *yéntra* and the common correct construction *èav* *yéntra* can hardly be expressed in English or Latin, except by using ‘*forte*’ ‘*perhaps*’ in the latter case. Thus we have—

1. *ei* *yéntra* *raúra* assuming that this will happen (possibility).
2. *èav* *yéntra* *raúra* if perchance this happen (probability).
3. *ei* *yéntra* *raúra* if this happen (apart from any conditions).
4. *ei* *yérotro* *raúra* if this should happen (uncertainty).

It will be seen that the *nuances* of meaning here conveyed are too delicate to be expressed except by periphrases in Latin or English, and barely even by them; in fact, even high authorities (e.g. Rost) deny the existence of *any* perceptible difference between 1 and 3, and Liddell and Scott between 2 and 3. Certainly, *ei* with the subjunctive is rare and archaic; one would but rarely require to say ‘if—leaving all conditions out of sight—not implying the probability or even the possibility of the supposition.’

**202. IV. Impossibility (*only when followed by ἄν with the indic.*).**

- a. εἴ τι εἶχεν if he were (or had been) having, si quid haberet.
- β. εἴ τι ἔσχεν if he had had, si quid habuisset.
- a. εἰ τοῦτο ἐλεγεν if he were (or had been) saying this, si hoc diceret.
- β. εἰ τοῦτο ἐλεξεν if he had said, si hoc dixisset.
- a. εἰ ἐγίγνετο ταῦτα if this were (or had been) happening, si haec acciderent.
- β. εἰ ἐγένετο ταῦτα if this had happened, si haec accidissent.

N.B. When these sentences are set in examination papers, as is so frequently the case, the student should give an *accurate* English translation, even at the expense of our ordinary idiom; and therefore εἴ τι εἶχεν ἐδίδον ἄν should *not* be rendered 'if he had anything he would give it' (as in Arnold, Dr. Donaldson, &c.), but by these two formulae (*either* of which is correct, and both of which should be given):

- a. 'If he were having anything,  
he would be giving it'
  - or    b. 'If he had been having any-  
thing, he would have  
been giving it'
- } si quid haberet, daret.

This is a *literal* translation of the Greek which is required; but, no doubt, neither sentence is in *idiomatic* English, which would require for

- a. 'If he had anything, he would give it,' for
- b. 'If he had had anything, he would have given it,'

which last would be expressed in Greek by εἴ τι ἔσχεν, ἔδωκεν ἄν. The very fact that a study of Greek enables us to appreciate shades of thought so subtle as to be scarcely capable of being expressed in our own language, adds to its value as an educational instrument.

**203. The reason why the student will constantly see different English forms used to render these expressions, is the practical inaccuracy of the English language in neglecting all these shades of thought. We have tried to use the most accurate English equivalents; but, practically, English entirely neglects the distinction between continued and single actions in conditional sentences; and thus, though εἴ τι εἶχεν**

means 'if he were (or had been) having,' and *εἰ τι ἔχειν* means 'if he had had,' and although these forms convey clearly distinct meanings, yet ordinary English would use 'if he had had' for all three.

N.B.—Notice the use of *εἴθε*, *εἰ* (like the Latin *si*) in *wishes*; as *εἴθε τοῦτο ἐγίγνετο* utinam hoc fieret; *εἴθε ἐγένετο* utinam factum esset; *εἰ γὰρ γένοντο* utinam fiat! In *unfulfilled wishes*, *εἴθε*, *εἰ γάρ*, are used with the imperfect (of continuous) and aorist indicative (of single acts), as *εἴθε ήσθι δυνατὸς τοῦτο δρᾶν* would that you had been able to do this; *εἴθε οὐ μήποτε εἰδόμην* would I had never seen you!

### APODOSIS.

**204.** The same Protasis may have different Apodoses according to the meaning required. The commonest forms of apodosis are

- a. The imperative.
- β. Some tense of the indicative.
- γ. The optative with *ἄν* which is the commonest of all, and may follow any protasis, because being more polite and indirect the Greeks preferred it to the indicative.
- δ. When the *non-fulfilment* of the condition is implied, a past tense of the indicative with *ἄν*.

And here we again meet the distinction between the aorist and the imperfect with *ἄν*, which *may* indeed be unidiomatically expressed in English, but which for the most part we neglect; thus

*ἀπέθνησκεν* *ἄν* means 'he would be dying,' or 'he would have been dying;'

*ἀπέθανεν* *ἄν* 'he would have died;'<sup>\*</sup>

*ἔτεθνήκει* *ἄν* he would have been dead.

### COMPLETE CONDITIONAL SENTENCES.

**205. I.** Possibility, or mere *assumption*, with no expression of uncertainty.

*εἰ τι ἔχει, δίδωσι* si quid habet, dat. If he has anything, he gives it.

*εἰ τοῦτο λέξοις, ἀμαρτήσῃ* si hoc dices, errabis. If you say this, you will be in the wrong.

---

\* Some scholars maintain that *ἀπέθανεν* *ἄν* may mean 'he would die,' as well as 'he would have died;' but this is exceedingly questionable, and therefore I have taken no notice of it.

## 206. II. Slight probability.

*έάν τι ἔχῃ, δώσει* si quid habeat (or habebit), dabit. If he have anything, he will give it.

*έὰν ταῦτα λέξῃ, ἀμαρτάνει* si hoc dicat, errat. If he say this, he errs.

207. III. Uncertainty, or mere *supposition*.\*

*εἰ τι ἔχοι, δοῖν ἀν†* si quid habeat, det (rare in Latin). If he were (or should be) having anything (sc. now), he would give it.

*εἰ ταῦτα λέγοι, ἀμαρτάνοι ἀν* si haec dicat, errat. If he were (or should be) saying this, he would be erring.

## 208. IV. Impossibility, or the implied nonfulfilment of the condition.

a. *εἰ τι εἶχεν, ἐδίδον ἀν‡* si quid haberet, daret. If he were (or had been) having anything (which is not the case) he would be (or have been) giving it.

*εἰ ταῦτα ἔλεγεν ἀμάρτανεν ἀν* si haec diceret, erraret. If he were (or had been) saying this, he would be (or have been) in the wrong.

β. *εἰ τι ἔσχεν, ἔδωκεν ἀν* si quid habuisset, dedisset. If he had had anything, he would have given it.

*εἰ ταῦτ' ἔλεξεν ἥμαρτεν ἀν* si haec dixisset, errasset. If he had said this, he would have been in the wrong.

209. It will be seen at once, as already stated, that the chief difficulty in understanding the use of conditional sentences, rises from the fluctuating and uncertain use of the English equivalents, since our ordinary idiom often prevents us from representing the accurate meaning of the Greek; yet we may in English accurately render

- I. by ‘if’ with the indicative.§
- II. by ‘if’ with the subjunctive.

\* On indefinite frequency; as *εἴ που ἐξελάνων περίγε τὸν Κύπρον* whenever he went out riding he used to take Cyrus about with him.

† This is the favourite apodosis, and is often put with one of the other protases; e.g. *τάπ' εἴπεις ἔτη Κλίνων δέχεσθαι . . . Ἀλλήν λάβοις ἀν* (Soph. O. T. 216) if you be willing to listen to and obey my word . . . you would gain help (where *λάβοις ἀν* is politely indefinite for *λάβεις*).

‡ Compare the French *S'il allait*, il donnerait.

§ The protasis of every one of these four may be represented by *ἔχει τι*; and that of I. by & *ἔχει*; of II. by & *ἀν ἔχει*; of III. by & *ἔχει*; of IV. α. by & *εἶχεν*; of IV. β. by & *ἔσχεν*.

III. by 'if' with 'were to' or 'should.'

IV. β. by 'if' with the pluperfect, and by 'would have' in the apodosis.

**210.** The main difficulty is with IV. α. Many scholars translate *εἰ τι εἰχεν, εἰδόν ἀν* by 'if he had anything, he would give it'; others, declaring this to be inaccurate and unphilosophical, render it 'if he (were, or) had been having anything, he would (be, or) have been giving it.' It is clear that in many sentences, such periphrases would be intolerable in classical English, although they are correct, and discriminate well such sentences as

a. *εἰ μὴ τότε ἐπόνουν, οὐκ ἀν νῦν εὐφρανόμην* had I not then been toiling, I should not now have been rejoicing.

β. *εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίει μέγα με ὠφελεῖ ἀν* if he had *been acting* this, he would have *been doing me a great service*.

Clearly *εἰ τοῦτο ἐποίει*, and therefore the apodosis dependent on it, *sometimes refers to the present,\* sometimes to the past*; e.g.

*εἰ τὸν Φιλιππὸν τὰ δίκαια πράττοντα ἔωρων, σφόδρα οὐ θαυμαστὸν ἡγούμην αἰνῶν* if I but saw Philip acting with justice, my opinion of him would be that he is very admirable.

*οὗτος εἰ ἦν προφήτης ἔγίνωσκεν ἀν* if he were a prophet, he would be aware.

**211.** The Greek love for *dramatic imperfects*, expressive of *continuous acts*, going on as it were before the eyes, leads them to a constant use of this form of the conditional sentence; e.g.

*οὐκ ἀν προέλεγεν εἰ μὴ ἐπίστευεν ἀληθεύσειν* he would not have been in the habit of saying so beforehand, had he not been confident that he would be speaking truth.

*οὐκ ἀν οὖν νήσων ἐκράτει, εἰ μὴ τι καὶ ναυτικὸν εἶχεν* he would never, then, have held sovereignty over the islands, had he not been in possession of some fleet also.

\* Dr. Donaldson cannot be right in making it refer to the present *only*. (*Gr. Gram.* p. 540.) In the same way, 'Si quid haberet, daret,' may mean either 'if he had been having anything, he would have been giving it.' Vellelum = *ξερνλόμην ἀν* lit., *I should have been wishing*, or 'I should be wishing,' sc. if it were, or had been, possible. In English however we should use neither of these imperfects to express the continuous action, but merely 'I could have wished.'

212. To sum up then what has been said about IV. α., the context only can determine exactly whether in the particular instance any such sentence as

*εἰ ταῦτ’ ἔγιγνετο, ἀπίθνησκεν ήν* means

If these things *were* taking place, he would be dying ; or, If these things *had been* taking place, he would have been dying.

213. One or two instances of conditional sentences, both Greek and Latin,\* are added, in some of which the apodoses are varied† from the regular construction. In the light of what has gone before they will be easily understood by the attentive student ; their occasional irregularities are all due to the triumph of the dramatic tendency over formal grammar.

#### I. Possibility, or assumption.

*Εἴ μ' ἔθέλεις πολεμῖσαι, "Αλλονς μὲν κάθισον* if you want me to fight, make the rest sit down.—*Pl. iii. 67.*

*ἢ καλόν, ἢν δ' ἔγω, τέχνημα κέκτησαι, εἴπερ κέκτησαι* in truth, said I, a fine contrivance you have acquired, if you have but really acquired it.—*Plat. Prot. p. 319 A.*

---

\* I borrow some of these from a difficult, but careful little treatise on *The Theory of Conditional Sentences*, by Mr. R. Horton Smith (Macmillan). Many Latin instances are given by Jani, in his *Art of Poetry* (*Engl. Tr. p. 52*).

† Such a change in the apodosis of a sentence is regarded as an inaccuracy in English (however frequently it may occur); e.g. such a sentence as Steele's, 'If you please to employ your thoughts on that subject, you *would* easily conceive,' &c., where 'you *will*', &c., would have been more regular ; but in Greek, which submitted less tamely to formal rules, and allowed more for the passing play of thought, such a sentence would have been regarded as quite admissible. It is the same in French, where one might have either 'Si vous aviez fait le contraire il *aurait* mieux valu, il *valait* mieux, or il *vaudrait* mieux.'

I collect one or two English instances of conditional sentences with varied apodoses from an excellent pamphlet by the Rev. E. Thring, 'On Common Mood Constructions.' They will show that Greek is not in this respect one whit more irregular than our own language.

'I'll speak to it though hell itself *should* gape.'

'Thou *wrong*st thyself, if thou shouldst choose to strike.'

'If I *answer* not you *might* haply think

Tongue-tied ambition yielded.'

'An I *might* live to see thee married once

I *have* my wish.'

*εἰ μὲν θεοῦ ἦν, οὐκ ἦν, φήσομεν, αἰσχροκερδής* if he was the son of the god, he was not, we shall say, basely avaricious.—Plat. *Rep.* 408 c.

Erras, si id credis, et me ignoras, Clinia, you are mistaken if you think so, and don't know me, Clinia.—Ter. *Heaut.* i. i. 53.

Si quod erat grande vas lāti afferebant, if there was any large vessel, they would bring it to him with exultation.—Cic. *II. Verr.* iv. xxi. 47.

### II. Slight probability.

*Νέος ἀν πονήσης γῆρας ἔξεις εὐθαλὲς* si juvenis laboraveris, senectutem habebis jucundam.

*καὶ ἦν ἄρα μὴ προχωρήσῃ ἵσον ἐκάστῳ ἔχοντι ἀπελθεῖν,* πάλιν πολεμήσομεν and if by any chance things proceed not smoothly for each side to separate on equal terms, we will go to war again.—Thuc. iv. 59.

Nunquam labere, si te audies You will never slip, if you listen to your own guidance.—Cic. ii. *ad Fam.* 7, 1.

Pol si istuc faxis (=feceris) haud sine pena feceris Faith if you do so, you will not have done it with impunity.—Plaut. *Capt.* iii. v. 37.

### III. Uncertainty, or supposition.

**ΣΤΡ.** *γυναικα φαρμακίδ'* εἰ πριάμενος Θετταλήν,  
καθέλοιμι τὴν σελήνην, εἴτα δὲ . . .

. . . κατὰ τηροίην ἔχων, . . .

**ΣΩ.** *τί δῆτα τοῦτο σ' ὥφελήσειν σ'*; **ΣΤΡ.** δ, τι;  
εἰ μηέτ' ἀνατέλλοι σελήνη μηδαμοῦ  
οὐκ ἀν ἀποδοίην τὸν τόκους.—Ar. *Nub.* 749.\*

**Str.** If purchasing a Thessalian witch I should draw down† the moon (*single act*), . . . and then keep it in my own possession (*continued act*) . . .

**Soc.** Why, what good would that do you?

**Str.** What good, quotha? why if the moon should no longer be rising (*continued act*) I should not pay (*single act*) the interest on my debts.

\* Several idioms occur in this instructive example; e.g. the difference of present (*τηροίην*, &c.) and aorist (*καθέλοιμι*) tenses; the use of the relative δ, τι in repeating a question, &c.

† His mother was a witch, and one so strong  
She could controul the moon.—Shaksp. *Tempest.*  
‘While the labouring moon  
Eclipses at their charms.’—Milton.

ἀπηγύρεν μηδένα βάλλειν πρὶν Κῦρος ἐμπλησθεῖν he forbade any one to shoot until Cyrus was satisfied [referring to his own words].

οὐκ ἔθελεν φεύγειν πρὶν πειρήσαιτ' Ἀχιλῆος he did not wish to fly till he had made trial of Achilles [referring to his thoughts].

iii. Sometimes (as we have already noticed § 177, 7) an optative after *πρὶν* is due to the *attraction* of a previous optative, as

ὅλοιο μήτω πρὶν μάθοιμι (Soph. *Phil.* 961) mayst thou perish! Yet no, not till I learn.

Here we should have expected the infinitive, but compare *O. T.* 505.

iv. *πρὶν*, *ἔως*, with the subj. differs from *πρὶν ἀν*, *ἔως ἀν*, by being only used in poetry when something *certain* to happen is spoken of; e.g. an actually dying man should not say *μήμνετε ἔως ἀν θάνω* but *μήμνετε ἔως θάρω*.

*μὴ στέναζε, πρὶν μάθης* (Soph. *Phil.* 917) do not groan till you have learnt (which will be the case immediately);

but

*ἔως δὲ ἀν ἐκμάθης ἔχει λαπίδα* till you have learnt (which you may or may not do) keep hope.

*Usually*\* however *ἀν* is added, because the Greeks disliked talking of *future certainties*, and ‘amant omnia dubitantius loqui.’

v. We find a similar fact with *ὅς*, *ὅτις*, which (in Attic *τοις*) are used alone with the subjunctive of things certain, as *ἄλλας ὁς τοῖς εἰδῆς ἐνέπιος σαφέστερος* but I tell you more plainly that you may know it (which of course you will do, when I have told you); but *σταθῶμεν ἐκποδόνης, ὁς ἀν μάθεις* let us stand aside, that I may (sc. if possible) learn.

\* *ἔως ἀν*, with the subjunctive present, often implies duration, = so long as.

*σωτῆστε ἔως ἀν καθεύδῃ* as long as he continues sleeping, be still.  
*λέγειν χρή ἔως ἀν ἔώσιν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι*, Plato, *Phæd.* 85 A, one must continue speaking as long as the Athenians permit.

It is easy to see that the *ἀν* is here used because of the *uncertainty* of the *duration* alluded to; but *χρησμοῖς ἔνεγκε ἔως καθεύδει*, Ar. *Eg.* 110, bring the oracles while he is asleep (where no *ἀν* is needed—his sleep being a *fact*).

Thus we find them in the same passage, *Aesch. Choeroph.* 983—

ἐκτείνατ' αὐτὸν . . . ὡς οὐδὲ πατήρ,  
οὐχ οὐδὲ διλλά' δ τάντ' ἐποπτεών τάδε  
“Ηλιος ἄνωγνα μητρός ἔργα τῆς ἐμῆς·  
ὡς διν παρῇ μοι μάρτυς ἐν δικῇ ποτὲ  
ὅτιδ' ἔγω μετῆλθον θελικῶς μέρον  
τὸν μητρός.

Unfold it that . . . the sun *may see* (*which of course will be the case*) the unhallowed deeds of my mother, so that *perchance he may hereafter be my witness* (*of the fact*) that I justly wrought this fate of my mother.

N. B. i. The infinitive with *πρίν* may be substituted for any other mood.

ii. *πρὶν δειπνεῖν* before dining, *priusquam cænem*.

*πρὶν δειπνῆσαι* before having dined, *priusquam cænavero*.

*πρὶν δεδειπνηκέραι* before having finished dinner, *priusquam à cœna surrexero*.

iii. The following sentences will illustrate the commonest uses of *πρίν*.

*ἐποίησα ταῦτα πρὶν ἐκέλευσας ante-*

quam jubebas	}	or <i>πρὶν σε κελεῦσαι</i> .
οὐκ ἥθελον ποιῆσαι ταῦτα πρὶν		

κελεύσεις αντε quam juberet

ποιήσω ορ οὐ ποιήσω ταῦτα πρὶν σε κελεῦσαι.  
οὐ ποιήσω ταῦτα πρὶν ἀν κελεῦσῃς.

On these sentences we may observe : *a.* That *πρίν* may always go with the accusative and infinitive, except where a negative statement is limited by a future contingency. *β.* It takes the indicative when certain facts are spoken of in the past. *γ.* It takes the optative in oratio obliqua, and after another optative. *δ.* It is rarely used at all, and with the subjunctive or optative *never*, unless a negative notion precedes.

#### THE INFINITIVE (*ἔγκλισις ἀπαρέμφατος*).

**216.** The Infinitive can hardly be considered as a mood ; it is rather a noun expressive of action, and therefore it can take the article. Hence some grammarians call it ‘the noun of the verb’ (*ὄνομα τοῦ ρήματος*). It however resembles the verb in having tenses, in governing cases, in being used with *ἄρ*, and in being qualified by adverbs, not by adjectives, as *καλῶς θιήσκειν*, but *καλὸς θάνατος*.

**217.** The connection between the infinitive and the abstract noun accounts for the fact that in many languages—for instance in Arabic and in Modern Greek—there is no infinitive mood. We shall see that in most languages infinitives with the article may be used as substantives; e.g. in French *le savoir*, *le toucher*, &c.

**218.** The uses of the infinitive in Greek are far more rich and varied than its uses in Latin; e.g.

τις Φίλιππον κωλύσει δέρο βαδίζειν; quis Philippum impedit quominus hoc veniat?  
 τοῖς Λίγυσήταις ἔδοσαν Θυρέαν οἰκεῖν dederunt Thyream habitandam.  
 πάντες αἰτοῦνται τὸν Θεὸν τύγαθὰ διδόναι omnes homines precantur Deum ut bona largiatur.  
 ἀκοῦσαι μαλθακὰ dulcia ad audiendum.  
 φοβερὸς ὄραν horibilis aspectu.  
 ἄξια ἀποδέξασθαι digna qua quis accipiat.

**219.** Most of the idioms in which the Greek infinitive is employed closely resemble those of English, as will be seen by the following instances, in which the infinitive completes or qualifies the meaning of various words; as

οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν οὐδὲν I have nothing to say.  
 ικανὸς ἦν εἰπεῖν he was able to speak.  
 θείειν ἀνέμοισιν ὄμοιη like the winds to run.  
 ἔστι πόλι καθίζεσθαι there is grass to sit down upon.  
 μέγα καὶ ἐσσομένοισι πυθέσθαι great even for posterity to hear of.  
 δοκεῖς ἀμαρτεῖν you seem to have erred.  
 οὐχ ἡδὺ πολλοὺς ἔχθροὺς ἔχειν it is not pleasant to have many enemies.

**220.** The Greek infinitive is even used, as in English (but never in Latin prose\*), to express a fact or consequence almost resembling a *purpose*, where the Latin supine would be used:

μανθάνειν ἥκομεν we have come to learn.

\* Latin poets however allow themselves to use a similar idiom with verbs of going, sending, coming; as

'Non nos . . . Libycos *populare* Penatus  
 Venimus.'—Virg. i. 527.

'Vultisne eamus *visere*?'—Ter. *Phorm.* i. ii. 52; ibis frænare cohortes.  
 —Stat. *Sylv.* iv. iv. 61.

'Legati veniunt *speculari*.'—Liv. xli. 25-8; Prop. i. 1-12, &c.

**Ξενοφῶν τὸ ήμισυ τοῦ στρατέματος κατέλιπε φυλάγτειν τὸ στρατόπεδον** Xenophon left half the army *to guard the camp.*

**ἥλθομεν προσκυνῆσαι αὐτῷ** we have come to worship him.  
Matt. ii. 2.

**221.** It is often qualified by various conjunctions, *ὅστε, ἵφ' οὖτε, &c.*, and by *ἢ* after comparatives; as

*ἔλπίδα δὲ δὴ τίν' ἔχομεν, ὅστε μὴ θανεῖν;* but what hope then have we of escaping death?  
*τὸ γὰρ νόσημα μεῖζον ἢ φέρειν* the disease is too great to bear.

**222.** In such instances as *χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν, ηδὺ ἀκούειν, θείειν ἀριστὸς, ἄξιος θαυμάζεσθαι, &c.*, the infinitive is called *epexegetic*, because it defines or limits the notion of the adjective with which it is joined.\* This infinitive is not uncommon after *δίδωμι*.

**223.** It is used in various adverbial phrases, as  
*ἐκών εἰναι* 'not if I can help it' (after *negatives*).  
*ἐμῷ δοκεῖν* in my opinion.  
*ὅσον γ' ἐμ' εἰδέναι* so far as I know.  
*ἄς εἰπεῖν* so to speak.  
*τὸ νῦν εἰναι* at present, at all events  
*κατὰ τοῦτο εἰναι* in this respect.  
*δλίγον δεῖν* almost, &c.

**224.** In commands,† prayers, laws, expressions of wonder, &c., it is used elliptically :

*χαίρειν πολλὰ τὸν ἄνδρα Θυνώνιχον* good morning, Thyonichus!  
(sc. κελεύω χαίρεν.)  
*τοὺς Θρῆκας ἀπιέναι παρεῖναι δὲ εἰς ἔνην* the Thracians to go away, and appear the day after to-morrow.  
*μή με δουλείας τυχεῖν* (grant) that I may not be enslaved!

\* The Latins copy the Greek *epexegetic* infinitive in such phrases as *λευκὸς ιεῦν niveus videri*, Hor. *Od.* iv. 2, and also the infinitive in apposition to the meaning of the sentence; compare *δῶρ' ἀδωδάτων οἴα διδοῦσιν ἔχειν*, Theogn. 1164, with 'Ille suo moriens dat habere nepoti,' *En.* ix. 362, and *δῶκεν ἀνέμοις φέρεσθαι* with 'dederatque comam diffundere ventis,' Virg. *En.* i. 323. 'And give him to partake Full happiness with me.'—P. L. ix. 818.

† This use of the infinitive as an imperative is found in other languages. In Hebrew the infinitive and imperative are generally the same in form. In Provençal Non temer Maria =fear not Mary.

*τοῦτον ἵβριζειν, ἀγαπητεῖν δὲ* that this fellow should be insolent, and that he should be alive !

So in Latin :

‘Men’ incepto desistere victimam.’—Virg. *AEn.* i. 41.

‘Adeone hominem . . . infelicem esse ut ego sum.’—Ter. *Andr.* I. v. 11.

**225.** After verbs of declaring, feeling, &c., the *tenses* of the infinitive are used in their proper meaning; as

*ἡνάγκασε τὸν μαθητὰς ἐμβῆναι εἰς τὸ πλοῖον καὶ προάγειν αὐτὸν* he made the disciples embark on the ship (single action), and go before him (continued action).—Matt. xiv. 22.\*

**226.** The *subject* of the infinitive is put in the *accusative*, not in the nominative as in the case of a finite verb, as

ὅς Κῦρος ἐνίκησε, but

ἥγγειλαν τὸν Κῦρον νικῆσαι.

**227.** This use of the accusative and infinitive in good classical English is very much more rare, although it is not unknown; e.g.

I hear you sing, I bid you go.—Clyde.

It is really due to what is called antiposis, i.e. to that *prolepsis of the subject of the dependent clause*, which has been already explained in § 63; e.g.

ἔλεγον ὅτι ὁ Κῦρος τέθνηκε they said that ‘Cyrus is dead,’

may become

ἔλεγον τὸν Κῦρον ὅτι τέθνηκε,†

which is the same as

ἔλεγον τὸν Κῦρον τεθνηκέναι.—Curtius.

\* The very frequent use of the infinitive with *τοῦ* to express purpose in the New Testament (e.g. *εἰσῆλθε τοῦ μείναι σὸν αὐτῷ*, Luke xxiv. 29) is neither an ellipse of *ἔνεκα*, nor a Hebraism, but may be paralleled in classical Greek (see Winer, *Gram. N. T.* § xliv.), and arose from the meaning of the genitive. It is however used in a lax and extended manner, especially by St. Luke.

† And this construction with *ὅτι* being more *precise*, becomes more frequent in later writers (e.g. in Hellenistic Greek). Accordingly, we are (once more) not surprised to find that the infinitive has *vanished from Modern Greek*, being replaced by *να* (= *τα*) and a finite verb; just as in French, *que* with a verb is often used where the infinitive would have been used in Latin, because in later Latin *quod* or *quia* with the finite verb is substituted for it.

**228.** Instead of the accusative and infinitive after verbs of declaring, *ōti* may be used with the indicative where we should use inverted commas to show that we are quoting a person's exact words, as

*they said 'Cyrus is dead';*

but where the narrator does not wish to vouch for the fact stated, *ως* with the optative is used, as

*διαβάλλει τὸν Κῦρον πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ως ἐπιβουλεύοι  
αὐτῷ he accused Cyrus to his brother, alleging that  
he was plotting against him (compare the English  
vulgarism 'saying as how').*

**229.** If the subject of the infinitive is the same as that of the finite verb, the *nominative* and *infinitive\** are used, as

*ἔφη οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἔκεινον στρατηγεῖν he said that not he  
(himself), but that Nicias was general.*

*ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἔφασκεν εἶναι Διὸς νιός Alexander alleged  
that he was a son of Zeus.*

[So too with participles; as *ἴσθι ἀνόητος ων* know that you are foolish.]

It is the same in Latin; as

‘Rettulit Ajax  
Esse Jovis pronepos.’—Ov. *M.* xiii. 141.

**230.** ‘Predicative qualifications referring to a genitive or dative may be in these cases.’—Clyde.

*ἔδεοντο αὐτοῦ εἶναι προθύμουν they besought him to be of  
good cheer.*

*ἔξεστί μοι γενέσθαι εὐδαιμονί licet mihi esse beato.*

**231.** English differs from Greek and Latin in taking a *present* instead of a *future* infinitive after verbs of promising &c.; as

*ἐλπίζω εὐτυχήσειν spero me beatum fore I hope to be  
happy.*

*ὑπέσχετο δώσειν πέντε μνᾶς promisit se quinque minas  
daturum he promised to give five minæ.*

\* This is really a case of brachylogy, i.e. a shortened form of expression for *αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔφη ἔστω στρατηγεῖν*. In Latin, and sometimes in Greek, the full construction is used, as *οἶομαι ἔμαυτον ἀμαρτεῖν credo me  
ērراسse.*

**232.** The infinitive with the article becomes a declinable substantive, and may be used in any case (*rò τύπτειν* striking, *τεῦ τύπτειν* of striking, &c.), thus answering to the Latin gerund; as

Nom. *rò ἀμαρτάνειν ἄνθρωπονς ὅντας οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν*  
*'to err is human.'*

Gen. *ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ πιεῖν* desiderium bibendi.

Dat. *κειράτηκε τῷ πρότερος πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους λέναι* he  
 has conquered by going first against the  
 enemy.

**233.** Accus. *αὐτὸν τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται* no one fears  
 the mere dying. Even without the article the infinitive is  
 often substantival; as

*δεῖ λέγειν* it is necessary to say.

*υχήσω σε πηδᾶν* I will stop your leaping.

*ον θανεῖν ἔρρυσάμην* whom I saved from death.

**234.** This substantival use of the infinitive is common to  
 most languages; e.g. it is found in Hebrew:

In Latin: Matris lallare recusas, you refuse your mother's  
 lullaby.—Persius. Multum interest inter dare et ac-  
 cipere.—Sen. *Beneſ. v. 10.*

In German: Und ihr Leben ist immer ein ewiges Gehen  
 und Kommen, oder ein Heben und Tragen, Bereiten  
 und Schaffen für Andre.—Göthe, *Herm. und Dorothea.*

In French: Il en a perdu le boire et le manger.

In Italian: Non era l' andar suo cosa mortale.—Petrarch.

In Spanish: El mucho estudiar, too much study.

In English:

For not to have been dipped in Lethe's stream  
 Could save the son of Thetis *from to die.*—Spenser.\*

### THE PARTICIPLE (*μεροχή*).

**235.** The Participle† has affinities with the adjective, as  
 the infinitive has with the noun. Its essential force is *attributive*, and hence it always refers to some substantive expressed

\* 'Our English infinitive is the mutilated form of the dative of a gerund. Rask says that the present infinitive is never used in Anglo-Saxon with the particle *to* as in Modern English, though the gerund always requires *to*.'*—New Crat. p. 603.*

† *Μεροχή ἐστι λέξις μετίχοντα τῆς τῶν βημάτων καὶ τῆς τῶν δνομάτων βεύητος.* Dionys. *Thrac.* § 19, i.e. it is so called from *participating* in the nature both of verbs and nouns.

or understood. The present participle in Sanskrit was originally an ablative (or genitive) of the verbal root ending in *at*; the nasal addition of *n* is non-essential, though it appears in the Greek termination *ων* and the Latin *ns*. Thus the participle would be analogous to our participial forms *a* (i. e. *on*) *hunting*, *a fishing*, &c. We have already seen in the instance of the adjective that it is a common practice in most languages to form new declinable expressions by adding case-endings to some oblique case of a noun; e. g. in German the adjective *vorhandener* is obviously formed by declining a dative case.

**236.** In the use of the participle, as in that of the infinitive, English and Greek are more rich and varied than Latin or German. In consequence of their frequent use of the participle, one of the grammarians calls the Greeks φιλομέτοχοι.

**237.** Like the infinitive, the participle may express

I. Either the necessary accessories of the verbal notion; as

χαίρω τῷ πατρὶ ἐλθόντι I rejoice at my father's arrival.

Or

II. 'It expresses notions of time, cause, manner, which are the mere accidents of the verbal notion;'<sup>\*</sup> as

τελευτῶν εἶπε at last he said.

ληξόμενοι ζῶσι they live by plunder.

χαίρων with impunity.

κλαίων to your sorrow, &c.

**238. I.** It completes the verbal notion by expressing the exact circumstances under which the action took place; as

ὅρῳ ἀνθρωπον τρέχοντα.

ἀκούων Σωκράτους λέγοντος.

In such cases it is really equivalent to a separate clause introduced by *ὅτι*, and when the subject of both these clauses is the same, the participle is attracted into the nominative, e.g. 'I know that I am mortal,' becomes in Greek *οἶδα θνητὸς ὁν*.†

\* Jelf, § 680.

† With σύνοιδα, συγγεγνάσκω ἔμαυτῷ 'I am conscious of,' the nominative or dative may be used, as σύνοιδα ἔμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὁν, or σοφῷ δητι. N.B. οἶδα ἀγαθὸς ὁν I know that I am good; but οἴμαι ἀγαθὸς εἰμι I think that I am good.

The verbs which take this construction are a. Verbs of physical or mental perception. b. Verbs of emotion. c. Verbs of knowing etc. d. Verbs which express a state or condition; as

- a. ἀνέπειρον οἶτε ταῦτα γνόμονα are see that we are unable to compare.  
τοῖς αὐτοῖς γάρ τοι πάνταί γνώμην she perceived that she had been injured by her husband.
- b. οἱ θεοὶ χαιρούσσι τιμώμενοι the gods rejoice in being honoured.  
οὐ εἰ σοι τίπερ' ἀνόντων he rejoiced in heart to hear it.
- c. τυκός οὐ ἀλιστεῖται he is convicted of being base.  
ἔπλετο ἔστι οὐ τοσαῖτον ταῦτα it is evident that he intends to do some mischief.\*  
οτιδύων δὲ φαρερός μέν ηὐ οὐδέτερα it was obvious that he loved no one.
- d. τις ἐπήχε ταραγενόμενος; who happened to be present?  
οὐκ ἀτέξομαι ζῶσι I will not endure to live.  
ταῦτας λέγονται cease saying.  
ῆρξαντο οἰκοδομῶντες they began building.  
διατελεῖ με ἀγαπῶν he continues loving me.

We find the same idiom in Latin; as

Sensit medios delapsus in hostes, he perceived that he had slipped into the midst of foes.—Virg. *Aen.* ii. 377  
(= ἤσθετο ἐμπεσών). Video *deceptor* ab illis, I see that I have been deceived by them (*αισθάνομαι* ἐξηγαγημένος).

And it has been imitated by Milton (*Par. Lost*, ix. 792):

'She engorged without restraint,  
And knew not eating death,'

i.e. *that she was eating death*. Cf. Oppian, *Halieut.* ii. 106:  
*οὐδὲ ἐνόησαν έὸν σπεύσαντες ὄλεθρον.*

\* Notice the *personal* construction of *λέγομαι*, *δῆλος*, *φανερός*, *δίκαιός εἰμι*, unlike the English idiom '*it is evident that*', &c.

**239.** With the infinitive some of these verbs express an entirely different meaning; e.g.

*ἐπίσταμαι ποιῶν* I know that I am doing it; *ἐπίσταμαι ποιεῖν* I know how to do it.

*οἶδα ἄγαθὸς ὡν* I know that I am good; *οἶδα ἄγαθὸς εἰναι* I know how to be good.

*μέμνησο ἀνθρώπος ὡν* remember that you are mortal; *μεμνήσθω ἀνὴρ ἄγαθὸς εἰναι* let him remember to be a brave man.

*φαίνομαι ὡν* it is obvious that I am; *φαίνομαι εἰναι* I appear to be.

*αἰσχύνομαι λέγων* I am ashamed though I say it; *αἰσχυνοίμην ἦν εἰπεῖν* I should be ashamed to say.

*ἀρχομαι διδάσκων* I enter on the position of a teacher; *ἀρχομαι διδάσκειν* I begin to teach.

*λέξας ἔχει* he has declared; *ἔχω λέγειν* I have something to say.

**240.** *Φόδνων* and *λαθάνω* may have two constructions, as *ἔποιησε φόδνας* (or *ἀνθρας*) he did it beforehand or quickly; *ἀπὸ τείχους ἀλτολαθάνω* he leapt from the wall unnoticed; or *ἔβη περὶ ιδν* he was beforehand going afoot, *ἔλαθε φεύγων* he escaped notice in his flight. It is equally correct to say *φόδνον ποιῶν* or *ποιήσον φόδνας*.

**241. II.** The participle expresses the *accidents* of the verbal notion,—time, cause, manner; as

*ἀπέρ καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον* as I said at first.

*ληζόμενοι ζῶσιν* they live by plunder.

*τί μαθών, τί παθὼν ταῦτα ἐποίησας;* cur haec fecisti?

*οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχειν μη δίδοντα μισθὼν* one cannot rule if one does not pay.

**242.** In this way the participle serves as a substitute for the Latin gerund, as in

*Θρηνεῖν ἐπφέδας πρὸς τομῶντι πήματι* to shriek charms over a cutting wound, i.e. one that *requires* to be cut.  
*ὄταν τις ἔτι πλέον πέσῃ τοῦ θέλοντος.*

**243.** Participles tend to *compact* sentences together, and to supersede that constant necessity for conjunctions which exists in English, as

*'Αλλ' ἀναστάντες καταψήφισασθε* But now rise and condemn me.

The sentences of the Greeks, it has been observed, were like their earliest buildings, Cyclopean in structure,—dispensing, as far as possible, with mortar.

**244.** "Εχων, φέρων, ἄγων,\* λέγων, χρώμενος, ἀπιών, are used where we use 'with,' as  
ἴπκον ἄγων ἥλθεν, ξίφος φέρων προσήλασε, τέχνη χρώμενος  
ἐνίκησεν.

Εχων is sometimes colloquial and superfluous, as  
τί ληρεῖς, φλυαρεῖς ἔχων; why do you trifle so? &c.

**245.** The uses of the genitive and accusative absolute (*ἐμοῦ διδάσκοντος* while I am teaching, *δέον* it being my duty, &c.) are explained under the heads of those cases.

**246.** Various adverbs are used to add distinctness to participles, as

- ἀμα φεύγοντες whilst flying.
- μεταξὺ δειπνῶν during dinner.
- εὐθὺς ἰδὼν on seeing (a person).
- ἄτε παῖς ὡν inasmuch as he was a boy.
- ἀχνύμενός περ though grieved.
- καίτερ εἰδότες though knowing.

N. B. Notice the difference between such phrases as  
κολακεύοντες ἀπατῶσι they deceive by flattery,  
and

οἱ κολακεύοντες ἀπατῶσι flatterers deceive;  
between  
ἐποίησε βασιλεύων he did it during his reign,  
and  
ὁ βασιλεύων ἐποίησεν the reigning sovereign did it.

#### VERBALS IN *τέος*.

**247.** Verbal Adjectives are a kind of participles passive. They are found in *-τέος* or *-τός*, and when derived from transitive verbs may be used either

- i. Personally, as  
ἀσκητέα σοι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ you must practise virtue;
- or  
ii. Impersonally,† as  
ἀσκητέον ἔστι σοι τὴν ἀρετήν.  
ἐπιθυμητέον ἔστι σοι τῆς ἀρετῆς.

---

\* "Ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν 'to harry and carry,' the former of animate, the latter of inanimate things.

† This resembles the use of the Latin participle in *-dus*, in such phrases as 'pacem Trojano a rege petendum,' Virg. *Xen.* xi. 230 (*αἰτητέον εἰρήνην*). Cf. Lucr. i. 111. *Canes paucos et acres habendum.* Varro.

**248.** They are frequently used in the neuter plural, as

οὐδεὶς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἔστιν whom we must not give up to the Athenians.  
γυναικὸς οὐδαμῶς ἡσσητέα we must by no means be worsted by a woman.

**249.** Verbal adjectives in -τὸς usually imply *possibility*; those in -τέος *necessity*; as

λυτὸς one who is loosed, or able to be loosed; λυτέος one who is to be loosed.  
ποιητὸν what *may* be done; ποιητέον what *must* be done.

#### THE PARTICLE "ἌΝ WITH THE MOODS.

**250.** The very important particles ἄν, and epic κέ, κά, are supposed to be derived respectively from ἀνὰ and κατά, 'according to,' and to be connected with the Latin *an*, and *quam*. They always imply a verb and a *condition*,\* but have no *exact* equivalent in any language. Their chief use is to articulate, analyse, give prominence or emphasis to the *conditionality* of a notion.

**251.** Ἄν is used with three moods, the indicative, optative, and (*when combined with other words*), the subjunctive; and also with the infinitive and participle. But it is never found with the imperative.

**252.** In the indicative, it is generally found with the *imperfect* (of continued acts), the *aorist* (of momentary acts), and less frequently the *pluperfect* (of abiding results); but not with the present and perfect, and very rarely (if ever) with the future.†

\* The particles τε, τού, τούς, ἄν express *ascending degrees of uncertainty*; viz.: i. surely, ii. very likely, iii. possibly, iv. contingently, or *on certain conditions*. The very existence of this unparalleled particle shows how intensely the Greeks realised the conception of *contingency*, and their general dislike to *positive directness*. On its derivation see Pott, *Etymolog. Forschungen*, i. 420. In some of its usages (ἄν = εὖ) it offers a curious fortuitous analogy to the now obsolete 'an,' which indeed might often be used in rendering it. 'An,' in the sense of 'if,' was once common, as 'an it please you,' 'an I should catch you,' &c.

† The best scholars (Hermann, Porson, &c.) decide against ἄν with the future; there is indeed no reason *in the nature of things* against such an idiom (since what *will be* may be supposed to depend on conditions), and *κέ* is used freely with the future in Epic; but as it is certain that a

**253.** Its potential meaning is always clear; thus

ἀπέθνησκεν he was dying;

ἀπέθανεν he died;

ἐτεθνήκει he had died;

but

ἀπέθνησκεν ἀν he would be, or have been, dying;

ἀπέθανεν ἀν he would have died;

ἐτεθνήκει ἀν he would have been dead;\*

i.e. in each case ‘he would, if so and so had happened;’ and ἀν always implies a protasis of this kind, even where such protasis is not expressed.

τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐν' ἐγίγνερο οὖν' ἀν ἐγένετο for such things neither were taking place, nor could have taken place (sc. on any conditions).

**254.** But, besides this potential usage, ἀν with the imperfect is also used *frequentatively*, to mean ‘you did so as often as such and such circumstances recurred;’ and sometimes it cannot be certainly known which of the two meanings is intended. Thus

ὅτι μάθοιμ' ἐκάστοτε  
ἐπελανθανόμην ἀν εὐθὺς ὑπὸ πλέους ἐτῶν (Ar. Nub. 831)

but whatever I learnt on each several occasion, I used to be forgetting directly in consequence of my old age.

people, ‘qui amant omnia dubitantes loqui,’ would have used this formula if it had not grated against their sense of fitness, it is better to attribute to carelessness or corrupt readings the few cases which do occur.

\* The position of ἀν is always nearest to the word which colours the sentence. Sentences like οὐκ οἴδ' ἀν εἰ πείσαιμι, Eur. Med. 941, *Alc.* 48, vereor ut suadeam, *I fear I shall not persuade*, are mere instances of a spurious hyperbaton, meaning οὐκ-οἴδ'-ει=haud scio an, πείσαιμι-ἀν; for ἀν in Attic is never resolved into ει ἀν, and never takes the optative (or the indicative). οὐκ οἴδ' ἀν ει δυναμην=I fear I shall not be able =φοβούμαυ-μη οὐδένωμαυ.

It is true that in *late* Attic ἀν is found with the optative (e.g. twice in Lucian); in Thuc. iii. 44, the reading ήν τε καὶ λχοντές τι συγγράμμενοι εἰσει is probably wrong, or else the expression is a mere solecism, such as is found even in the best writers. Thomas Magister lays down the rule ήν ἀει μετά τῶν ὑποτακτικῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις ήν is always found with subjunctives in the most accurate writers; and then alluding to this passage of Thucydides as an exception, he adds ἀλλ' οὐ δει ηρλούν το ἄπαξ ρηθει isolated exceptions should not be imitated.

ὥς προτοῦ

*οὐδεὶς ἐπρίατ'* ἀν δρέπανον οὐδὲ κολλήθον may be either  
 ‘since previously, no one used to be buying a sickle  
 even for a farthing,’ or, ‘no one would have been buy-  
 ing one,’ i.e. if it had been for sale.

255. This *double* use of *ἄν* with the imperfect (*potential* and *frequentative*) is closely paralleled by the English ‘*would*,’ which not only implies a condition, but also *indefinite recurrence*; \* as

‘Pleased with my admiration, and the fire  
 His words struck from me, the old man *would* shake  
 His years away,’ &c.—Wordsworth.

256. In Epic *κε* is found both with the present and future indicative; but in Attic Greek, *ἄν* with these tenses is so extremely exceptional, that it must be regarded as due to mere carelessness.

257. *Ἄν* becomes rarer in the New Testament and in later Greek.

258. We have seen that the optative *by itself* has a potential force; and thus we find both

*ποῖ τις φύγοι*; whither can one fly?—Ar. *Plut.* 438;  
 and

*ποῖ τις ἄν φύγοι*;† whither could one fly?—Eur. *Or.* 598.

But when the optative is potential in meaning, it is *generally* accompanied by *ἄν*, as

*τοῦτο γένοιτο* *ἄν* this *might* happen.

Hence it is used to soften the asperity i. of commands; ii. of inferences; and iii. direct assertions; as

i. *χωροῖς ἄν εἰσω* you *might* go in=be so good as to enter.

ii. *οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἄν εἴη αἰδὼς* it seems then that sobriety and modesty *could not* be synonyms.

\* F. Whalley Harper *On the Greek Tenses*.

† In *ποῖ τις φύγῃ*; the subjunctive expresses a sort of hopeless *delibera-*  
*tion*, ‘whither is one to fly?’ N.B. You can say *ποῖ τις φύγῃ*; because this is equivalent to *ποῖ φύγω*; whither *am I* to fly; but you cannot say *ποῖ φύγῃ* without the *τις*.

iii. ὅθλεῖς· ἀπέρρι, οὐκ ἀν διδαξαμην σ' ἔτι you talk nonsense; get away; I couldn't [=will not] teach you any more.

σὺ μὲν κομίζοις ἀν σεαυτὸν ἢ θέλεις you then may convey yourself where you like.—Soph. *Ant.* 444.

N. B. Expressions like the last being *in form* conditional (though *really* polite imperatives), are negatived by *οὐ*, not by *μή*.

259. In negative sentences the omission of *ἀν* with the optative makes the negation stronger, by denying the potentiality absolutely and independently of all conditions, as

τὸ γάρ ἐμφύεις οὔτ' αἴθων ἀλάπηξ οὔτ' ἀρίθροις λέοντες διαλλάξειν τὸ θῆσος neither tawny fox, nor loudly-roaring lions *could* change their inborn nature.—Pind.

*νῶς* *τοῦ*; *τοῖς* *τῷ*; are used with the optative in wishes.

260. \**Ἄν* does not properly go with the subjunctive;\* but it often qualifies *εἰ*, *ὅτι*, *οἷος*, *πρὶν*, *ἔως*, &c., and often coalesces with some other particle, as in *ἴαν*, *ὅταν*, *ἴπειδάν*, &c.; and these combinations *always* take the subjunctive. In such cases therefore *ἄν* does not belong to the verb, but modifies the particle or relative; thus *ὅς* who; *ὅτι* *ἄν* whoever; *ἴαν* where; *ἴαν* *ἄν* wheresoever; *ἔως* when; *ὅταν* whensoever; *πρὶν* ere; *πρὶν* *ἄν* or ever, &c.

*ὅς ποιεῖ* he who does; *ὅς ἄν ποιῇ* whosoever may do.

*οὓς εἶδεν* those whom he saw; *οὐκ ἄν οἴδη* whomsoever he sees.

*ἴαν* where; *ἴαν* *ἄν* wheresoever; as *πατρὶς γάρ ἐστι πᾶσαν* *ἴαν* *ἄν πάρτη τις εὖ* for every land is one's country wheresoever one fares well. (*ἴαν* *ἄν* always=ubique.)

261. We get therefore this rule: Whenever an indefinite sense is not required for *ὅς*, *ὅτις*, *ὅτε*, *ἴτει*, &c. the optative is almost always used; when an indefinite sense is required, they are combined with *ἄν* and followed by the subjunctive.†

\* As Hermann briefly states it, 'you cannot say *λέγῃ* *ἄν*; and in phrases like *ὅς ἄν λέγῃ*, *ὅταν λέγῃ*, *ἴαν λέγῃ*, &c., the particle *modifies*, not the verb but the preceding relative. Not *ἄν* therefore, but its combination with the preceding word, is correctly said to be construed with the subjunctive; for *ὅς ἄν λέγῃ* gives a meaning, and so does *ὅς ἄν* *whoever*, but *ἄν λέγῃ* combines into no meaning at all.' Hence we always find *ὅς ἄν λέγῃ* never *ὅτι λέγῃ* *ἄν*'. The rule for beginners, says Dr. Donaldson, is 'Relativa et particulae relativae cum ἄν subjunctivum exigitur.'

† We have already seen that *ὅς*, *ὅτε*, *ἴτει*, &c., may be joined with the subjunctive without *ἄν* in those *very rare* cases in which it is intended to exclude all notion of any possible condition.

**262.** If however any such combination of a conjunction with *ἄν* is found in the same clause with the optative, the *ἄν* then belongs to the verb and not to the conjunction, as

*ἐσθῆτα δὶ' ἦν ἄν μάλιστα ἡ ἀρά διαλάμποι* dress such as through it her beauty might best shine (*ἄν-διαλάμποι*);

but if it had been *διαλάμπῃ* it would mean through whatever dress (*δὶ' ἦν ἄν*) her beauty may best shine.

So too

*οὐκ-ἔχω-ὄπως ἄν-ἀπιστοίην* I know not how I could-possibly-disbelieve.

N. B. Compare

*ὅσους εἶδεν* as many as he saw (on some past occasion).

*ὅσους ἴδοι* as many as he saw (i.e. 'from time to time')

(the optative being *iterative=happened* to see).

*ὅσους ἄν ἴδη* as many as ever he sees.

**263.** *Ἄν* with the infinitive\* and participle gives them a potential or hypothetic meaning; † as

*Κύρος εἰ ἐβίωσεν ἄριστος ἄν δοκεῖ ἄρχων γενέσθαι* Cyrus, had he lived, *would I think have been* a consummate general (= *οἷμαι ὅτι ἄν ἐγένερο*).

*δυνηθεὶς ἄν αὐτὸς ἔχειν ἀπέδωκεν* though he *might have kept* it, he gave it back (= *ἐδυνήθη ἄν*).

**264.** Practically it is not used with the future infinitive or participle. The few apparent cases in which this occurs are so rare, that they must be due to carelessness.

**265.** Just as

*ταῦτ' ἄν ἐγίγνετο*=these things would be taking place, or *would have been taking place*;

so

*ἔφη ταῦτ' ἄν γίγνεσθαι*=he said that these things *would be*, or *would have been taking place*.

\* In Latin we cannot express the distinction between the aorist and the present; so that we get

*γράφειν ἄν* = *scripturum esse*  
*γεγραφέναι ἄν* = *scripturum fuisse* } = *γράψαι ἄν*.—Clyde.

† In Thuc. iv. 24, we have *τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις τε οὐκ ἄν εἴησι ἐφορμεῖν καὶ τοῦ πορθμοῦ κρατεῖν* 'In that case they thought that it would be impossible for the Athenians to lie at anchor there, and that they themselves would remain masters of the strait,' where the *ἄν* with *εἴησι* implies that *that result* is slightly less probable than the other.

And as

*ταῦτ' ἀντὶ ἐγένετο*=these things *would have taken place*;

so

*ἔφη ταῦτ' ἀντὶ γενέσθαι*=he said that these things would have taken place.

**266.** With the participles we have

*τὰ γιγνόμενα* the things which are taking place; *τὰ ἀντὶ γιγνόμενα* the things which would be (or, *would have been*) taking place.

*τὰ γενόμενα* the things which took place; *τὰ ἀντὶ γενόμενα* the things which would have taken place.

**267.** Demosthenes often uses the phrase

*πολλὰ δὲ ἀντὶ ἔχων εἰπεῖν* though I should have plenty to say, &c.

N. B. i. The verb belonging to *ἀντὶ* is often *omitted*, as in Plato's phrases

*πῶς γάρ ἀντὶ*; *πῶς οὐκ ἀντὶ*;

and in

*τάχ' ἀντὶ, ωσπερ ἀντὶ εἰ.*

*οἱ δὲ οἰκέται πέγκουσιν ἀλλ' οὐκ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ* and the servants are snoring, but they *would not have been* heretofore.  
*φέρε τι δὴτ' ἀντὶ*; come then what would you have done?

ii. On the other hand *ἀντὶ* itself is sometimes omitted where it can be easily understood, and this is the usual way of explaining such phrases as

*πειθοί ἀντὶ εἰ πειθοίς, ἀπειθοίς δὲ σιως ὁbe if thou wouldest obey; perhaps thou wouldest disobey (where however, as we have already seen, § 177, 2, *ἀπειθοίς* may be potential without *δὲ* being understood).*

iii. *ἀντὶ* is sometimes *repeated* with the optative, partly for rhetorical effect,\* and partly to emphasise two words in the same conditional sentence, of which one is often the negative; as

*φθάνοις δὲ ἀντὶ οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῖσδε συγκρύπτων δέμας* you could not possibly be too soon in clothing your person with these arms (i.e. do it with all speed).

\* The first *ἀντὶ* is called by the grammarians *δυνητικὸν* 'effective,' and the second *παραπληρωματικὸν* 'complementary.'

*τῷ γὰρ ἀν καὶ μείζονι*  
*λέξαιμ' ἀν οὐ σοι; for to whom in the world even greater*  
*than thyself could I possibly say it?—Soph. O. R.*  
*772.*

*οὐκ ἀν γενοίμην Ἡρακλῆς ἀν I shouldn't at all like to be*  
*Hercules (Ich mag nicht etwa Hercules werden).*

iv. *ἀν* is sometimes *misplaced*, by hyperbaton, as in

*οὐκ οἴδ' ἀν εἰ πείσαιμι I think it doubtful whether (οὐκ*  
*οἴδ' εἰ haud scio an) I could persuade (πείσαιμι' ἀν).*  
*οὐκ οἴδ' ἄρ' εἰ φθαίης ἀν I'm not sure whether after all*  
*you'd get the start.*

v. *ἀν* as a conjunction means *if==έάν*, *ἢν*, as is often the case in Plato (but not in the poets). It may be distinguished from the particle *ἀν* by its standing first in the sentence, which the particle *ἀν* never does. This usage of *ἀν* closely resembles the obsolete English 'an,' as

*ἄν Θεὸς ἔθέλῃ an God will.*

vi. *ἀν* may sometimes be rendered 'otherwise' (pointing to a suppressed clause), as

*ἐπιστευόμην ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων· οὐ γὰρ ἀν με ἐπεμ-*  
*πον I was trusted by the Lacedæmonians, otherwise*  
*they would not have sent me.*

### THE FINAL CONJUNCTIONS.

**268.** Final Conjunctions are those which express an end or purpose, viz. *ώς*, *ὅπως*, *ἵνα*, and in Epic *ὅφρα*.

We have already seen that after primary tenses they regularly take the subjunctive (where we use *may*), and after historical tenses the optative (*might*).

**269.** When this rule is violated, it is from a desire to be graphic (*πρὸ ὁμάτων ποιεῖν*); as in the following sentence of Lysias (*de Cæde Eratosth. ix. 2*):

*ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ παιδίον ἐγένετο ήμῖν, η μήτηρ αὐτὸ ἐθῆλαζεν,*  
*ίγα δὲ μῆ, ὅπότε λούεσθαι δέοι, κινδυνεύῃ κατὰ τῆς*  
*κλίμακος καταβαίνουσα, ἐγὼ μὲν ἄνω διρτώμην, αἱ δὲ*  
*γυναῖκες κάτω . . . μετά δὲ τὸ δεῖπνον τὸ παιδίον ἐβόα*  
*καὶ ἐδυσκόλαινεν ὑπὸ τῆς θεραπαίνης ἐπίτηδες λυπούμε-*  
*νον ἵνα ταῦτα ποιῇ . . . but when our boy was born,*

the mother used to nurse it. But that she *may* not run a risk by descending down the stairs whenever it wanted washing, I used to live upstairs, and the women below. And after dinner the child used to cry and fret, being pinched on purpose by the nurse that he *may be doing so*, &c.

It will here be seen at once that κινδυνεύοι ‘*might* run no risk,’ and το·οι *might* do so, would have been the regular constructions; and that the subjunctives are only dramatically substituted for them, to represent the events as going on before the hearer’s eyes.

**270.** On similar principles ὅπως is constantly joined with the future indicative;\* as

δέδοιχ’ ὅπως μοι μὴ λίπη φανεῖ σοφή! I fear that you will seem too wise to me (cf. the vulgar English ‘I fear as how’).

καὶ τὸ μὲν καλῶς ἔχον  
ὅπως χρονίζον εἴ μενεῖ βουλευτέον (Æsch. *Ag.* 846) and  
we must take measures whereby all which now is  
well, shall long continue so.

ἀλλ’ ὅπως μὴ ’ν τοῖς τριβώσιν ἐγκάθηνται που λίθοι see  
that there are not stones lying anywhere in your cloaks.  
—Ar. *Ach.* 343.

**271.** ὅπως with the future constantly means ‘see that,’ ‘take care that,’ ‘I fear that,’ &c.

ὅπως μὴ σαντὸν οἰκτεῖς ποτέ take care that you will not  
have some day to pity yourself.—Æsch. *P.* V. 68.

νῦν οὖν ὅπως σώσεις μ’ ἐπεὶ καπώλεσας now then see that  
you save me, since you too destroyed me.—Ar. *Nub.*  
1177.

**272.** With the past tenses of the indicative ὡς, ὅπως, ἵνα imply that something *has not* occurred,—an impossible or unfulfilled result. It is often rendered ‘*in which case*,’ but such a rendering is unnecessary, and in the third of the following examples would have required οὐποτε not μήποτε.

οὐκοῦν ἐχρῆν σε Πηγάσου ζεῦξαι πτερόν,  
ὅπως ἐφαίνου τοῖς θεοῖς τραγικώτερος.—Ar. *Pax*, 135.

\* This is less frequently the case with ἵνα; and when it is, ἵνα may always have its quasi-local meaning of *where*=*in which case*.

Ought you not to have, &c., that you might have appeared to the gods more tragic-looking?

*εἰ τῆς ἀκονούσης ἔτ' ἦν  
πηγῆς δὶ’ ὄτων φραγμός, οὐκ ἀν ἐσχόμην  
τὸ μὴ ποκλεῖσα τούμὸν ἀθλιων δέμας,  
ἴν’ ἦν τυφλός τε καὶ κλύνων μηδέν.*—Soph. *O. T.* 1386.

'If there had been any further means of stopping the fount of hearing through the ears, I would not have abstained from closing up my wretched frame, that I might have been both blind and deaf.'

*τί μ' οὐ λαβὼν  
ἐκτεινας εἰθύνε, ὡς ἔδειξα μήποτε  
ἔμαυτὸν ἀνθρώπουσιν ἐνθεν ἦν γεγώς.*

Why didst thou not take, and slay me at once, that I might ne'er have shown to men whence I was sprung.

273. We may thus briefly sum up the uses of *ὡς*, *ὅπως*, *ἴρα*:

I. *ὡς*=as; [*ὡς*=thus; except when *ὡς* follows the word which it compares, as *πατὴρ ὡς* like a father].

*ὡς* is the adverb of *ὅς ἢ ὅ*; when *ὡς*=as, *ὡς ἀν* means 'in whatever way.'

- a. It is used with superlatives, as  
*ὡς τάχιστα quam celerrime* as quickly as possible.
- b. Like the Latin *ut*, *ὡς* sometimes means *when*.
- c. It is sometimes used declaratively for *ὅτι quod* when we intend to express an *assertion* rather than a *fact*.
- d. *ὡς* as a final conjunction=*in order that*; *ὡς ἀν\** *in order that perhaps*; the former used, as we have seen, when the result is certain; the latter when less certain (but only in poetry; *ὡς ἀν* is never used of a purpose in Attic prose).

II. a. *ὅπως how* stands to *πῶς* in the same relation as *ὅστις* to *τις*, &c., as has been already explained.

N. καὶ *πῶς*; Δ. *ὅπως*; N. How then? D. *How quotha?*  
*πῶς*; how? *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως* I don't know how.

\* In one or two instances only, *ὅς ἀν* appears to mean 'so long as'; e.g. Soph. *Aj.* 1096,

*τοῦ δὲ σοῦ ψέφου*

*οὐκ ἀν στραφεῖην ὡς ἀν ἢσ τοῖς περ εἰ* but I will not swerve because of thy clamour, *so long as* thou art what thou art. (Comp. Eur. *Ion*, 77, *Hec.* 330.)

When  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ =how,  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma\ \grave{\alpha}\nu$ =howsoever; as

$\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\omega\varsigma\ a\bar{n}\tau\bar{\rho}\ t\acute{e}\zeta\epsilon\iota\ a\iota\ \delta\iota\alpha\lambda\acute{e}\gamma\epsilon\sigma\theta\iota\ \delta\pi\omega\varsigma\ \beta\bar{o}\bar{u}\bar{l}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{a}\iota\ k\bar{a}\iota\ s\bar{o}\iota$   
 $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma\ \grave{\alpha}\nu\ a\bar{n}\ s\bar{u}\ \beta\bar{o}\bar{u}\bar{l}\bar{p}\bar{r}$  claiming the right for himself to  
discourse how he likes, and for you too however *you*  
like.—Plat. *Prot.* 836 B.

b. Like the English *how*,  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  comes to mean *that*, and in many sentences either translation may be used.\*

c. When  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$ =in order that;  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma\ \grave{\alpha}\nu$ =in order that perhaps.

III. a.  $\acute{i}v\alpha$ =*where*; as

$o\bar{n}\chi\ \dot{\delta}\bar{o}\bar{q}\bar{\varsigma}\ i\bar{n}'\ e\bar{l}\ k\bar{a}\kappa\bar{o}\bar{v}$ ; see you not in what evil plight (lit.  
*where* of evil) you are?

$\acute{i}v\alpha\ \grave{\alpha}\nu$ = wheresoever (*sicubi, ubicunque*).—Soph. *Œd. Col.* 189.

b. As a final conjunction,  $\acute{i}v\alpha$ =*whereby*, i.e. in order that.

But in *this* meaning it differs from  $\omega\varsigma$ ,  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  in *two respects*:

i. It is never combined with  $\grave{\alpha}\nu$ .

ii. It is never found with the future indicative.

### THE NEGATIVES.

274. The Greek language has two classes of negatives,  $o\bar{v}$  and its compounds  $o\bar{v}\delta\bar{e}\iota$ ,  $o\bar{v}\tau\bar{e}$ ,  $o\bar{v}\delta\bar{e}\iota\bar{c}$ ,  $o\bar{v}\delta\bar{a}\mu\bar{w}\varsigma$ , &c.;  $\mu\bar{n}\dag$  with its compounds  $\mu\bar{n}\delta\bar{e}\iota$ ,  $\mu\bar{n}\tau\bar{e}$ ,  $\mu\bar{n}\delta\bar{e}\iota\bar{c}$ ,  $\mu\bar{n}\delta\bar{a}\mu\bar{w}\varsigma$ , &c. The differences between them are simple and definite.

275. The main distinctions between  $o\bar{v}$  and  $\mu\bar{n}$  are as follows: ‘ $o\bar{v}$  negat,  $\mu\bar{n}$  vetat;  $o\bar{v}$  negat *rem*,  $\mu\bar{n}$  *conceptionem quoque rei*.—Herm. In fact, as Madvig observes,  $o\bar{v}$  is always used when some *specific* rule does not require the use of  $\mu\bar{n}$ .

\* ‘How’ and ‘that’ are interchanged throughout the whole of Coleridge’s beautiful poem of Genevieve; and Johnson quotes as an instance of this sense the following sentence, ‘Thick clouds put us in some hope of land, knowing *how* that part of the South Sea was utterly unknown,’ &c.—Bacon, [Harper, p. 117.]

† Naturally the subjective negation  $\mu\bar{n}$  is too refined and luxurious for some dialects of Modern Greek; accordingly in Tzaonian we find only the negatives  $\grave{\delta}\bar{e}\nu$  (=  $o\bar{v}\delta\bar{e}\nu$ ), and  $\grave{\delta}$  (=  $o\bar{v}$ ). See Suidas, s.v. *φιλόξενος*; Athen. *Deipnos.* xi. v. p. 466; Farrar, *Chapters on Language*, p. 91.

i. *οὐ* denies, as

*οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα* it is not so.

*μὴ* forbids, as

*μὴ κλέπτε* do not steal.

ii. *οὐ* is objective and categorical, i.e. it negatives *facts* and *certainities*.

*μὴ* is subjective and hypothetical, i.e. it negatives *conceptions*, thoughts, &c.

iii. *οὐ* is the negation of the judgment; *μὴ* of wishes and suppositions.

*οὐ . . .*; expects the answer Yes; as *ἄρα οὐ=nonne?* *οὐ μενεῖς;* *quin manes?* Won't you stop? = stop!

*μὴ . . .*; expects the answer No; *ἄρα μὴ=μῶν;* (*μὴ οὖν*) = *num?* *μὴ τέθυηκεν ὁ πατήρ;* I hope my father is not dead, *num mortuus est pater?*

### Mή.\*

276. *Mή* is used

i. With the hypothetical participle, as

*μὴ δρῶν* if he does not do it.

ii. After *εἰ*, *ἐάν*, *ἐπειδάν*, *ὅταν*, as

*εἰ μὴ λέγεις unless you say.*

iii. After final particles, *ἴνα*, *ὅπως*, &c., as

*παρακάλει ἵατρόν,* *ὅπως μὴ ἀποθάνῃ* summon a physician that he may not die.

iv. After all hypothetical, indefinite, or causal relatives, *ὅτε*, *ἄν*, *ὅποιος ἄν*, &c.

v. In all wishes, as

*μὴ γένοιτο* God forbid!

vi. In all prohibitions, as

*μὴ κλέψῃς τοῦτο* do not steal this.

*Μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω* let no one untrained in geometry enter.

vii. With the hortative and deliberative subjunctive, as

*μὴ γράφωμεν* let us not write.

*μὴ ἀποκρίνωμαι;* am I not to answer you?

---

\* In Hebrew **לֹא** *al* = *μὴ*, **לֹא** *lo* = *οὐ*.

viii. With the infinitive\* (except after verbs *declarandi* et *sentiendi*, because then the infinitive=the indicative with *ōtē*); as

*σοὶ τὸ μὴ σιγῆσαι λοιπὸν ἦν* *it remained for you not to be silent.*

ix. With questions which expect the answer *no*; as

*μὴ ἀρχιτέκτων βούλει γενέσθαι* *you don't want to become an architect, do you?*

Hence *μῶν* ; = *μὴ οὖν* ; = *num?*

It will be seen at once that every one of these uses of *μὴ* springs from its character as a subjective or hypothetical negative.

277. An apparently superfluous *μὴ* is found after verbs of fearing,† doubting, denying, hindering, &c., as

*φοβοῦμαι μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἡμαρτήκαμεν* I fear we have missed both..

*ἡγαντιαθην αὐτῷ μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους* J'empêchai qu'il ne fit rien contre les lois.

*οὐκ ἀν ἔξαρνος γένοιο μὴ οὐκ ἐμὸς νιὸς εἰναι το ne nieras pas que tu ne sois mon fils.*

*μὴ λαβεῖν ἔξαρνον μενος* denying that he received them.

\* *Ὥστε* when followed by the indicative requires *oīō*, when by the infinitive *μή*. Thus

<i>οὕτως ἄφρων ἦν ὤστε</i>	<i>Adeo stultus fuit ut</i>	<i>he was so foolish that</i>
<i>οὐκ ἡβούλετο</i>	<i>noluerit,</i>	<i>he did not wish</i>
(expressing the fact).		

<i>οὕτως ἄφρων ἦν ὤστε</i>	<i>Adeo stultus fuit ut</i>	<i>he was so foolish as</i>
<i>μὴ βούλεσθαι</i>	<i>nollet,</i>	<i>not to wish</i>
(expressing the natural consequence).		

The former construction is the more oratorical and picturesque.

Sometimes, when the negative belongs to a single word, *oīō* with the infinitive follows *Ὥστε*, and sometimes by an apparent irregularity as in Soph. *El.* 780. See Shilleto on *Dem. de F. Leg. App. c.*

† *φοβοῦμαι μὴ* = *forsitan*, *οὐκ οἴδει* = *haud scio an*, which signifies less probability. Notice the distinction between the following,

*δέδοικα μὴ ποιῆσις* vereor ne facias, I fear that you may be doing it.

— *ποιήσης* — feceris, I fear that you did it.

— *ποιήσεις* — facturus sis, I fear that you will do it.

But for *δέδοικα μὴ ποιεῖσις*, *ἐποίεισις*, *ἐποιήσας*, *πενοτηκας* I fear you are, were doing, did, or have done it (where no *doubt* is expressed, and the *δέδοικα* is merely due to courtesy), there is no exact Latin equivalent, since in Latin the subjunctive *must* be used. See Shilleto, *Démosth. de F. Leg. App. A.*

278. In all these instances the  $\mu\eta$  expresses the negative effect of the verb; e.g.

$\eta\mu\nu\bar{\eta}\nu\tau o\ \mu\eta\ \pi\epsilon\pi\tau\omega\kappa\epsilon\nu\tau\alpha i$  they made a denial to the effect that 'they had not fallen';

after verbs of fearing and considering  $\mu\eta=lest$ , as

$\delta\acute{e}\delta\omega\kappa\alpha\ \mu\eta\ \theta\acute{a}\nu\gamma$  vereor ne moriatur, I fear lest he die, i.e. that he will die.

This pleonastic negative is common in modern languages, e.g.

In English :

'If any of you know . . . just *impediment* why these two should *not* be joined together.'—Prayer-book.

'Can any man *forbid* water that these should *not* be baptised . . . ?'—Acts x. 47.

In French :

Je crains que sa maladie *ne soit mortelle*, I fear his disease *is fatal*.

In Italian :

Guardati di *non credere alle favole*, be on your guard against believing all stories.

In Spanish :

Temía *no entrar*, I feared he might come in.

Por poco *no me caigo*, haud multum abfuit *quín caderem*.

### Ov.

279. *ov* is the proper negation of the *indicative*, and of all forms that *can be directly resolved* into the indicative; e.g. in Homer of the subjunctive, where it scarcely differs from a future (see § 176); of the optative in oratio obliqua (after  $\delta\tau\iota$  and  $\omega\zeta$ ), where it merely represents the indicative of the oratio recta; and of the optative with  $\ddot{\alpha}\nu$ , which is merely a milder future or imperative.

280. *ov* has a property, not possessed by  $\mu\eta$ , of *coalescing* with single words, like the privative *a*; as

$\tau\dot{\alpha}\ \sigma\bar{\nu}\ \kappa\alpha\lambda\dot{\alpha}\ in\ honesta$ ;  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\chi\ \eta\kappa\omega\tau a$  *decidedly*;  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\ \phi\eta\mu\ nego$ ;  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\chi\ \bar{\iota}\pi\iota\sigma\chi\nu\bar{\eta}\mu\tau a$  I refuse;  $\sigma\bar{\nu}\ \sigma\bar{\tau}\epsilon\gamma\varphi\omega$  I hate.

Hence such sentences as

*εἰ τοὺς θαυμόντας οὐκ ἤρξεθάπτειν* if you prevent the burial of the dead,

or

*εἰ δέ τοι οὐ δώσει* if he shall refuse it to you,

are no violations of the rule that *μή* should be used after conditionals, because *οὐκ εἴω*=veto, *οὐ δώσω*=recusabo; and so of all similar cases. Such expressions are due to the figure of speech called *Litotes*, by which less is *said* than is *meant*; e.g.

'Shall I praise you for these things? I praise you not.'  
=I do anything but praise you.\*

281. The same thing sometimes occurs where *εἰ*=*ὅτι* after verbs of disapprobation, &c., an indirect form due to Attic politeness; as

*θαυμάζω εἰ ταῦτα οὐ ποιεῖς* I wonder that you do not act thus;

but here *μή* is more usual [see Jelf, 804, 8].

282. Similarly verbs *declarandi et sentiendi* may be followed by *οὐ* with the *infinitive*, as

*δημολογῶ οὐ καὶ Μέλητον καὶ Ἀνυτον εἴραι ρήτωρ* I confess that I am not an orator after the fashion of Meletus and Anytus.

283. *οὐ* is redundant after *ἢ* than generally in negative sentences, as

*πόλιν δῆμην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους* (Thuc. iii. 36) to destroy a whole city rather than the guilty;

so in French:

On méprise ceux qui parlent autrement qu'ils ne pensent.  
Il n'écrit mieux cette année-ci qu'il ne faisait l'année passée.—Jelf, § 749, 3.

284. A few contrasted and mixed instances of *οὐ* and *μή* will illustrate the principles here laid down, which are sufficient to meet every case which occurs in good Greek.

*εἰ μή ταῦτά ἔστι, οὐδὲ τάδε* (Plat. *Phæd.* 76, ε) if that is not true, neither is this.

*μή θνήσχ' ὑπὲρ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός, οὐδὲ ἔγὼ πρὸ σοῦ* (Eur. *Alc.* 690) die not on my behalf, nor (will I die) for thee.

---

\* This is a common idiom in Hebrew with נַי—'anything but.' See Hos. i. 9; Ps. i. 4.

ἐγὼ δὲ ὅπως σὺ μὴ λέγεις ὥρθῶς τάξε  
οὐκ ἀν δυναίμην μήτ' ἐπισταίμην λέγειν (Soph. *Ant.* 682)  
'but I could not say, and may I never know how to say,  
that you are not right in what you say.'

[μὴ λέγεις because it follows the indefinite relative ὅπως; οὐκ  
ἀν δυναίμην because ἀν δυναίμην is a mild future; μήτ' ἐπισταί-  
μην because this is a wish.]

ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν οὐ κρίνεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ πιστεύων ηδη  
κέκριται, θτὶ μὴ πεπίστευκει κ.τ.λ. (John iii. 18) he that  
believeth on him is not condemned, but if any one  
believeth not he has been condemned already, because  
he hath not believed, &c.

[οὐ κρίνεται is a fact; ὁ μὴ πιστεύων is an hypothesis—if any  
one does not; θτὶ μὴ because this depends on the former  
hypothesis.]

ἔξεστι κῆγον δοῦναι ή οὐ; δῶμεν ή μὴ δῶμεν; (Mark xii.  
14) is it lawful to give tribute, or (is it) not? [direct  
question with οὐ], are we to give, or are we not to  
give? [deliberative subjunctive with μὴ].

οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ καλοῖς βουλεύμασιν  
οὐδὲ ἐλπίς.—Soph. *Tr.* 727.

There is not even hope in any plans if they be not  
honourable.

ὁ οὐ πιστεύων is *qui non credit.*  
ὁ μὴ πιστεύων *si quis non credit.*

ὁ ἀληθῆς τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς οὐκ ὄντα λέγει he who is true re-  
presents whatever things are not [μὴ an indefinite con-  
ception] as not-being (or as non-entities).

ἡ οὐκ ἐμπειρία the actual want of experience.  
ἡ μὴ ἐμπειρία want of experience if, or wherever it may  
exist.

τὸ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν that which is bad; τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν whatever  
may not be good.

ὅς οὐ ποιεῖ ταῦτα qui non facit hæc.  
ὅς μὴ ποιεῖ ταῦτα qui hæc non faciat, or si quis, &c.  
ἃ οὐκ οἶδα certain things which I do not know; ἃ μὴ  
οἶδα whatever things I may not happen to know.  
προσπασσαλεύσω . . . ιν' οὔτε φωνὴν οὔτε του μορφὴν βροτοῦ  
οὕψει.—Æsch. *Prom.* 20.

I will nail thee to a spot where thou shalt never see, &c.  
(of a *definite* place).

*μέλλουσι γάρ σ' εἰ τῶνδε μὴ λήξεις γόων  
ἐνταῦθα πέμψειν ἔνθα μὴ ποθ' ἡλίου  
φάος προσόψει.*—Soph. *El.* 379.

For they are about to send thee, unless thou wilt cease from these complaints, to some (unknown) region where thou shalt never gaze on the sun's light.

*οὐροι φίλαι τὰ μὴ φίλαι, ὡς κόραι* (Eur. *Troad.* 468) truly things are not acts of friendship, *if they be not* pleasant, maidens.

*ἔξεστι γάρ μοι μὴ λέγειν ἀ μὴ τελῶ* (Æsch. *Eum.* 859)  
for it rests with me not to mention *anything which I shall not carry out.*

*ἀ μὴ φρονῶ γάρ οὐποτ' ἀξιῶ λέγειν* I never think fit to speak *anything which I do not think* (*ἀ οὐ φρονῶ* would be any *definite* things).

### 285. The following instances should be specially noticed:

*οὐ μενεῖς*; will you not stay? = stay.

*οὐκ ᾴω*; nonne ibo? am I not to go? [subj. = future indic.]

*μὴ κλέψεις* (rare, but\* admissible) do not steal.

*μὴ κλέψῃς* do not steal.

Hence since *οὐ* with the future or subjunctive *commands*,

and *μὴ* with the future or subjunctive *forbids*,

we frequently have both combined in the same sentence, as

*οὐ σῆγα; μηδὲν τῶν δέρεις κατὰ πτόλιν;* Silence! mention none of these things throughout the city.—Æsch. *Sept. c. Theb.* 250.

But more generally the interrogation is placed at the end of the sentence, and the *οὐ* is *understood before the following μὴ* in a manner which will be explained hereafter.

\*      *λέξεις δὲ μηδὲν τῶν ἐμοὶ δεδογμένων.*—Eur. *Med.* 822.  
*καὶ τὰμδ τεύχη μὴν ἀγωνάρχαι τινὲς*  
*θῆσουσαν Ἀχαιούς.*—Soph. *Aj.* 572. Cf. *Ant.* 84.

Elmsley's attempt to change as many of such instances as possible into subjunctives, was one of those premature instances of *a priori* reasoning which have done so much to injure scholarship.

*οὐ στήγ' ἀνέξει, μηδὲ δειλίαν ἀρεῖς;* Keep silent, and assume not cowardice!—Soph. *Aj.* 75.

*οὐχὶ συγκλείσεις στόμα,  
καὶ μὴ μεθήσεις αὐθὶς αἰσχίστους λόγους;*  
close thy mouth, and do not again utter most disgraceful words!—Eur. *Hipp.* 498.

**286.** Two negatives only destroy each other when they belong to *different predicates*, as

*οὐδεὶς δοτις οὐ γελάσεται* there is *no one who will not laugh*, i.e. every one will;

otherwise they only *strengthen* the negation. In fact it may be laid down as a rule that *all men have a tendency to strengthen negation by additional words*.†

*μήποτ' ἀσεβὲς μηδὲν μηδὲ ἀνόσιον μήτε ποιήσῃτε μήτε βουλεύεσσητε* neither do, nor plan anything either impious or unholy.—Xen. *Cyr.* VIII. vii. 22.

*οὐ οὐκ ἦν οὐδέτω οὐδεὶς κείμενος* wherein never man had yet been laid.—Luke xxiii. 52.

*ἀκούει δ' οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδένος* no one obeys any one in anything.

**287.** Old German and Old English *both* agreed with Greek in this idiom, and have only lost it from the influence of Latin; ‡ thus we find in Chaucer—

\* Of the two very difficult lines—

*ἔγώ δ' οὐ μή ποτε*

*τέλμ' ἐν ἀν εἴπω μη τὰ σ' ἐκφήνω κακά,* Soph. *O. T.* 329,

one can only say ‘Quot viri tot sententiae.’ Donaldson supposes that *μή* is *repeated* before the verb, because the *οὐ μή* is separated from it. It would then mean ‘Never will I, for the sake of uttering my own predictions, never will I reveal thy woes.’—*New Crat.* p. 587.

† ‘Not nohow,’ said the landlord, thinking that where negatives were good, the more you heard of them the better.—*Felix Holt*, ii. 198. Whatever may be said of the genius of the English language, yet no one could have misunderstood the query of the London citizen, ‘Has nobody seen nothing of never a hat nowhere not their own?’ The addition of words like *γρῦ* in Greek, *hilum* in Latin (*ne hilum, nihil*), *pas* and *point* in French, *jamas* and *nada* in Spanish, &c., is due to the same tendency.

Two negatives are often found in Hebrew also (1 K. x. 21; Zeph. ii. 2; Is. v. 9, ‘without no inhabitant,’ &c.). So we have *οὐδὲ πολλοῦ δει minime gentium, far from it*, after *negatives*.

‡ In Latin however the rule is *sometimes* broken; e.g. *Nulla ne exustas habitant animalia terras*.—Tib. IV. i. 164. *Absenti nemo ne*

'He never yet no vilanie ne sayde  
 In all his life unto no manner wighte.'  
 'His horse was good, but he ne was not gaie.'  
 'There ne was none him like,' &c.

And even in Queen Elizabeth's time the idiom prevailed, for we find her writing to King James,

'If I had meant it, I would never lay it on others' shoulders, no more will I not damnify myself that thought it not.'

And, in the same letter—

'but as not to disguise fits not the mind of a king.'

The latter instance is illogical though the meaning is clear; it shows how prevalent was the use of the double negative.

Hence Dr. Clyde correctly observes that 'I don't know nothing' is simply the relic of a *once classical* idiom; and this is true, it may be added, of many vulgarisms and colloquial forms of speech. They are frequently relics of the old infantine pleonastic condition of all languages at their commencement.

**288.** The first of two negatives is sometimes omitted; as  
 Πάρις οὐτε πόλις *neither Paris nor the city*.—Æsch. *Ag.*  
 514.

λέγοντα μηδὲ δρῶσα.—Eur. *Hec.* 374.

As in Milton—

'Fearing God *nor* man;

and in Carew—

'Give Lucinda pearl *nor* stone ;'  
 'Gums *nor* spice bring from the East ;'

nocuisse velit (= ne quis).—Prop. II. xix. 32. Cf. Luc. II. xix. 32, &c. The Romance languages have not imitated the pedantic purism of Latin in this matter. Thus in Latin nonnullus = someone, non nemo = somebody; but in Italian 'Non dice nulla,' 'non v'è niente,' are negatives. So in Provençal, 'Nuds hom non pot ben chantar sens amar' is 'no man can sing well without loving.'—Sir G. C. Lewis, *Romance Languages*, p. 238. So in Spanish *no lo sabe nadie* nobody knows it; *no lo he visto jamas* I have never seen it. In fact in Latin the colloquial instinct was often too strong for grammatical nicety. Thus in Plautus, *Mil. Glor.* v. 18, we find 'Jura te non nocitum esse homini de hac re nemini,' and even Cicero has (*Verr.* ii. 57) 'Non mihi prætermittendum videtur ne illud quidem genus,' &c. See Jani, *A. P.* p. 236.

and in Gifford—

‘Pallas nor Licinus had my estate.’

So too in Latin—

‘Quā fornace graves, quā non incude catenæ?’—Juv.

## Οὐ μή.

**289.** i. *οὐ μή* with the 2nd person of the future, is a *strong prohibition*; as

*οὐ μή ποιήσεις*; do not do it!

ii. *οὐ μή* with the aorist subjunctive and with other persons of the future, is a *strong negation*; as

*οὐ μή ποιήσῃς* you certainly shall not do it.

Instances of i. are

*οὐ μή φλυαρήσεις ἔχων*; don't keep playing the fool.—  
Ar. *Ran.* 202.

*οὐ μή προσοίσεις χείρα, βακχεύσεις δ' ιών,*  
*μηδὲ ἔξομόρξει μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί*;—Eur. *Bacch.* 343.

Put not forth thy hand, but go play the bacchanal, and  
wipe not off thy folly on me. [The *οὐ* is understood  
both before *βακχεύσεις* and before *μηδὲ ἔξομόρξει*.]

*οὐ μή προσοίσεις χείρα, μηδὲ ἄψει πέπλων*; put not forth  
thy hand, nor grasp my robes!—Id. *Hipp.* 601.

**290.** These are usually explained by the interrogative;  
thus

*οὐ μή προσοίσεις*; = will you not not-put-forth?

= will-you-not abstain-from-putting-  
forth?

= put not forth!

Undoubtedly this explanation is open to the serious objection that it attributes to *μή* that power of *coalescing with*, and so *reversing*, the meaning of a word which properly belongs to *οὐ* only. It is far better to explain the idiom thus:

*οὐ ποιήσεις*;—*μή*; i.e. you will not do it—will you?  
= do not do it! \*

---

\* I have never met with any *formal* explanation of this idiom, which satisfied me.

Instances of ii. are

*οὐ σοι μὴ μεθέψομαι ποτε* I will *never* follow after thee.—*Soph. El.* 1052.

*οὐ τι μὴ ληφθῶ δόλῳ* I shall certainly not be caught by craft.—*Aesch. Sept.* 38.

*ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ οἶστ' ἡς* but you certainly will not be able.—*Plat. Rep.* 341 c.

**291.** These are usually explained by the ellipse of *δέος* or *δευτόν* ('There is *no fear lest*, &c.'), which are often expressed, as in Ar. *Eccles.* 646 :

*οὐχὶ δέος μή σε φιλήσῃ* there's no *fear of his kissing you*.  
So in Latin :

'Non *metus officio ne se certasse priorem Pœniteat.*'—*AEn.* i. 548.

This is a simple explanation, and is certainly admissible. It may however be doubted whether these idioms, arising from the union of an objective and subjective negative, do not owe their prevalence to that accumulation of negative words towards which there is an instinctive tendency in all languages.

### Mὴ οὐ.

**292.** After negatives, verbs expressive of negative notions (fear, doubt, shame, disapprobation, &c.), and in indirect questions, *μὴ οὐ = ne non*, or *ut*, is used.\* The *μὴ* really belongs to the previous words, and expresses that their general result and effect is negative.

*δέδοικα-μὴ οὐκ ἀποθάνῃ* I fear he will *not* die, vereor ut moriatur.

\* Verbs of fearing in Attic poetry are also followed by *δπως = vereor ut*, I fear that *not*; and *δπως μῇ = vereor ne*, I fear *that*. *δέδοικα δπως ξλθῃ* I fear that he will not come; *δέδοικα δπως μῇ ξλθῃ* I fear that he will come; as

*δέδοικ' δπως*

*μὴ 'κ τῆς σιωπῆς τῆσδε ἀναρρήσει κακό.*—*Soph. O. R.* 1074. 'I fear that calamities *will* burst forth from this silence.' [Literally, 'I fear how lest,' &c.] Here again the French idiom resembles the Greek, 'Je crains que vous *ne m'abandonniez*' I fear you will abandon me; 'Je crains qu'elle soit heureuse' I fear that she is *not* happy. (Clyde, p. 185.)

δέδοικα-μή οὐκ ἔλθῃ I fear that he will not come, vereor ut veniat.

ἄθρει μή οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν consider whether this be not 'the good.'

**293.** *Mὴ οὐ* with the infinitive = *quominus*, after negatives, or quasi-negatives, e. g.

οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτο nihil impedit *quominus* id verum sit, nothing hinders this from being true.

τί ἐμποδὼν μὴ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν ἔμετ; quid impedit *quominus* moriar? what prevents me from dying?

μὴ παρῆς τὸ μὴ οὐ φράσαι do not omit saying it.

οὐδὲν ἐλλείψω τὸ μὴ οὐ  
πᾶσαν πυθέσθαι τῶν ἀλήθειαν πέρι

nihil prætermittam quin verum cognoscam, I will leave no stone unturned to discover the whole truth respecting these matters.—Soph. *Tr.* 88.

τείσομαι γὰρ οὐ  
τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ὥστε μὴ οὐ θανεῖν καλῶς  
for I shall suffer no penalty so great as to prevent my dying nobly.—Soph. *Ant.* 96.

**294.** It is also used with the infinitive after *δεινόν*, *αἰσχρόν*, *αἰσχύνη ἴστι*, and after negative notions, where *quin* might be used in Latin; as

οὐχ οἵος τε εἰμὶ μὴ οὐ λέγειν non possum *quin* dicam, I cannot but say.

*μὴ οὐ* with the participle follows negative expressions, and means *unless*; as

δυσάλγητος γὰρ ἀν  
εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικείρων ἔδραν

I should be ruthless [a negative notion] if I did not pity such a suppliant posture.—Soph. *O. T.* 12.

αἱ τε πόλεις . . . χαλεπαὶ λαβεῖν . . . μὴ οὐ χρόνῳ the cities are *difficult* (=not easy) to take except by time.  
—Dem. *de F. Leg.* § 135.

## VARIOUS NEGATIVE PHRASES.

295. Distinguish between *οὐπω*, *μήπω* nondum, *not yet*.  
*οὐκέτι*, *μηκέτι* non amplius, *no longer*.  
*οὐτε* = *ne*, *οὐδὲ* = *ne quidem*.

*οὐχ ὅτι* = *not only*.

*μη ὅτι* = *nendum, ne dicam, not to mention.*\*

These two phrases however, like *οὐχ δπως*, *οὐχ ολον*, often mean '*not only not*;' as

*μη δπως ὥρχεισθαι ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὥρθοῦσθαι ἐδύνασθε* you were  
*not only unable to dance, but even to stand upright;*

so too *οὐχ ολον*, as

*οὐχ ολον ὠφελεῖν δύναιτ' ἄν, ἀλλὰ μήδ' αὐτὴν σώζειν* not  
*only unable to assist, but even to save herself.*

i. *οὐκ ἔσθ' δπως* = *nullo modo*.

*οὐκ ἔσθ' δπως λέξαιμι τὰ ψευδῆ καλὰ* I could not possibly  
*call lies honourable.*—*Æsch. Ag.* 620.

ii. *οὐκ ἔσθ' δπως οὐ non fieri potest quin*, it cannot be but  
*that.*—*Soph. El.* 1479; *Ax. Eq.* 426.

iii. *δσον οὐ, μόνον οὐ all but, tantum non.*

*δσον οὐκ ηδη ἀπῆλθεν* he has only just gone, *il ne fait  
 que de partir.*

iv. *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ 'not but what,' 'however.'*

*οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἐπέμεινεν δ Κύρος μόλις πως* not but what  
*with some difficulty Cyrus kept his seat.*

v. *μὴ πολλάκις* in Plato means '*lest perchance*'

vi. *οὐτε μέγια οὐτε μικρὸν nothing whatever* (*cf. 1 Kings xxxii.*  
*21, fight neither with small nor great, &c.*).

vii. *οὐδὲν χείρον* '*it is just as well to.*'

*οὐδὲν δὲ χείρον ὑπομνησθῆναι καὶ Εὐπόλιδος* one may  
*just as well mention Eupolis also.*

viii. *οὐδὲν οἶον there is nothing like* (doing so and so); as  
*οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶον ἀκόνειν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου car il n'y a rien  
 de tel que d'entendre la loi même.*

---

\* As *κχρηστον καὶ γυναιξί*, *μη δτι ἀνδροσι* useless even to women, not  
 to mention (or *much less*) men; so in Italian 'i fortissimi uomini *non*  
*che le tenere donne*' the bravest men, *not to mention* delicate ladies, &c.  
 Clyde, p. 175.

## PARTICLES.

*Μὴ νεμέσα βανοῖσι, χάρις βανοῖσιν ὀπηδεῖ.*

**296.** A perfect knowledge of the particles in which Greek abounds can only be obtained by extensive reading.\* The manner in which, especially in Homer, ‘they sustain and articulate the pulses of emotion’ is in itself a fruitful and valuable study. By them alone we can perceive that Greek was the language of a witty, refined, intellectual, sensitive, and passionate people. It would be impossible in any book to *tabulate* the delicate shades of meaning, the subtle intricate touches of irony or pathos, the indescribable grace and power which the particles lend to many of the grandest passages in ancient literature. Indeed these can often be only felt at all by a scholarlike appreciation of the entire context, and of the circumstances which dictated the particular expression; so that in very many instances, not in Greek only but in German, and in *most* languages to a greater or less degree, the force of the particles cannot be accurately transferred into a foreign version. In short they are often untranslatable, and can only be approximately represented by *some look, gesture, emphasis, or tone of the voice*. Thus *μὲν* and *δέ*, two of the commonest Greek particles, correspond to the English ‘on the one hand,’ ‘on the other hand;’ but to substitute these long and heavy periphrases† for them in all cases would be utterly unidiomatic, and would not in any way represent their force and meaning in Greek.

It would be out of the question to attempt here anything approaching to a complete treatment of the conjunctions, which Apollonius Dyskolus ‡ and Priscian arrange logically under no less than eighteen heads. All that we shall here attempt will be to give one or two notes and suggestions, which can be amplified by each student for himself.

\* Hence even the New Testament, though it represents the spoken Greek of its day, yet being Greek written by foreigners, is comparatively poor in the use of particles.

† The attempt to translate a particle exactly leads to curious results. Dr. Cyril Jackson used always to render Τρῶες þa by ‘the Trojans, God help them!’ and a former head-master of Eton always distinguished between *σοι Sir, to you, and τοι at your service* (Coleridge, *Gk. Classic Poets*, p. 221), and the rendering of the Hebrew “*וְ*” by ‘also’ gives us a somewhat odd nexus in this verse of Canticles, i. 16, ‘Behold thou art fair, my beloved, yea, pleasant; also, our bed is green.’

‡ Egger, *Apolon. Dycs.* p. 209. On the other hand, Dionysius Thrax only recognised eight classes of conjunctions.

**297. COPULATIVE CONJUNCTIONS.**\*—καὶ = et, τε = que. In poetry we have η̄σέ, ῑσέ = atque. Often καὶ is used to mean also, even; and sometimes 'and yet,' as

σὺ Διὸς ἔφυς . . . καὶ οὐχὶ σὴ ἀδίκος and yet thy utterance is unjust!—Eur. *Hel.* 1147; cf. *Herc. F.* 296.

Occasionally καὶ nearly means 'when,' as  
ἥδη ήως διέφαινε καὶ ἐπ' ἀκρωτηρίῳ ἐγενόμεθα.—Herod. vii. 217.

ἥδη τε ἦν ὅψε . . . καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι πρύμναν ἐκρόνοντο.—Thuc. i. 50. Cf. Soph. *O. T.* 717; Herod. iii. 108; iv. 189, 181; Hebr. viii. 8.†  
καὶ ταῦτα = and that too.

μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν little or nothing (literally, 'and even nothing').

After ἵσος, ὅμοιος, ὁ αἰνός, and words of likeness generally, καὶ = 'as,' like the Latin similis et, ac; ἵσα καὶ = aequae ac.

οὐχ ὁμοίως πεποίκαστι καὶ Ὁμηρος they did not act in the same way as Homer.—Plat. *Ion*, p. 500 D.

εἴ τις καὶ ἄλλος more than any one (by Litotes).

ἄλλως τε καὶ especially.

καὶ δή well, suppose, or granted; fac ita esse.

καὶ with πῶς, &c., often expresses surprise, &c. It is used too in eager appeals, as

καὶ μοι δὸς τὴν χεῖρα 'give me then your hand.'

It often seems to connect the speaker's first words with a long train of his thoughts. One of Lord Lytton's tales begins with the word 'and'—'And the stars sat each upon his ruby throne, and looked with sleepless eyes upon the world.'—*Pilgr. of the Rhine*.

καὶ εἰ etiam si, even if; εἰ καὶ quamquam, even though (wenn auch).

Negative clauses are coordinated (united together) by οὐτε nec, οὐτε ne quidem, &c.

οὐτε followed by τε = so far from . . . that.

**298. DISJUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS.**—ἢ . . . ἢ; εἴτε . . . εἴτε.

\* The Hebrew הַ 'and' means a hook, and resembles a hook in shape.

† So in the Latin et: 'Nox media, et dominæ mihi venit epistola nostra.'—Prop. III. xiv. 1.

**299. ADVERSATIVE CONJUNCTIONS.** — *μὲν* ‘indeed,’ ‘on the one hand,’ the old neuter from *εἰς*, *μία*, *ἕν* = ‘one thing.’

δέ ‘but,’ ‘on the other hand,’ derived from *δεις* = δύο = ‘two things.’ *μὲν* is always (regularly) followed by δέ, or, less accurately, by some other adversative particle, as ἀλλά,\* *αὐ*, *μέντοι*, &c. *μήν*, δή, are lengthened forms of *μέν*, δέ.

*καίτοι* = ‘and yet,’ ‘although,’ *verum, sed tamen*. *καίπερ* ‘although’ is used with the participle; *καίτοι* with the finite verb, as *καίτοι ἄγαθὸς ήν*, *καίπερ ἄγαθὸς ἦν*.

*δμως* ‘nevertheless,’ *nihilominus*; as

ἡκουσα κάγω τηλόθεν μέν, ἀλλ' δμως I heard it from a distance, indeed, but still I heard it.†—Eur. *El.* 753.

*Dic.* ἀλλ' ἐκκυκλήθητ'. Eur. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον. *Dic.* ἀλλ' δμως.

*D.* Now do be wheeled out. *E.* Nay I can't. *D.* Nay but do!—Ar. *Ach.* 401.

κάγω σ' ἵκνοῦμαι, καὶ γυνὴ περ οὖσ' δμως and I too beseech thee, though but a woman, still!—Eur. *Or.* 671.

**300. CONJUNCTIONS OF COMPARISON.** — ὡς, ὥσπερ, ὥστε. Hom. ηὔτε.

ὡς = as, ὡς thus; but when ὡς as, follows its word it receives an accent; as λέων ὡς like a lion.

**301. TEMPORAL CONJUNCTIONS.** — ὅτε, ὥποτε quando, quum. Hom. εἴτε.

ἐπειδή, ἔως, ἔστε, ἄχρι, μέχρι, πρίν, πάρος [see Temporal Sentences, § 214 seqq.].

*avtrika immediately*, is used by Plato to mean ‘for instance.’

**302. CAUSAL CONJUNCTIONS.** — διτι, διότι, ἔνεκα, γάρ, &c. γάρ is derived from γε and ἄρα. γάρ in animated style often points to a suppressed sentence.

πῶς γάρ οὐ; of course! †

τι γάρ; how so? τι γάρ κακὸν ἐποίησε; why, what evil hath He done?

εἰ γάρ utinam.

οὐ γάρ ἀλλὰ however.

ἢ γάρ τέθνηκεν οὗτος; what! is this man dead?

\* Ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία = but some one will say, at enim.

† Compare the position of *tamen* in ‘*Perfida, sed quamvis perfida, cara tamen.*’

‡ Cf. Ital. *perchè no?*

*γάρ* also may express indignation, as

'Ατρείδη κύδιστε, φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων,  
πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθυμοι' Αχαιοί;—*Il.* i. 122.

Like the Latin *nam*, as

*Nam* quis te, juvenum confidentissime, nostras  
Jussit adire domos?—*Georg.* iv. 445 (cf. *AEn.* ii. 373).

**303. INFERENTIAL CONJUNCTIONS.**—'Αρα (Ep. ἄρ and βά) often expresses surprise, emotion, like 'it seems,' 'after all,' &c. So that the Dean (see note † p. 187) was not so far wrong when he translated Τρῶες ἄρα 'the Trojans, God help them' (*New Crat.* p. 335), as

ταῦτα ἀκούσας ὁ Κῦρος ἐπάισατο ἄρα τὸν μηρὸν when  
Cyrus heard this, he smote on his thigh.

ἴφ' οὐ

φορέως ἄρ' ἐξέπενυσας;  
by whose murderous blade *after all* you died.—*Soph.*

*Aj.* 1025.

ἡλθεν εἰ ἄρα εὐρήσει τι ἐν αἰτῷ he came if *happily* he might find anything thereon.—*Mark xi.* 13.

ω̄ παιδες, ω̄ς ἄσα ἐφλυαροῦμεν boys, how we were trifling after all!

This is like the Latin *ergo*, as in

'Ergo Quintilium perpetuus sopor urget'  
so then the sleep that knows no end is weighing down  
Quintilius!—*Hor. Od.* i. xxiv. 5.

ἄρα . . . ; = ne,

ἄρα οὐ . . . ; = nonne,

ἄρα μὴ . . . ; = num?

οὖν then, οὐκοῦν not then, οὐκοῦν therefore. In this sense the οὐκ becomes simply otiose (see § 103, and Herm. *Vig.* n. 261).

μὲν οὖν nay rather, *immo*.

τάδ' ἀν δικαιώς ήν, ὑπερδίκως μὲν οὖν this would have been justly done, *nay* more than justly.—*Aesch. Ag.* 1363.  
ἐγώ οὖν φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε do I deny it? nay on the contrary, *I assert it*.—*Plat.*

In the *Knights* of Aristophanes when Kleon proposes that Demos, the personified Great Public, should wipe his nose on—but we must leave the line untranslated, *Eq.* 910:

ἀπομυξάμενος, ω̄ Δῆμ', ἐμοῦ πρὸς τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀποψῖ.

The sausage-seller feeling that he cannot beat *that* proposal, cries out

ἐμοῦ μὲν οὖν, ἐμοῦ μὲν οὖν nay rather on mine, on mine!

## PARTICLES OF EMPHASIS.

**304.** Τέ ‘at least’ is used to modify various words; as  
 ὅς γε *quippe qui*, ‘seeing that he.’  
 ἔγωγε *equidem*, I for my part.  
 εἴ γε since.  
 γε μῆν certainly.

Often ironical, as

εὖ γε κηδεύεις πόλιν good care *you* (forsooth) take of the  
 city!  
 παῦσαι γε do cease!

The exclamation μὴ σύ γε oh do not! is often used with great pathos by Euripides, as in

μὴ δῆτα, θυμέ, μὴ σύ γ' ἐργάσῃ τάδε.—*Med.* 1056.  
 βούλει . . . ἀσχημονῆσαι τ' ἐκ νέου βραχίονος  
 σκασθεῖσ', & πεισει· μὴ σύ γ'. οὐ γάρ ἄξιον.—*Hec.* 405.

See too *Ion*, 439, 1334; *Phæn.* 531; *Iph. Aul.* 1460.

που often expresses surprise, οὔτι που ‘not, I presume;’ οὐ δήπου ‘not, I suppose;’ e.g.

πῶς; οὔτι που σῷ φασγάνψ βίου στερεῖς;—*Eur. Hel.* 95  
 [cf. 475, 541, or 1510].

οὐ τί που minantis et indignantis est, οὐ δήπου suspicantis.  
 —Stallbaum.

γοῦν at any rate.

δὴ ‘certainly:’

καὶ τότε δὴ even then; οὐτω δὴ then *at last*.

νῦν ὁρᾶτε δὴ now of course you see.

μέγιστος δὴ far the greatest [compare αἰτὸς δὴ i-dem,  
 πρὶν δὴ pri-dem, ἄγε δὴ age dum].

Often like δήπου ‘of course,’ ‘forsooth,’ with a shade of sarcasm.  
 καὶ δὴ often means *fac ita esse*; as

καὶ δὴ τεθῶσι· τις με δέξεται πόλις; well, *suppose* them  
 dead; what state then will receive me?—*Eur. Med.* 386; *Hel.* 1066.

Sometimes it implies *quid tum?* as in *Hel.* 101; *El.* 655.

βλέψον κάτω look downwards.

καὶ ἐῇ βλέπω well, I am looking—what then?

**Δῆτρα** is a lengthened form of δή; e.g.

οἰκτειρέ δ' ἡμᾶς . . . οἰκτειρέ δῆτρα but pity us—ay, do pity us.—Eur. *El.* 678.

ἴω ἴω δῆτρ' woe ! ay, woe !—Soph. *O. R.* 541.

δῆθεν 'naturally enough,' or, as they alleged, 'scilicet,' mostly in an ironical sense.—Hdt. i. 59; Thuc. i. 92.

δῆπουθεν 'I should hope.'

**μὴν** 'verily,' 'truly,' *vero*, a lengthened form of μὲν—

τί μήν; *why not?* of course; *what then?*

ἔπον μήν *do follow.*

ἀλλ' ἔστι μήν οἰκητὸς well, it *certainly is inhabited.*

καὶ μήν *enimvero*, moreover.

**μὰ** a form of adjuration, generally in negative oaths, as

οὐ μὰ Δία no by Zeus !

οὐ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον *never by this sceptre !*

**περ** a shortened form of περὶ; in its adverbial sense of 'exceedingly' it increases the force of words, like the Latin *pergratus, perque jucundus.*'

ἐάν περ even if.

ἀγαθός περ very good; compare our colloquial expression 'good all round,' and the French très, which is derived from *trans*, so that très bon = *thoroughly good* (=good throughout).

Often it comes to mean 'although,' as

γενναῖός περ ἐών *though noble, &c.*

τοι 'ay,' as

σέ τοι, σὲ κρίνω you, ay, you.—Soph. *El.* 1445.

Probably the τοι in τοιγάρ 'therefore' is derived from τῷ since it may begin a sentence, as in Soph. *Tr.* 1249; *Ant.* 594.

## INTERJECTIONS.

**305.** Interjections being, as their name implies, passionate exclamations *thrown in* to the sentence, are for the most part unsyntactical. The Greeks did not even regard them as forming separate parts of speech, but classed them with adverbs. The Roman grammarians first treated them separately. Their claim to be separately considered, and their high linguistic importance, I have vindicated elsewhere (*Chapters on*

*Language*, pp. 88–103). Their antiquity and their truthfulness have justified grammarians so eminent as Scaliger and Destutt de Tracy in regarding them as words *par excellence*.

ὦ the sign of the vocative (*ἄοθρον κλητικῆς πτώσεως*) is an interjection in all languages, and is in reality the same as ὦ the interjection (*ἐπίφρημα σχετλιασμοῦ*).

Interjections may be followed either by the causal genitive (as *οἵμοι τῶν κακῶν*); or, more rarely, by the accusative of the object.

The tragedians often have interjections *extra metrum*; i.e. they do not take them into the scansion of the line.

#### ORDER OF WORDS, &c.

**306.** A sentence is arranged in the natural order when the subject and all that belongs to it is placed first, and then the predicate with all that belongs to it, the copula being either expressed between the two, or understood, or involved in some inflection.

**307.** Thus in all languages such a sentence as

Alexander conquered Darius

is expressed in the natural order (*φυσικὴ τάξις*); and it would usually be so expressed in Greek, as

ὦ Ἀλεξάνδρος ἐνίκησε τὸν Δαρεῖον.

But owing to the *inflection* of the accusative in Greek and Latin, the order may be altered in those languages in every possible way (*πλαγιασμός*), without any modification of the sense, the subject, the verb, or the accusative being placed first, according as it is requisite to make either of them emphatic; whereas in English or French any variation of the order destroys the sense, and if it were necessary to bring Darius into prominence we should be obliged to adopt some entirely different turn of sentence, as

Darius was conquered by Alexander.

**308.** We can indeed use a rhetorical inversion in English poetry (though but rarely in prose), and often with the finest effect; as

And over them triumphant Death his dart

*Shook*, but delayed to strike.—Milton.

Under a coronet his flowing hair

In curls on either cheek *played*; wings he wore, &c.—*I.d.*

But our power of doing this is extremely limited, as must always be the case in a flexionless language; and it is impossible to read a page of Demosthenes, or Cicero, or Virgil, without seeing the immense rhetorical power which they are able to command by a mere variation in the order of construction. It is almost impossible to render in an analytical language the matchless force of such expressions as

*ἐν δὲ φάει καὶ ὀλεσσον,*

or,

*Me, me, adsum qui feci, in me convertite ferrum,  
O Rutuli!*

And although the rich and powerful vocabulary of English renders it one of the noblest of all languages, yet in harmony, precision, elasticity, variety, grace, and force, it must yield an easy victory to the Greek.

**309.** We may here mention one or two of the figures, rhetorical and idiomatic, which are of the most *constant* occurrence in Greek. It will be seen that many of them are due to that agility and acuteness of the Greek intellect which enables them readily to sacrifice the grammar of a sentence to its logic, or in other words its form to its meaning. Hence arose the many forms of the sense-figure (*σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον constructio ad sensum*); e.g.

i. When the concord is only a concord of the sense,\* as  
*φίλε τέκυον;* varium et mutabile semper Fœmina; Δώς  
τέκος ἦτε μοι αἰεῖ, &c.

ii. When the expression is shortened by the suppression of a clause or word (Brachylogy, *breviloquentia*), as

*δεινὰ βοῶν, sc. βοήματα, τύπτομαι πολλάς, sc. πληγάς.*

Of this there are several varieties, as

a. *Constructio prægnans*, where two clauses are compressed into one; as

*Φίλιππος εὑρέθη εἰς Ἀζωτον P. was carried to Azotus, and found there.*

b. *Zeugma*, where two nouns are joined to a verb, which

\* Cf. the Italian *Corsevi le sorelle*; (*each of*) the sisters ran thither.—Boccaccio.

only suits *one* of them, but *suggests* the other verb, which may often be even opposite in sense; as

*γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα, οὐ βρῶμα I gave you milk to drink,  
not meat.—1 Cor. iii. 2.*

*κωλυόντων γαμεῖν, ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων preventing from  
marriage, (ordering to) abstain from meat (where the  
positive κελευόντων is understood out of the negative  
κωλυόντων).—1 Tim. iv. 3.*

‘See Pan with flocks, with fruits Pomona crowned’  
(where from ‘crowned’ we must understand ‘sur-  
rounded’ in the first clause).—Pope.

This figure of speech is very rare in English, and illustrates more than any other the Greek quickness of apprehension.

c. *Sylylepsis*, often confounded with *Zeugma*,\* where the same word is applied to different nouns but in a different sense; as

*Ἐλεν δ' Οἰνομάου βίαν παρθένον τε σύνευνον he subdued  
the might of Oenomaus, and [won] the virgin as his  
bride.—Pind. Ol. i. 88.*

‘Quas et aquæ subeunt et aurae’ under which the waves  
and breezes flow.—Hor.

In English the chief instances are comic, as

‘This general is a greater *taker* of snuff as well as of  
towns.’—Pope.

‘And there *he left* his second leg,  
*And the forty-second foot.*’—Hood.

‘Miss Bolo went home *in* a flood of tears and a sedan-  
chair.’—Dickens.

d. *Comparatio Compendiaria*, or Brachylogy of comparison;  
as

*κομὰτ Χαρίτεσσιν ὄμοια hair like (that of) the Graces.—  
Il. xvii. 51.*

*εἶχε κέρατα δύο ὄμοια ἄρνιψ he had two horns like (those  
of) a ram.—Rev. xiii. 11.*

*πυραμὶς πατρὸς μείζων a pyramid loftier than (that of)  
his father.*

\* On the distinction between the two, see Lobeck, *ad Soph. Aj.* p. 429 seqq.

e. *Ellipsis*, the omission of a word easily understood, as  
 $\epsilon\iota\zeta \tilde{\alpha}\delta\omega\nu, \omega\zeta \beta\alpha\theta\tilde{\nu}\nu \tilde{\epsilon}\kappa\iota\mu\eta\theta\eta\zeta$  sc.  $\tilde{\nu}\pi\nu\nu$ ,  $\epsilon\zeta \kappa\tilde{o}\rho\kappa\alpha\zeta$  sc.  $\tilde{\epsilon}\rho\rho\epsilon$ ,  
 $\pi\omega\tilde{t}\rho\iota\omega\nu \psi\chi\rho\omega\nu$  sc.  $\tilde{\nu}\tilde{\delta}\alpha\tau\omega\zeta$ , calida sc. aqua, &c.

This is common in all languages, as when we say a coach *and* six (sc. horses), a bottle of port (sc. wine), to St. Paul's (sc. church), he sat on the right (sc. hand), &c.

f. *Anakoluthon*, or non-sequence; when the sentence begins with one construction, and continues in another. This is very common in Greek, which is a language eminently swayed by emotion, and one in which the syllogism of passion often supersedes and transcends the syllogism of logic. It is found in writers who adopt a naive, simple, childlike style, as Herodotus; in those profound and powerful writers whose thoughts flow more rapidly than their words, as Thucydides, Pindar, Aeschylus, and St. Paul; and in those who, like Plato, adopt the informal and easy style of common life.\*

Sometimes, α., they are common sense-constructions; sometimes, β., rhetorical; and sometimes, γ., merely due to carelessness or accident.

α.  $\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\delta}\omega\zeta\epsilon \tau\omega\zeta \tilde{\alpha}\kappa\omega\sigma\tau\omega\zeta\omega\zeta \dots \gamma\tilde{r}\alpha\psi\alpha\eta\tau\omega\zeta$ .—Acts xv. 22.†

β. Under this head fall the instances of *oratio variata*, where, for the avoidance of monotony, the phrase is altered, as

$\zeta\eta\omega\tilde{t}\omega\zeta \tau\tilde{a} \pi\kappa\omega\mu\omega\tau\omega\zeta \mu\tilde{\alpha}\ll\omega\zeta \delta\tilde{e} \tilde{\iota}\tilde{\nu}\alpha \pi\kappa\omega\phi\eta\tau\omega\zeta\eta\tilde{t}\omega\zeta$ .—1 Cor. xiv. 1;

and the frequent transition from *oratio obliqua* to *oratio recta*; as

$\pi\kappa\omega\tilde{y}\omega\tilde{e}\tilde{l}\omega\zeta \alpha\tilde{\iota}\tilde{t}\tilde{\omega}\tilde{\varphi} \mu\tilde{\eta}\tilde{\delta}\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{n}\tilde{\iota} \epsilon\tilde{\iota}\tilde{p}\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\iota}\tilde{n} \tilde{\alpha}\tilde{\lambda}\tilde{\lambda}' \tilde{\alpha}\tilde{\pi}\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\lambda}\tilde{\theta}\tilde{\omega}\tilde{\eta} \delta\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\iota}\tilde{\kappa}\tilde{\omega}\tilde{\eta}$  κ.τ.λ.  
 he bade him to tell no one, but departing shew thyself,  
 &c.—Luke v. 14; cf. Acts xxiii. 22; Ps. lxxiv. 16  
 seqq.; Virg. *Aen.* viii. 291.

This is sometimes used with fine effect in poetry, as in Milton (*Par. Lost*, iv. 721):

' Both turned, and under open sky adored  
 The God that made both sky, earth, air, and heaven . . .  
 And starry pole. *Thou also madest* the night,  
 Maker Omnipotent, and thou the day,' &c.‡

\* See Jelf, § 901.

† Cf.  $\tilde{\alpha}\kappa\omega\tilde{y}\omega\tilde{e}\tilde{l}\omega\zeta \alpha\tilde{\iota}\tilde{t}\tilde{\omega}\tilde{\varphi} \lambda\tilde{e}\tilde{y}\omega\tilde{t}\omega\zeta\omega\zeta$ , Luke viii. 20, and similar idioms in the LXX. *passim*.

‡ For similar instances see Forbiger, Virg. *Aen.* ii. 182, iii. 85.

*γ.* Careless *anakolutha* are found even in the best writers ;  
as

θεωρῶ, ὅτι μετὰ ὑβρεως . . . μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι τὸν πλοῦν.—  
Acts xxvii. 10.

'Those *who* he thought true to his party.'—Clarendon.

The sun upon the calmest sea  
Appears not half so bright as *thee*.—Prior.

*g.* *Aposiopesis*, the passionate suppression of the latter part of a sentence ; as

κἄν μὲν ποίησῃ κάρπον . . . εἰ δὲ μῆγε.—Luke xiii. 9 (for other instances see Luke xix. 42; xxii. 42; Acts xxiii. 9).

μὴ σὺ γ'.—Eur. *Hec.* 405.\*

Quos ego—sed motos præstat componere ventos.—Virg.

Compare the German *Warte*, ich will dich . . . !

'Bertrand is—what I dare not name !'—Scott.

### 310. Among other figures of speech we may mention

#### HYPERBATON,†

*verbi transgressio*, the rhetorical misplacement of a word, as

φ καὶ δεκάτην Ἀβραὰμ ἐδώκεν ἐκ τῶν ἀκροθινίων, ὁ παριάρχης to whom even Abraham gave a tithe of his first-fruits, the patriarch.—Heb. vii. 4; cf. Mark xi. 10.

Under this head we may range,

*a.* ANTIPTOSIS, the transposition of the subject from one clause to another, as

ὅν εἶδες ἄνδρα οἴτός ἐστιν . cf. Acts xxi. 16; Rom. vi. 17.

οἵδ' ἦν ἔθρεψεν Ἐρμιόνην μήτηρ ἐμή.—Eur. *Or.* 1117.

*Urbem quam statuo vestra est.*—Æn. i. 572.

*Him I accuse*

The city gates by this hath entered.—Shaksp. *Ant. and Cleop.* iii. 1.

'And God saw the light that it was good.'—Gen. i. 4.

\* See II. i. 340.

† The word which first occurs in Plato (*Protag.* p. 343 *B*) was probably borrowed from him by the scholiasts. See Weil, *De l'ordre des mots dans les langues anciennes*, p. 8.

b. CHIASMUS, when words are arranged cross-wise like the letter X, as



This is very common in Latin, where the arrangement

Ratio consentit, repugnat oratio (Cic. *de Fin.* iii. 3)

is more elegant and forcible than ratio consentit, oratio repugnat. Something like it is found in English, as

'He hath fed the hungry—the rich he hath sent empty away.'

c. HYSTERON PROTERON (*πρωθύστερον*) or Last-first, as

τὰς μὲν ἀρα θρέψασα τεκοῦσά τε.—*Od.* xii. 184.

Moriamur et in media arma ruamus.—*Virg. En.* ii. 353.

'In Africam redire atque ex Italiam decedere.'—*Cic. Cat.* iv. x. 21.

'Is your father well, the old man of whom ye spake, is he yet alive?'—*Gen. xlivi. 47.*

'I die, I faint, I fail.'—Shelley.

d. HYPALLAGE, an attraction of the adjective to a substantive with which it does not properly agree, or more generally a change of case (Enallage, as dare classibus Austros, for classem Austris).

ὄγκον ὄνόματος μητρῶν motherly boast of a name = boast of a mother's name.—*Soph. Tr.* 817.

Nec purpurarum sidere clarior  
Delenit usus.—*Hor.*

'Holy and humble men of heart' = men of holy and humble hearts. Cf. *Isaiah*.

### 311.

### EUPHEMISM,

the principle of avoiding all strong or unpleasant forms of expression. This tendency has exerted a most powerful influence over the Greek language,\* and leads to the use of such

---

\* In fact euphemism is woven into the very structure of Greek, and explains many of its words and idioms. Hence *τί* with the optative for a polite imperative, and an indirect future; the use of the optative as the most indirect mood in wishes; the use of the indefinite *τις* for a personal

terms as *ἴάντι πάθη* for ‘if he die,’ *εἰνήθης* for ‘silly,’ *οἰκημα* for ‘prison,’ &c. We may range under this head

a. IRONY (*χλευασμός* very different from the Greek *εἰρωνεία* of which the style of Plato is so perfect an example), Persiflage (*χαριεντισμός*), complimentary expressions (*ἀστεϊσμός*), &c., which need no special illustration.

b. HYPOCORISMA, the use of exaggerated terms of endearment, and the veiling over of that which is disagreeable or vicious by specious glosses (see *Chapters on Language*, pp. 281, 282).

c. LITOTES (smoothness), the suggestion of a strong notion by the use of an over-weak form of speech, as

*οὐ πάντα = omnino non, οὐχ ἥκιστα = μάλιστα.\**

*οὐδέποτε κέ μίν τις  
Γηθήσειεν ιδών.—Π.*

*Illaudati Busiridis aras.—Virg. Georg. iii. 5.*

‘Shall I praise you for those things? I *praise you not.*’

‘Narcissa’s nature *tolerably mild*

To make a wash would *hardly stew a child.*’—Pope.

d. ANTIPHRASIS, the suggestion of a word by the use of its opposite, as

*εὐώνυμος* and *ἀριστερός* for the ill-omened *left.*

e. AMBIGUITY, the use of a formula to dismiss an unpleasant subject; † as

*ὅ γέγραφα γέγραφα* what I have written I have written  
(cf. ‘If I perish, I perish;’ ‘If I be bereaved of my  
children, I am bereaved,’ &c.)—*O. T.* 1876, &c.

He is that he is, I may not breathe my censure.—*Othello.*

Among other figures we may briefly mention

### 312.

#### PLEONASM,

or the use of words apparently superfluous, as in

*πόλεμον πολεμεῖν, μεγέθει μέγας, πανύστατον δὴ κοῦποτ'*

pronoun (as in English ‘one’ ‘it’s enough to enrage one,’ &c.). See *Chapters on Language*, p. 278.

\* This particular use of the negative, as when we say of a poor man ‘he’s not rich,’ of a short man *οὐ μέγας*, &c. is called Meiosis.

† Hanc formulam et similes adhibent ii qui rem clarius exponere aut nolunt, aut nequeunt.—Seidler.

αὐθεὶς αὐτὸς πάλιν, ἐφη λέγων, cursim currere, ‘we have seen with our eyes,’ &c.\*

This is an important tendency in language, and admits of a very wide range of illustration, which cannot here be given. Under this head we may range two out of many rhetorical figures (such as Epanaphora, Anadiplosis, Palillogia, &c.), e.g.

a. PERIPHRAESIS, or circumlocution ; as

μέγα χρῆμα συός,† βίη Ἡρακλῆος, σθένος Ἐκτορος, ιερὴ οἰς Τηλεμάχου, κ.τ.λ.

Compare :

‘When once *the service of the fort* is gangrened.’—Shaksp.

Milton—

‘where the *might* of Gabriel fought  
And with fierce ensigns pierced the deep array  
Of Moloch, furious king.’—*Par. Lost*, vi. 345.

and Gibbon—

‘*The youth and inexperience of the prince* declined a perilous encounter.’

and Schiller—

‘Zu Aachen in seiner Kaiserpracht,  
Im alterthümlichen Saale,  
Sass *König Rudolph's heilige Macht*  
Beim festlichen Königsmahle.’

*Der Graf von Hapsburg.*

\* ‘Pistol. He hears with his ears.

Sir Hugh. The devil and his tam ! what phrase is this, “He hears with ear?” Why it is affectations.’—Shaksp. *Merry Wives of Windsor*, I. i.

Lobeck has treated the subject with his usual exhaustive learning, *Paralip. Gram. Græc.* 61 seqq. and *Dissert.* 8; and on *Aj.* v. 140, 866; see too *Id.* pp. 181–185. It is a special characteristic of immaturity, and therefore of children; hence it is very common in *colloquial* usages, and in infant literatures. One very common form of pleonasm, especially in the tragedians, is the repetition of a participle after the principal verb; e.g. κτείνει Κρίστοντα καὶ κταγάντι δρχει χθονός.—Eur. *Herc.* F. 33. Cf. *Hec.* 25, *Phæn.* 22, &c. There is an instance of pleonasm in Pope's *Odyssey*, which Lord Macaulay used to call ‘the very worst line in the English language,’ viz.:

‘To the rock he clung  
And stuck adherent, and suspended hung !’

See *Origin of Language*, p. 168.

† See Bernhardy, *Griech. Syntax*, S. 52.

b. POLYPTOTON, the collocation of different cases or tenses of the same word, as

*δόσιν κακὰν κακῶν κακοῖς*.—Æsch. *Pers.* 1035.

Clipeus clipeis, umbone repellitur umbo,  
Ense minax ensis, pede pes, et cuspide cuspis.—Stat.  
Dart follows dart, lance lance.—Byron.

Alive they shall not take him; not they alive, him alive.  
—Carlyle, *French Rev.* i. 282.

## 313.

## HENDIADYS,

the use of two nouns to convey one notion, as

*βορὰ καὶ λεῖαν* = plundered booty.—Soph. *Aj.* 145.

Pateris libamus et auro = with golden cups.—Virg.

See Lobeck *ad loc.* p. 112. He distinguishes four kinds of hendiadys:

1. Where the second word is explanatory, as

*πυρὶ καὶ στεροπαῖς* ‘with lightning flames.’

2. Where the dependent notion precedes, as

*αἷμα καὶ σταλαγμὸν* ‘a drop of blood.’

3. Where two entire synonyms are united, as

*λῆγε βωῶν καὶ παῖς* (compare ‘I am a widow woman, and my husband is dead,’ 2 Sam. xiv. 5).

4. When words of similar origin are joined, as

*στροβεῖ καὶ στρέφεται*.

## 314.

## ASYNDETTON,

the omission of conjunctions, as Abiit, evasit, excessit, eruptit. There is a fine instance in Eur. *Hipp.* 352, expressive of the most violent emotion. Many epithets are often thus joined (*πύργωσις ἐπιθέτων*), as in Homer’s *Il.* xi. 32 : \*

*ἀμφιβρότην πολυδαιδαλον ἀσπίδα θοῦριν καλήν.*

To us we find in Shakspeare—

Unhoused, unanointed, unanealed.

\* In Æschylus we have six epithets to one noun, *Ag.* 155, *μίμησ* φοβιζά παλινορτος, οίκονόμος, δολία, μνάμων μῆνις τεκνόπονος.

and Milton—

Among innumerable false, unmoved,  
Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified,  
His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal.—*P. L.* v. 501.

## 315.

## PARONOMASIA,\*

the juxtaposition of words of similar sound, which is especially frequent in proverbs, and proverbial expressions, as

*παθήματα μαθήματα*, bear and forbear, changes and chances, giving and forgiving, &c.

In Rom. i. 29, 31 we have *πορνείᾳ πονηρίᾳ, φθόνου φόνου, ἀσυνέτους ἀσυνθέτους*.

'Quam *ferus* et vere *ferreus* ille fuit.'—Tibullus.  
'Fear the fierceness of the boy.'—Ben Jonson.

Under this head fall the numerous plays on names and words † found in writers of every age and every language; and under the same general division fall such figures as,

a. ΟΝΟΜΑΤΟΡΕΙΑ, the imitation of the sense by the sound; whether in words, as *τήνελλα* the sound of a harpstring, *taratantara* the blast of a trumpet, &c., or in lines, as

*δεινὴ δὲ κλαγγὴ γένετ' ὄργύρεοι βιωῖ* (of a twanged bow-string).

*πολλὰ δὲ ἄναντα, κάταντα, πάραντα τε, δόχμιά τ' ἡλθον* (of galloping horses).

Quamquam sunt sub aquâ sub aquâ malacipere tentant  
(of the croaking of frogs).—Ovid.

*Quadrupedante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum.*—  
Virg.

'Shocked like an iron-clanging anvil banged  
With hammers.'—Tennyson, *The Princess*.

\* This subject is treated at some length (being a very important one in the history of language) in *Chapters on Language*, p. 265.

† It is particularly common in Tennyson; as,

'Every soldier waits  
*Hungry* for honour, *angry* for his king.'

'the sea-wind sang  
*Shrill, chill* with flakes of foam.'

'To break my chain, to shake my mane.'

Und es wallet, und siedet, und brauset, und zischt,  
 Wie wenn Wasser mit Feuer sich mengt,  
 Bis zum Himmel spritzet der ~~schäumende~~ Gischte, &c.  
 Schiller, *Der Taucher*.

This figure abounds in the best poets of every age.\*

*b. ALLITERATION*, as

Σῶσος καὶ Σωσὼν Σωτείρη τῆνδ' ἀνέθηκαν  
 Σῶσος μὲν σωθεὶς Σωσὼν δ' ὅτι Σῶσος ἐσώθη.—Simonides.  
 'O Tite, tute, Tati, tibi tanta, tyranne, tulisti.'—Ennius.

'Alliteration adds its artful aid' very commonly in our own poets, and is, as *alternate alliteration*, used very subtly in the following examples :

Her dainty limbs *did lay*.—Spenser.

His heavy-shotted hammock-shroud.—Tennyson.

*c. OXYMORON* is the juxtaposition of opposite words, as

γάμος ἄγαμος, χάρις ἀχαρις.

Funera ne-funera 'living deaths' (Catull. lxiv. 83),  
 splendide mendax, &c., † insaniens sapientia, impietate  
 pia est (Ov.), strenua nos exercet inertia (Hor.)

'His honour rooted in dishonour stood,  
 And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true.'

Tennyson's *Idylls*, p. 192.

'Shall make the name of Danton *famous infamous* in  
 every land.—Carlyle.

*d. ANTITHESIS*, the contrast of opposite conceptions, as

Infelix Dido, nulli bene nupta marito,

Hoc fugiente peris, hoc pereunte fugis.—Auson.

The παρὰ γράμμα σκῶμμα or sudden pun, so frequent in Aristophanes; as

ἐκ κυμάτων γὰρ αὖθις αὖ γαλῆνυ δρῶ.‡

'Here the first {<sup>r</sup><sub>n</sub>} oses of the year shall blow.'

\* It is a principle of immense importance. See *Origin of Language*, chap. iv.; *Chapters on Language*, p. 168, and *passim*.

† Hor. *Od.* iii. xi. 35; cf. i. xxxiv. 2, iii. xvi. 28.

‡ The line in Euripides ran γαλῆνυ=γαληνά 'calm' 'after storm I see a calm,' but the actor did not pronounce so as to allow for the elision, and it became a standing joke at Athens—'out of the waves I see—a weasel!' Cf. *Orest.* 279.

The σκῆμμα τὰρ προδοκίαν corresponds in some measure to the ‘pleasantry by surprise’ of the (miscalled) Augustan age of English literature; as

ἴστειχε δὲ ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσοὶ . . . χιμετλα he was walking,  
having under his feet—chilblains.—Ap. Arist. *Rhet.*  
iii. 6.

‘Where thou, great Anna, whom three realms obey,  
Dost sometimes counsel take, and sometimes—tea !’

Pope.

e. RHYME. The secret of the pleasurableness of Rhyme was not unknown to the ancients, and it is found in many passages, as

Ἡύτε ἔθυε εἰσὶ μελισσάνων δόδυνάνων,  
Πέτρης ἐκ γλαφυρῆς αἰεὶ νέον ἐρχομενάνων.—Hom. *Il.* ii. 87.  
Cælum nitescere, arboreæ frondescere,  
Vites lætifice pampinis pubescere,  
Rami baccarum ubertate incurvescere.

Ap. Cic. *Tusc. Quæst.* I. 69.

f. RHYTHMS. Occasionally an accidental verse, or a sentence with the cadence of a verse, occurs in good writers, but this is as much a defect as the blank-verse style of English prose.

πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον.—James i. 17.  
καὶ τροχίας ὄρθας ποιήσατε τοῖς ποσὶν ὑμῶν.—Heb. xii. 13.  
Auguris patrum et priscâ formidine sacram.— Tac.  
*Germ.* 39.

Urbem Romam a principio reges habuere.— Tac. *Ann.* c. 1.  
Cnæi Pompeii veteres fidosque clientes.— Sall. *Cat.* 19.

It will be readily understood that many figures of speech are here designedly passed over as of secondary importance, but the subject is one which will bear examination, and is essential to the study of language as illustrating psychological tendencies.

FINIS.

*Works by the same Author.*

---

	<i>s. d.</i>
ERIC; or, Little by Little. 8th Edition. ....	5 0
ST. WINIFRED'S; or, The World of School. 3rd Edition.....	6 6
THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE. 8vo. 1860. ....	4 6
CHAPTERS ON LANGUAGE. 1865. ....	6 6
GREEK GRAMMAR RULES, drawn up for the use of Harrow School. 4th Edition. 1866.....	1 6

